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ABSTRACT 
It seems a logical assumption that as the nexus between interstate and intrastate 
conflict is inherently linked in a larger strategic calculus, so too should be the 
theoretical and conceptual foundations, and practical application, of apposite conflict 
prevention efforts. This thesis examines conflict prevention efforts towards each of 
the three phases of the Macedonian case, with those phases identified as the pre-
Kosovo phase, Kosovo Intervention phase and post-Kosovo phase. It analyzes the 
dyadic nexus between interstate and intrastate conflict prevention as it relates to a 
strategy of simultaneity and connectivity as regards implementation of conflict 
prevention efforts by the international community. A strategy of simultaneity and 
connectivity is characterized as the process of advocating and pursuing policies to 
inhibit or mitigate the occurrence of interstate and intrastate conflict that are 
associated and conjoined in a concurrent and synchronous manner. This study finds 
evidence of support for the hypothesis of a direct correlation between the application 
of international community efforts targeted toward a nexus of interstate and 
intrastate conflict prevention, through a strategy of simultaneity and connectivity, 
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Chapter 1: Terminological and 
Methodological Perspectives 
The deliberation of conflict has been with us ever since the writings of Plato, 
Aristotle, Thucydides, Machiavelli, Augustine, Aquinas, Grotius, Hobbes, Kant. and 
abundant other great minds over the centuries. However, it is only in the twentieth 
century the study of conflict has become a field in its own right (Schellenberg 1996, 
1). With the conclusion of the Cold War came diverse perspectives regarding the 
future as it pertained to peace, conflict, and the world at large. Fukuyama (1989, 6) 
proclaimed the world had reached the "end of history as such: that is, the endpoint of 
mankind's ideological evolution and the universalization of Western liberal 
democracy as the final form of human government". In a similar vein, Mueller 
argued, ''war among developed countries has gradually moved toward terminal 
disrepute because of its perceived repulsiveness and futility" (1989, 20) and that 
''war may be a social affliction, but in important respects it is also a social affectation 
that can be shrugged off' (1989, 29). Huntington queried what he termed the 
"end ism" arguments ofFukuyama and Mueller in their failure to address reality as a 
consequence of two innate fallacies. Endism "overemphasizes the predictability of 
history and the permanence of the moment. and tends to ignore the weakness and 
irrationality of human nature" (1989). At the converse end of the spectrum was 
Mearsheimer (1990, 45) who, in pure realist tradition, reasoned the prospect of 
major crises, even wars, in Europe was likely to increase dramatically as the Cold 
War receded into history. Regardless of myriad prophecies, the fact remains that the 
post-Cold War era continues to be fraught with wars and endemic violence. 
Within the sphere of political science and international relations the post-Cold 
War age seems to have brought into vogue another specialist field for academic 
endeavor, research, and debate, that being conflict prevention. The basis of conflict 
prevention ideals date from the height of the Cold War, and is intertwined with 
deterrence theory. The genesis of this specialist field came in June 1960 when 
Secretary General Dag Hammarskjoeld coined the term ''preventive diplomacy" in 
his United Nations Annual Report, referring to United Nations efforts aimed at 
keeping newly arising local disputes out of bloc differences that could evolve into 
wider confrontations between the two superpowers (United Nations General 
Assembly 1960, 4). Thirty-two years later, in October 1992, Secretary-General 
Boutros Boutros-Ghali broadened and publicized the term by devoting a chapter to 
preventive diplomacy in his "Agenda for Peace" report (Lund 1996, 4). While 
Hammarskjoeld concentrated on preventing possible conflict between the two 
superpowers, and not preventing conflict altogether, Boutros-Ghali focused his 
policies on the post Cold-War aspirations of preventing disputes from escalating to 
armed conflict and spreading to other countries or regions. This came 
simultaneously with the realization that the conclusion of the Cold War was not 
going to result in the era of peace and global harmony that had been hoped for and 
envisaged. Instead, the world witnessed an increase in conflicts and humanitarian 
crises, and a shift in focus from interstate wars and ideologically oriented civil 
movements toward a more multifaceted range of conflicts and catastrophes, 
encompassing such phenomena as intrastate conflict, ethnopolitical conflict, 
genocide and gross human rights violations, refugee flows and internal displacement, 
state failure, political instability, arms flows, food crises, and environmental conflict 
(Davies and Gurr 1998, 1). With this increase and shift came failed and/or costly 
attempts at conflict resolution and peacekeeping in places such as Angola, Liberia, 
Somalia, Bosnia, Chechnya, Rwanda, Nogorno-Karabakh, and the Congo, as well as 
apparent successes in the Baltics and Macedonia (JentIeson 2000, 4). The natural 
progression was to a newfound emphasis on conflict prevention, preventive 
diplomacy, and early warning rather than conflict resolution. 
Whereas there have been prominent cases where conflict prevention has failed, 
there have also been cases of acclaimed success. However, a specific preventive 
case might be termed a success in relation to the level and dimension to which it was 
applied, but fail in prevention of conflict in the long run. As Miall (200 I, 2) 
comments, "non-occurrence of violence in a particular time period clearly cannot 
predict future non-occurrence". Miall, Ramsbotham and W oodhouse, (1999, 127) 
have broken success into the phases of light and deep prevention, where light 
prevention is targeted towards the proximate causes of conflict and deep prevention 
is projected towards the more latent, or underlying, causes of conflict. Success 
within light prevention is defined as the aversion of armed conflict, while failure is 
described as armed conflict. For deep prevention, success is peaceful change and 
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failure is a conflict-prone situation. Consequently, it is possible to avert anned 
conflict through light prevention, thereby achieving success, but enter or remain in a 
conflict prone situation, thus failing through deep prevention. Is any conflict ever 
really solved or prevented, or is success in conflict prevention merely a transitory 
period amid other conflicts and stages? This question is particularly valid in light of 
the multidimensional and multilevel aspects of conflict prevention. Though 
simplistic at best, this assists in illustrating the difficulty of defining success 
respective of temporal periods and relative to the dimension and level of conflict 
prevention efforts. 
One of the most acclaimed cases of success to date has been that of Macedonia 
(Ackermann 2000; Burg 1998; Jentleson 1996,2000; Lund 1999). However, there 
are some who assert the Macedonian case was not as comprehensive ofa success as 
others have claimed. For instance, Ackermann (2000, 179) writes of conflict 
prevention success in Macedonia until the destabilizing effects of the Kosovo 
conflict. Leatherman et al., (1999, 176-177) also refer to the idea of success until 
problems escalate to the level where international resources and capabilities are no 
longer a match for the dimensions and complexities of the problems. Most literature 
on conflict prevention in Macedonia, however, was written prior to the Kosovo 
intervention; and what has been written afterwards has concentrated predominantly 
on Kosovo as the primary focus, with Macedonia as a peripheral element. It is as if 
conflict prevention in Macedonia was declared a success at a certain point in time 
and any failings thereafter were deemed a result of the tertiary effects of Kosovo. 
Yet, the ethnic conflict of2001 indicates results other than complete success in the 
Macedonian case. 
The central and overarching question this study addresses is why do some conflict 
prevention efforts succeed where others fail? Within that context, the specific 
question examined is what is the relationship, if any, concerning the appliance of 
interstate and intrastate conflict prevention fundamentals, as they relate to overall 
success. 
This study takes a two-level approach to conflict prevention, that of interstate and 
that of intrastate. The first independent variable is the level of interstate conflict 
prevention efforts, defined as the degree to which the international community 
advocates and pursues policies to inhibit or mitigate the occurrence of interstate 
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conflict. These policies come from a "toolbox" of possible conflict prevention 
actions designed to promote effective international regimes, stable and viable 
countries, and create a secure environment by providing the necessary security for 
government to function. 
On the other hand, the second independent variable is the level of intrastate 
conflict prevention efforts, defined as the degree to which the international 
community advocates and pursues actions designed to inhibit or mitigate the 
occurrence of intrastate conflict. Also coming from the conflict prevention 
''toolbox'' of possible actions, these efforts are designed to promote and establish 
political systems characterized by representative government, open economies with 
social safety nets enabling socioeconomic and humanitarian needs to be met, and 
egalitarian justice systems. In both instances the international community is defined 
as states and/or collective groupings of states such as the United Nations (UN), the 
European Union (EU), the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the 
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). While Non-
Governmental Organization involvement is a significant component of the conflict 
prevention process, decisions at the international level regarding sanctions, actions, 
and will are ultimately determined at the level of the state, or collective 
combinations of states. 
The confluence ofthese two variables determines this study's dependent variable: 
the level of conflict prevention effectiveness, defined as the degree to which the 
international community has created an environment for conflict to be prevented by 
advocating and pursuing actions designed to inhibit or mitigate the occurrence of 
interstate and intrastate conflict through a strategy of simultaneity and connectivity. 
It will be argued that it is this critical and very delicate nexus between interstate and 
intrastate conflict prevention that is ultimately responsible for success or failure. In 
the remainder of this chapter, I elaborate on conceptual, definitional, and 
methodological aspects that provide the context and framing for this study, and 
present the ensuing structure of the analysis. 
Viability and Efficacy 
Conflict prevention is essential and applicable in theory but nearly always the 
prevention comes too late, especially since there are no international or supranational 
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mechanisms available to oblige opposing parties to separate (Rotberg 1996, 264). 
At least this is one of the more frequent critiques of conflict prevention efforts, if 
and when they are finally attempted. Brown and Rosecrance (1999, 226-228) offer 
three mainstream arguments for inaction in that the interests of international powers 
are not engaged by conflicts in far-off lands, it is difficult to predict where conflicts 
will break out, and the international community lacks the capacity to engage in large 
numbers of conflict prevention efforts. Three counterarguments are then swiftly 
provided where local conflicts almost always have important regional ramifications, 
timely warning of impending conflict is usually available, and while it is true the 
international community cannot become involved in all and sundry conflict, it does 
not follow that prevention efforts cannot occur anywhere at all. In view of the 
counterarguments, five domestic political considerations, or fears, are proposed that 
inhibit international power involvement. The domestic political inhibitors to action 
are: international actions will lack public support, economic cost will be too high, 
military operations will result in casualties, open-ended commitments in far-off 
lands should be avoided, and basic fear of failure for obvious domestic political 
purposes. Each of these inhibitors, though, may likewise be considered unfounded 
with respect to conflict prevention. 
While linkage of domestic political factors to foreign policy decision-making 
persists, prudence should be employed to ensure this linkage does not subsume 
conflict prevention decisions. In the end, timely implementation of conflict 
prevention efforts will most likely be a comparatively low-cost, low-risk undertaking 
(Brown and Rosecrance 1999,229). Brown and Rosecrance (1999) conduct a cost-
effective analysis of conflict prevention, as opposed to conflict, utilizing three 
dissimilar methodological approaches, by investigating Bosnia, Rwanda, Somalia, 
Haiti, Kuwait, Macedonia, Slovakia, Cambodia, and El Salvador. They conclude 
that in every case conflict prevention is more cost effective methodologically, and 
quite persuasive politically. 
The Aspen Institute (1996) hosted an international conference on conflict 
prevention strategies, which drew scholars and leaders from 22 countries. The focal 
point for the Institute was the question of how conditions can be created in which the 
naturally occurring competition for power, resources, and prestige within and 
between societies can be kept peaceful and prevented from plunging into a spiral of 
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violence. In-depth discussion and analysis of conflict in the post-Cold War period, 
the key challenges and key players in conflict prevention, and key recommended 
actions brought unanimous and resounding support to the viability and efficacy of 
conflict prevention. 
While the skeptical view is that governments are guided by domestic political 
considerations and will therefore only pay lip service to conflict prevention, except 
when their self-determined vital interests are threatened, a more optimistic view is 
that leaders and the public will understand conflict prevention is in the common 
national interest. Here. a common national interest must take into account moral 
concerns, increasing interdependence, the greater cost in terms ofthe number of 
dead, the scale of international effort ultimately required, and harm to international 
principle resulting from delaying actions until an emergency develops. The 
emerging consensus from the Aspen Institute Conference on Conflict Prevention was 
that conflict prevention must be given high priority on the international agenda, 
including individual states, the G-7. the UN Secretary General, the UN Security 
Council and the UN system as a whole, and international financial institutions 
(Aspen Institute 1996, 9). Without such responses, the cost of actions necessary to 
react effectively to conflicts after they develop is likely to be a good deal greater in 
terms of both the ultimate financial burden and the international instability that will 
prove inimical to the interests of the international collective good. 
In May of 1994, the Camegie Corporation of New York established the Camegie 
Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict with the task at hand of addressing the 
loom ing threats to world peace and to advance new ideas for the prevention and 
resolution of deadly conflict. The Commission consisted of 16 international leaders 
and scholars with widespread experience and groundbreaking accomplishments in 
conflict prevention, and an international advisory council of 42 eminent practitioners 
and academics. They spent three years examining the principal causes of deadly 
ethnic, nationalist, and religious conflicts within and between states and the 
circumstances that foster their outbreak. Their task, with respect to a long term, 
global perspective of violent conflict, was to ascertain the viable and efficacious 
requirements of a system for preventing mass violence and to identifY the ways in 
which such a system could be implemented. 
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The Commission readily admitted that preventing the world's deadly conflicts 
would be a highly complex undertaking requiring a concerted effort by a wide range 
of actors. Conflict prevention will never be an unproblematic. naturally occurring, 
or inexpensive prescription for the blight of mass violence; however, with concerted 
early action and deliberate operational steps. prevention is possible. Similarly. the 
costs are miniscule compared to the cost of conflict and the rebuilding and 
psychological healing in its aftermath (Carnegie Commission 1997. 9). The 
Commission is steadfast in its belief that preventing deadly conflict serves the most 
vital human interest, that of survival, and any effort to promote the norms of 
tolerance. and social equity is valuable in its own right. However, bear in mind that 
in addition to the moral value of conflict prevention lays the practicality of peace and 
cooperation breeding security and prosperity. 
The final evaluation of conflict prevention, in the view of the Commission, is that 
although war. domination, and conflict have been recurrent features of human 
history. mass violence and/or deadly conflict does not, thus should not, have to be a 
fact of life. War, mass violence, and deadly conflict usually result from initial 
deliberate political calculations and decisions and are not inevitable (Carnegie 
Commission 1997, 3). Bearing in mind that those of the realist and neorealist 
perspective would vehemently counter the previous conclusion of the Carnegie 
Commission, the predominance of conflict prevention theory is in agreement that 
conflict is not inevitable and may be prevented. 
Jentleson (200080 6) feels the bona fide question of the viability of conflict 
prevention is rooted in the broader debate over the principal sources of post-Cold 
War conflicts. principally ethnic conflicts. In essence. this is the methodological 
deliberation concerning primordialism versus instrumentalism. If the primordialist 
hypothesis were undeniable, then it would indeed be problematical to retain much 
optimism in conflict prevention. However. as Lake and Rothchild (1998.5) reason. 
the primordialist methodology "founders on its inability to explain the emergence of 
new and transformed identities or account for the long periods in which either 
ethnicity is not a salient political characteristic or relations between ethnic groups are 
comparatively peaceful". Jentleson (200080 7) is of the opinion the dominant 
dynamic is not the playing out of historical determinism. but rather the consequences 
of calculations by parties to the confl ict of the purposes served by political violence. 
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By focusing the analysis on forces and factors that intensify and activate the 
dispositions as shaped by history, into actions and policies reflecting conscious and 
deliberate choices for conflict. conflict prevention thereby becomes a viable means. 
Other basic critiques of conflict prevention addressed by Jentleson (2000a, 8-10) 
revolve around the basic perception of high risk and low interest. Based on the 
threat of contagion or diffusion, and the fact that inaction in point of fact has its own 
associated costs with respect to compelling the cessation of violence and rebuilding 
devastated societies, reality dictates the high risk-low interest perception needs to be 
inversed. A further point made regarding interests is that world powers have a world 
order interest that goes beyond strict national security interests. 
Jentleson (2000a) conducted a multi-case comparative analysis ofChechnya, 
Nagorno-Karabakh, the Baltics (Estonia and Latvia), Ukraine, Croatia, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Macedonia, Somalia, Rwanda, the Congo, and Korea (1993-94 nuclear 
crisis) in order to identify conflict prevention patterns, general conceptual 
formulations, middle-range theories and policy lessons. Jentleson's fundamental 
conclusion is that although more development, refinement, elaboration, 
modification, adaptation, and extension are needed, the core ideas of conflict 
prevention are compelling and sound (2000b, 348). He asserts one must act early to 
stop disputes from escalating, reduce tensions that could lead to war, and to deal 
with today's conflicts before they become tomorrow's crises. 
Whereas each of the above deliberations addresses the issue from a different 
perspective, there is evident concurrence regarding the viability and efficacy of 
conflict prevention. Granted, much work is required in the form of forthcoming 
research in order to refine and validate hypotheses for future policy prescription, 
nevertheless there is evident agreement that conflict prevention is a promising 
endeavor. As lentIeson (1996, 315) concluded, while conflict prevention is possible, 
it is also both difficult and necessary. In that vein, the principal ambition of this 
work is to add to the theory refinement process by identifying and testing the 
criticality of a nexus between interstate and intrastate conflict prevention, 
implemented through a strategy of simultaneity and connectivity, as it relates to the 
successful application of conflict prevention efforts. 
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1.2. Terminological Delineation 
A major quandary concerning conflict prevention literature is the contemporary 
use of dissimilar terminology for a single concept, and likewise the use of analogous 
vocabulary in a diverse mode. The terminology perplexity is frequently dependent 
on the major field in which the author is resident. As Deutsch (1991, 26) explains, 
"The plethora of scholars writing about conflict from different disciplinary 
backgrounds and focusing on different types of disputes has given the study of 
conflict a fragmented appearance". For instance, Nicholson (1991,59) articulates 
that "conflict exists when two or more parties have opposed views about how some 
social situation should be organized", and "conflict resolution is the process of 
facilitating a solution where the actors no longer feel the need to indulge in conflict 
activity and feel that the distribution of benefits in the social system is acceptable". 
Burton (1997, 150) writes about conflict resolution and avoidance; Wallensteen 
(1991, 129-130) discusses conflict transformation, conflict resolution, and conflict 
termination; and Galtung (1996, 9) considers conflict transformation a component of 
peace studies. 
Jabri (1996, 11) clarifies the difference between conflict research and peace 
research as "a dichotomy whereby the hard core of conflict research is rational actor 
decision-making, while the hard core of peace research looks to structures which 
perpetuate domination and dependency". Schellenberg (1996, 10) refines this 
definition by explaining that ''peace studies (or peace and conflict studies, or peace 
science) is frequently applied to the work of scholars who operate at the broader 
levels of conflict studies" such as "relations between national states", while "those 
who work at the micro level often identify their field by the term conflict 
resolution". Lund (1996, 40) then distinguishes between the "P" series 
(peacemaking, peacekeeping, peace enforcement, preventive diplomacy, etc.) and 
the "C" series (conflict management, conflict termination, conflict mitigation, 
conflict prevention, etc.) by stating the "P" series is generally employed in 
discussions with the United Nations, while the "C" series is generally preferred in 
academic literature. Lund prefers the term preventive diplomacy, Leatherman et a1. 
(1999, 99) prefer conflict prevention, and Ackermann (2000, 5) avows conflict 
prevention is more commonly known as preventive diplomacy. Meanwhile, more 
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specialized verbiage, such as ethnopolitical conflict (Gurr 2000, 65), has entered the 
academic discourse. 
It is manifest that with all these clarifying definitions, clarity and understanding is 
emphatically not the resultant state. It is imperative for the purposes ofthis study to 
unwnbiguously define the terminology so as to preclude confusion in the manner in 
which said terminology will be employed. Agreeing with Lund, I confine my terms 
to the "c" series as the expressions preventive diplomacy, preventive deployment, 
peacemaking, peace enforcement, peace-keeping, and post-conflict peace-building 
were applied by Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali (1992) as the foundation 
of his "Agenda for Peace" report to the United Nations Security Council, and as an 
operational conduit for ensuing United Nations Peace Operations. Consequently, as 
related to this work, I define the terminology to be utilized in the following manner. 
Conflict is a situation in which conflicting interests between two or more 
organized actors, not necessarily states, have led, or have a significant possibility of 
leading, to the threat or use of armed force (Lucarelli 1999). This includes 
traditional interstate conflict and the more contemporary intrastate, or ethnopolitical, 
conflict. 
Crisis Management refers to efforts to manage tensions and disputes that are so 
intense as to have reached the level of confrontation, usually involving threats of 
force and its deployment, from breaking into armed violence (Lund 1996, 42). 
Conflict Management is the action to limit and contain the diffusion, contagion or 
escalation of armed force or violence (Leatherman et a11999, 99; Miall et a11999, 
21) 
Conflict Mitigation conveys the utilization of a third party threat or use of force to 
impose a cessation of hostilities, not always with the consent of the conflicting 
parties (Crocker et a12001, xxviii). 
Conflict Termination refers to those efforts or actions designed to facilitate and 
maintain a cessation of armed hostilities (Lund and West 1997). 
Conflict Resolution is the deterrence of armed hostilities re-emergence by 
disarmwnent, restoration of order, refugee repatriation (Boutros-Ghali 1992), and 
addressing the conditions that led to the dispute and building or strengthening the 
institutions and processes through which the parties interact (Lund and West 1997), 
including the (re )establishment of democratic institutions (Lucarelli 1999). The 
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ultimate objective is a self-supporting society, acceptable to aH, without coercion of 
any form. 
Ethnic Groups are people who share a distinctive and enduring collective identity 
based on a belief in common descent and on shared experiences and cultural traits 
(Gurr 2000,5). 
Ethnopolitica/ Groups are ethnic groups whose ethnicity has political 
consequences, resulting either in different treatment of group members or in political 
action on behalf of group interests (Gurr 2000, 5). 
Ethnopolitica/ Conflict is conflict in which a national or minority group makes 
claims against the state or against other political actors (Gurr 2000,65). 
Conflict Prevention as a field can be conceived as a rich set of activities, aH of 
which aim at preventing the development of conflict, and its management, 
mitigation, termination, and resolution when it does manifest itself (Lucarelli 1999). 
Ambiguity may exist, though, as the term conflict prevention may specifically 
address those actions aimed at preventing violence before it has broken out or 
become widespread, or those actions taken during the post-conflict phase to avoid its 
recurrence (Ackermann 2000, 29; Lund and West 1997). Consequently, attention to 
detail must be paramount when employing the term conflict prevention so as to 
properly distinguish contextual usage. 
For the purposes ofthis study, unless specifically stated otherwise, the term 
conflict prevention, as it relates to a stage within the Iifecycle of a conflict, shaH 
refer to actions, policies, procedures or institutions utilized in vulnerable places and 
times to avoid the threat or use of armed force and related forms of coercion by 
states or groups, in order to settle the political disputes that can arise from the 
destabilizing effects of economic, social, political, and international change, targeted 
at preventing violence before it has broken out or become widespread (Ackermann 
2000, 19; Lund 1996, 37). This can be accomplished by the international 
community advocating and pursuing policies to inhibit or mitigate the occurrence of 
violence in accordance with the articles of the Charter of the United Nations, 
including Chapter VI and Chapter VII, short of the use of offensive measures. White 
the threat or use ofmilitary force is deemed an adequate, and valuable, component of 
conflict prevention measures, it will be limited to preemptive or preventive 
deployment for the purpose of threat or coercion, or the conduct of humanitarian, 
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observation, protective, training or demilitarization operations. The concrete use of 
force shall be limited to instances of self-defensive purposes. 
Figure 1.1 will furthermore assist in defining the above terminology as well as 
relating it to, and delineating, conflict prevention efforts within the lifecycle of a 
conflict. Relating to the stages of conflict depicted in figure 1.1 Stable Peace ranges 
from a high level of reciprocity and cooperation to a relationship of wary 
communication and limited cooperation, within an overall context of basic order or 
national stability. Unstable Peace is a situation in which tension and suspicion 
among parties run high but violence is either absent or sporadic. Crisis is tense 
confrontation between armed forces that are mobilized and ready to fight, and may 
engage in threats and occasional low-level skirmishes, but have not exerted any 
significant amount of force. War is sustained fighting between organized armed 
forces (Lund 1996, 39). 
The concept of a conflict lifecycle, whereby conflict transits through stages, or 
phases, is an oversimplified and idealized generalization, which functions as a 
constructive heuristic, so long as the stages are not considered rigidly bounded and 
sequenced (Crocker et al 200 I, xxviii; Kriesberg 1998, 339; and Lund 1996, 40). 
Each conflict and its constituent parts, which themselves may be lesser and more 
succinct disputes, will have its own distinct temporal and spatial dynamics 
dependent upon the parameters of that conflict. A conflict can often reverse 
sequence, reverting from a fragile settlement to further conflict, or it could stagnate 
for years situated precariously between latency and manifestation. It is also feasible 
that the social, economic, political or international environment can change, thereby 
negating the initial source of conflict. Moreover, what could possibly be considered 
a successful resolution to a conflict at present might become the genesis for conflict 
in the near future. In this sense, the stages ofthe conflict lifecycle allegory are 
deceptive as the ephemeral nature and mutability of a conflict disaJJow returning to 
the position of origin. Regardless, the lifecycJe explanation is a practical instrument 
of understanding broad-spectrum conflict dynamics and categorizing conflict 
prevention applications. 
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Figure 1.1: Lifecyc1e of Conflict and Conflict Prevention I. 
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A further theme oftenninological confusion revolves around the spread of 
conflict. As in the conflict prevention field, utilization of disparate tenns for a single 
concept. and the use of comparable lexis in a dissimilar manner often confound the 
issue, particularly with respect to the tenns contagion, diffusion, and escalation. 
Contagion and diffusion are the two most oft confused, however their similarity 
in meaning and frequent overlap in occurrence facilitate that dilemma. Geller and 
Singer (1998, 131-132) define contagion of conflict to have occurred if the use of 
force by one actor increases the probability that another actor will use force in the 
future. Diffusion of conflict is said to occur if states bordering on a state already in 
1 Source: Adapted from figure 2.1 in Michael S. Lund, Preventing Violent Conflict: A Strategy for 
Preventive Diplomacy. Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1996,38; and from 
figure 1 in Chester A. Crocker, Fen OsIer Hampson, and Pamela Aall, Turbulent Peace: The 
Challenges of Managing International Conflict. Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace 
Press, 2001, xxviii. 
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conflict become more likely to engage in conflict in subsequent years. The key 
defining difference is that diffusion requires a contiguous border. Gurr (1993, 133-
134) supports this definition in his explanation of diffusion as the "spillover" 
processes by which conflict in one country directly affects political organization and 
action in adjoining counties. Contagion refers to the processes by which one group's 
actions provide inspiration and strategic and tactical guidance for groups elsewhere; 
the diffusion of conflict is direct, contagion is indirect. To compound the situation, 
two other more commonplace terms are habitually employed to explicate the same 
intentions. The terms spillover and spread are often used as synonyms for diffusion 
and contagion respectively. 
While the term escalation, as regards conflict, intuitively appears to be a 
straightforward concept, it is not to be quite that easy. Leatherman et a1. (1999, 74-
77) have divided the concept of escalation into vertical and horizontal dimensions. 
Vertical escalation refers to the increase in the intensity of the dispute in terms of the 
conflict behaviors and means used, whereas horizontal escalation expands the 
geographical scope of conflict and brings into the sphere of violent action new 
groups, communities or states. While the differentiation is logical, for the sake of 
simplicity horizontal escalation is in truth simply an alternative term for contagion 
and/or diffusion. Accordingly, as related to this study, I define the additional 
terminology to be employed in the following manner. 
Contagion of conflict is the indirect processes by which one actor's use of force 
provides inspiration and strategic and tactical guidance for actors elsewhere, 
increasing the probability that another actor will use force in the future. 
Diffusion of conflict is the direct processes by which conflict in one country 
directly affects political organization and action in adjoining counties, increasing the 
likelihood to engage in subsequent conflict. 
Escalation is the increase in the intensity of the dispute in terms of the conflict 
behaviors and means used. 
Two additional terms, which are absolutely integral to the essence of this thesis, 
are those of simultaneity and connectivity. Whereas conflict was traditionally 
perceived as either interstate or intrastate, the fungible nature of contemporary 
conflict has a tendency to shift along a sliding scale between interstate and intrastate. 
Intrastate conflict easily permeates across existing state borders to form regional 
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conflict complexes; conversely, regional conflict dynamics can impact readily on the 
internal processes of neigh boring states (Hampson, Wermester, and Malone 2002, 
3). It is a logical assumption that as the nexus between interstate and intrastate 
conflict is inherently linked in a larger strategic calculus, so too should be the 
theoretical and conceptual foundations, and practical application, of apposite conflict 
prevention efforts in the form of a strategy of simultaneity and connectivity. For the 
purposes of this project, these terms are defined below. 
Simultaneity refers to the process of advocating and pursuing policies to inhibit or 
mitigate the occurrence of interstate and intrastate conflict in a concurrent and 
synchronous manner. 
Connectivity refers to the linkage and degree by which the processes of 
advocating and pursuing policies to inhibit or mitigate the occurrence ofinterstate 
and intrastate conflict are associated and conjoined. 
The concepts of simultaneity and connectivity are integrally linked in myriad 
modes and do not create mutually exclusive categories. Together, these two terms 
form a strategy of simultaneity and connectivity, whereby the process of advocating 
and pursuing policies to inhibit or mitigate the occurrence of interstate and intrastate 
conflict are associated and conjoined in a concurrent and synchronous manner. In 
essence, this is the dependent variable upon which the premise of this study rests. A 
syllabus of relevant terms is presented in figure 1.2. 
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Figure 1.2: Summary of Relevant Tenninology. 
Tenn Definition 
Conflict Situation in which conflicting interests between two or more organized actors, not 
necessarily states, have led, or have a significant possibility ofleading, to the threat or 
use of anned force. This includes traditional interstate conflict and the more 
contemporary intrastate, or ethn~litical, conflict. 
Crisis Efforts to manage tensions and disputes that are so intense as to have reached the level 
Management of confrontation, usually involving threats of force and its deployment, from breaking 
into armed violence. 
Conflict Action to limit and contain the diffusion, contagion or escalation of armed force or 
Management violence. 
Conflict Utilization of a third party threat or use of force to impose a cessation of hostilities, 
Mitigation not always with the consent ofthe conflicting parties. 
Conflict Efforts or actions designed to facilitate and maintain a cessation of armed hostilities. 
Tennination 
Conflict Deterrence of armed hostilities re-emergence by disannament, restoration of order, 
Resolution refugee repatriation, and addressing the conditions that led to the dispute and building 
or strengthening the institutions and processes through which the parties interact, 
including the (re)establishment of democratic institutions. Ultimate objective is a self-
supporting society, acceptable to all, without coercion of anL fonn. 
Ethnic Groups People who share a distinctive and enduring collective identity based on a beliefin 
common descent and on shared experiences and cultural traits. 
Ethnopolitical Ethnic groups whose ethnicity has political consequences, resulting either in different 
Groups treatment of group members or in political action on behalf of~l!.Q. interests. 
Ethnopolitical Conflict in which a national or minority group makes claims against the state or 
Conflict against other political actors. 
Conflict Actions, policies, procedures or institutions utilized in vulnerable places and times to 
Prevention avoid the threat or use of armed force, and related fonns of coercion, by states or 
groups, to settle the political disputes that can arise from the destabilizing effects of 
economic, social, political, and international change, aimed at preventing violence 
before it has broken out or become widespread. This can be accomplished by the 
international community advocating and pursuing policies to inhibit or mitigate the 
occurrence of violence in accordance with the articles of the United Nations Charter, 
Chapter VI and VU, short ofthe use of offensive measures. 
Military Force While the threat or use of military force is deemed an adequate, and valuable, 
component of conflict prevention measures, it shall be limited to preemptive or 
preventive deployment for the purpose of threat or coercion, or the conduct of 
humanitarian, observation, protective, training or demilitarization operations. The 
concrete use offorce shall be limited to instances of self-defensive purposes. 
Diffusion Direct processes by which conflict in one country directly affccts political 
organization and action in adjoining counties, increasing the likelihood to engage in 
subsequent conflict 
Contagion Indirect processes by which one actor's use of force provides inspiration and strategic 
and tactical guidance for actors elsewhere, increasing the probability that another 
actor will use force in the future. 
Escalation Increase in intensity of the dispute in tenns of the conflict behaviors and means used. 
Simultaneity Process of advocating and pursuing policies to inhibit or mitigate the occurrence of 
interstate and intrastate conflict in a concurrent and synchronous manner. 
Connectivity Linkage and degree by which the process of advocating and pursuing policies to 
inhibit or mitigate the occurrence of interstate and intrastate conflict are associated 
and conjoined. 
Strategy of The process of advocating and pursuing policies to inhibit or mitigate the occurrence 
Simultaneity and of interstate and intrastate conflict are associated and conjoined in a concurrent and 
Connectivity sy"_chronous manner. 
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1.3. Tools of Conflict Prevention 
Throughout the discourse of conflict prevention literature, myriad specific tools 
have been suggested for application as conflict prevention measures. Lund (1996, 
203-205) classified many ofthem collectively into what he tenned a ''toolbox'' of 
available policies and instruments. Jentleson (2000, 335) cites Lund's tool box, 
while Ackennann (2000, 169-170) developed her own. Figure 1.3 provides a 
compendium of conflict prevention policy tools and instruments that have been 
identified by researchers to date. 
These tools can comprise projects, procedures, programs, policies or mechanisms 
as means for actors to target a conflict's sources and manifestations, by manipulating 
various kinds of influence, and attempt prevention (CAI 1997, 56). Application of 
these tools may be in any combination dependent on the dynamics of the conflict, at 
any stage of the conflict dependent upon that specific tool's intent, and may be 
perfonned by third parties as well as the parties of the conflict. Application of 
conflict prevention tools should commence with a diagnosis of the nature and stage 
of the particular conflict, which then serves as the basis for selection of appropriate 
policy tools. These tools should then be applied in proactive combinations tailored 
to the specific conditions and scope of the conflict, with coordinated multilateral 
state and regional strategies to allow for comparative advantage and burden sharing. 
The various tools fluctuate in the stage of the conflict when most effectively applied, 
the source of the conflict they address, and can be grouped according to different 
functional areas. While the stages of conflict have previously been covered in 
detail, the different functional areas within which the conflict prevention tools are 
categorized are official diplomacy, unofficial (non-governmental) diplomacy, 
military measures, economic and social measures, political development and 
governance measures, judicial and legal measures, and media and educational 
measures. Various conflict prevention policy tools are then targeted towards a 
principal source of conflict designated as structural, proximate or triggering. 
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Figure 1.3: Compendium ofContlict Prevention Pohcy Tools an d 2 Instruments. 
Policy Tool Stage of Source of ConOid .'undional Area 
Conflict Addressed 
Adjudication U Triggering Judicial 
Alternative Defense Strategies S U Proximate Militarv 
Agricultural Reform S U Structural Economic/Social 
Arbitration U Triggering Judicial 
ArmsControlAgreemen~ S U Proximate Military 
Arms Embargoes and Blockades CW Triggering Military 
Arms Proliferation Control S U Proximate Military 
Certification!Decertification U,C Proximateffriggering Official 
Civic Education S,U Proximate MedialEducation 
Civic Society Development S U Proximate Political 
Civilian Fact-Finding MissionsIVerification Teams U,C Triggerinsz Unofficial 
Civilian Peace Monitors UC Tri22erinsz Unofficial 
Coercive Diplomacy C Proximate Official 
Collective Security/Cooperation Arrangements S,U Proximate MilitaTY 
Conciliation UC Tril!.l!.erinsz Official 
Conditionalitv UCW Tri2gerinsz Economic/Social 
Confidence BuildinwSecurity Measures UC Proximate Militarv 
Conflict Prevention and Management Centers UC Proximate Official 
Conflict Resolution Training S U Proximateffriggering MedialEducation 
Constitutional Refonn S U Structural Political 
Cultural Exchanges S,U Proximate Unofficial 
Crisis Management Procedures C Tril!.l!.erinl!. OfficialllJnofficial 
Decentralization of Power UC Proximate Political 
Demilitarized Zones UC Proximateffriggering Militarv 
Demobiliz.ation and Reintegration of Armed Forces C Proximate Military 
Development Assistance SU Structural Economic/Social 
Diplomatic Sanctions U C, W Proximateffri2e.erin2 Political 
Disarmament UC Proximate Military 
Displaced Persons RepatriationiResettlement UC Triggering Economic/Social 
Economic Integration S,U Structural Economic/Social 
Economic ReformlSocial Safety Nets U,C Structural Economic/Social 
Economic and Resource Cooperation U,C Structural Economic/Social 
Economic Sanctions C Proximateffriggerinll Economic/Social 
Election SupPOrt and Monitoring U,C Proximate Political 
Election Reform U,C Structural Political 
Embarrassing Witnesses UC Proximate Unofficial 
Employment Training SU Proximate Economic/Social 
Exchange Visits S,U Proximate MedialEducation 
Formal Education ProlU1lffis S Proximate MedialEducation 
Friends Groups S Proximate Unofficial 
Health Assistance S,U,C Proximateffriggerine. Economic/Social 
Human Righ~ Promotion and Monitoring S,U,C Proximate Political 
Human Rights Institution-Building S U,C Proximate Political 
Humanitarian Assistance S U C,W Structural Economic/Social 
Humanitarian Diplomacy U,C Triggering Unofficial 
Inter-CommunallRel!ional Trade S,U,C Structural Economic/Social 
International Appeal/Condemnation U,C Proximateffriggering Official 
International Broadcasts S,U,C W Proximateffriggering MedialEducation 
Joint Projects S,U Proximate Economic/Social 
Journalist Training S,U Proximate MedialEducation 
Judicial Institution Support S,U Proximate Judicial 
2 Source: Compiled from Appendix A in Michael S. Lund, Preventing Violent Conflicts: A Strategy 
for Preventive Diplomacy. Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1996,203-205; 
Table 2 in Alice Ackermann, Making Peace Prevail: Preventing Violent Conflict in Macedonia. 
Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University press, 2000, 169-170; and from Creative Associates International, 
Preventing and Mitigating Violent Conflicts: An Abridged Practitioner's Guide. Washington, D.e.: 
Creative Associates International, 1997.56-61. 
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Judicial Refonn UC Proximate Judicial 
Law Enforcement Refonn U.C Proximaten·riMerinl!: Judicial 
Limited Military Intervention CW Tril!:l!:ering Military 
Media Professionalization S U Proximate MedialEducation 
Mediation U,C W Triggering Official/Unofficial 
Military Aid UCW Proximateffriggering Military 
Military to Military Programs S, U Proximate Military 
National Conferences UC Proximate Political 
Negotiation C,W Tril!:gerinl!: OfficiallUnofficial 
Non-Al!:l!:fession Agreements S U Proximate Military 
Non-Violent Campaign S,U Proximate Unofficial 
Peace Commission CW Triggering Unofficial 
Peace Conference CW Triggering Official 
Peace Education S,U,C Proximateffriggering MedialEducation 
Peace Enfurcement C,W Triggering Military 
Peace-Keeoing U,C Triggering Military 
Peace Radioffelevision S U,C Proximateffriggering Media/Education 
Political Institution-Building UC Proximate Political 
Political Party-Building VC Proximate Political 
Power Sharing Arrangements C Proximate Political 
Preventive Deployment VC Proximate Military 
Private Economic Investment S, U Structural Economic/Social 
Problem-Solving Workshop S,U Triggering Unofficial 
ProfessionalizationIModemization of Armed Forces S,U C Proximate Military 
Protectorates UC Proximate Political 
Public Official Training UC Proximate Political 
Refugee Repatriation/ResettIement U,C Triggering Economic/Social 
Special Envoy UCW Triggering Official 
Threat or Projection of Force CW Triggering Military 
Trusteeship UC Proximate Political 
Visits by Eminent Individuals/Organizations UC Triggering Unofficial 
War Crimes Tribunals/Commissions of Inquiry C Triggering Judicial 
Withdrawal of Recognition CW Triggering Official .. 
Stage of Conflict: S - Stable Peace, U - Unstable Peace, C - CriSIS, W - War 
structural sources of conflict may include legacies of colonial and/or Cold War 
policies, material resource deficiencies, poverty, socio-economic inequities and 
ethnic divisions. Conflict prevention policy tools designed to address structural 
sources are aimed to increase the aggregate, conserve and/or redistribute natural, 
economic and human resources such as land, water, infrastructure and technical 
skills, in order to improve material conditions. Proximate sources of conflict are the 
political and institutional factors that influence whether structural sources give rise 
to possible violence, and may encompass economic reform dislocations, ideologies, 
arms flows and military aid, internal militarization, competition for state power and 
the problems of political liberalization. Conflict prevention policy tools designed to 
address proximate sources are intended to reduce and restrain means of armed force 
or coercion that could be used to effect violence. Triggering sources of conflict are 
those actions or behaviors that could immediately lead to conflict, and the conflict 
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prevention policy tools designed to address these sources are targeted to directly 
regulate the conflicting parties' behavior, such as actions, speech, and interactions. 
This compendium serves as tool in itself and does not preclude the application of 
a specific tool during a stage of conflict or toward an intended source of conflict 
other than annotated. Bear in mind these tools are intended to be overlapping and 
complementary in nature, and can be implemented through various organizational 
channels such as by actors outside the conflict area, by actors involved in the conflict 
and by local organizations. 
Employment of Military Force 
Another concern relating to the possible and available tools for conflict 
prevention is that of inclusion of the threat or use of military force as an implement 
of conflict prevention. At first glance, the employment ofmilitary force as a means 
to prevent conflict seems counterintuitive. Burton (1997), Jabri (1996), and Galtung 
(1996) contend the use of military force has contributed to the legitimization of war 
within society, and stands as a foremost impediment to future peace. Conversely, 
the majority of contemporary conflict prevention literature appears to support the 
threat or use of military force. 
Several scholars and practitioners advocate the use of force as a measure of 
conflict prevention. Crocker (2001, 234) believes there is a vast range of conflict 
prevention options, which include everything from doing nothing to sending in 
military forces; where a conflict situation may demand an immediate military 
response, akin to a police action, to uphold the law or maintain collective security. 
Leatherman et al. (1999, 105) consider actions ranging from a large-scale preventive 
war, through limited military options, to the establishment of deterrence and the 
balance of power as preventive actions; which can be taken to contain the causes and 
dynamics of conflicts to avoid their outbreak or escalation. J. Fishel (1998, 14), 
following Clausewitz' dictum, regards the use of military force as a political act 
designed to attain political objectives. Manwaring and K. Fishel (1998, 203-204) 
espouse the mandate for application of military force is to "aggressively take control 
of a contended area, stop any escalation of violence, enforce law and order, and 
impose an acceptable level of security and stability. Haass (1999, 51, 130) proposes 
the preventive uses of force are those that seek to either stop another state or party 
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from developing a military capability before it becomes threatening or to hobble or 
destroy it thereafter. In this respect. Haass supports use of military force in a 
preemptive attack. ifnecessary. 
More prevalent. though, are those who uphold that the credible threat ofthe use 
of force, as opposed to the actual employment of military force, is the more integral 
component of conflict prevention. George (1991, 4-5; 1993, 79-80) is an avid 
proponent of what he calls "coercive diplomacy", or "coercive persuasion", whereby 
the term is restricted to defensive purposes in seeking to persuade an actor to cease 
aggressive actions rather than bludgeoning him into stopping. The credibility of a 
threat of military force is key to creation ofthe mind that cessation of aggressive 
actions is preferable to facing the consequences, however, coercive diplomacy is 
limited in that the actual use of military force indicates a failure in the coercive 
aspects of the strategy. Lund (1996, 148-149), applying his "stages of conflict", is in 
favor of Chapter vn United Nations Peace Operations, coercive diplomacy, or 
''mediation with muscle" during the crisis stage, but reserves the concrete use of 
force until the stage of war. Nicolaiedis (1996, 40-41), in his framework for conflict 
prevention actions, also favors coercive diplomacy, delineated as the threat of force 
as a defensive strategy employed by policy-makers hoping to secure a peaceful 
resolution of a serious dispute. Miall et al., (1999, 113) limit acceptable military 
measures to preventive peacekeeping, arms embargoes enforcement, and 
demilitarization. Schellenberg (1996, 134) in examining the conditions when the 
threat or use of force may prove effective, points to the fact that while force can 
sometimes be used to resolve a conflict. at least temporarily, force often just makes 
the conflict less manageable. The Aspen Institute (1997, 37-45), in their Conference 
on International Peace and Security report. while including intervention with major 
combat forces as an option for conflict prevention, emphasized that options short of 
combat force engagement need to be developed, where preemptive deployment or 
presence was the task agreed upon as the optimal level to pursue, including 
humanitarian relief and protection measures. 
Jentleson (2000a, 13; 2000b, 340-344) avows that excluding military force and 
other coercive measures from the realm of conflict prevention instruments and 
strategies is a fallacy, which lapses into the snare of positing force and diplomacy as 
antithetical. While force and diplomacy may well be adversative, they need not be. 
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Case studies have empirically shown that diplomatic components of conflict 
prevention need to be backed by a credible threat to use military force. in terms both 
of the will to take military action and the potency of the action threatened (Carnegie, 
1997, 40; Jentleson 2000b, 341). 
When Boutros-Ghali (1992) composed his "Agenda for Peace" statement, he 
acknowledged that under Article 42 ofthe United Nations Charter, the Security 
Council has the authority to take military action to maintain or restore international 
peace, however, these measures provided in Chapter VII, should only be used when 
all peaceful means have failed. Leatherman (1999, 105), while including preemptive 
military force under the auspices of conflict prevention, accedes that to resort to that 
level is admittance of failure of other preventive strategies. 
Reverting back to figure 1.1 and the lifecycle of conflict and conflict prevention, 
the focus of this study will concentrate on conflict prevention as it relates to 
prevention of conflict during the unstable peace or crisis stages, prior to the outbreak 
of armed hostilities. Therefore, while the threat or use of military force is deemed an 
adequate, and valuable, component of conflict prevention measures, it will be 
limited to preemptive or preventive deployment for the purpose of threat or coercion, 
or the conduct of humanitarian, observation, protective, training or demilitarization 
operations. The concrete use of force will be limited to instances of self-defensive 
purposes. Referring back to figure 1.2, all tools encompassed under the functional 
area of the military adhere to this definition of the employment of military force. 
1.4. Methodological Framework 
Multiple Level Analytic Framework 
International relations have evolved throughout time to the current system of 
states. A momentous shift was marked by the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648, which 
concluded the Thirty Years War and commenced the quest, that persists today, in 
pursuit of a means for independent states, each sovereign over a given territory, to 
pursue their interests exclusive of mutual destruction or obliteration of the system of 
which each is a part (Lyons and Mastanduno 1995, 5). 
The predominance ofthought, concerning theoretical perspectives of international 
relations logically conveys an interstate focus, however, the characteristics and 
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sources of most contemporary conflicts since 1945 have become increasingly 
divorced from the Clausewitzian image. Holsti (1996) alleges the world has seen a 
shift to "wars of the third kind". Institutionalized war was the first kind, typified by 
dynastic wars conducted by professional militaries and suffused with rules, norms, 
and etiquette. Total war came next. This was Napoleonic war, which introduced no 
great technology but the manpower and financial limitations of dynastic war were 
overcome by the 1792 "levee en masse" that transformed war from an undertaking 
by professionals to a mighty campaign of a nation in arms. Currently, the world is 
involved in ''wars of the third kind", in which "there are no fronts, no campaigns, no 
bases, no uniforms, no publicly displayed honors, no points d'appui, and no respect 
for territorial limits of states" (Holsti 1996, 36). Civilians not only become major 
targets of operations, but their transformation into a new type of individual becomes 
a major purpose of war. Succinctly stated, contemporary conflict since 1945 has 
occurred predominantly within states as opposed to between states (Ackermann 
2000, 10; Aspen 1996, 1; Brown 1996,3; Davies and Gurr 1998, 1; Holsti 1996, 14; 
Lake and Rothchild 1998,3; Leatherman, DeMars, Gaffney, and Vaeyrynen 1999,3; 
Saideman 2001,3 SIPRI 1998, 1). 
In light of this metamorphosis ofthe nature and conduct of war, a similar change 
in conventional methodology must transpire with respect to analysis of war 
occurrence, as well as analysis of the prevention of that occurrence. It is no longer 
conceivable to divide interstate from intrastate conflict as discrete components of 
analysis. Rather, simultaneous analysis of the interstate and intrastate aspects of 
conflict as a distinct and aggregate phenomenon is warranted. 
Kenneth Waltz (1954) was the first to envisage three images, or levels, of war: 
that of war as a consequence of the nature and behavior of man, war as an outcome 
ofthe internal organization of states, and war as a consequence of international 
anarchy. The interrelatedness of the images was that ''the third image describes the 
framework of world politics, but without the first and second images there can be no 
knowledge of the forces that determine policy; the first and second images describe 
the forces in world politics, but without the third image it is impossible to assess 
their importance or predict their results" (Waltz 1954, 238). 
Since 1954 when Waltz framed his concept, scholars have analyzed conflict 
within the levels of analysis framework of the individual, the state and the 
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international system. The individual level focuses on human nature, predispositions, 
belief systems personalities and psychological processes. The state level includes 
governmental variables, such as political system structure and the nature of the 
policymaking process, and societal factors, such as economic system structure, the 
role of public opinion, economic and non-economic interest groups, ethnicity and 
nationalism, and political culture and ideology. The systemic level consists of the 
anarchic global structure, the number of major players in the system, military and 
economic power distribution, patterns of military alliances and international trade, 
and any other factors that constitute the global milieu communal to all states. 
It is logically plausible, and in fact typically desirable, for analyses to conjoin 
different levels of analysis, because whether conflict or peace transpires is habitually 
ascertained by amalgam variables functioning at multiple levels of analysis. As long 
as the framework assumes that the actor in question is sufficiently organized that it 
has a decision-making body with the authority to act on behalf of the group, the 
levels of analysis framework can be applied to any actor (Levy 2001, 6). Levy 
proceeds to explicate congruency between analysis of interstate and intrastate 
analysis at all levels of the framework, signaling the possibility of connective and 
simultaneous issues. At the systemic level, with the unit of analysis shifted from 
states to ethnopolitical groups that seek security in an anarchic system, intrastate 
conflict can easily fit into the framework for analysis. The state, or societal, level 
has long generated considerable interest in intrastate, or ethnic, conflict. 
Ethnopolitical groups may affect intrastate conflict indirectly through their influence 
on state policies, or directly through their own military actions, since within 
intrastate wars ethnopolitical groups are themselves independent actors. Likewise, at 
the individual level cognitive processes, personalities, belief systems, 
misperceptions, and predispositions are equally as relevant in interstate as intrastate 
analysis. In sum, Levy (2001) recommends an egalitarian utilization of the levels of 
analysis framework for both interstate and intrastate conflict analysis, as well as 
incorporation of different levels; meaning that the evaluation of the validity of a 
certain theory is not necessarily congruent with the evaluation of the importance of 
that particular level of analysis. 
This interconnected nature of analysis levels is not a novel concept and is 
furthermore corroborated by, among others: Allison's (1969) bureaucratic politics 
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model of foreign policy decision-making, Putnam's (1993), view of the politics of 
international relations as a two-level game, and by Tsebe1is' (1990) concept of 
nested games. As the focus of this thesis is to analyze the criticality of a nexus 
between intrastate and interstate conflict prevention as it relates to a strategy of 
simultaneity and connectivity in application of conflict prevention efforts of the 
international community, elements of the systemic, state and individual levels of 
analysis must be conjoined. 
Methodology 
This is a qualitative rather than quantitative analysis, and as such, does not utilize 
a large number of cases in order to find a statistically significant correlation between 
independent and dependent variables. In fact, although possible, it would be 
difficult to quantify variables such as interstate and intrastate conflict prevention 
efforts and retain requisite meaning. Rather than relegating certain conflict 
prevention actions to a numerical data point, it is more illuminating and explanatory 
to elucidate the complexity of these actions and their nexus, or lack thereof, in a 
qualitative manner. Lijphart (1971, 691-693) contends that case studies make a 
contribution to testing hypotheses and building theory. Campbell (1975, 178-193) 
shows that case studies are the basis of most comparative research and that much can 
be learned by making explicit the comparisons that are often implicitly built into 
case studies. Eckstein (1975, 113-123) agrees with this statement and the qualitative 
traditions, and argues that many analysts have greatly underestimated the value of 
case studies for hypothesis testing. 
King, Keohane, and Verba (1994, 1-4) posit that while quantitative and 
qualitative research methods are very contrasted, their ultimate goal is essentially 
equivalent, to apply valid theoretical standards ofinference. The differences 
between the quantitative and qualitative traditions are in truth only stylistic, where 
neither is superior to the other regardless of the area of study. The key is that both 
quantitative and qualitative research be scientific, in that scientific research 
embraces the four characteristics of being designed to: formulate descriptive or 
explanatory inferences based on empirical information; use explicit, codified, and 
replicable analytical methods; reach conclusions that remain uncertain and 
25 
falsifiable; and where the content of science is primarily the method and not the 
subject matter (King et at. 1994, 7-9). 
This thesis employs the process tracing, within-case comparative method, where 
the selection of method is determined by the descriptive and explanatory objectives 
of the study. Congruence testing and statistical correlations are useful components 
of broader means of making causal inferences, but because covariations have 
important and well-known limitations as sources of causal inference, philosophers of 
science and social science methodologists have given increasing emphasis in the last 
two decades to causal mechanisms as a second basis for causal inference effects 
(Bennett and George 1997a, 2). Causal mechanisms are defined as the causal 
processes and intervening variables through which causal or explanatory variables 
produce causal effects. In case study methods, the identification of causal 
mechanisms through process tracing is a stronger methodological basis for causal 
inference than the estimation of covariation through congruence tests. Similarly, 
case study methods are superior at process tracing and identifYing causal 
mechanisms, identifYing omitted variables and measuring qualitative variables, and 
they also have advantages in the explanation of individual cases and of path-
dependent processes (Bennett 1999, 3). The general method of process tracing is to 
generate and analyze data on the causal mechanisms, or processes, events, actions, 
expectations, and other intervening variables that link putative causes to observed 
effects. 
Data collection and analysis for this thesis is guided by the method of structured, 
focused comparison (Bennett and George 1997). Comparative case studies can use 
within-case analysis ofindividual stages as well as case comparisons to assess and 
refine existing theories, and more generally, to develop empirical theory. The 
method of doing so is structured in that the same general questions are asked of each 
case, or stage of a case, in order to guide data collection, thereby making possible 
systematic comparison of findings across cases or stages. The method is focused in 
that it deals only with certain aspects of the cases or stages; that is, a selective 
theoretical focus guides the analysis. The important mechanism of formulating a set 
of standardized, general questions to ask of each case, or stage, will be of value only 
if those questions are grounded in, and adequately reflect, the theoretical perspective 
of the study. Likewise, a selective focus for the study will be inadequate by itself 
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unless coupled with an appropriate set of standardized general questions. 
Consequently, the method requires both structure and focus. 
This combination of process-tracing, within-case comparative method with the 
use of structured, focused comparison will achieve integration of empirically rich 
historical narrative with rigorous theoretical investigation (Manners 2000, 12). 
Here, the general method of process-tracing used to engender and evaluate 
information on the causal mechanisms, processes, events, actions, expectations, and 
other intervening variables that link putative causes to observed effects will serve to 
determine and isolate those specific aspects of the case to be focused upon as 
dictated by the methodology of structured, focused comparison. 
As such, this study will focus on the critical conflict prevention efforts applied by 
the international community towards Macedonia from independence in 1991 until 
the writing of this thesis in 2004. Within that temporal period three discrete phases 
can be patently differentiated: the pre-Kosovo phase, the Kosovo Intervention phase 
and the post-Kosovo phase. The pre-Kosovo phase incorporates the temporal period 
from independence in 1991 until the end of the United Nations mandate in 1999. 
During this period conflict prevention efforts were predominantly administered by 
the United Nations, although experiencing several transitional stages throughout the 
phase. The Kosovo intervention phase addresses conflict prevention efforts in 
Macedonia from the end ofthe United Nations mandate, through the NATO air 
campaign and conflict resolution, until adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 
1345 in March of2001. Throughout this phase, while minimal conflict prevention 
efforts did continue within Macedonia, the international focus had become Kosovo 
with Macedonia assuming a peripheral or tangential significance. The post-Kosovo 
phase attends to conflict prevention efforts from the adoption on UN Security 
Council Resolution 1345 until the summer of2004. It was the approval of UN 
Security Council Resolution 1345 that marked the return ofinternational community 
conflict prevention efforts targeted specifically towards Macedonia. 
After identification of the critical conflict prevention efforts applied by the 
international community, analysis will be conducted to determine if each of those 
efforts focused solely on intrastate conflict prevention, interstate conflict prevention 
or there was a logical and concerted effort to connect those efforts in a nexus of 
intrastate and interstate conflict prevention as related to a strategy of simultaneity 
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and connectivity. The primary sources of data will be from public communications, 
official governmental or organizational documents and statements, broadcast 
transcripts, and historical documentation. 
As this project seeks to draw out the complexities ofthe case of conflict 
prevention in Macedonia, the narrative, descriptive and explanatory objectives of 
this undertaking determine the selection of method. One of the foremost advantages 
of the case study is that it can facilitate detection of certain factors as significant that 
otherwise may have been overlooked in the casual observations necessary for a 
statistical, or large-n comparative, analysis. Additionally, the comprehensive case 
study has the capacity to exemplify causal means as opposed to merely 
demonstrating statistical correlation. Consequently, the most appropriate 
methodological approach for this thesis is a qualitative process tracing, within-case 
comparative method, utilizing structured, focused comparison, aimed at hypothesis 
generating, or theory developing, causal inference. 
Counterfactual Analysis 
An inherent complexity in any evaluative analysis of a case from an historical 
point of view is the dilemma of counterfactual analysis. Assessment of conflict 
prevention efficacy suffers from the methodological predicament of having to 
prophesy what might, or might not, have transpired if a different course of action 
had, or had not, been taken at a precise point in time. Thus, in a normative sense, 
counterfactual analysis in conflict prevention must envisage initial conflict 
prevention where it failed to arise and, imagine conflict occurrence where it did not 
materialize. Notwithstanding the attendant methodological difficulties, 
counterfactual analysis, when carefully grounded in a coherent structure, can play a 
central role in international relations evaluation (Bueno de Mesquita 1996, 211). 
Counterfactuals can be seen as supplements and/or substitutes for direct empirical 
analysis and can alert us to the possible operation of dynamics and pathways that we 
would otherwise be prone to ignore (Kiser and Levi 1996, t 88; Jervis 1996, 3 to). 
Tetlock and Belkin (1996, 6) succinctly explicate counterfactual analysis validation 
in their statement that "counterfactual analysis is unavoidable in any field in which 
researchers want to draw cause-effect conclusions but cannot perform controlled 
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experiments in which they randomly assign subjects to treatment conditions that 
differ only in the presence or absence of the hypothesized cause3". 
Accordingly, it has been established that all historical causal presumption 
ultimately rests on counterfactual claims about what would or might or could have 
happened in hypothetical worlds to which scholars have no direct empirical access 
(Tetlock and Lebow 2001,829). The key to counterfactual analysis is to both 
establish the theoretical basis for the logic of the alternative hypothesized path, and 
to support it empirically as strongly as possible (Jentleson 1996, 297; 2000a, 19). 
An interrelated component is that the focal point of nearly all historical and 
empirical analysis is on what really did transpire, not on what might have happened. 
Nonetheless what actually comes to pass is frequently. conceivably always, the 
consequence of expectations about what would have happened had another course of 
action been chosen (Bueno de Mesquita 1996. 212; Jervis 1976; 1996. 314; 
Weingast 1996, 230). 
While not desiring to devolve into an exhaustive treatise on rational choice or 
game theory, it is useful to show game theory is a body of thinking that encourages 
the systematic examination of counterfactuals in that game theory suggests we 
cannot comprehend what transpired in reality without understanding what did not 
happen. but might have happened under other circumstances. What game theory 
brings to bear on counterfactual adjudication, as related to conflict prevention 
efforts, is its emphasis on decision points where the causal mechanism is 
Tetlock and Belkin advance six nonnative criteria for judging ideal counterfactual arguments that 
appear to command substantial cross-disciplinary support (where ''ideal'' means most likely to 
contribute to the ultimate social science goals oflogical\y consistent, reasonably comprehensive and 
parsimonious, and rigorously testable explanations that integrate the idiographic and nomothetic). 
Clarity specifies and circumscribes the independent and dependent variables (the hypothesized 
antecedent and consequent). The key is to manipulate the hypothesized antecedent with due 
consideration for the complexities created by interconnectedness so as not to generate ripple effects 
that modifY the values taken on by other potential causes in the historical matrix. Logical consistency, 
or cotenability, specifies connecting principles that link the antecedent with the consequent that are 
cotenable with each other and with the antecedent These connecting principles stipulate, within 
reasonable limits, everything else that would have to be true to sustain the counterfactual. Historical 
consistency (minimal rewrite rule) specifies antecedents that require altering as few ''well-established'' 
historical facts as possible. Theoretical consistency articulates connecting principles that are 
consistent with "well-established" theoretical generalizations relevant to the hypothesized antecedent-
consequent link. Statistical consistency articulates connecting principles that are consistent with 
"well-established" statistical generalizations relevant to the hypothesized antecedent-consequent link. 
Finally, projectability teases out testable implications of the connecting principles and detennines 
which of those hypotheses are consistent with additional real-world observations. Counterfactual 
Thought Experiments In World Politics: Logical. Methodological. and Psychological Perspectives. 
Philip E. Tetlock and Aaron Belkin. 1996. Princeton. NJ: Princeton University Press. Pgs 6-31. 
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unobservable4• From a methodological perspective, this presents a hurdle to 
surmount. The only feasible analytic method to ascertain what the intended recipient 
of a conflict prevention action perceived is to know what the cognitive process was 
upon receipt. Thus, the issue of counterfactual analysis complexity in an evaluative 
case analysis substantiates the process-tracing, within-case comparative method. 
Case Selection 
Controlled comparison requires identification of at least two cases that are similar 
in every detail but one. When this requirement can be met, the comparison is 
controlled and provides the functional equivalent of an experiment. Variation in but 
one variable permits the employment of experimental logic in making causal 
inference regarding the impact that variable has on the outcome dependent variable. 
Unfortunately, it is exceedingly difficult, if not nearly impossible to meet the 
requirements for controlled comparison in the complex and heterogeneous world of 
conflict prevention. As alluded to previously, no two conflicts are alike as each has 
its own unique components, causes and actors. Consequently, this study utilizes the 
within-case method of comparison towards each ofthe three phases ofthe 
Macedonian case of conflict prevention efforts. In this way, structure is retained in 
that the basic causes, components and actors remain as rigid as possible. 
Macedonia represents the clearest example of the international community 
explicitly implementing conflict prevention efforts in response to fears of future 
conflict. As such, it is additionally one of the most well documented examples of 
conflict prevention efforts. Nearly every author who has broached the subject of 
4 Game theory provides a useful way to structure counterfactual arguments in that the solution to 
extensive fonn games requires explicit attentiveness to counterfactuals in at least two ways: the 
solutions or predictions depend on what is expected to happen "ofT the equilibrium path", and games 
often have more than one equilibrium solution, each of which represents a plausible state of the 
relevant world. The central means of solving non-cooperative games, the Nash equilibrium, depends 
on each player choosing a strategy, or complete plan of action, such that no unilateral defection from 
that strategy can make the player expect to be better ofT. This means that in choosing a strategy, each 
player must think about the expected consequences of selecting another plan of action. What would 
happen under these alternative, unchosen plans of action represents counterfactual expectations. The 
assumptions of rationality, expected utility maximization, and the criteria for locating the Nash 
equilibria (and its refinements) provide the basis by which the analyst connects the independent 
variables to the dependent variables. It should be noted that game theoretic evaluation of actions in 
light of off the equilibrium path counterfactual expectations satisfies the criteria suggested by Tetlock 
and Belkin. Counte!factuals and International Affairs: Some Insights from Game Theory." Bruce 
Bueno de Mesquita. 1996. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Pg 217. 
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conflict prevention in recent times has incorporated the case of Macedonia in one 
respect or another. Most writings regard Macedonia as the prime example of 
successful efforts. but this is due to the fact that nearly all documentation on conflict 
prevention in Macedonia ceases at the commencement of intervention in Kosovo. 
However. the civil and ethnic conflict that erupted in the summer of2001 indicates 
results other than success. 
Macedonia has also become one of the longer standing international community 
efforts, commencing in 1991 and still currently in effect. As a result, the case of 
Macedonia can now be separated into phases, providing three distinct stages of 
conflict prevention efforts. This allows within-case comparison similar to a cross-
case comparison. although providing more structure in holding the dependent 
variables constant. Consequently, the within-case study of the three stages of the 
case of conflict prevention in Macedonia will be self sufficient as a theory 
developing. causal inference research project. 
Relevance 
The significance of this thesis is its focus on conflict prevention and the 
implementation of apposite efforts by the international community to inhibit, 
mitigate or prevent impending or future conflict between states or groups within a 
state. As conflict between sovereign states has not yet been eradicated. and ethnic 
and nationalistic malcontent persist. conflict prevention as a field and a normative 
mechanism will continue to be paramount to peace. This is particularly essential in 
light ofthe fact that academic and governmental agreement has not yet been 
achieved in determining the most effectual methods of employing conflict 
prevention efforts. 
Furthermore. this study fills the void between two existent bodies of literature on 
conflict prevention. For most ofthe twentieth century. both the academic and policy 
communities had focused on the twin issues of interstate security and intrastate 
affairs separately. While the academic community began to examine and espouse a 
nexus between interstate and intrastate conflict as early as the 1980s. this data is only 
now commencing to be acknowledged. and integrated within the policy community. 
The 1990s is when the international community. including both the academic and 
policy sectors, responded to the ostensible increase in intrastate crises. and conflict 
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prevention literature emerged at the intersection of theory and practice. However, 
conflict prevention literature and methodology to date seem not to have fully 
integrated the standing theoretical implications of a nexus between intrastate and 
interstate conflict in any applied form. 
This thesis also advances conflict prevention theory by proposing a strategy of 
simultaneity and connectivity as regards implementation of conflict prevention 
efforts by the international community, whereby the process of advocating and 
pursuing policies to inhibit or mitigate the occurrence of interstate and intrastate 
conflict are associated and conjoined in a concurrent and synchronous manner. In 
the contemporary global environment, conflict in one state often spreads or has 
repercussions in a neighboring state. Furthermore, a state adjacent to a state engaged 
in conflict is simultaneously at risk from both interstate and intrastate conflict. 
Whereas conflict was traditionally perceived as either interstate or intrastate, the 
fungible nature of contemporary conflict has a tendency to shift along a sliding scale 
between interstate and intrastate. Intrastate conflict easily permeates across existing 
state borders to form regional conflict complexes; conversely, regional conflict 
dynamics can impact readily on the internal processes of neighboring states. It 
appears a logical assumption that as the nexus between interstate and intrastate 
conflict is inherently linked in a larger strategic calculus, so too should be the 
theoretical and conceptual foundations, and practical application, of apposite conflict 
prevention efforts in the form of a strategy of simultaneity and connectivity. 
Additionally, this study adds to conflict prevention literature in that it utilizes the 
case study of conflict prevention efforts in Macedonia from the inception of conflict 
prevention efforts in 1991 until the present, by separating the Macedonian case into 
the three discrete phases ofpre-Kosovo, Kosovo intervention and post-Kosovo. 
Most literature on conflict prevention in Macedonia was written prior to the Kosovo 
intervention, and what has been written afterwards has concentrated predominantly 
on Kosovo as the primary focus, with Macedonia as a peripheral element. It is as if 
conflict prevention in Macedonia was declared a success at a certain point in time 
and any failings thereafter were deemed a result of tertiary effects of Kosovo. 
However, conflict prevention efforts in Macedonia continued throughout the Kosovo 
intervention, and continue today, but little has been written on these latter efforts and 
their relative success or failure. 
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Organization of the Project 
This composition is organized into seven chapters. This chapter introduced 
conflict prevention as a field in its own right, as well as the evident academic 
concurrence regarding the viability and efficacy of conflict prevention. A discussion 
of the terminology perplexity then ensued, and a refined delineation ofthe relevant 
terminology within the field was presented through clarification of previously 
ambiguous usage in the form of a syllabus of relevant term inology. A heuristic of 
the cycle of conflict and conflict prevention was offered to conceptualize the stages 
and processes of conflict as they apply towards the applicable tools of conflict 
prevention available to the international community. Levels of analysis were 
discussed explicating the utility of a multiple level analysis towards conflict as a 
whole, incorporating both intrastate and interstate conflict. A methodological 
framework was then furnished, articulating the analytical advantage of utilizing the 
process tracing, within-case comparative method of analysis, coupled with 
structured, focused comparison data collection. Several clarifYing factors were 
provided regarding the case selection rationale, and finally, the relevance of this 
thesis was explicated as related to an original contribution to knowledge and/or 
understanding in the field of international relations. 
Chapter 2 provides a conceptual investigation of the theoretical aspects of 
mainstream conflict prevention literature to date, so as to impart a suitable context 
and framing for this study. Derived from the existing literature is an examination 
and synthesis of the fundamental factors deemed requisite for the occurrence of 
successful conflict prevention. Critical to the essence of this study, an analysis of 
the theoretical and conceptual plausibility of a nexus between interstate and 
intrastate conflict is conducted, relating this analysis to the level of incorporation 
within conflict prevention application as it pertains to a strategy of simultaneity and 
connectivity. 
Chapter 3 delineates the historical milieu of Macedonia, and the surrounding 
Balkan region, concentrating on those aspects of history, geography, religion, and 
ethnicity that impact contemporary deliberations regarding contentious issues. 
Paramount to the application of conflict prevention efforts in a country or region is 
thorough comprehension of the related contentious issues, and in the case of 
Macedonia these issues are intricately intertwined with history. This chapter is not 
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intended to be an exclusively comprehensive historical essay, imparting all historical 
facts from the time ofPhilip 11 of Macedon until contemporary times. Instead, 
germane events and facts will be culled out of the more than two millennia of Balkan 
history that can be related to current conflictive claims and/or actions. Thus, a 
historical base is provided, which should increase impartiality throughout the 
remainder of this study. 
Chapter 4 examines conflict prevention efforts targeted towards Macedonia in the 
pre-Kosovo phase. This phase incorporates the temporal period from independence 
in 1991 until the end of the United Nations mandate in 1999, during which conflict 
prevention efforts were clearly led by the United Nations. This chapter progresses 
from the initial conflict prevention efforts of the United Nations in the region, 
through the establishment of a UN presence in Macedonia, the authorization of a 
broadened political mandate for the mission, transition to a fully independent 
mandate, and finally the termination of UN presence on the eve of the Kosovo 
conflict in 1999. 
Chapter 5 analyzes the Kosovo intervention phase, addressing conflict prevention 
efforts in Macedonia from the end of the United Nations mandate, through the 
NATO air campaign and conflict resolution, until adoption of UN Security Council 
Resolution 1345 in March of2001. Throughout this phase, while minimal conflict 
prevention efforts continued within Macedonia, the international focus had become 
Kosovo with Macedonia assuming a peripheral or tangential significance. This 
international focal shift was amalgamated with a change in architecture from a UN 
led effort to that of a token OSCE presence, coupled with a joint UN and NATO 
presence in Kosovo. 
Chapter 6 addresses conflict prevention efforts during the post-Kosovo phase, 
which attends to conflict prevention efforts from the adoption of UN Security 
Council Resolution 1345 in March of2001 until the writing of this thesis in 2004. It 
was the approval of adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 1345 that marked 
the return of international community conflict prevention efforts targeted specifically 
towards Macedonia. As a result of the Framework Agreement of 13 August 2001, 
the EU, OSCE and NATO were all to have integrated and overlapping roles in the 
re-establishment of conflict prevention efforts targeted toward Macedonia from 200 I 
forward. 
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Chapter 7 summarizes the findings and correlates them to the criticality of the 
interstate and intrastate conflict prevention nexus as it relates to a strategy of 
simultaneity and connectivity as a determining factor of conflict prevention success. 
Finally, the limitations of this study are addressed, possible future areas ofrelated 
research are identified, and potential policy implications are proposed. 
3S 
2.1. Introduction 
Chapter 2: Major Theoretical 
Perceptions on Conflict Prevention 
Since the early Nineties, there has been a substantial and rapid increase in the 
academic debate regarding conflict prevention. As in any academic field, 
controversy exists over its viability and efficacy. Those, who are advocates, agree 
on the strategic value of conflict prevention, and that preventive diplomacy, early 
warning and early action are central tenets upon which the generic paradigm is 
based. Though there are several models delineating and prescribing the most 
effectual methods of implementation, all agree the conceptual essence is to take 
action early so as to avoid disputes from escalating into unmanageable levels of 
violence. 
The literature regarding conflict prevention analyzes what measures or actions 
should be taken by whom, and at what stage, to inhibit or mitigate violence 
intensification and effect or maintain peace. Within the field of conflict prevention 
there exists two primary sectors of deliberation. There are those who focus on 
preventing interstate conflict, as clashes between sovereign states have not yet been 
eradicated; and those who concentrate on preventing intrastate conflict, as ethnic and 
nationalistic malcontent appear to be on the rise in recent years. Some have 
addressed the transnational spread of conflict, but predominantly do so from either 
the interstate or intrastate perspective in that one or the other type of conflict has the 
propensity to cross national borders. Yet what of a sovereign state that faces an 
interstate threat, while concurrently dealing with civil and ethnic intrastate peril? 
While a nexus between the fundamental doctrines of interstate and intrastate conflict 
prevention seems obvious, there is a void of literature and theory regarding any 
simultaneity or connectivity of the two with regard to conflict prevention. 
The balance of this chapter provides a conceptual investigation of the theoretical 
aspects of mainstream conflict prevention literature to date, so as to impart a suitable 
context and framing for this study. An abstract will also be generated of the factors 
deemed requisite for successful conflict prevention to occur, derived from the 
presented literature. Whereas the conflict prevention literature contends that 
synergistic intervention in the form of execution and leadership is critical to conflict 
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prevention success, this chapter develops the hypothesis of the criticality of a 
synergistic strategy of simultaneity and connectivity towards both intrastate and 
interstate conflict prevention efforts. 
2.2. Conflict Prevention Literature 
The Camegie Commission conducted from 1994 to 1997 what amounts to the 
most overarching and holistic analysis of conflict and conflict prevention to date. 
The threat of violent conflict between states from the traditional preoccupation of 
states to defend, maintain or extend interests and power remains in the contemporary 
world. Yet, given the number and extent of states presently in the throes of profound 
political, social and economic transition, the notable absence of instances of 
interstate war is notable. This absence of interstate conflict is even more noteworthy 
in light ofthe fact that most of the recurring motivation for conventional interstate 
conflict, such as disputes over territory and boundaries, profitable natural resources, 
and national honor are nonetheless prevalent today (Carnegie 1997, 26). However, 
as interstate conflict seems to diminish, intrastate conflict appears to be proliferating. 
Significant sources of conflict may be found in the competition to fill power 
vacuums during times of transition. Other contributing consequential factors for 
conflict may be economic factors such as: resource depletion, rising unemployment, 
failed fiscal or monetary policies, problematic regional relationships, systematic 
cultural discrimination, political or economic repression, illegitimate governmental 
institutions, and corrupt or collapsed regimes. Politicians, demagogues and criminal 
elements alike, as a means to achieve their objectives may straightforwardly exploit 
these events. The circumstances that give rise to violent conflict can usually be 
anticipated, and successful preventive efforts will hence depend on impeding and 
reversing the extension of such conditions. 
To move policies of prevention toward greater pragmatic effect, the Commission 
identified four broad objectives (Camegie 1997, 37). First, promote effective 
international regimes for arms control and disarmament, for economic cooperation, 
for rule making and dispute resolution, and for dialogue and cooperative problem 
solving. Second, promote stable and viable countries, which are thriving states with 
political systems characterized by representative government, the rule of law, open 
economies with social safety nets, and robust civil societies. Third, create barriers to 
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the spread of conflict between and within societies by means such as the suffocation 
of violence through various forms of sanctions, preventive deployment of military 
resources when necessary, and the provision of humanitarian assistance. Finally, 
create a safe and secure environment in the aftermath of conflict by providing the 
necessary security for government to function, establishing mechanisms for 
reconciliation, enabling essential socioeconomic and humanitarian needs to be met, 
establishing an effective and legitimate political and judicial system, and 
regenerating economic activity. These component strategies fall within two all-
encompassing categories, that of operational prevention consisting of applicable 
measures in the face of immediate crisis, and structural prevention comprising 
measures to ensure crises do not arise in the first place. or if they do, that they do not 
recur. 
Operational prevention focuses on strategies and tactics undertaken when 
violence appears imminent and relies on early engagement deliberately designed to 
facilitate creation of conditions in which responsible leaders can resolve the 
problems giving rise to a crisis (Carnegie 1997.39). The integral rudiments of the 
need for leadership, a coherent political-military approach. adequate resources, and a 
restoration plan, were identified to form a framework for operational prevention that 
enhances the conjecture of successful prevention. These measures fall into the four 
broad groups of early warning and response; preventive diplomacy; economic 
measures, sanctions and incentives; and the use of force. Although necessary, these 
steps may not be sufficient to ward off impending violence. but can provide critical 
spatial and temporal political opportunities to pursue other complementary means. 
While operational prevention consists of strategies that face an imminent crisis, 
structural prevention comprises strategies to address the root causes of violent 
conflict that ensure crises do not arise in the first place, and include: emplacing 
international legal systems, dispute resolution mechanisms, and cooperative 
arrangements; meeting people's basic economic, social, cultural, and humanitarian 
needs; and rebuilding societies that have been shattered by war or other major crises 
(Camegie 1997, 69). Structural prevention strategies encompass both the 
development by governments acting cooperatively, and the development by 
individual states, of mechanisms to ensure security, well-being and egalitarian 
justice. 
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In sum, the Carnegie Commission emphasizes that any successful regime of 
conflict prevention must be multifaceted and designed for the long term. 
Operational and structural prevention strategies must be combined and synergistic in 
their efforts to resolve the underlying root causes of violence and provide a 
comprehensive and balanced approach to alleviate the pressures that trigger violent 
conflict, and incorporate all levels of available agencies and actors such as states, 
international organizations, NOOs, religious leaders, the scientific community, 
educational institutions, the media, the business community, and most importantly, 
the people (Carnegie 1997). Unfortunately, one of the remaining dilemmas is that of 
access to conduct conflict prevention efforts if the conflict is occurring within a 
sovereign state that does not seek assistance, such as the case ofKosovo. 
Additionally, it can be argued that structural prevention is actually judgmental in that 
one person's norms are not another's. Moreover, although the Commission 
addressed conflicts both within and between states, each was addressed as a discrete 
entity thereby negating the concept of connective issues. 
Janie Leatherman, William DeMars, Patrick D. Oaffuey and Raimo Vaeyrynen 
(1999) represent another fairly comprehensive analysis of conflict and conflict 
prevention in the literature pool. Leatherman et al. (1999, 46), differentiate between 
the social and material background and the escalatory dynamics of conflict. 
Background factors are a necessary but not sufficient condition for the outbreak of 
violence, while conflict dynamics can be sufficient, but not usually necessary 
conditions for escalation. Both background conditions and violence dynamics are 
equally applicable towards the four basic types of conflict, which are structural, 
material, institutional, and identity conflicts. Structural conflicts are where tensions 
stem from such conditions as social hierarchies and cleavages, or territorial 
divisions, resulting in the marginalization of some groups and privileging of others 
along class, ethnic, or gender lines. Material conflicts are when scarcity and 
allocation of resources, and demographic and environmental pressures lead to 
adverse effects that shape politics and potentially lead to violence. In institutional 
conflicts the political struggle mobilizes the ideological values and material interests 
of the people to fight for control of the state, the resources it commands, and in that 
way, hegemony and autonomy within society. And finally, in identity conflicts 
violence is embedded in the socio-economic and cultural cleavages of society, but 
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reproduced in the perception of threats to the individual and group core values and 
belief system leading to the resort to force to defend or augment them (Leatherman 
et al. 1999,46). 
After a conceptual analysis supported by case studies of Burundi and Macedonia, 
Leatherman et al., drew four conclusions, or prescriptions, framed as interim insights 
leading towards fruitful methods of conflict prevention. Each conclusion is 
expressed as a hypothesis for discovering the causal processes by which conflict 
either escalates or is prevented, and also as a criterion for designing and evaluating 
policies for early warning and conflict prevention. By pairing hypotheses with 
criteria, explicit commitments of conflict prevention are thereby proposed in the 
form of the hypothesis ofmultidimensionality, the hypothesis of political access, the 
hypothesis of synergy, and the hypothesis of political interest (Leatherman at al. 
1999,182-217). 
The hypothesis of multidimensionality states that conflict and its prevention are 
multidimensional and multilevel in their causal structure, incorporating structural, 
cultural and institutional dimensions, as well as national elite, intergovernmental and 
international levels. In effective early warning and conflict prevention pol icy, 
international actors should "cover the bases" through a division of labor that puts 
them in a position to monitor and influence aH important dimensions and levels of a 
society. If any critical segment is omitted, the effort is likely to fail. 
Conflict and its escalation can be understood analytically as growing out of three 
dimensions. Structural cleavages entail the broad social distinctions demarcated by 
categories such as economic class, racial group, and urban/rural division; and the 
way the distribution of wealth and privilege is mapped onto these distinctions. 
Structural cleavages are not necessarily static, but remain stable for long periods. 
Culture is a real, though elusive and dynamic, variable in generating conflict. 
Cultural difference does not necessarily lead to cultural tension or outright conflict, 
but is a fertile field for the politically ambitious, particularly when cultural divisions 
coincide with economic cleavages or carry memories of past victimization. The 
legitimacy and effectiveness of political institutions are critical factors influencing 
whether structural cleavages or cultural differences generate conflict escalation. 
Institutional legitimacy can be threatened when state administrative capacity erodes 
or during a fragile transition from authoritarian to democratic institutions. The 
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critical actors who escalate or prevent conflict are national elites, intergovernmental 
actors and international actors, the most important of which are national elites for it 
is they who ultimately choose to escalate a conflict or move towards resolution. 
Within the hypothesis of multidimensionality, the criterion of comprehensiveness is 
paramount, as all three categories of actors can act on all three dimensions of the 
conflict. 
The hypothesis of political access states that information to warn the international 
community of an impending conflict is produced in a political process through 
which multiple actors negotiate with local political elites for access to sensitive areas 
and populations. The criterion of engagement is the normative commitment for 
political access, where effective early warning presupposes that international actors 
have already gained access to the conflict through negotiated engagement with one 
or more of the conflict parties. Hence, theoretical models that would conceptualize 
early warning as disengaged from direct involvement with a society and its leaders 
are misleading. International actors who understand the partiality of their own 
information, and their need to learn from and coordinate strategies with other actors 
engaged in conflict prevention, seek to overcome these limitations by forming 
network relationships with other actors. 
The hypothesis of synergy states that conflict prevention is policy artifice that sets 
in motion simultaneous peace processes in multiple levels and dimensions of a 
society. The combination generates synergies across the levels and dimensions until 
peace develops a life of its own. Peace entrepreneurs not only invent processes for 
each dimension and subgroup of society, they also actively deter or neutralize the 
negative synergies created by conflict entrepreneurs or by the inadvertent effects of 
international intervention. Actors engaged in conflict prevention cultivate networks 
as a source of power, which engage significant sectors of a society, correct negative 
synergies and enhance positive ones through the criterion of decentralized 
coordination, and maximize effectiveness of limited resources and political will. 
The challenge of conflict prevention is to maximize the positive synergy between the 
tactics of independent actors through consensual rather than authoritative 
coordination. 
The hypothesis of political interest states that the political will and material 
resources available for conflict prevention, and even the threshold of violence that 
41 
defines the early warning task, differ from case to case and reflect the perception of 
interests by major powers and leading regional states. These interests are not fixed 
or given, but emerge from fluid coalitions of political leaders, bureaucrats, public 
opinion, mass movements, NGOs and other actors. The criterion of coalition 
building is achieved by actors committed to effective conflict prevention 
continuously building supportive coalitions by mobilizing constituencies, shaping 
perceptions and generating policy options. Discovering the political will for 
preventive action is a task done one conflict at a time. Each coalition is built 
individually, and its members will not necessarily cooperate on the next conflict or 
country. One of the possible difficulties with the hypothesis of political interest is 
that it does not take into consideration the possibility of intervention fatigue. 
Leatherman et al. (1999, 217) conclude by cautioning that the performance of 
each of these tasks is a necessary but not sufficient condition for successful conflict 
prevention. The sufficient condition is that international and domestic actors 
somehow fmd a way to make peace by matching the reality ofthe particular society 
with the available policy tools and coalition partners. Throughout this analysis, the 
entire focal point was only on intrastate crises. 
Lund (1996) was the first to analyze conflict and conflict prevention with the goal 
of determining a more normative model of conflict prevention tools to be utilized in 
prevention of possible future conflicts, based on a systemic assessment of those 
actions that helped prevent conflicts in the past as well as those that failed. The 
primary focus of his research was to ascertain if conflict prevention efforts actually 
made a difference, or did the non-escalation of a conflict have little to do with 
deliberate prevention efforts. Of the various issues related to why an emerging 
dispute may not always lead to armed conflict, some factors are subject to human 
manipulation and are thus targets for conflict prevention, while other factors are 
more structural, or systemic, and are less predisposed to deliberate human 
manipUlation. Lund (1996, 84) cautions that while underrating human prevention 
efforts may lead to the inference of conflict being an ingrained human trait, 
overestimation of human agency can lead to unrealistic policy recommendations and 
hopes. 
By conducting a similar systems cross-case analysis of conflicts in Croatia, 
Serbia, Bosnia, Macedonia, Albania, Hungary, Estonia, Zaire, Congo, Haiti, Peru, 
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and Guatemala, Lund assessed the causal relationship of hypothesized manipulable 
factors as they related to the diverging outcomes of conflict or prevention. Lund 
deduced that five manipulable factors were often present in the circumstances where 
nascent political disputes were handled through peaceful means and were largely 
absent in those disputes that resulted in the use of armed force. Three of the factors 
functioned external to the dispute itself, pertaining to third parties, while two factors 
were indigenous to the dispute, thereby indicating where third parties could employ 
additional influence. The five factors identified were third party timing, 
multifaceted action, support from major players, moderate leadership, and state 
autonomy. 
Third party timing is critical in that "peaceful outcomes are more likely to the 
extent that third parties apply unequivocal pressures on the parties to engage in 
mutual processes and institutions aimed at peaceful settlement of differences before 
one or the other party mobilizes its political constituency or deploys armed force or 
coercion to achieve concrete gains" (Lund 1996, 86). The degree of stimulus that 
third parties must bring to bear is relative to the scale and stage of development of 
the violence or coercive power being targeted, whereby measures applied early in a 
conflict before these factors intensify require less pressure and cost than do measures 
applied later. 
Multifaceted action refers to a variety of actions and instruments to address the 
various facets of a dispute, such as economic or political incentives or sanctions, 
institution building assistance, alleviating distrust, promoting reconciliation, 
establishing negotiation or mediation channels, and formulating settlements. A 
premium is accordingly placed on close coordination and cooperation among the 
third parties partaking in preventive actions; and where cooperation and unity of 
purpose among third parties is meager, or absent, conflict prevention effectiveness is 
compromised. In other words, one of the measures of the adequacy of preventive 
interventions is their richness of breadth. Consequently, third party action may be 
greatly facilitated by the presence of a unifying actor or force to provide overarching 
strategy and orchestration. 
Support from major players is key, given that conflict prevention efforts are more 
effective when major powers, regional powers, and neigh boring states agree to 
support or tolerate those efforts and do not undermine them by overt or covert 
43 
support for one or another party to the dispute. The participation of the United 
States and regional organizations further enhances the possibilities for success (Lund 
1996, 95), provided access is available. Whereas major players can facilitate 
through the economic or diplomatic influence they may hold in a given region, 
competing interests can weaken the efficacy of conflict prevention efforts. Here, 
regional organizations can assist. Not only can regional organizations serve to 
advance conflict prevention efforts and allay suspicions of major power parochial 
interests, but they can additionally function as a deconfliction point or unifYing 
force. 
Moderate leadership refers to the fact that ''peaceful outcomes are more likely 
when the leaders of the parties to the dispute are moderate in their words, actions 
and policies, make conciliatory gestures, and seek bilateral or multilateral 
negotiations and bargaining to resolve the issues in dispute". The level of tension 
and propensity for use of violence can be significantly amplified with intemperate 
and incendiary public ultimatums, threats and divisive rhetoric; when partisan 
rhetoric is translated into legislation or policy that clearly favors one group or faction 
at the expense of the other; or force is used by the police or military against political 
opponents. Conversely, the chances of successful conflict prevention are 
appreciably enhanced where leaders demonstrate greater restraint and exhibit an 
inclination to submit matters to negotiation and international organizations. 
State autonomy can be vital since "conflict prevention is more effective to the 
extent that the state directly affected by a dispute is autonomous from one or another 
of the disputants". An autonomous state encompasses the requisite procedures and 
institutions for impartial negotiation, where the military and security forces serve the 
constitutional order and are independent of partisan aims. Successful conflict 
prevention is more probable when the parties to the dispute negotiate within some 
previously established set of norms and procedures. It should be noted, however, 
that an autonomous state is not synonymous with a democratic state, only that state 
institutions be effectively governed by established conventions and norms. 
Lund (1996, 200) concludes that, based on his similar systems cross-case 
analysis, these five manipulable and salient factors are integral to successful conflict 
prevention, and that in light of both the threats and constraints confronting the global 
system of nations today, an intensified, systematic, and relatively low cost effort to 
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create a collective, strategic approach to multilateral conflict prevention is 
paramount for the future. As such, his work is of a much more prescriptive nature, 
while keeping in line with the theoretical temperament of the preceding studies, and 
is applicable to both interstate and intrastate conflict, albeit independently. Finally, 
his normative intent was encapsulated by the development of a "toolbox" of policies 
and instruments from which to draw for application of conflict prevention efforts, 
which served as a base for the development of figure 1.3 in the preceding chapter. 
In his multi-case comparative analysis, introduced in the previous chapter, 
Jentleson (2000a; 2000b) followed suit with the objective of creating a normative 
model of conflict prevention efforts and actions that could be used to thwart 
contentious political issues from developing into conflict. After empirically and 
analytically supporting his contention that conflict prevention is not just a gallant 
concept, but also a viable real world strategy, requisites for conflict prevention 
application were defined. Ultimately, four major requisites were delineated: early 
warning, diplomatic strategies, major international actors, and credible military force 
(Jentleson 2000b, 334-344). 
Early warning, an integral component of conflict prevention for the equivalent 
rationale as explicated by Lund, was not deemed to be the specific quandary, as the 
United Nations, national governments, and NGOs all had a number of early warning 
mechanisms in place. What constituted the early warning dilemma was the 
requirement to close the warning-response gap (Jentleson 2000b, 335; George and 
Holl 2000, 21-36). While the information was available early on in the dispute, the 
problem was determined to be limited political incentives, and in some instances 
political disincentives, to responding with early action. Jentleson underscored the 
need for a more systematic and analytic capacity for developing policy responses. 
Diplomatic strategies, citing Lund's ''tool box" were determined to fall within 
seven general spheres (Jentleson 2000b, 335-338). The first factor was the 
significance of mixed strategies, amalgamating both coercive measures and 
inducements. Second was that the terms of negotiation allow all sides to derive 
gains from cooperation and be able to illustrate those gains to their domestic 
constituencies. Third was the major role played by special envoys and other lead 
diplomats as negotiators and mediators. Fourth was that the requisite action be taken 
early on in the dispute. Fifth was that economic sanctions be imposed 
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comprehensively and decisively. and enforced tightly. rather than imposed partially 
and incrementally with limited effort at enforcement. Sixth was the influential lure 
of membership in major international and regional organizations. And finally. that 
no one international actor is singularly vital to conflict prevention; many have 
important roles to play across the range of cases. while the same actor can play 
varying roles in different cases. 
Major international actors are required to lend credibility to the conflict 
prevention efforts as well as leadership in the multilateral environment. The United 
States' role continues to be essential, particularly as it relates to multilateral 
leadership. Western European powers also have a critical leadership role, whether as 
individual states or collectively as the European Union. The United Nations brings 
two profound assets to conflict prevention; that of collective legitimation, and that of 
its network of agencies. Regional multilateral organizations provide a more topical 
ability to address the concerns of contagion, diffusion and escalation. NGOs can 
additionally play key roles and often achieve what governments cannot, albeit not 
always in an explicitly coordinated fashion. While all these actors can have a crucial 
role in conflict prevention efforts, the role ofleadership must be underscored, as 
therein lies the focal point for creation of a synergy of actors and actions. 
Credible military force is the last of lentleson's requisites for conflict prevention. 
The impartial threat of credible military force is essential both in terms of deterrence 
and reassurance. Deterrence refers to the credibility of the international community 
to respond coercively to the purposive nature of the conflict parties, while 
reassurance ascribes to the protection that only international actors can provide as 
related to the security dilemma and commitment problem. Impartial refers not to 
impartiality between belIigerents, but impartiality in executing the decisions of the 
United Nations Security Council, or other prevailing organizations, in fair, firm and 
symmetrical enforcement of consequences. Similarly, credible refers not to whether 
the threat of military force can be made, but to whether the threat is believed by the 
intended recipients. 
lentleson (2000b, 334) concludes that, based on his multi-case comparative 
analysis, these four requisites are fundamental to successful conflict prevention. in 
the sense that they provide sufficient generality to constitute the parameters of a 
strategy, but are also flexible enough to be adapted for specific application on a case-
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by-case basis. Similar to Lund, Jentleson's work is applicable to both interstate and 
intrastate conflict, although discretely. 
Ackermann (2000), utilizing the normative conclusions ofLund's research as a 
foundation, conducted an empirical single-case study of conflict prevention efforts in 
Macedonia up to the point of commencement of the Kosovo crisis in order to 
identify the concrete conditions under which conflict could be prevented. By 
applying the normative aspects of conflict prevention research to a specific case, 
Ackermann developed an analytical framework, which described the various actors, 
methods, and approaches that appeared to be necessary for successful conflict 
prevention. Developed hypotheses were then evaluated in a cross-case analysis of 
conflicts in Hungary, Slovakia, Estonia, Russia, Bosnia, Croatia, and Rwanda. 
Lastly, she identified four general, and in many ways intertwined, necessary factors: 
timely involvement; support of major international actors; coordinated, varied, and 
multifaceted intervention; and moderate behavior of domestic leaders. 
Timely involvement of third parties is vital as preventive actions must occur in 
the early or formative stages of conflict when there is no, or only sporadic, violence 
and when contending parties have not yet mobilized to use force. This is critical in 
cases where violent conflict has the propensity for spillover across borders. 
Support of major international actors, particularly either the United States or an 
international or regional institution was determined to be vital to the initiation and 
continuation of conflict prevention measures. Due to the hesitancy of the 
international community to become involved in the internal affairs of states, in order 
to muster the political will for initiation of conflict prevention measures, a dominant 
international actor must either initiate or be supportive when domestic players 
request third party involvement as well as go through the due process of the United 
Nations Security Council. Also emphasized is the role of individuals representing 
international and/or regional organizations and their leadership and personal 
commitment to the conflict prevention effort. 
Coordinated, varied, and multifaceted intervention actions, instruments and 
strategies are needed to prevent incipient conflict. Official and unofficial actors 
must employ a number of instruments, from preventive deployment, to the use of 
good offices and mediation, to grassroots activities designed to induce behavioral 
changes among members of the competing parties. Concurrently, where mandates 
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overlap, such as those of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe 
and the United Nations, actors need to coordinate and complement prevention 
actions. Furthermore, utilization ofleadership who is familiar with the region, and 
has a strong personal belief in conflict prevention is indispensable. 
Moderate behavior of domestic leaders, though not requisite for conflict 
prevention actions, increases the potential for success. Moderate behavior may 
denote an array of possibilities: from abstention of the pursuit of nationalist, 
excIusionary agendas, from the use of hate rhetoric, from the falsification and misuse 
of historical events, symbols, and myths, and from extreme expressions of 
victimization; to a willing openness to political accommodation and power sharing, 
such as governmental coalitions, parliamentary proportionality, or some degree of 
local or regional autonomy. Equally critical is the ability of political leaders to 
convince their constituency that such accommodative measures work to the benefit 
of all segments of society. 
In sum, Ackermann (2000, 162) contends that conflict prevention does not come 
automatically, effortlessly, or through good will alone, but entails the conscious 
implementation of preventive measures, on the part of myriad actors, and on many 
different, overlapping levels. At the same time, however, Ackermann cautions that 
intrinsic psychological factors may inhibit peaceful outcomes, conflict prevention is 
an on-going process and is never entirely complete, and that it is vital not to have 
exaggerated expectations. Though her study addressed both the interstate and 
intrastate aspects of conflict, it was done so with the two being separate entities. 
While the literature is not replete with abundant normative models for conflict 
prevention, it should be evident that the models presented are compatible, 
complementary, and synergistic in approaches. While the semantics may be 
dissimilar, each approach prescribes a multifaceted and multilevel methodology, 
from all available actors, to address the proximate and latent aspects of conflict. 
These approaches also underpin the leaders as critical nodes, whom have the 
ultimate decision as to whether to pursue conflictual or peaceful paths. 
Figure 2.1 recapitulates the theoretical and normative aspects of available conflict 
prevention literature as they relate to those factors deemed requisite for successful 
application. The Carnegie Commission, and Leatherman, et al., collectively develop 
the empirical and theoretical foundation for application of the more normative works 
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ofLund, Jentleson, and Ackennann. From the theoretical perspective, the social and 
material background, and the escalatory dynamics of conflict, as delineated by 
Leathennan, et al., correlate and complement the structural and operational 
components ofthe Carnegie Commission respectively. The social and material 
background dynamics, and structural prevention, both address long-tenn, bottom-up 
strategies, while escalatory dynamics and operational prevention adopt short-tenn, 
top-down strategies. 
Figure 1.1: Factors for Successful Conflict Prevention. 
Author Factors of Successful Conflict Prevention 
Early Warning and Response 
Carnegie Commission Preventive Diplomacy 
Economic Measures, Sanctions and Incentives 
Useofforce 
Hypothesis of Multidimensionality 
Leatherman, et al. Hypothesis of Political Access 
Hypothesis ofSynergy 
Hypothesis of Political Interest 
Third Party Timing 
Multifaceted Action 




JentIeson Diplomatic Strategies 
Major International Actors 
Credible Mili!ary Force 
Timely involvement 
Ackermann Support of Major Actors 
Coordinated, Varied and Multifaceted Intervention 
Moderate Behavior of Domestic Leaders 
From a more nonnative perspective, the conceptual framework of Lund, 
Jentleson, and Ackennann are also complementary in scope. The third party timing 
of Lund, early warning of Jentleson, and timely involvement of Ackennann, all refer 
to the ability to detect the early or fonnative stages of conflict, but even more 
crucially, to exploit this knowledge into policy responses early on in the dispute 
prior to mobilization of either party. Consequently, the aspects of early warning and 
early response are inextricably intertwined. The multifaceted action of Lund, 
diplomatic strategies of Jentleson, and coordinated, varied and multifaceted 
intervention of Ackennann all submit to the requisite of conflict prevention efforts 
being multifaceted in approach and multilevel in action. Additionally. all three 
authors agree on the importance of support from major international actors. 
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However, what all the authors' normative prescriptions fail to address is any type of 
synergy or nexus of interstate and intrastate conflict prevention measures in 
application. For the purposes of this study, early warning and response, support of 
major international actors, multifaceted and multilevel action, and synergistic 
intervention will be addressed. While all are necessary, but not sufficient, 
synergistic intervention is the most critical, combining both the synergy of execution 
and leadership, as well as a synergy of simultaneity and connectivity towards both 
the interstate and intrastate aspects of a conflict. 
2.2. Simultaneity and Connectivity 
As formerly affirmed, resident within the sphere of conflict prevention exist two 
major sectors of deliberation. There are those who focus on preventing interstate 
conflict, as clashes between sovereign states have not yet been eradicated; and those 
who concentrate on preventing intrastate conflict, as ethnic and nationalistic 
malcontent seems to be the current trend. Although there has been some recent 
academic discourse on the subject oftransnational conflict, in essence this term 
describes the spread of conflict across international borders either through contagion, 
diffusion or escalation and in itself does not represent a discrete category of conflict. 
However, the primary focal point of this study is of a sovereign state that faces an 
interstate threat, while concurrently dealing with civil and ethnic intrastate peril. 
While the coincidence between the fundamental doctrine of interstate and intrastate 
conflict prevention is palpable, and probable, there is a veritable void of literature 
and theory regarding any simultaneity or connectivity of the two. 
The concept of a nexus between interstate and intrastate war is not novel, and has 
been considerably analyzed within the discipline of war and conflict studies at the 
systemic level. Geller and Singer (1998) provide an explanation of war in 
international politics grounded on data based, empirical research, which classifies 
and synthesizes the research findings of over 500 quantitative analyses of war at the 
analytic levels of the state, dyad, region, and international system. Within this 
context, the possibility of contagion or diffusion of international conflict, whether in 
the form of war or less serious modes of dispute is evaluated. In dealing with the 
spread of conflict across national boundaries, conflict may be treated as both cause 
and effect. At the state level, the issue involves the spread of internal violence, 
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while at the interstate level it involves the spread of war (Geller and Singer 1998, 
106). 
Geller and Singer (1998, 106-108) investigate six studies with reference to 
contagion/diffusion as related to war prone regions. Bremer (1982) researches 
regional patterns of coercive interstate behavior from 1900 to 1976 and observes 
compelling evidence that coercive behavior is contagious intra-regionally, but there 
is little evidence of inter-regional coercive contagion. Faber, Houweling, and 
Siccama (1984) examine the temporal and spatial distances between wars from 1816 
to 1980, where temporal distance is defined as the time-lapse between successive 
wars and spatial distance is defined as the geographical distance between successive 
war localities. Their results suggest the location and timing of previous conflicts 
have positive and significant effects on subsequent war location and timing 
regionally, but are not contagious across space. In a succeeding and more 
meticulous study, Houweling and Siccama (1985) corroborate these same findings. 
Starr and Most (1983, 1985) conduct two studies containing the factor of borders in 
examination of contagion/diffusion processes from 1960 to 1972. Their results 
indicate that nations with wars on their borders have a higher probability of engaging 
in war in a subsequent temporal period than do nations without border wars. Kirby 
and Ward (1987) conduct a spatial analysis of conflict from 1948 to 1978, and 
observe that hostile interactions between states are significantly affected by existing 
conflicts within bordering states. Reflecting on these studies, Geller and Singer 
(1998, 107) contend that conflict or war contagion/diffusion processes operate at the 
regional level and border contact increases the probability of war contagion. 
Subsequently, Geller and Singer (1998, 122-123) examined the possible 
relationship between the frequency of civil wars and the frequency of international 
disputes and wars, specifically whether the amount of system-level interstate conflict 
is affected by the amount of state-level civil war or revolution in the international 
system. Maoz (1989) analyzes the correlation between the number of revolutionary 
state formations and/or transformati?ns and the incidence of interstate disputes from 
1815 to 1976, and determines his hypothesis, that the number of interstate conflicts 
in the system will increase when a large number of states are experiencing regime 
changes, is statistically supported. Hoole and Huang (1989), in an analogous study 
of the limited temporal period of 1947 to 1980, determine that changes in the 
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amount of system-level interstate war are significantly affected by changes in the 
amount of civil war occurring in the interstate system. These studies, relating state-
level attributes to system-level patterns of conflict, indicate positive associations 
between the number of civil and revolutionary wars and the incidence of interstate 
conflict, whereby interstate and intrastate conflict are part of an interactive global 
process (Geller and Singer 1998, 123-125). 
Most and Starr (1980) research the possible diffusion of new war participations 
during the 1946 to 1965 temporal period, whereby the war diffusion hypothesis 
concerns the possibility that the occurrence of one new war participation will alter 
the probability of subsequent occurrences. The analysis focuses on the four 
diffusion-related processes of positive reinforcement, negative reinforcement, 
positive spatial diffusion, and negative spatial diffusion. Positive and negative 
reinforcement is an intrastate process, in which there are possible linkages between a 
state's own war experiences at one time and at some subsequent time. Decision 
makers in any state are confronted by an "operational milieu" that comprises risks 
and opportunities. This operational milieu, and its perceived risks and opportunities, 
may modify through time causing decision makers to reassess their situations as they 
relate to particular policies in response to those perceived risks and opportunities. 
Positive and negative spatial diffusion is an interstate process, wherein if wars tend 
to diffuse, the process is most likely to operate among those states that share high 
levels of interaction through geographic proximity, operationalized as shared 
borders. The analytic results of this study exhibited strong statistical evidence in 
support of the warring border state, positive spatial diffusion hypothesis (Most and 
Starr 1980,944). 
Employing further refined variables and the expanded temporal period of 1816 to 
1965, Siverson and Starr (1990) apply borders and alliances as indicators of 
opportunity and willingness, respectively, to test the war diffusion hypothesis. 
Previously, two discrete lines of investigation had been followed on the diffusion of 
war, that of borders as interaction opportunities and that of alliances as indicators of 
mutual willingness. Whereas opportunity represents macro level environmental and 
structural factor potential, willingness is related at the micro level to decision 
maker'S calculations of advantage and disadvantage, cost and benefit, and 
considered on both the conscious and unconscious levels. Siverson and Starr (1990, 
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49) contend that opportunity and willingness are integrally linked in myriad modes, 
and do not create mutually exclusive categories. Their findings suggest that the 
probability of war diffusion is substantially increased as opportunities and 
willingness increase, and particularly when such geographic and political factors are 
combined. 
Neither is the concept of a nexus involving interstate and intrastate conflict novel 
within the sphere of internal or ethnic conflict at the state level. Brown (1996) 
examines intrastate conflict in an attempt to explicate how internal conflict 
commences, how it involves neighboring states, and what distant powers and 
international organizations can do about it. Brown defines internal conflict as 
violent or potentially violent political disputes whose origins can be traced to 
domestic rather than systemic factors, and where armed violence takes place or 
threatens to take place primarily within the borders of a single state. 
The central premise of Brown's reasoning is that, although neighboring states and 
developments in neigh boring countries rarely trigger all-out civil wars, almost all 
conflicts involve neighboring states in one way or another, and the vast majority of 
internal conflicts have important regional implications for regional stability. 
Conventional wisdom regarding regional dimensions of intrastate conflict relies 
profoundly on rudimentary analogies to diseases, fires, floods, and other forces of 
nature, whereby conflicts are said to spill over. Brown (1996, 24) maintains this 
manner of thinking about regional dimensions of intrastate conflict is both simplistic 
and mechanistic. It is simplistic because it perceives conflict transitioning in only 
one direction, from the site where the conflict initiated to neighboring states, which 
are characterized as passive and innocent victims. It is mechanistic since it views 
events occurring in an uncontrolled and uncontrollable fashion; problems are blamed 
on forces of nature, or conflict itself, rather than on the acts and decisions of leaders, 
decision-makers and governments. By distinguishing between the effects of 
intrastate conflict on neighboring states and on the actions that neighboring states 
take with respect to intrastate conflict, Brown endeavors to advance analytical clarity 
of the regional dynamics of intrastate conflict. 
The effects of intrastate conflicts on neigh boring states fall into five main 
categories: refugee problems, economic problems, military problems, instability 
problems, and war (Brown 1996, 591-600). At a minimum, refugees place a 
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profound economic burden on recipient countries, the vast majority of whom have 
acute resource constraints themselves. Additionally, refugees have the capability of 
generating grave security problems, as combatants often merge with refugee 
populations and utilize refugee camps as areas for rest, recuperation, recruitment and 
reorganization. Refugees entering a neighboring state where large numbers of ethnic 
brethren reside, may also initiate their compatriots to become more radicalized, 
thereby leading to increased domestic political turmoil within that state. 
The positive economic relations that neighboring states often have can be 
disrupted though intrastate conflict, damaging regional interests in a significant 
manner. An intrastate conflict on the border of another state can have extensive 
effects on trade, transportation, communication, manufacturing, finance, and raw 
material access. Moreover, if world powers become apprehensive with reference to 
regional stability as a whole, foreign investment can be reduced or terminated. 
Military problems for neighboring states as a result of intrastate conflict can 
occur by means of four possible methods. First, a neighboring state's territory can 
be used for transshipment of arms and supplies to insurgents within the conflict 
state. Second, the territory of bordering states can act as an operations base or safe-
haven for insurgent groups. Third, insurgent groups can conduct attacks within the 
adjoining state, either to strike at their adversaries indirectly or invite regional and 
international attention to their cause. Finally, exploitation of neigh boring state 
territory for arms and supplies transshipment, operational bases or safe-haven areas 
can easily set in motion hot-pursuit operations and interdiction campaigns. 
Political instability within a neigh boring state can be generated by intrastate 
conflict in several ways, such as economic costs leading towards an increase in civil 
strife and/or weakening the host government, or refugees inciting disruption and 
turmoil. However, these causes usually serve to exacerbate existing stability 
dilemmas as opposed to creating new ones. Intrastate conflict is most likely to spark 
instability in bordering states when ethnic groups straddle formal state boundaries; 
divided ethnic groups are particularly effective conflict transmitters. 
The final category of effects of intrastate conflicts on neigh boring states is that of 
war. Hot pursuit operations and interdiction campaigns can instigate intrastate 
conflict leading to interstate conflict when one government is trying to root out 
insurgents in a neighboring state, and the bordering state in question seeks to defend 
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its territory and sovereignty. Intrastate conflict can also lead conflicting parties to 
adopt increasingly radicalized and belligerent platforms. This aggressive 
nationalism can develop and become directed not just at internal rivals. but external 
actors, and adjacent states are the most likely targets of intensifying nationalistic 
crusades. An additional possibility of intrastate conflict effecting interstate conflict 
is that of diversionary war, where leaders beset by internal challenges lash out 
against bordering states to divert attention from domestic troubles. 
The actions that neighboring states take with respect to intrastate conflict also fall 
into five major categories: humanitarian intervention, defensive intervention, 
protective intervention, opportunistic intervention, and opportunistic war. In this 
context, it should be noted that the term "intervention" should be thought of 
generally, encompassing diplomatic initiatives, economic assistance or sanctions, 
military assistance, or military action. In addition, interventions are oft complex in 
that they involve a breadth of activities and actions, and states usually act for a 
variety of reasons, in which the true motivation is frequently concealed behind 
diplomatic smokescreens. 
Humanitarian interventions are often supported by neighboring states in an 
attempt to assuage the tremendous humanitarian suffering habitually caused by 
intrastate conflict. In some instances, regional powers take humanitarian action 
aimed at relieving distress and restoring stability within the region. As altruistic and 
benign as humanitarian interventions may seem, a regional power rarely launches a 
purely altruistic initiative, as there typically exists a self-serving agenda of some 
nature. 
Defensive interventions are often embarked upon by neighboring states to bring 
trans-border problems to an end, to keep conflict from spreading, or to bring a war to 
its end. In such cases as these, the motivations of the bordering state are usually 
justified as being self-defense oriented, and can range from an actual invasion, to the 
dispatch of peacekeeping forces to a specific location. 
Protective interventions are actions by the neighboring state, whose design is to 
protect or assist ethnic brethren involved in the conflict across their border. In this 
instance, the bordering state customarily undertakes proceedings that cannot be 
depicted as solely defensive from an international legal stance, even if the 
interveners continually maintain they are merely defending their brethren. 
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Opportunistic interventions are acts by the bordering state intended to exploit 
internal tunnoil elsewhere, advance their political, economic and military interests, 
and improve their regional strategic position. Regional rivals often support 
insurgents in neighboring countries, substituting insurgent proxies for direct 
interstate conflict, in the hopes that the rival neighboring state will remain 
preoccupied with domestic affairs and weaken over time, or more ambitiously that 
the neighboring state government will be forced to the precipice of failure. Support 
activities include financial assistance; weapons and communications equipment; 
manpower, training and leadership; logistical assistance; and operational bases and 
safe-havens. The converse side of opportunistic interventions holds that neighboring 
states may intervene to sustain a friendly neighboring government and assist in 
keeping communally problematic insurgents contained. 
The final category of actions that neigh boring states can take with respect to 
intrastate conflict is opportunistic invasions. Intrastate conflict creates a window of 
opportunity for a rival bordering state to exploit the transitory weakness and invade. 
The distinction between an opportunistic intervention and an opportunistic invasion 
is essentially a matter of degree and fonn: in the fonner, bordering states assist 
insurgent forces and engage in proxy wars while trying to retain an innocent public 
pretense; in the latter, they initiate full-scale military offensives via their indigenous 
forces and effect a less plausible pretense about their intentions. 
Although neighboring states can be the innocent victims of intrastate conflict, 
they are habitually active contributors to violence, escalation, and regional instability 
(Brown 1996, 600). Conventional wisdom regarding the regional dynamics of 
intrastate conflict; that conflict merely "spills over" from one location to another in a 
unidirectional manner that is no-fault and beyond control, is misleading. The spread 
of conflict is bi-directional, both from the originating point and from neighboring 
states, and is often the product of deliberate decisions taken by leaders and 
governments. In precis, few if any intrastate conflicts are hennetically sealed, and 
the vast majority have important regional dimensions and implications. 
Citing Brown's work as a foundation, Lake and Rothchild (1998) further probe 
the question of how, why, and when do intrastate conflicts spread across national 
borders. Lake and Rothchild (1998, 4) reason that intrastate conflict is not caused 
directly by intergroup differences, ancient hatreds and centuries old feuds; the 
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stresses of modern life within a global economy; nor were ethnic passions, long 
contained by repressive communist regimes, simply uncorked by the end of the Cold 
War. Rather, intrastate conflict is most commonly caused by collective fears of the 
future, propagated through information failures, problems of credible commitment, 
and the security dilemma. Regarding the actual spread of intrastate conflict, Lake 
and Rothchild distinguish between diffusion, which occurs when conflict in one area 
alters the likelihood of conflict elsewhere, and escalation, which occurs when 
additional, foreign participants enter an otherwise intrastate conflict. 
Diffusion of intrastate conflict across state borders can occur in four fashions, 
which are not necessarily exclusive and may all occur simultaneously (Lake and 
Rothchild 1998, 25-32). First, intrastate conflict may actually be contagious, in the 
full sense of this overused term, in that refugee flows from a neighboring state can 
alter that state's own ethnic composition. Similarly, changes in the ethnic balance of 
power can occur with the fragmentation of federal states, without the actual 
migration of peoples across state borders. Second, groups in one state, witnessing 
ethnic mobilization or political success by ethnic groups in another state, may foster 
their own political agitation and make significantly greater demands upon their state 
government. Correspondingly, intrastate conflict elsewhere may cause groups to 
revise their beliefs about the possible demands of other groups in their own state. 
Third, intrastate conflict in other states, may lead groups to update their beliefs about 
the efficacy of the political safeguards contained in their own existing contracts. For 
instance, if international events suggest that the leverage wielded by minority groups 
is less effective than previously believed, the majority may become more 
emboldened. Finally, intrastate conflict abroad may lead groups to modernize their 
values about the costs of protest or, ultimately, violence and their probability of 
success, thereby creating the perception that valued ends can be obtained through 
coercion. 
Whereas diffusion occurs in part through information flows that condition the 
beliefs of ethnic actors elsewhere, escalation occurs through the more traditional 
routes of other interstate conflicts, such as alliances, spillovers, irredentism, 
diversions, and internal weaknesses. Escalation of intrastate conflict into interstate 
conflict can occur in five methods, similar to those explicated by Brown, and also 
not necessarily mutually exclusive. First, Ethnic ties and antagonisms frequently 
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motivate states to become involved in an intrastate conflict elsewhere, when like 
ethnic groups in one state are propelled by feelings of solidarity with their ethnic kin 
in another state. This typically occurs between neighbors where ethnic groups span 
national boundaries. Second, ethnic combatants in one state may use the territory of 
a second state for staging areas, retreats, etc. This can result in recriminations 
between the two affected states and, in the case of hot pursuit operations, direct 
border clashes that may spiral out of control. Third, ethnic mobilization often 
contains within it an irredentist dimension, as ethnic leaders demand the 
reunification of an often mythical, but nonetheless politically salient, ethnic 
homeland. This is typically defined as the largest area of territory ever controlled, or 
believed to have been controlled, by that ethnic group. Fourth, ethnicity provides an 
effective foundation for diversionary wars, stimulated by political leaders beset by 
domestic opposition and seeking to incite interstate conflict as a rallying point for 
support of their continued rule. Lastly, aggressor states within the region may 
consider states with significant internal conflict to be an easy target for takeover. 
After a succinct evaluation ofthe concepts of ethnicity and ethnic groups, the 
sources ofintrastate conflict, and characterization ofthe differentiation concerning 
diffusion and escalation, Lake and Rothchild (1998, 339-344) draw five preliminary 
conclusions about the possible proliferation of intrastate conflict across state 
borders. Firstly, intrastate conflict, and its spread across state boundaries, is the 
product of strategic interactions between and within groups. In all conflict, both 
individuals and groups select strategies based upon their expectations of the actions 
of others, where the outcome is the consequence of the selected strategies. Within 
groups, ethnic activists or political entrepreneurs seek self-aggrandizement by 
polarizing society and outbidding moderate politicians within their community, in 
quest of enhancing their position both within the group and in the larger social and 
political systems. Between groups, violence arises from information failures, 
problems of credible commitment, or the security dilemma, and most prevalently 
from an implacable amalgamation of all three strategic dilemmas. Intrastate conflict 
spreads in much the same way as it arises domestically, by diffusing or escalating as 
outlined above. 
Secondly, intrastate conflict does diffuse abroad, but largely to states that already 
contain the seeds of discord, or to groups that can identifY with the conflicting 
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parties. Direct diffusion stimulated by refugees, armed insurgents, and other trans-
border spillovers is a valid and realistic apprehension, however, strong, robust states 
able to cope with strategic dilemmas are generally able to contain the trans-border 
spillovers produced by their weaker neighbors. States that are already at risk of 
intrastate violence are most likely to be affected detrimentally. Indirect diffusion of 
intrastate conflict is considerably more subtle and problematical to distinguish, and 
may furthermore prove, in the long run, more essential and challenging to manage. 
Indirect diffusion is driven primarily by ideas and knowledge, both of which can 
traverse borders with little effort and proliferate extensively, being potentially 
universal in extent and sphere of influence. Nevertheless, diffusion does have limits. 
When political conflict is defined in universalistic terms and when political tactics 
are readily transportable to other locales, conflict is more likely to diffuse. 
Conversely, when conflicts are defmed in particularistic terms and employ tactics 
specific to a time and place, diffusion is less liable to transpire. 
Third, intrastate conflict does escalate and bring in third parties. At the aggregate 
level, intrastate conflict is noticeably prone to escalation, with solid evidence that 
ethnic alliances extending over borders are apt to engender higher levels of conflict 
between states. Yet, ethnic alliances do not inevitably effect collaborative efforts 
among groups, but depend on the larger strategic context in which group leaders 
calculate their political strategies. Additionally, escalation ofintrastate conflict is 
self-limiting, as unlike ideological conflicts, which have universal allure and can 
escalate to incorporate virtually all states, ethnic conflict ultimately exhausts the 
quantity of states with substantial ethnic kin. 
Fourth, even if the international spread ofintrastate conflict is limited, it is 
sensitive to the strategies of all relevant actors, including third parties. As a strategic 
process, intrastate conflict and its international expansion are the products of 
strategies chosen by all groups, states, and international organizations; and any 
modification in the strategies of these actors, therefore, can have extensive and 
frequently unforeseen consequences. To the extent that implementation of ethnic 
contracts within multiethnic societies depends implicitly or explicitly on noncoercive 
interventions, any decline in international vigilance may generate a further sequence 
of intrastate conflict. Affirming triumph against ethnic hatred and violence and 
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diminishing the promotion of stable ethnic relations may, in fact, exacerbate latent 
ethnic fears. 
Finally, intrastate conflict is not unique. Lake and Rothchild (1998,343-344) 
assert that many of the theories developed or utilized in their analysis have their 
roots in the study of interstate conflict, and nearly all are built upon the general 
theories of human behavior that have been applied throughout the social sciences. 
Although ethnic conflict may be a uniquely vicious and even perverse form of 
conflict, it is intently interconnected to other modes of conflict and can be examined 
with many of the same theoretical tools and conceptual foundations. 
Gurr (1993, 133-134; 200 I, 178-180), while primarily focused on the intrinsic 
sources of ethnicpolitical conflict, does address international diffusion and contagion 
of intrastate conflict. Diffusion is defined as the processes by which conflict in one 
state directly affects political organization and action in adjoining states. Contagion, 
alternatively, refers to the processes by which one group's actions provide 
inspiration and strategic and tactical guidance for groups elsewhere: diffusion of 
conflict is direct; contagion is indirect. Lake and Rothchild's concept of direct and 
indirect diffusion are congruent with this distinction. Ultimately, Gurr (200 I, 179-
180) discerns three general propositions in relation to diffusion and contagion of 
intrastate conflict. First, an ethnopolitical group's incentives for political action are 
increased by successful mobilization and political action by similar groups 
elsewhere. Second, a group's capabilities for political action are increased by 
political and material support from segments of the group elsewhere, especially from 
segments that are mobilized. Third, a group's opportunities for rebellion are 
increased by the number of segments of the group in adjoining countries and by their 
proximity to open conflict. 
The above theoretical discussion visibly indicates a nexus involving intrastate and 
interstate conflict, which has been significantly investigated and documented, at 
various levels of analysis within the realm of conflict studies. The distinction 
between interstate and intrastate conflict has itself begun to blur (Levy 2001,3), and 
security between states has become increasingly dependent upon security within 
states (Holsti 1996, 15). In the contemporary global environment, conflict in one 
state often spreads or has repercussions in a neighboring state (Peck 1996, 70). 
Furthermore, a state adjacent to a state engaged in conflict is simultaneously at risk 
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from both interstate and intrastate conflict (Wallensteen 2002, 226). Whereas 
conflict was traditionally perceived as either interstate or intrastate, the fungible 
nature of contemporary conflict has a tendency to shift along a sliding scale between 
interstate and intrastate. Intrastate conflict easily permeates across existing state 
borders to form regional conflict complexes; conversely, regional conflict dynamics 
can impact readily on the internal processes of neigh boring states (Hampson, 
Wermester, and Malone 2002,3). It appears a logical assumption that as the nexus 
between interstate and intrastate conflict is inherently linked in a larger strategic 
calculus, so too should be the theoretical and conceptual foundations, and practical 
application, of apposite conflict prevention efforts in the form of a strategy of 
simultaneity and connectivity. 
The Carnegie Commission, which is arguably the single most important research 
and policy analysis enterprise to influence the conflict prevention agenda (O'Neil 
and Tschirgi 2002, 275); while examining the principal causes of ethnic, 
nationalistic and religious conflicts, both within and between states, contained a 
mere two short paragraphs regarding any conjunction in relation to simultaneity and 
connectivity of interstate and intrastate conflict. The extent of dialogue was to 
acknowledge the possibility of spillover effects of an intrastate conflict (Camegie 
1997,27), and that this possibility would most likely occur in areas where ethnic 
groups straddle interstate boundaries (Carnegie 1997, 101). An additionally salient 
point was the lack of differentiation between application of intrastate or interstate 
conflict prevention recommendations, other than those recommendations that were 
applicable to both types of conflict. 
Leatherman et al. (1999, 73-121), devote two chapters to deal with the 
mechanisms of conflict intensification and the differentiation between vertical and 
horizontal escalation. Vertical escalation is defined as an increase in the intensity of 
the dispute in terms of the conflict behaviors and means used, while horizontal 
escalation is an expansion ofthe geographical scope of conflict and brings into the 
sphere of violence new groups, communities, or states, as well as increasing the 
number and size of issues and actors' goals. While acceding the fact that historically 
states have become regularly involved in intrastate conflicts in neigh boring 
countries, and averting the spillover of conflict in regional contexts is an important 
task, the only reference of avoidance methodology is, "the prevention and limitation 
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of violence requires neighboring states and other third parties not be permitted to 
assist the opposing parties" (Leatherman et al. 1999, 102). As the focus of their 
work is specifically conflict prevention in intrastate crises, avoidance of vertical 
escalation within the state is the prime application, with no further elaboration or 
analysis of the nexus between interstate and intrastate conflict or simultaneity and 
connectivity with regards to conflict prevention. 
Lund (1996) and Jentleson (2000) are similarly vague in their approaches, or lack 
thereof, as regards the subject of simultaneity and connectivity. Although Lund 
(1996,48) does state that both interstate and intrastate conflict fall within his 
definition for conflict prevention, and that intrastate conflict may occur within or 
across state boundaries, no allowance is made for simultaneity and connectivity of 
conflict prevention actions or efforts. Jentleson (2000, 15) alludes to the correlation 
of interstate and intrastate conflicts in his case selection when he states that the cases 
were selected as a crosscut sample, both geographically and with respect to, "inter-
and intrastate terms, albeit with the necessary fluidity in setting these parameters and 
allowing for mixed cases". However, throughout the analysis, and ensuing 
development of his normative requisites for conflict prevention, there is a patent lack 
of partition of these "mixed cases" as anything but a discrete conflict, which 
unfortunately diffused across state borders. 
Ackermann (2000) is the first author to broach the subject of simultaneity and 
connectivity of conflict prevention actions or efforts in normative substance. 
Ackermann opines that within the field of conflict studies, in what some scholars 
describe as the internationalization of communal violence and others as the 
disappearance of the distinction between internal and external conflicts, interstate 
and intrastate conflicts have become even more closely linked (Ackermann 2000, 
14-15). Based on this view, one of Ackermann's stated major objectives is to 
explore the conditions under which conflict prevention can be successful, "especially 
where a more complex pattern of conflict has emerged, one in which interstate and 
intrastate levels of conflict have become closely intertwined, and where external and 
internal conflicts must be dealt with at the same time to arrive at a peaceful 
outcome" (Ackermann 2000, 5-6). Nevertheless, her analytical framework and 
developed conflict prevention factors, while focusing on the various actors, methods, 
and approaches necessary for successful conflict prevention, did not specifically 
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explicate any execution methodology regarding simultaneity and connectivity in 
function towards both the interstate and intrastate aspects of conflict. 
For most of the twentieth century, both the academic and policy communities had 
focused on the twin issues ofinterstate security and intrastate affairs separately. 
While the academic community began to examine and espouse a nexus between 
interstate and intrastate conflict as early as the 1980s, this data is only now 
commencing to be acknowledged, and integrated within the policy community. The 
1990s is when the international community, including both the academic and policy 
sectors, responded to the ostensible increase in intrastate crises, and conflict 
prevention literature emerged at the intersection of theory and practice (O'NeiJ and 
Tschirgi 2002, 276). However, conflict prevention literature and methodology to 
date seem not to have fully integrated the standing theoretical implications of a 
nexus between intrastate and interstate conflict in any applied form, which is the 
foremost aspiration of this work. 
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Chapter 3: The Macedonian Historical Milieu 
3.1. Introduction 
To provide the requisite conditions for analysis, it is necessary to delineate the 
historical milieu of Macedonia, and the surrounding Balkan region, concentrating on 
those aspects of history, geography, religion, and ethnicity that impact contemporary 
deliberations regarding contentious issues. Paramount to the application of conflict 
prevention efforts in a country or region is a thorough comprehension of the 
contentious issues, and in the case of Macedonia these are intricately intertwined 
with history. Accordingly, the definitional, historical and contemporary aspects of 
Macedonia shall be addressed so as to provide an apposite background for 
subsequent analysis of conflict prevention efforts. 
Macedonia is a small landlocked country situated in the center of the Balkan 
Peninsula. Today it consists of25,333 square kilometers of territory, with a 
population of approximately 2.1 million people. It is a mountainous country 
positioned where the southern Dinaric Ranges and eastern Albanian Alps meet the 
northern protrusions of the Pindos Mountains, with the Vardar River system 
bisecting the country from north to south. As such, Macedonia serves, and has 
historically served, as the primary transportation corridor from Western and Central 
Europe to Southern Europe and the Aegean Sea. The Republic of Macedonia1 is a 
relatively young state, having declared its independence from the Socialist Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia on 8 September 1991, and adopted its constitution on 17 
November 1991. Ofthe four former Yugoslav republics to gain their independence, 
Macedonia was the only one to achieve that goal without a shot being fired. 
However, to understand contemporary Macedonia one must understand its past, for 
within the Balkan region history is a fundamental aspect of the present. 
The Balkan Peninsula, and by default Macedonia, is one of the most ethnically, 
linguistically and religiously complex areas of the world, resulting in a long history 
1 By resolution AlRES/471225 of8 April 1993, as a result ofa dispute with Greece over the 
constitutional name, the Republic of Macedonia, the newly independent state was admitted to the 
United Nations under the provisional name of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. United 
Nations. 2003. United Nations Member States. http://www.un.orglOverview/unmember.html(2003. 
April 11). While resolution of the name dispute is officially still being negotiated, for the sake of 
brevity I shall refer to the country simply as Macedonia. 
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of age old contestations and disputes (Cowan 2000; Danforth 1995; Hupchick 2002; 
Hupchick and Cox 2001; Poulton 1991,2000; Talevski 1998; Williams 2000). In 
fact, the history of the Balkans extends over two millennia, and involves the 
interplay of three civilizations, five empires, three major religions, ten modem 
nation-states, and some fourteen major ethnic groups (Hupchick and Cox 2001, vii). 
From this historical complexity befall the three primary perspectives of defining 
Macedonia: geographically, ethnically, and civilizationally. 
3.2. Definitional Aspects 
Geographical Definitions. 
Currently, the term Macedonia may refer to an ancient kingdom, a historically 
established geographic region, the largest and most northern region of Greece, what 
used to be the most southern republic within the Socialist Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia, and the newly independent state of Macedonia While the last three 
definitions of Macedonia are the most contemporary, they are themselves based 
upon historical and geographical reference and interpretation. 
As an ancient land, the earliest settlers were small groups of lIIyrians, Paeonians, 
Thracians, and Dacians (poulton 2000, 13), and immediately to the south were the 
Greeks. At this time, Macedonia was a kingdom consisting of sparsely populated 
and geographically dispersed villages. Although historians have determined there 
was a lineage of22 preceding rulers, due to limited and fragmented sources it is 
impossible to get a thorough and wholly reliable picture of the Macedonian 
Kingdom and way oflife prior to Philip II (Errington 1990). However, it was Philip 
n. reigning from 359-336 B.C., and his son Alexander Ill, more commonly known as 
"Alexander the Great", reigning from 336-323 B.C., who brought Macedonia to 
historical prominence. Under Philip 11, Macedonia became a formidable military 
power, incorporating Illyrian and Thracian villages and peoples, as well as the 
northern Greek city-states, under one kingdom. This kingdom included present day 
Kosovo, Albania, Macedonia and Thrace, and enjoyed a relatively peaceful political 
relationship with the remaining Greek city-states. Under Alexander the Great, the 
political affiliation with the Greek city-states dissipated rapidly as within a span of 
13 years Alexander extended the kingdom to an empire by conquering the lands 
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from the Adriatic Sea to the Indus River. At its height. the Macedonian Empire was 
a vast geographic area that included most of present day Albania, Macedonia, 
Kosovo, Greece, Bulgaria, Turkey, Syria, Egypt. Iran, Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan 
and a small portion of India (Fox 2001). After the death of Alexander the Great in 
323 B.C .• the Macedonian Empire divided into three separate components: 
Macedonia, Syria, and Egypt. with the Macedonian segment relapsing back to a 
kingdom combined from IIlyrians, Thracians. and Greeks. and similar in size and 
location to the Macedonian Kingdom under the reign ofPhilip 11. Rather than the far 
reaches of the Empire at its apogee. it is predominantly this geographic area that is 
referred to in relation to the ancient Kingdom of Macedonia. 
As a historically established geographic region. Macedonia refers to an area 
marked by nature over the course of several millennia. and bounded to the north by 
the Skopska Cma Gora and Shar Planina Mountains; in the east by the Rila and 
Rhodope Mountains and the Mesta and Nestos Rivers; to the south by the Aegean 
Sea; and to the west by the lakes of Ohrid and Prespa (Danforth 1995. 44; Magocsi 
1998.3; Poulton 1991,46). The geographic region of Macedonia has been 
tenaciously contested and the source of several wars, from the emergence of 
nationalistic claims upon this land to its partition in 1913. First at the Treaty of 
London and subsequently at the Treaty of Bucharest. geographic Macedonia was 
partitioned among Serbia. Bulgaria and Greece. with these three portions of 
Macedonia also being commonly referred to as Vardar. Pirin and Aegean Macedonia 
respectively. 
A combination of the historical definitions of Macedonia as an ancient 
kingdom and as a geographic region serves as a backdrop for the other three more 
contemporary definitions. First. Macedonia defmed as the most northern and largest 
region of Greece was a result of Greece receiving the Aegean portion of Macedonia 
in the partition of 1913. which nearly increased the landmass of Greece twofold. 
The present region of Greece referred to as Macedonia includes 13 provinces and the 
Monastic Republic of Mount Athos. This area provides Greece with critical 
agricultural zones delineated by fertile river valleys and an extensive coastal plain 
(Curtis 1995); as well as Greece's second largest port and city. Thessaloniki. which 
is located between the Chalkidiki Peninsula and the mouth of the Vardar River. 
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Second. Macedonia defined as the most southern republic within the Socialist 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was also a result of the partition of 1913, where the 
size of Serbia was nearly doubled by receiving the Vardar portion of Macedonia. 
After World War I, the first Yugoslavia was formed with the announcement on 1 
December 1918 of the founding of the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, 
which was later renamed the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. However, with Macedonians 
constituting the largest minority within Serbia, discontent was prevalent within 
Vardar Macedonia, which continued throughout the interwar period. After World 
War n, and the dissolution of the monarchy and establishment of the Socialist 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia on 29 November 1945, the regime recognized 
Macedonia as a separate Republic. From this time until the Macedonian declaration 
of Independence from Yugoslavia, in 1991, Macedonia represented the most 
southern republic of Yugoslavia. 
Finally, the last defmitional aspect of the Term Macedonia is as the newly 
independent and sovereign state of Macedonia. However, since independence was 
only declared on 8 September 1991, this is a relatively new term chronologically; 
which seems to suffer from being overshadowed by the longer standing historical 
and geographic definitions, as well as historical claims upon the land, language and 
people by neighboring states. 
Ethnic Definitions. 
The austere and divisive geography of the Balkan Peninsula performed a 
noteworthy function in determining the existence of its inhabitants. Typically 
mountainous terrain fragmented settlement, and limited natural resources 
necessitated group cohesion for survival, resulting in acute competitiveness between 
ethnic cultures. All Balkan peoples have traditionally exhibited one common 
characteristic: a sense of passionate, tenacious pride (Hupchick 2002). While 
diverse ethnic groups at present constitute the Balkans, the peninsula's population of 
approximately 69.3 million people, excluding European Turkey, is predominantly 
comprised of three principal groups: ancient peoples, South Slavs, and Turks. 
Ancient peoples are those who can trace their ancestry at least back to classical 
antiquity. The ancestors of these people spoke Indo-European languages, and the 
most familiar among them are the Greeks. Notwithstanding the fifth through 
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seventh century invasions of the Slavs, and settlement of their mainland possessions, 
the Greeks today occupy basically the same territories as they did in antiquity. 
Admittedly, however, it was not until the mid-twentieth century that this fact came 
to fruition through a long struggle for reconquest oftheir former lands. 
The Albanians are the second largest faction of ancient peoples in the Balkans, 
and current estimates are that somewhere between one quarter and one third of the 
Macedonian population are Albanian. Albanians speak a distinctive language 
thought to have descended from ancient Illyrian, which would afford them an ethnic 
heritage equating that of the Greeks, and placing them as contemporaries of the 
Basques as being among the oldest existing non-Greek ethnic groups in all of 
Western Europe. In Antiquity the llIyrians dominated a large swath ofthe western 
Balkans situated north ofthe Greeks, which included present day Albania. 
Northwestern Greece, Montenegro, part of Serbia. most ofBosnia and Herzegovina. 
and western Macedonia. Later, the Roman, Goth, Avar and Slavic invasions, pushed 
the IlJyrians into the mountainous regions inhabited by today's Albanians, where 
they evolved as a mostly tribalized, pastoral society thereby facilitating resistance of 
later latinization. 
The third and final faction of ancient peoples in the Balkans are the Romanians, 
who speak a Latin based language that is alleged to have derived from the Roman 
occupation of Dacia during the second and third centuries. Dacia once included the 
present day territories of Romania and the Danubian Plain in northern Bulgaria. 
Closely related to the Romanians are the Vlachs, also a Latin based language 
speaking people. Although alluded to by a variety of names, the Romanians 
customarily refer to themselves as Aromani. While the question of the ethnic origins 
of the Romanians versus the Vlachs has not yet been definitively settled, one of the 
more predominant anthropological theories is that modern day Romanians 
descended from those Latin speaking ancient peoples living north of the Danube, 
and the Vlachs descended from those inhabiting the area south of the Danube 
(Poulton 2000). During the migration of the South Slavs into the area during the 
fifth through seventh centuries, the Vlachs took to the high mountains where they 
subsisted as scattered small groups of transhumant herdsmen; in so doing preserving 
their Latin based Romanian dialect. The name of the Romanian region of Walla chi a 
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means "land of the Vlachs", and at present the Vlachs represent a minority people 
throughout the Balkans and, 2.2 percent ofthe Macedonian population. 
The second principal group inhabiting the Balkans is that of the South Slavs, 
divided today between seven major groups: Bosnians, Bulgarians, Croats, 
Macedonians, Montenegrins, Serbs, and Slovenes. The South Slavs constitute one 
of the three primary branches of the Slavic speaking family of peoples in Europe, the 
other two being the West and the East Slavs. The South Slavs arrived in Eastern 
Europe from their native soil hypothesized to have been positioned somewhere in 
the environs of the great Pripet Marshes, which be stride the border dividing present 
day Ukraine and Belarus. It seems their movement was linked in large part to the 
invasions between the fifth and seventh centuries of nomadic peoples from the east, 
and the two most common routes were either along the western or eastern flanks of 
the Carpathian Mountains. It is unclear whether at first the Slays were allies of, or 
refugees from, the Asiatic invaders, but later they transitioned into the aggressors 
themselves. Slavic raids south of the Danube into the East Roman Empire took on 
massive proportions beginning in the 520s, and during the next half-century they 
penetrated the East Roman provinces ofThracia, Macedonia, Epirus, Thessalia, and 
by 578, as far south as Achaia on the Peloponnesian Peninsula (Magocsi 1998). The 
Slavic presence in the Balkan Peninsula was to intensifY even further after the arrival 
ofthe A VaTS, also in 578, a nomadic people of Mongolian or Turco-Tartar origin, 
who developed a rather symbiotic relationship with the Slays. Whether as vassals or 
allies, the Slavs fought side by side with the A vars during their campaigns against 
the Byzantine Empire. The primary difference, however, was that while the A vars 
returned to the Pannonian Plain after each campaign, the sedentary minded Slays 
remained, resulting in Slavic expansion into large parts of the Balkans. Today 
Slavic descendants solidly inhabit virtually all of the northwestern. central and 
southeastern regions of the Balkans, while within Macedonia, the Slavic portion of 
the population is estimated to be 66.6 percent Macedonian and 2.1 percent Serb. 
The third and last principal group of inhabitants of the Balkans is the Turks. 
Although presently they numerically represent the smallest group at a little over one 
million. roughly 2 percent, they have played a role in shaping the history of the 
Balkans far beyond their numbers. On the southeastern perimeter of the Avar 
territory, an influential new state was formed with the arrival in 679 of the Bulgurs 
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along the lower Danube, who represented several Turkic tribes originating from the 
basin of the lower Volga River. The Bulgurs were able to exercise dominating 
influence over seven Slavic tribes already dwelling adjacent the Danube, and 
subsequent to military victories against the Byzantine Empire and the A vars, to 
establish in 681 the First Bulgarian Khanate. The Turkic Bulgurs gradually 
amalgamated with the more numerous Slavic popUlation, and the conversion of the 
Turkic Bulgur ruling elite to Orthodox Christianity in the mid-ninth century 
facilitated the rapid and total ethnic assimilation. Within a hundred years of the 
Bulgarian conversion, most traces of their Turkic origins had dissipated, except for 
their name, and the Bulgarian Empire became a Slavic state. Moreover, the Ottoman 
Turks' five hundred year rule over most of the Balkans established numerous 
scattered enclaves of Turkish speaking peoples. Present day estimates are that 
approximately 4.0 percent of the Macedonian population is Turkish. 
Civilizational Definitions. 
Civilization is a complex culture shared by a network of ethnic groups spread 
over a large geographic area that demonstrate a shared sense of a distinctive and 
enduring collective identity based on a belief in common descent and on shared 
experiences, cultural traits and language. Every civilized society incorporates a 
number of constituent ethnic societies that are unified by a common religious belief, 
philosophy, or both. To understand the Balkans. one must comprehend the cultural 
forces that have functioned in the region, and historically. the Balkans have 
witnessed the interactions of three civilizations: Orthodox Eastern European, 
Western European. and Islamic. 
Perhaps. the existence of two European civilizations sounds peculiar to some, yet 
when westerners speak of Europe in cultural terms they generally employ selected 
suppositions, founded upon either the historical. or economic, developmental phases 
that transpired in Western Europe. The historical developmental phases are typically 
referred to as the Dark Ages, the Renaissance. the Reformation. the Counter-
Reformation, the Scientific Revolution. the Enlightenment, and the rise of modern 
liberal democracy. nationalism and the nation-state. Conversely. the economic 
developmental phases are characteristically the progression from slaveholding, 
through feudalism. and mercantilism. to the industrial revolution and market 
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capitalism. The Eastern European peoples' historical experiences do not coincide 
with the Western phases as their heritage is bound directly to the Byzantine Empire. 
The crucial divergence is that the eastern half of the Roman Empire never 
experienced a Dark Ages or Renaissance similar to that in the west, as they endured 
the decline and fall of the west by a thousand years and the society of the classical 
world never disappeared. The close affiliation of church and state in Byzantine 
society disallowed materialization of a Western style Reformation and Counter-
Reformation, whereas the theocratic society imposed on the Byzantine Balkans by 
centuries of Ottoman Islamic rule hindered a secular Scientific Revolution or 
Enlightenment (Hupchick 2002). 
The Eastern and Western European civilizations share in common important 
cultural traditions such as the classical Greco-Roman heritage, barbarian (non-
Roman) ancestors and Christianity. The cultural variation inherent in Greco-Roman 
traditions, however, is what rationalizes their developing as two discrete civilized 
societies. The east promoted the classical Greek propensities for a mystical, 
ritualistic, idealist, and symbolic sense of reality, while the west accepted the Roman 
penchant for a practical, legalistic, and pragmatic approach. Those distinctions were 
initially consigned in the forms of Christianity each developed: Orthodoxy in the 
east and Catholicism in the west. The Eastern and Western European civilizations 
are oft likened to siblings where they share a basically similar genetic composition 
but diverge in character, while the Islamic civilization is their cultural cousin, 
sharing a good quantity of their Judeo-Christian and Hellenic traditions, but 
embracing crucially different Arabic and Mesopotamian characteristics. Islam 
regards itself as the divinely ordained corrective for deficiencies that crept into 
Judaism and Christianity. 
When Emperor Diocletian divided the Roman Empire into two administrative 
halves to stabilize the imperial progression and to better defend the empire's 
widespread borders against foreign enemies, he did so along imperceptible lines 
marking and institutionalizing the human cultural divide in the northwestern corner 
of the Balkan Peninsula separating the Greek east and the Latin west. Historically, 
the cultural fault line dividing the Western and Eastern European civilizations in the 
Balkans runs from Transylvania in Romania, through Serbia's Vojvodina province, 
along the Slavonian border region separating Croatia and Serbia, including all of 
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Bosnia and Herzegovina, to the Dalmatian and Montenegrin border and to northern 
Albania along the Adriatic Sea. A second fault line separates the Eastern European 
and Islamic civilizations concurrent with the border of Turkey with Bulgaria and 
Greece (Hupchick and Cox 2001). The Islamic Ottoman conquest and five centuries 
of Ottoman rule additionally formed a wide-ranging arced belt penetrating 
northwestward through Bulgaria, northern Greece, Macedonia, Albania and Kosovo, 
eventually intersecting the East-West European fault line in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
and northern Albania. Consequently, the fault lines of the three Balkan civilizations 
all converge in Bosnia and Herzegovina and northern Albania, while numerous other 
states, such as Bulgaria, Macedonia, Serbia, Croatia and Romania, all straddle the 
fauIt lines of two civilizations. Today approximately 64 percent of the Balkan 
inhabitants are Orthodox Christians, constituting clear majorities in the populations 
of Bulgaria, Greece, Macedonia, Romania, and Serbia and Montenegro, while in 
Albania and Bosnia and Herzegovina they represent the largest religious minority. 
Conversely, the largest religious minority in Bulgaria, Greece Macedonia and Serbia 
is Islamic. Within Macedonia specifically, 67 percent of the population is Orthodox 
while 30 percent is Islamic. 
Christianity is the seminal factor in identifying Europe (Curtis 1992; Hupchick 
and Cox 2001; Magocsi 1998). In fact, as regularly employed at present, the term 
Europe did not appear until the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries as prior 
to that time the traditional term was Christendom. Relatively late coming ethnic 
migrations to geographical Europe, such as the Bulgars, Czechs, Hungarians, Poles, 
and Russians were forced to choose between conversion to Christianity or risk 
possible annihilation. The borders of Europe became, and remain, synonymous with 
mainstream Christian culture. Within the Balkans, the historically seminal civilized 
culture is Orthodox European, and this fact, not ethnicity nor geography, is what 
definitively places the Balkans in Europe. However, being situated along the East 
European and Islamic fault lines has meant civilizational friction has been long-lived 
and frequent. Throughout history almost every region of the Balkans has served as a 
cultural flashpoint at least once, with Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo and 
Macedonia proving the most recent. Within Macedonia and the Balkans, culture, 
civilization and religion are nearly synonymous. 
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3.3. Historical Aspects. 
In 168 B.C., Rome conquered the Macedonia ofPhilip 11 and Alexander the 
Great. The most significant legacy Rome brought to Macedonia and the Balkans 
was to separate the Byzantine and Roman spheres into the Eastern and Western 
Roman Empires, respectively, between 395 and 410 (Curtis 1992; Hupchick and 
Cox 2001; Magocsi 1998; Poulton 2000). This created a cultural chasm that would 
divide East from West, Eastern Orthodox from Roman Catholic, Latin speaking 
cultures from Greek speaking cultures, and placing Macedonia as a border region 
between the two. With the deposition in 476 ofthe last Roman Emperor in the west 
it was only the Byzantine half in the east that survived. In the early ninth century, 
though, the Macedonian region fell to the Bulgarian Empire, which reached its 
height of political influence during the reign of Emperor Samuil from 976-1014. 
Under Emperor Samuil, the First Bulgarian Empire expanded their territories from 
the Black Sea to the Adriatic, and transferred the capital southwestward to the 
religious and cultural center of Ohrid. In 1014, however, Basil 11 reclaimed the lands 
for the Byzantine Empire. 
It was during this time, in the mid ninth century, when the Bulgarian Empire 
dispatched two Greek missionary brothers on a mission to convert the Moravians to 
Christanity, and thereby save them from Frank Suzerainty. These two brothers were 
Constantine and Methodios, later to be known as Saints Cyril and Methodios. Born 
in Thessaloniki, they were familiar with the Slavic dialect and developed a Slavic 
alphabet, which was recognized by the Pope for liturgical purposes and then utilized 
to teach Orthodox Christianity. Two of their disciples, Klement and Naum, were to 
continue the Orthodox Missions from Ohrid, where they established a center to train 
youths for the clergy, translate the entire Orthodox liturgical text and ultimately lay 
the foundation for the Slavic literary culture. It was also during this period when in 
1054 the formerly unified European Christian Church was tom into the two halves of 
western Roman Catholic and Eastern Orthodox during the Great Schism. Although 
initially it was merely an ecclesiastical division marginally affecting the populations, 
that situation changed drastically during the Crusades. 
In 1282 Milutin, the Serbian King took Skopje from Byzantium and by the end of 
the century had established hegemony over the majority of the Balkans. The apogee 
of the Serbian Empire came under Stefan Dusan, when in 1346 in Skopje, he 
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proclaimed himself Emperor of the Serbs Greeks, Bulgarians and Albanians. 
Immediately after his death in 1355, the Serbian Empire began its descent until the 
Era of Ottoman domination. 
Era of Ottoman Domination. 
The term Ottoman is a Western corruption of the Turkish name of the original 
tribal leader Osman I. He governed the Seljuk principality closest to Byzantium and 
Europe in the northwest corner of Anatolia and engaged in unremitting battle against 
the Christians in an attempt to expand Islamic territories. Ottoman forces first 
entered Europe in 1345 and realized the Balkan Christian states had been weakened 
by decades of internecine wars. The gradual Ottoman conquest continued, and in 
1389 at Kosovo Polje, they defeated the Serbs, which afforded total control of 
Macedonia and the Balkans. Ottoman domination was to continue in the Balkans 
until the first Balkan war of 1912. 
The Ottoman Empire ruled Macedonia for five centuries, which resulted in the 
arrival of many Turkish speaking peoples, as well as Islam. Inevitably, there were 
many in the Balkans who adopted the religion of the new rulers, within Macedonia 
particularly the Albanians and small sections of the Slavic speaking people. In the 
Western sense, Islam is more than a religion as it encompasses a total way of life, a 
model for society, a culture and a civilization; in essence, it is the state (Hupchick 
2002; Poulton 2000). The Ottomans were non-assimilative and multi-national as 
there was no differentiation by language or race. There was differentiation by 
religion, however. The requirement for high office in the empire was first to be a 
Muslim, and second to know the Ottoman language, which was a mixture of 
Turkish, Arabic and Persian, and reflected the importance in Islamic society of men 
of the sword, men of the pen and men of religion. While people of other religions, 
such as Christians and Jews, were tolerated, they were not seen as first class citizens. 
Whereas certain avenues of advancement were closed to non-Muslims, others like 
commerce were open since Islamic society tended to think of it with disregard. 
Additionally, non-Muslims were forbidden to carry arms, ride horses or enlist in the 
army. 
The Ottoman state was an Islamic one, with the population divided by religious 
affiliation and based on separation of the groups through the institutional structure of 
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the millet system. As noted previously, all Muslims were officially recognized as 
equal first class citizens in the Muslim millet. As a result ofMehmed II's pertinent 
legislation in 1453, non-Muslims were organized into three separate millets, in order 
of priority to the state: the Orthodox Christians, headed by the Greek Patriarch of 
Constantinople; the Jews, headed by an elected representative ofthe Rabbinical 
Council in Istanbul; and the Armenian Christians, headed by the Armenian Patriarch 
oflstanbul, who also represented the empire's Roman Catholic subjects (Hupchick 
2002). It should be noted, however, while the Jewish millet had a head and 
functioned well from 1453 on; it was not officially recognized until 1839 (Sugar 
1996,44). Within the millet. the leader had wide jurisdiction and was capable of 
determining the hierarchy, internal structure and educational system. The millet also 
permitted the subject Christian peoples to retain their separate identities and cultures 
rooted in their respective churches. More importantly, it allowed many of the 
Christian groups to retain a sense ofa former glorious history of when they ruled a 
specific region, which with the national awakenings of the nineteenth century they 
once more claimed. Thus. the national awakenings, which came with the first 
crumbling of the Ottoman Empire, were to reach their zenith in the Balkans and in 
the struggle for Macedonia in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. 
The Macedonian Question 
The six decades following the end ofthe Napoleonic era, and the Congress of 
Vienna in 1815, were marked by three significant developments in the Balkans: the 
genesis of nationalist movements and the creation of independent states; intervention 
in the region by Europe's Great Powers, particularly Austria, Russia, Great Britain 
and France; and attempted internal reform within the Ottoman Empire. As the 
Western European concept of nationalism expanded into the Balkan region, each 
nationalist group structured their internal agendas in support of territorial expansion 
at the expense of the contracting Ottoman Empire, often in direct competition with 
other nationalist factions. The Ottomans, cognizant of the fact that the proliferation 
of nationalism presaged catastrophe for the empire, made efforts at reform to 
stabilize their situation and adapt to Western pressures. However, both the 
nationalist movements and Ottoman reforms became pawns in the imperialist 
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policies of the European Great Powers, of which control of the Balkan Peninsula 
perfonned a strategically essential function (Hupchick 2002). 
Serbia was the first to achieve successful political change by transfonning a local 
uprising begun in 1804 in the Belgrade region into a nationalist movement in 1815. 
In 1829, as part of the Russo-Turkish Treaty of Edirne (Adrianople), Serbia was 
declared an autonomous Ottoman province. Greece was even more successful than 
the Serbs, with the Greek nationalist push for independence commencing in 1821, 
sparked by Alexander Ypsilantis and the Philike Hetairia (Society of Friends). In 
1830, the London Protocol declared Greece an independent monarchical state under 
the protection of Great Britain, Russia and France (Jelavich 1997). 
The rise in Bulgarian national consciousness was later to start and more gradual 
to propagate. Originating in 1835 when the first modem Bulgarian secular school 
was founded, the Bulgarian quest for autonomy would not be achieved until 1878. 
Its struggle for independence, however, would have significant repercussions for the 
future as a result of the question regarding the Bulgarian church. Until now, under 
the Ottoman millet system the Orthodox Christians were subordinate to the Greek 
Patriarch of Constantinople, who was furthennore responsible for the Orthodox 
Christian education system as well as the language of that system. As such, the 
language of education for all Orthodox was Greek. Once Greece gained its 
independence, however, the divide between the Ottomans and the Greeks expanded, 
thereby creating the opportunity for the Bulgarians to pressure the Ottomans to 
establish a Bulgarian school. The academic curricula within the newly founded 
secular school consisted mostly of Western European publications in translation, and 
by the mid-nineteenth century a large Bulgarian populace was committed to a 
nationalist agenda targeted towards both political independence from the Ottomans 
and religious independence from the Greeks. In 1860, Bulgarian Merchants 
announced that Bulgarians would no longer recognize the Greek Patriarch ate and 
demanded the creation of a separate Bulgarian Orthodox church. After a decade-
long bitter struggle, and political pressure from Russian Ambassador Nicholas 
Ignatiev, Ottoman Sultan Abduelaziz instituted in 1870 the reform measure of 
recognizing an independent Bulgarian church. The church was to be headed by an 
Exarch in Istanbul, with jurisdiction over large tracts of Bulgaria, Thrace, and 
Macedonia, and the ability to acquire further territory if two thirds of the inhabitants 
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voted in favor (Hupchick and Cox 2001). One of the first acts of the Exarch was to 
establish Bulgarian Orthodox Bishoprics in Skopje and Ohrid. Although the new 
Bulgarian church was subordinate to the secular leadership of the nationalists, its 
residual cultural influence assured that adherence to a particular rite was central to 
defining one's national identity. To this day, Greek, Serbian, and Bulgarian 
nationalists insist that it is only possible to claim membership of the nation if one 
adheres to the Orthodox rite. The establishment of the Bulgarian Exarchate prepared 
the ground for one of the most intractable nationalist disputes in Balkan history. the 
Macedonian question (Glenny 2002, 116). 
The Treaty of San Stefano, which ended the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-1878. 
was the genesis of the Macedonian question (Barker 1999; Glenny 1996; Hupchick 
and Cox 2001; Magosci 1998; Williams 2000), although it would dominate 
nationalist political affairs in the Balkans through the end of the Balkan Wars in 
1913, and beyond. As Russian forces were finally in sight ofIstanbul itself and it 
seemed only a matter of time until Russia would finally realize its dream of 
acquiring the Ottoman capital and access to the Mediterranean, the British 
dispatched a fleet to the Bosphorous Straits with orders to intervene should Istanbul 
appear doomed. Deciding not to fight Great Britain for the city, the Russians halted 
and negotiated bilaterally with the Ottomans the Treaty of San Stefano on 3 March 
1878. The treaty's terms redrew the Balkan borders by granting Serbia, Montenegro 
and Romania full independence, but the most significant provision was for the 
creation of large Bulgarian state, including nearly all of Macedonia and the central 
Balkans. This new state, now the largest and potentially the strongest in the region, 
was designed to be under Russian control with the Russian Army in occupation for 
two years. Not only were the other Balkan states dismayed with this settlement, but 
the European Great Powers, particularly Great Britain and Austria-Hungary, found it 
impossible to accept. After a period of fervent political negotiation, Russia agreed to 
submit the treaty to revision by the Great Powers at a congress to be held in Berlin. 
Even prior to the initiation of the congress the Balkan states found themselves in 
a vulnerable state of affairs. The decisions that would affect the Balkan states were 
being made in Berlin, Vienna, London, and S1. Petersburg by their patron Great 
Powers. Even Russia, who realized the Great Powers were united in their opposition 
of Russian dominance in the eastern Balkans, could only hope to retain as much of 
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its gains as possible. The Ottomans went to Berlin merely to observe. After intense 
negotiation, on 13 July 1878 the Congress' dictate was made public, abrogating the 
agreements made at San Stefano. Most of the non-Bulgarian provisions were 
upheld, with Serbia, Montenegro and Romania retaining independence, Russia 
maintaining its acquisition ofBessarabia, Romania gaining its slice ofDobrudzha, 
and Greece not being referenced but watching Cyprus being granted to Great Britain. 
To the consternation of Serbia and Montenegro, Austria-Hungary was permitted to 
occupy Bosnia and Herzegovina and station troops in the neighboring Sanjak. of 
Novi Pazar, an Ottoman province separating Serbia from Montenegro. It was the 
Bulgarian stipulations of San Stefano, which had necessitated the Congress of Berlin 
in the first place, that underwent drastic modification. The large Bulgarian state, 
which had roughly corresponded to the territory of the Bulgarian Exarchate 
established in 1870, was dismantled and carved into four sections in order to deprive 
Russia ofits strategic advantages. Bulgaria proper, an area north of the Balkan 
Mountains, but including Sofia was established as a Bulgarian Tributary Principality. 
Eastern Rumelia, the area south ofthe Balkan Mountains was to be a semi-
autonomous province under a Christian governor. Western Thrace was returned to 
direct Ottoman control, thereby denying Bulgarian access to the Aegean Sea, and the 
entire region of Macedonia was likewise returned to direct Ottoman control. The 
final outcome of the Congress of Berlin was the single most important agreement for 
the Balkan states during the nineteenth century (Jelavich 1997), allowing the 
nationalist ambitions of all Balkan Peoples in the decades afterwards to collide 
violently, with the Western imposed terms serving as the fundamental driving force 
in the peninsula's subsequent divisive events. From this point forward the Balkans 
were dominated by the Macedonian question, a conflict between Greece, Serbia and 
Bulgaria over possession of the Macedonian territories, of which all of the young 
states had aspirations that were denied by the Congress of Berlin. 
Greece, Serbia and Bulgaria all were of the opinion they had been wronged by the 
Congress of Berlin, and scholars and politicians from each country began to develop 
and foster nationalistic claims that Macedonia "rightfully" belonged to their 
respective country. Whether based on ethnic, religious or historical claims, none of 
the countries were content with the status quo, and all sought territorial expansion 
into Macedonia for three primary reasons: it would enlarge the state and incorporate 
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more nationals within it; the acquisition of the Vardar and Struma valleys, and the 
railroads through them, would have great economic advantages; and whoever 
controlled Macedonia would be the strongest power on the peninsula. The last two 
decades of the nineteenth century saw political maneuvering from each country to 
better their position and claims. Much of this political manipulation was through the 
organization of competing national societies such as the Bulgarian Cyril and 
Methodius Society, the Serb Society of St. Sava, and the Greek Ethnike Hetairia. In 
1893, the extremist organization known as the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary 
Organization was formed (VMRO), whose primary objective was to overthrow 
Ottoman rule and establish an autonomous Macedonia. Its main rival became the 
Macedonian Supreme Committee, also known as the External Organization, whose 
principal aim was the Bulgarian annexation of Macedonia. Macedonia became a 
region of sabotage, terrorist tactics and uprisings conducted by these two 
organizations, as well as by Greek and Serbian infiltrators. Such revolutionary 
measures culminated with the VMRO organized I1inden uprising of 2 August 1903, 
which seized the vilayet of Monastir and established the Krushevo Republic that 
lasted for about 10 days before Ottoman forces responded to quell the uprisini. In 
1908, Austria-Hungary annexed Bosnia and Herzegovina outright, which Bulgaria 
used as political cover to unilaterally declare its independence. By 1912, all the 
protagonists in the struggle for Macedonia realized that before any nationalist 
solutions could be realized, Ottoman presence had to eradicated. Consequently 
Bulgaria, Greece and Serbia, along with prodding from Russia, put aside their 
antagonisms long enough to form the Balkan League as an anti-Ottoman alliance 
aimed at expelling the Ottomans from Europe and resulting in the Balkan Wars. 
Twentieth Century Balkans 
Prior to the onset of the First Balkan War, several separate alliances of mutual 
defense were signed. All contained secret clauses regarding the distribution of any 
future spoils of war with respect to the Macedonian lands. Bulgaria and Serbia had 
2 A "vilayet" refers to one of the chief administrative divisions or provinces of the Ottoman Empire, 
formerly termed "eyalet", and comprised of subdivisions designated as a "Sanjak". Southeastern 
Europe under Ottoman Rule, 1354-1804. Peter F. Sugar. 1996. London, UK: University of 
Washington Press. Pgs 41-42. 
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an agreement. as did Bulgaria and Greece. and Serbia and Bulgaria together had a 
separate agreement with Montenegro. On 8 October 1912, Montenegro commenced 
hostilities against the Ottoman Empire. soon to be joined by her allies. The Serbs 
and Bulgarians advanced from the north while the Greeks advanced from the south, 
all attempting to seize their perceived prized possessions in the region. By April of 
1913, the Balkan League had pushed the Ottomans almost completely out of Europe 
and held the lands from the Adriatic to near Istanbul. Again, the Great Powers 
intervened and imposed the Treaty of London on 30 May 1913. Both Austria-
Hungary and Italy were determined to prevent Serbia from gaining a port on the 
Adriatic, and consequently declared an independent Albania to accomplish this 
purpose. Greece and Serbia, thwarted in their plans to annex the western Balkan 
territories, demanded compensation elsewhere and received it in Macedonia, at the 
expense of the Bulgarians. The Treaty of London proved unsatisfactory to all the 
Balkan states, but especially to Bulgaria, which felt it deserved Macedonia. 
Consequently on 29 June 1913, the Second Balkan War commenced when Bulgaria 
attacked Greek and Serbian positions. Montenegro, Romania, and the Ottomans 
rapidly joined Serbia and Greece in an anti-Bulgarian alliance and crushed Bulgaria 
within a month. The Treaty of Bucharest concluded the Second Balkan War on 10 
August 1913, and settled the division of Albanian and Macedonian lands. The 
Ottomans received eastern Tbrace; Greece received southern Macedonia and the 
Epirus region, and retained western Thrace; Serbia received northern Macedonia; 
and Bulgaria received only a small section of Macedonia in the Struma valley. 
Additionally, the borders of independent Albania were demarcated, which left many 
Albanians in Western Macedonia and Kosovo outside the new state. The Treaty of 
Bucharest is of great significance for the Balkan states since, with minor 
adjustments, the borders set at this time have remained fixed until today (lelavich 
1997). 
During World War I, Greece and Serbia supported the Western Allies, while 
Bulgaria supported the Central Powers. By the time World War I was in its last 
months the idea of an independent South Slav state was promulgated, which called 
for: a union of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes in one nation with a single democratic, 
constitutional parliamentary system; and equal recognition of the Latin and Cyrillic 
alphabets, the three national names and flags, and the predominant religions. On 1 
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December 1918, the Kingdom ofSerbs, Croats and Slovenes was declared an 
independent state, which included Macedonia, but referred to as South Serbia. 
Greece, Serbia and Bulgaria all embarked at this time on nationalization missions to 
purge their countries of minorities through forced assimilation, and Macedonia, still 
consisting of a medley of ethnic groups underwent repressive "Serbianization" 
policies. In January 1929, the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes was formally 
renamed Yugoslavia (Land of the South Slavs) and increasingly became a Serb 
dominated state, which caused friction among the other nationalities. During World 
War n when the Bulgarians moved in to control the region, most of the Slavs in 
Macedonia welcomed the Bulgarians as liberators after the oppressive years of 
Serbian rule, however this too was short lived. Throughout World War 11 
Yugoslavia remained an area ofintense guerilla operations, and by the end of the 
war, the Partisans under JosefBroz Tito had become the dominant force, as well as 
recognized by the Allies. At the close of World War II Yugoslavia was restored, but 
in the political vision of its wartime hero and Communist leader Marshal Tito. 
Marshal Tito advocated Macedonia as an integral component of the post-war 
Yugoslavia, and the second congress of the Anti-Fascist Council for the National 
Liberation of Yugoslavia (A VNOJ), held at Jajce on 29 November 1943, granted 
Macedonia equal status to that of the other five entities: Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia, 
Montenegro, and Bosnia and Herzegovina. Then, on 2 August 1944, the anniversary 
of the Ilinden uprising, Tito organized the first Anti-Fascist Assembly of National 
Liberation of Macedonia (ASNOM) at the St. Pchinski monastery, which affirmed 
that Macedonia was a federal state within the Yugoslav Federation. On 7 March 
1945, a single provisional Yugoslav government took office with Tito as prime 
minister and war minister, and on 29 November 1945 the Socialist Federal Republic 
of Yugoslavia was established. The constitution of the new Yugoslavia called for a 
federation of six republics under a strong central government. In effect, Tito had 
created separate republics in Macedonia and Montenegro, and the autonomous 
provinces ofVojvodina and Kosovo in an effort to prevent Serb domination of the 
new state (Glenny 1996; 1998; WiIliams 2000). 
Tito's recognition of the Macedonian nationality and creation ofa separate 
republic within the Yugoslav federation served to set apart Macedonians from 
Bulgarians and Serbs, which was a fundamental tenet of his Yugoslav nation 
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building program. As such, Tito encouraged Macedonia to develop a separate 
national identity, and within Macedonia the new authorities quickly set about 
consolidating their position. The new Macedonian literary language was based on a 
central Vardar dialect from the Bitola-Veles region so as to remove it linguistically 
as far as possible from Bulgarian and Serbian. A separate Macedonian Cyrillic 
alphabet and orthography was devised to differentiate it from Bulgarian, and 
"Bulgarianisms" were replaced by folk substitutes. Led by Skopje linguist Blaze 
Koneski, and given international recognition in 1952 by Harvard Slavic Professor 
Horace Lunt, the new Macedonian literary language provided sufficient ethnic 
validity for national identity development (Hupchick 2002, 430). Bulgarians and 
others opposed to the existence of a separate Macedonian language, however, are 
swift to highlight that the new Macedonian language shares nearly all the same 
distinct characteristics which separates Bulgarian from other Slavic languages: lack 
of cases, the post-positivist definite article, replacement ofthe infinitive form, and 
preservation of the simple verbal forms for the past and imperfect tenses. 
In addition to a new language, the new republic also needed to commission new 
history textbooks for utilization in the educational system, as well as assert their 
religious culture. The history books drew strong criticism from Bulgaria as many of 
the Macedonian historical heroes, such as Emperor Samuil, Dame Gruev and Gotse 
Delchev, are similarly claimed by Bulgaria (Poulton 1991,49; 2000, 118). 
Meanwhile, the Serbs resisted the establishment of the autocephalous Macedonian 
Orthodox Church and revival in 1958 of the ancient archdiocese ofOhrid. That all 
of these events occurred or had a historical basis is certain, but that they were solely 
belonging to a Macedonian nation is still being debated today. However, the extent 
to which Tito succeeded in developing a separate Macedonian national identity 
would be tested during the breakup of Yugoslavia. 
The dissolution of Yugoslavia has been well documented and is continuing to 
produce a steady stream of books, all advancing contending explanations for the 
wars of secession that followed. The multiplicity of such potential contentions are: 
Serb Aggression and President Slobodan Milosevic were causal elements, "ancient 
hatreds" unleashed by the lifting of social rule were the root cause, war was brought 
on by a rise in ethnic nationalism, destabilization was caused due to the Great 
Powers attempting to reestablish their post-Cold War Balkan influence, and that 
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competing claims for self-determination within an artificially constructed federation 
were the ultimate cause. Regardless, in March and April of 1990, Slovenia and 
Croatia held their first multiparty elections in nearly fifty years. During early 1991, 
Macedonia's new president, Kiro Gligorov, and the president ofBosnia and 
Herzegovina, Alija Izetbegovic, made concerted efforts to find a solution to the crisis 
within a decentralized and reorganized Yugoslav federation. However, Gligorov and 
Izetbegovic made it unambiguous that ifSlovenia and Croatia decided to renounce 
the federation, Macedonia and Bosnia would do the same, as they held the opinion 
that independence was preferable to remaining within a rump Yugoslavia, dominated 
by Serbia. On 25 June 1991, Slovenia and Croatia simultaneously declared their 
independence from Yugoslavia, and on 8 September of the same year, a referendum 
for independence was held in Macedonia. Of the 72 percent of eligible voters who 
went to the polls, 99 percent of those voted for independence. It should be noted, 
however, that ethnic Albanians and Serbs boycotted the referendum. 
On 17 September 1991, the Macedonian National Assembly adopted a 
declaration of independence; on the 17th of November, a new constitution was 
accepted; and on 19 December, the National Assembly delivered a declaration 
calling for recognition. However, despite the recommendation of the European 
Community'S (EC) Badinter Commission in January 1992 that Macedonia be 
recognized by EC member states, Greek opposition caused an initial rejection. 
Greek opposition was based on a political dispute over Macedonia's proposed name, 
constitution and flag, stating they indicated irredentist ambitions. To alleviate Greek 
concerns, Macedonia amended its constitution on 6 January 1992, and was finally 
admitted into the United Nations as its 181 st member on 8 April, albeit under the 
provisional name of the "former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia" in light of Greek 
objections. 
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Figure 3.1 imparts a timeline ofthe key events in Macedonian history from 
antiquity to their formal acceptance into the community of United Nations. 
Figure 3.1: Chrono ogy 0 ey Istonca fK H' . lE vents m ace onta. 
._!?~!~(~.t __ . Event f-.------ ----.-.. ----------------------. 
~ent KJ.!!~2m ~fMac~.£!!!~~~d by Philip. 11. . 359-3~.?..!!~. --. 
~nclent Ml!ce<!.?E.!~_~~P.}re ~.!.t:.d by Alexand~_!.!!J.AI~~~~~!!.l~e (!.!!?~1=_ _______ ._. 1}.6-3.~.U!.&.-. 
r1}ome conquers M~sedo~~a. 168 B.C. . 
395 E~~_bJJ..s~~~nt 2fE~..!~~~_~~~!._'.~~man E~pi.~:. ______________________ ._. ._.... . 
East Roman Empire becomes Greek Monarchy under Heraclius I, henceforth referred to 610-641 
.~s BY~.!1tine E~p'ire.:.. --------_._------_. 
846-852 First BulB~an Empire gains control of M~~onia.!.!'!'Aer K.!!an MY.-!ami~-Pre~~~!!. 
863 · f-~ and Meth~i~~_~p~J.!l!~~..!?~oris I ~~~r!.~~~Q~~~~5.'~~· _ .. ----_. 
886 Clement and Naum establish Orthodox mission in Ohrid. ._.-
_i~!~-~!,ll..P.!!~~£f.~~~[~.~_.~~~.!l_I}~~[Il.~~!~~~~~p.~~!_~.~~j1._=====: 1014 ... __ ... _., 
1054 Unified European Christian Church tom into the two halves of western Roman Catholic 
· _~~E.~~~ °t!~£~2_'£_~~1~.s_!!!~.g.!!.at ~.~!!.~!!!! __________ -------_. '-' 
1282 · Milutin, the Serbian ~j.!l.s_~esJlkopje from ~E~~l~'!'..:___ __ 
1--"'--'- Apogee of Serbian Empire. Stefan Dusan proclaims himself Emperor of the Serbs 1346 
greeks, Buls~a.!!~~d Albani~s. 
1389 · e-9tto'.!'~!!~ defe~~§.~!?~!l~IS.~~o Polj~~.!:~~~~~_.~~~~.~.~!!.!..~!~D~~~~l~!._~:. __ _=: .. __ .. 
1870 · E~~.pJjs~,!!ent 2f1!~~a..!!.~~_~~~~..!~!!!!..!?~~~E~.£~J~~~£Pj~~.~g·~.1!!.!~: _____ ._. 
1878 · _!re~~ of.§an ~!..I?f.~!!~~~_f£~s.~~~! Be~!l~_· _____________ . ____ . _____ . 
1893 · r1-~ternal Maced~~ ~~~~'!!l~!l_lE2Qrj.~izat.i'?!!.!C?~~~J..y~~_~~..: . 
1895 · ~~ced~nian Su.E!!!']!.. CO!!!.'!!~ttee (AKA EX!.c:.~!.Q~_~~!!!!~?!'l..f.?.!'~t:.<!.L~.§5.'E~: ___ . 
1903 IIl!!.~c:.n Upri!!!!1.B. es~bl~~d the Krushevo ~pub!!.£. 
1908 · e-Y.9~.!1..s.. Tur~_~~~luti'?~· ___________________ . 
1912-1913 · f-E!.r~!..!l_~!-~n W_ar and T!.~~ of London; Ott'?'E!l.!l_I?!!,~re .P_~.~ed)!2~E_I!"2.r..~..:. .. _. 
1913 Se£<2!!~~alkan W~~d Treaty of Bucharest; ~~£<E.~~nia dividE~_~~~~ vi~~!s. 
1914-1918 First World War. 
1918 EJ~g~~~~LSe""r~!. Cro!l!~_!!!!:!.~ovenes ~~!~~~~~_Lry.~_~P~!.1EE.!l!~!;;--- . 
1929 _~j!!S~!,ll-2! Serbs!. Cr.?~~~~'§_IE~~~!l.!!!.~ Yu.g~~~~}.~.i!:.~~~~~~§2.~!~_~~~~;._: 
'''-'--' 
1941 ...Q.:!!nan oc£~~2.!!.. of YUj~lavia; Bu!s..~ia 1I!!~.~~~!1.!~~t.2!.!v.!~.~.~~<!.!!ja. _. 
1943 Anti-Axis ~~i~warf,!!e begi~s in Macedonia!.£.~!!!!El~~Tit~. .. - ASNOM affirms M!l.£ed~nia is a federal state within the Yu..s?sl~!~A~~tio_n. _____ : 1944 
1945 ~.ist Federal~~~lic of_,!.!:!~slavja is _~~b~~~~<!. ____ . -
1948 Break between Tito and Cominform. ._--' r-::------------ -_ . 
1990 . M~I.!!:'.P!l!!Y. e~E~~.!l..s_~~~_in .~~donia. .... _ ... ----_. 
Kiro Gligorav elected President. 
--------------_ . 
1991-Jan 
1991-Jun 25 Slovenia and Croatia simultaneously declare their independence. 
1991- Sep 8 Referendum held in favor of Macedonian independence. 
1991- Sep 17 Macedonian National Assembly adopts declaration of independence. 
1991-Nov 17 New Macedonian Constitution accepted. 
1991-Dec 19 ~..ational!,s~~ly d~li~,!S dE.?l~~ion ~allins. ~or !~£.~.g!!!!l~'!: ____________ . 
'1992 - Apr 8- Macedonta admItted mto the Umted NatIons as Its 181st member under the provisional 
name ofthe 'former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia". 
3 Source: Compiled from Dennis P. Hupchick and Harold E. Cox. 2001. The Pal grave Concise 
Historical Atlas of The Balkans. Hampshire, UK: Palgrave Publishers Ltd; Paul R. Magocsi. 1998. 
Historical Atlas of East Central Europe. London, UK: University of Washington Press; and James 
Pettifer. 1999. The New Macedonian Question. London, UK: MacMillan Press Ltd. 
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Figure 3.2 is presented as a synopsis ofthe key historical chronology as related to the 
establishment ofthe Balkan national states. 
F' 32 E br h t fth B Ik N f I Stat .. .. gure .. sta IS men 0 e a an Rlona es • 
Country Nationalist Autonomy Independence Initial Form of Current Form of 
Movement Achieved Achieved Government Government 
Initiated 
Greece 1821 1830 1830 Constitutional Parliamentary 
London London Monarchy Democracy 
Protocol Protocol 
Serbia 1804 1829 1878 Constitutional Parliamentary 
Treaty of Treaty of Monarchy Democracy 
Edime San Stefano 
Bulgaria 1835 1878 1908 Consti tutional Parliamentary 
Treaty of San Declaration of Principality Democracy 
Stefano Tsar Ferdinand I 
Albania 1878 1913 1913 Constitutional Parliamentary 
Treaty of Treaty of Principality Democracy 
London Bucharest 
Macedonia 1903 1991 1991 ParI iamentary Parliamentary 
National National Democracy Democracy 
Referendum Referendum 
Via an amalgamation ofthe facts contained within these two figures, an historical 
foundation is constructed upon which contemporary consequence can be evaluated. 
3.4. Contemporary Aspects. 
In one sense, Macedonia throughout the latter half of the nineteenth century was 
no different from its four contiguous neighboring regions: Serbia, Greece, Bulgaria, 
and Albania, in that all these peoples were struggling to extricate themselves from 
Ottoman rule. Nevertheless, there were two distinctive dissimilarities. Firstly, 
within Macedonia, there was basically no homogeneous population consisting of a 
dominant group from which a new state could be formed. There was a majority in 
the cultural sense of the existence of more peoples of Slavonic origin than of any 
other group, but only within a complex melange of Turks, Greeks, Albanians, Vlachs 
.. Source: Compiled from Charles and Barbara Jelavich. 1997. The Establishment of the Balkan 
National States, 1804-1920. London, UK: The University of Washington Press; Dennis P. Hupchick. 
2002. The Balkans: From Constantinople to Communism. Hampshire, UK: Palgrave Publishers Ltd; 
Dennis P. Hupchick and Harold E. Cox. 2001. The Pal grave Concise Historical Atlas of The Balkans. 
Hampshire, UK: Palgrave Publishers Ltd; and Paul R. Magocsi. 1998. Historical Atlas of East 
Central Europe. London, UK: University of Washington Press. 
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and Gypsies existing in conjunction with the Slavonic majority; moreover, that 
majority was itself subdivided between Serbian, Bulgarian and Macedonian elements 
(Pettifer 1999, 16). Secondly, while Serbia, Greece, Bulgaria, and Albania all had 
historical and geographical claims to the Macedonian lands, they also had a 
European Great Power who, for diverse political incentives, sought to promote their 
Balkan ally's case and champion their cause. The majority of these convictions has 
not altered over time and remains justifiable in the present day; consequently 
Macedonia declared independence wedged between four regional neighbors with 
their own claims upon the identical land and people, thereby perpetuating the fear of 
the "four wolves". To ethnic Macedonian nationalists, 8 September 1991 was the 
culmination of their quest for a sovereign state, however within the Balkan 
Peninsula, it served to rekindle the flames that surrounded the old Macedonian 
Question, and bring it to the forefront once again. As a result, Macedonia entered 
independence exposed to threats from her neighbors, and overshadowed by regional 
instability. 
Historically, Bulgaria has been the country with the most unequivocal intentions 
on Macedonian Territory. Bulgaria was the first country to recognize Macedonia as 
an independent state, while simultaneously explicitly denying recognition of 
Macedonia as an independent nation (Roudometof2000). From the time when the 
Treaty of San Stefano originally incorporated all Macedonian areas within the 
Bulgarian state, the Bulgarian belief has been that Macedonia and all Macedonians 
are rightfully Bulgarian. Likewise, there cannot exist any Macedonian language as it 
is in reality Bulgarian. In line with this viewpoint, Bulgaria has consistently opposed 
the designation of medieval and contemporary historical figures as Macedonian. 
In Serbia, Macedonia continued to be thought of as a Serb component. Ever 
since the Congress of Berlin, Serbians regarded Macedonia as South Serbia, and that 
it was only granted republic status by the creativity and good graces ofTito. In other 
words, from the Serbian perspective, Macedonia was an artificial state they 
themselves had created, and, consequently, the new Yugoslavia refused to ratify the 
border between Macedonia and Serbia. Another item of discontent between Serbia 
and Macedonia was that the Serbian Orthodox hierarchy had never recognized the 
existence of the Macedonian Autocephalous Orthodox Church. For that matter, no 
other Orthodox hierarchies had recognized the Macedonian Church either. Although 
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the Serbian Orthodox Church has begrudgingly accepted that buildings erected since 
1967 are property of the Macedonian Church, it contends that any churches or 
monasteries dating from before that time are, in fact, property of the Serbian Church. 
Greece responded to the Macedonian declaration of independence the most 
vehemently, and perhaps the most unexpectedly. In direct opposition to the Badinter 
Commission recommendation that Macedonia be recognized, Greece successfully 
pressed the EC to deny recognition, thereby blocking Macedonia's eligibility for 
International Monetary Fund loans or other aid. The grounds of Greek hostility to 
Macedonia's recognition were based upon opposition to the name and representative 
symbols. At the heart of much ofthe Greek rhetoric was a view of ancient history as 
national patrimony that underpins rights to exclusive ownership of symbols and 
territory in the present (Brown 2000). The primary Greek objection was to the name 
Macedonia, which was also the name of the most northern Greek province, while the 
secondary objection related to the Star ofVergina as a symbol on the new 
Macedonian Flag. The Greek perspective was both the name Macedonia and the 
Star of Vergina were based on the history of Alexander the Great and the Kingdom 
of Macedonia, and since Alexander was considered to be Greek, so too was all 
related to his heritage. Furthermore, since these symbols of antiquity were of Greek 
heritage, any modem claims upon their ownership demonstrated irredentist claims 
upon Greek territories. This concern was further exacerbated by the Macedonian 
utilization of the White Tower, a Greek Landmark in Thessaloniki, on Macedonian 
currency, as well as a stipulation in the Macedonian constitution referring to the 
republic's concern with the situation and rights of Macedonian people residing in 
neighboring countries and emigres from Macedonia. 
Albania also raised concerns regarding the independence of Macedonia, 
particularly with regard to the large Albanian minority residing in northern and 
western Macedonia. One of the fears perpetuated by the media was the Albanian 
desire for a greater Albania encompassing Albania proper, western and northern 
Macedonia and the Serbian province ofKosovo, thus uniting all Albanians who were 
separated under the treaty of London in 1913. The Albanian dilemma, however, had 
more of a potentially explosive threat domestically. With more than a third of the 
Macedonian population being comprised of Albanians and demanding better rights; 
the countrY sharing its western border with the countrY of Albania, who has its own 
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stability challenges, and its northern border with the Serb province of Kosovo, who 
is an advocate of independence for itself; domestic ethnic stability was of paramount 
concern. Consequently, Macedonia gained its independence with four competing 
claims upon its people and land posing external threats, and a domestic ethnic 
dilemma that held the distinct possibility of internal violence at any moment. These 
circumstances were set amid the overall regional sense of instability, as conflict had 
already commenced between Serbia, and Slovenia and Croatia, with the distinct 
possibility of further conflict as the dissolution of Yugoslavia progressed. 
The fundamental dogma of Macedonian historiography, explicitly, that there was 
an incessant survival of a self-conscious Slavic Macedonian entity since the 
settlement of the Slavs in the fifth through seventh centuries to the present day, is 
not historically supported. That Saints Cyril, Methodius, Clement and Naum, 
Emperor Samuil, Gotse Delchev, and every other historical figures originating from 
these lands prior to the nineteenth century possessed a conscious and purely 
Macedonian identity, is likewise not historically supported. The strength of the 
Macedonian position is predominantly founded on a corporeal political reality 
attested by all independent observers: at present the majority of the Macedonian 
population is resolutely convinced that it forms a Macedonian nation, and speaks a 
Macedonian language (Drezov 1999). Adjacent to this fact, the pronouncements of 
Greeks, Bulgarians and Serbs, that this self-recognition is somehow erroneous bear 
little credence, as self- recognition by definition means only what those people 
desire. In the nineteenth century, the Greeks changed their self-recognition and 
language from Romaika to HeIlenika, asserting their ancient Greek legacy over the 
Byzantine period. The Rumanians changed their self-recognition to Romanian, and 
their alphabet from Cyrillic to Latin to assert a more explicit link with ancient Rome. 
Both nations attempted respective re-Hellenization and re-Latinization of their 
present nation based upon the past. Against this background, the Macedonians can 
hardly be considered an artificial nation, yet the reality of the contemporaneous 
Macedonian identity in no way makes it a reality in previous times. Despite all their 
differentiation, one element is mutual for all Balkan elucidations of the Macedonian 
identity, be they Greek, Bulgarian Serbian, or Macedonian: none of them concedes 
the significance of historical transformation. 
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This chapter was not intended to be an exclusively comprehensive historical 
essay, imparting all historical facts from the time of Philip 11 of Macedon until 
contemporary times. Indeed, library shelves are already filled with volumes on the 
subject. Instead, germane events and facts were culled out of the more than two 
millennia of history throughout the Balkan region in order to provide a foundation of 
knowledge from which impartial judgments could be made regarding conflictive 
claims and/or actions. For quite often, within the Balkans, history itself can be used 
as a tool of conflict when subjected to nationalistic interpretations. 
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Chapter 4: Phase I: Pre-Kosovo 
4.1. Introduction 
Macedonia is one of six former republics of the Socialist Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia. During the supremacy of Josip Broz Tito, Macedonians were accorded 
the prominence of constituent nation, language, and culture equal to that of the other 
Yugoslav republics. In 1991 Macedonia became one offour former Yugoslav 
republics, joining Croatia, Slovenia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina, to declare its 
independence. Most notably, however, Macedonia was the only one of the four to 
achieve independence without bloodshed, violence, or even a shot being fired. 
Having obtained its independence, nevertheless, Macedonia faced various interstate 
and intrastate challenges. 
Surmounting interstate challenges was obviously correlated to the preservation of 
independence and existence as a sovereign state. As alluded to in the previous 
chapter, Macedonia declared independence wedged between four regional neighbors 
with their own claims upon the identical land and people. Bulgaria was the first 
country to recognize Macedonia as an independent state, while concurrently and 
unequivocally denying recognition of an independent Macedonian language and 
nation. From the time when the Treaty of San Stefano originally incorporated all 
Macedonian areas within the Bulgarian state, the Bulgarian belief has been that 
Macedonia and all Macedonians are rightfully Bulgarian. 
From the Serbian perspective, Macedonia has been regarded as South Serbia ever 
since the Congress of Berlin. Given that Macedonia was, in fact, an artificial state 
created by Tito, the new Federal Republic of Yugoslavia refused to ratify the border 
between Macedonia and Serbia as it as well was considered artificial. Though the 
Macedonian leadership had offered the Yugoslav Army ample time to withdraw 
from the area, hostilities between Serbia, Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina 
instilled a potent sense of trepidation among the Macedonian populace. 
The primary Greek objection was based upon opposition to the name and 
representative symbols. The Greek point of view was both the name Macedonia and 
the Star ofVergina were based on the history of Alexander the Great and the 
Kingdom of Macedonia, and since Alexander was considered to be Greek, so too 
was all related to his heritage. Furthermore, since these symbols of antiquity were of 
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Greek heritage, any modem claims upon their ownership were demonstrative of 
irredentist claims upon Greek territories. 
Albania also raised concerns regarding the independence of Macedonia, 
particularly with respect to the status and treatment of the large Albanian minority 
residing in northern and western Macedonia. One of the fears perpetuated by the 
media was the Albanian desire for a greater Albania encompassing Albania proper, 
western and northern Macedonia and the Serbian province of Kosovo, thus uniting 
all Albanians who were separated under the treaty of London in 1913. The Albanian 
dilemma, however, had more of a potentially explosive intrastate threat. 
As a result, Macedonia entered independence exposed to interstate threats from 
her neighbors, and overshadowed by regional instability. In response, the initial 
foreign policy promulgated by President Gligorov was based on a principle of 
equidistance, where good and friendly relations were to be developed with all while 
precluding the development ofa special relationship with any. Given Macedonia's 
geographic position in the southern Balkans, this task would require a tactful venture 
in harmonizing diplomacy. 
From an intrastate perspective, three primary challenges confronted Macedonia: 
the need for democratic transformation, the socioeconomic situation, and interethnic 
tensions. Each of these challenges was interrelated in nature and fundamental to the 
construct of a functioning independent and sovereign state. Similarly. these 
intrastate challenges were interconnected to the aforementioned interstate 
challenges. In the long term, each challenge required resolution to ensure the 
country's future as a full fledged member of the Euro-Atlantic community. 
Challenge of Democratic Transformation 
The Constitution, adopted on 17 November 1991, established a hybrid 
presidential-parliamentary political system, where legislative power was vested in a 
unicameral 120 seat "Sobranje" (National Assembly). Though the National 
Assembly can be dissolved by the government and early elections called, members 
of the National Assembly are directly elected for a four-year term. Currently, 85 
members are elected in single seat districts and 35 members are elected by 
proportional representation. The president is the head of state and, per se, represents 
Macedonia in international affairs and is the Commander in Chief ofthe Armed 
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Forces. He is directly elected for a five-year term and is limited to two terms. The 
president has limited powers such as nomination of candidates and appointment of 
certain officials. The president may also veto legislation adopted by the National 
Assembly, but a two thirds majority can override the veto. Executive power is 
vested in a government composed of the prime minister and other cabinet ministers. 
Once a prime minister is nominated by the president, the government must be 
confirmed in an investiture vote by a majority of all members ofthe National 
Assembly. Likewise, the prime minister, individual ministers, or government in its 
entirety may be required to resign by a majority vote of no confidence of all 
members ofthe National Assembly. 
One of the most discernible elements of the Macedonian political landscape is the 
division of political parties based on ethnic lines. Nearly every ethnic group 
organizes various corresponding political parties, while few, if any, people cross 
ethnic lines to become members of another political party. Consequently, most 
Macedonian political parties gave priority to ethnic interests, thereby providing 
impetus to nationalistic division. From 1946 until 1990, Macedonia, as a constituent 
republic of Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, had a single party system 
authorizing only the Communist Party to form the government. In 1990, the one 
party system was abolished, thereby initiating a substantial increase in political 
parties (Georgieva and Konechni 1998, 192-193). Roughly 20 political parties were 
represented in the first multi-party elections in 1991, but only a small number 
managed to win parliamentary seats. By the time the second elections took place in 
1994, there were over 60 political parties registered in Macedonia. With the 
abolition ofthe one party system, three primary political camps formed in 
Macedonia; the post-communists, ethnic Albanian nationalists and ethnic 
Macedonian nationalists (Sokalski 2003, 66-67). 
The post-communists were split into the three main smaller parties of the Social 
Democratic Alliance of Macedonia (SDAM), the Liberal Party (LP) and the Socialist 
Party (SP), although they would merge into the Alliance of Democratic Forces in 
Macedonia (SDSM) in 1994. This party advocated contemporary principles of 
social-democracy based on economic and social efficiency, and ethnic principles of 
European humanism, social justice and human dignity, with the aim being to 
transform Macedonia into a democratic and developed country. 
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Ethnic Albanian nationalists were divided chiefly into two smaller parties: the 
Party for Democratic Prosperity (POP) and the People's Democratic Party (NOP). 
The POP started building its image by expressing a certain degree of mistrust for, 
and phobia against, the state and its institutions. Although the POP is the largest 
party of Albanians in Macedonia, the importance of the NOP should not in the 
slightest be undervalued. The NOP is a purely national party almost solely 
concerned with political issues concerning ethnic Albanian's national demands and 
the status of Albanians in Macedonia as a constitutive people. 
Ethnic Macedonian nationalists established themselves as the Internal 
Macedonian Revolutionary Organization-Democratic Party for Macedonian National 
Unity (VMRO-DPMNE). With its ideological and political tenacity as a national 
party, VMRO-DPMNE resolved the most essential tasks of the party were defining 
the republic of Macedonia's international status; removing dangerous pro-Yugoslav, 
as well as communist, pockets in Macedonia; defining the status of relations with the 
Albanian minority; and consolidating the country's economy. The overarching goal 
ofVMRO-DPMNE was the struggle to re-establish the pride and dignity of the 
Macedonian people and state. 
In November and December of 1990 Macedonia held its first multi-party 
elections, where the outcome was: VMRO-DPMNE, 38 seats; SDAM, 31 seats; 
PDPINDP, 23 seats; LP, 17 seats; SP, 4 seats; independent candidates, 3 seats; Party 
of Yugoslavs in Macedonia, 2 seats; coalition ofLP/SP, 1 seat; and a coalition of 
LP/SP/ Young Democratic Progressive Party, 1 seat. (Georgieva and Konechni 1998, 
192-193). Ironically, although VMRO-DPMNE won the election, it did not have a 
majority and could not form a coalition government with any other parties. Faced 
with parliamentary paralysis, President Gligorov convinced the people to accept a 
non-party parliament, coupled with a coalition cabinet of "experts" from the SDAM, 
PDPINDP and LP Parties. Thus, a new group of young administrators emerged, 
most of who were in their 40s or 50s, were professors or lecturers at the University 
in Skopje, and were selected primarily for their academic merit and organizational 
skills. Among them were Branko Crvenkovski, the future prime minister; Ljubomir 
Frckovski, the future minister of foreign affairs and internal affairs; Jane Miliovski, 
future minister of finance and deputy prime minister; Vlado Popovski, future 
minister of defense and justice; Blagoj Handziski, future minister of defense and 
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foreign affairs, and Lazar Kitanoski, future minister of defense and member of 
parliament (Sokalski 2003, 66-67). Each ofthese individuals contributed in their 
own manner to the government and growth of the newly independent Macedonia. 
For many other young officials the concrete action of governing afforded on the 
job training resulting in both political successes and failures. Additionally, the 
fragmented and ethnically divided political parties created rivalries and political 
polarization. Unfortunately, this political setting, coupled with Balkan culture, 
created an environment where adopting positions largely for the sake of 
contradicting or embarrassing their opponents often took precedence over adopting 
positions in the interests of democratic and/or economic progress. Thus depicts the 
intrastate challenge of democratic transformation for Macedonia at the time of 
independence and shortly thereafter. 
Socioeconomic Challenge 
As the poorest republic in the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, 
Macedonia faced economic obstacles from the moment of independence. 
Industry in its entirety was inefficient, unprofitable and badly structured (Koller 
2001,30). Low levels of technology predominated, such as: oil refining by 
distillation only; production of basic fuels; mining and manufacturing processes 
resulting in the extraction and production of coal as well as metallic chromium, lead, 
zinc, and ferro-nickel; and light industry producing basic textiles, wood products, 
and tobacco. Agriculture provided 12 percent of Macedonia's Gross Domestic 
Product and met the basic need for food. Principal crops were rice, tobacco, wheat, 
corn, and millet; also grown were cotton, sesame, mulberry leaves, citrus fruit, and 
vegetables. Interestingly enough, Macedonia was, and still is, one of the seven legal 
cultivators of the opium poppy for the world pharmaceutical industry, including 
some exports to Europe and the United States. Agricultural production, however, 
was highly labor intensive, and the land was fatigued from uncontrolled cultivation 
of the soil and erosion. As the economy depended on outside sources for all of its 
oil, gas, modem machinery and parts; raw materials and spare parts constituted the 
largest segment of imports. In 1990 Macedonia contributed less than 6 percent of 
the gross social product of Yugoslavia, while it comprised 9 percent of the 
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population and 10 percent ofthe territory of Yugoslavia (Reuter 1999, 38-39). Per 
capita income in 1990 was assessed at 2,200 US dollars. 
Macedonia had to endure several of the same tribulations as other East European 
countries going through the transition from a centrally-planned to a market economy, 
and from a socialist/communist to an open democratic political system. Unique to 
Macedonia, however, was that the enterprise sector operated according to the 
Yugoslav system of "market socialism", in which the productive sector was 
dominated by large firms in heavy industries, many of which were integrated with 
firms located in other Yugoslav republics. These large, state-owned, loss-making 
enterprises had to not only be privatized, but additionally had to become independent 
ofthe Yugoslav federated system. Moreover, as a newly independent country, 
Macedonia had to face the supplementary difficulty of having to create institutions to 
perform national functions previously undertaken by the federal government in 
Belgrade, such as: foreign affairs, defense, treasury, customs, central banking, etc. 
Macedonia's economy was further restricted by its geographical location. As a 
result of the mountainous terrain to the east and west, the natural trade routes were to 
the north and south. Primary port access was in Thessaloniki, Greece, and the 
predominance of economic trade was conducted with Greece, Bulgaria, Albania, and 
the other republics within Yugoslavia; which accounted for 60 percent of its markets 
prior to its dissolution, and which also served as a conduit to other East, Central and 
West European markets. Economic viability would require ties be enlarged or 
reformed with its neighbors: Serbia, Albania, Greece, and Bulgaria; however, 
continued interstate threats and political turmoil, both internally and in the region as 
a whole, prevented any prompt readjustments of trade patterns. Furthermore, 
Macedonia's geographical isolation, technological backwardness, and political 
instability placed it far down the list of countries of interest to Western investors. 
Macedonia would have to struggle with economic transition in a particularly 
hostile environment. The country would have to deal with the effects of compliance 
with the United Nations-mandated sanctions against Serbia, and difficulties in 
relations with Greece would culminate in imposition of a trade embargo in February 
1994. The Greek embargo would block access to the port ofThessaloniki, and 
Greek markets, that had provided an important route for imports and exports to and 
from third country markets. Recognition of Macedonia by the European Community 
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would be delayed by Greek political opposition, thereby hindering the establishment 
ofnonnal relations with the World Bank and International Monetary fund until late 
spring ofl993. Consequently, the process of transition of the Macedonian economy 
began with a 2-3 year delay behind most other transitioning countries of Eastern 
Europe. 
These events threatened the economic stability of the country and exacerbated the 
tensions associated with the economic and political changes engendered in the move 
to independence. Dealing with ethnic tensions in a region rife with ethnic conflicts 
would only serve to complicate further the situation. As a result, the intrastate 
political and economic transition and development of the newly independent 
Macedonia were integrally connected, and both subject to the interstate instability 
and threats to the country. 
Interethnic Challenge 
The interethnic dilemma also posed an intrastate challenge to the newly 
independent Macedonia. The populace of Macedonia is primarily divided between 
an ethnic Macedonian majority and an ethnic Albanian minority, where the ethnic 
Albanian minority is predominantly concentrated in the northwest region of the 
country. In the communities ofTetovo and Gostivar the ethnic Albanians constitute 
an absolute majority, in Kicevo and Debar a relative majority, and in Kumanovo and 
Struga a strong minority (Reuter 1999, 35). In addition, there is a sizeable share of 
Skopje, which is heavily Albanian. Consequently, these communities compose a 
compact and joined section ofthe country that borders Albania to the west and 
Kosovo to the north. 
According to a 1991 census, of the total population of2,033,964, ethnic 
Macedonians comprised 1,328,187, or 67 percent; and ethnic Albanians included 
441,987, or 21.7 percent. In a subsequent census conducted in 1994, of the total 
population of 1,936,877, ethnic Macedonians consisted of 1,288,330, or 66.5 
percent; whereas ethnic Albanians were represented by 442,914, or 22.9 percent of 
the population. The disparity in total population figures is accounted for by the 
altered criteria ofthe census. In the 1991 census, citizens living or working overseas 
for more than one year were counted, while only citizens living abroad for less than 
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one year were accounted for in the 1994 census (Johnstone 2001). However, these 
censuses proved to be the source of added debate and divergence. 
In the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, a regular census was customarily 
held in the first year of each decade. Accordingly, from April 1 st through the 15th, 
of 1991, a census was conducted amid circumstances of imminent political 
dissolution. Prior to compilation and release of the data, Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, and Macedonia declared independence; and war had broken out in 
Croatia and Bosnia. As a result, the census was executed in an atmosphere of 
insecurity, suspicion and acrimony. Ethnic Albanians boycotted the census; on the 
pretext they would be deliberately undercounted, thus obliging the census officials to 
establish estimates of the Albanian population on the basis of previous polls and 
other scientific statistical parameters. 
Albanian political leaders complained this census, which they had deliberately 
boycotted, did them an injustice in that ethnic Albanians really accounted for up to 
40% of the population. Gennany, historically a guardian of Albanian national 
interests in the Balkans, and particularly in opposition to the Serbs, supported these 
complaints. Out of sensitivity to Albanian claims, Ambassador Geert-Hinrich 
Ahrens, head of the Working Group for Human Rights and Minorities within the 
International Conference on Fonner Yugoslavia, called for an unanticipated census 
to be held in Macedonia under supervision of the "international community." Thus, 
in 1994 a second census was conducted and paid for essentially by the European 
Union on Macedonian territory; an unusual intervention in the internal affairs of a 
recently "independent" state. 
Prior to the conduct of the 1994 census there was prolonged debate over the 
wording of the census law; predominantly regarding the issue of language and the 
fact that article 35 of the census law provided for bilingual fonns in Albanian, 
Turkish, Romani, Vlah, and Serbian in addition to Macedonian (Friedman 1996, 92). 
Those chosen to oversee the census were selected by European organizations and 
were officially referred to as the ''Group of Experts"; however, their fields of 
expertise were not inclusive of erudition relevant to Macedonia specifically nor the 
Balkans regionally. Just as the census was to commence, there was a serious threat 
of Albanian members of parliament calling for a boycott of the census based on 
these irregularities. Thus, while the ''Group of Experts" was convinced they were 
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merely conducting an objective mechanical and statistical exercise, they were in fact 
immersed in the center of an intrastate political issue. In sum, while the 1994 census 
was a statistical success it was a political failure; whereas it served to legitimate the 
basic statistics ofthe 1991 census, it did nothing to resolve the political issues 
leading up to the conduct of the census. Aside from the political debate regarding 
the exact percentage of the ethnic Albanian minority in Macedonia, there were other 
principal areas of grievance from the ethnic Albanian community. These areas of 
grievance could be classified as constitutional status and cultural, representational 
and educational rights. 
The issue of constitutional status is thoroughly allied to the political debate 
regarding the number of ethnic Albanians in Macedonia, and is focused on the 
Albanian demand for recognition as a constituent nation. The constitution of the 
Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia defined the Republic of Macedonia as ''the 
national state ofthe Macedonian people, and the state ofthe Albanian and Turkish 
nationalities in it, based on the sovereignty of the people". The constitution further 
acknowledged members of other groups who lived in the republic enjoyed legal 
equality and had the same rights and obligations as Macedonians, Albanians and 
Turks (Burg 1996, 34). Hence, while Macedonia was defined as both a national. or 
ethnic. state, and a civic one, the Yugoslav era constitutional distinction between 
nations (Macedonian) and nationalities (Albanians and Turks) related to an obvious 
disparity in political status. 
Subsequent to independence, the preamble of the Macedonian constitution 
defined the state as the ''national state of the Macedonian people" based on 
"historical, cultural, spiritual and statehood heritage of the Macedonian people and 
their struggle over centuries for national and social freedom, as well as for the 
creation oftheir own state". As well, the constitution grants "full equality as citizens 
and permanent coexistence with the Macedonian people" to Albanians, Turks, 
Vlahs, Romanies and other nationalities, in that order. The prime ethnic Albanian 
accusation was this distinction between nation and nationality preserved the 
separation maintained under the Yugoslav era by signifYing inferior political status 
of the second faction. As a result, ethnic Albanians boycotted the referendum on 
independence in 1991 and held their own referendum on territorial autonomy on 
January 11 and 12 of 1992, where 74 percent favored autonomy. The Macedonian 
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slant of this referendum, aside from its declared illegality, was an unambiguous 
indication from ethnic Albanians oftheir lack of a developed sense of identity with 
the Macedonian state and their disinclination to coexist in a coJlective state. The 
Albanian discernment of this issue was they wanted to express sincere opposition to 
their status as recognized in the constitution and demand to be recognized as a 
constituent nation within the newly independent Republic of Macedonia. 
Cultural rights were in addition a foremost distress of ethnic Albanians. Article 7 
ofthe constitution delineated Macedonian as the official state language, although 
mitigated by the proviso that nationalities may utilize their own language as an 
official language in local affairs where they constitute a majority or a considerable 
number of the inhabitants. Articles 8 and 48 of the constitution established the 
freedom to express one's national identity as weJl as the right to establish institutions 
through which to do so. Ethnic Albanians saw this as insufficient and demanded the 
officially recognized right to use the Albanian language freely, as weJl as an increase 
in utilization of Albanian in broadcast programs on the Macedonian national 
television channel. As with the demand for recognition as a constituent nation, the 
cultural rights issue represented an Albanian desire for equal status within the 
republic between Macedonians and Albanians. 
Representational rights were perceived as a contentious point as ethnic Albanians 
sought greater representation in the government, armed forces and police. In 1991 
ethnic Albanians comprised only three percent of police officers, three percent of 
state employees, and seven percent of military personnel. Ethnic Macedonians were 
swift to highlight that since 1990 four to five ethnic Albanians had been appointed to 
cabinet positions; and not only had formation of Albanian political parties been 
aJlowable, but they had furthermore been included in the ruling government. This 
area of ethnic disagreement served as a political field of debate and confrontation 
prior to, throughout, and subsequent to independence. 
Educational rights issues were closely linked to the issues of cultural and 
representational rights in that the right to primary and secondary education in one's 
own language is also granted by Articles 8 and 48 ofthe constitution. However, 
while primary and secondary education was available in Albanian, university 
education was obtainable only in Macedonian. Article 9 of the constitution 
stipulated that higher education was to be carried out in Macedonian, though classes 
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may be conducted in the languages ~f nationalities in the departments of elementary 
and secondary educational pedagogy, at teachers colleges and in certain other 
subjects in order to preserve and develop cultural and national identity (Burg 1996, 
63-64). While ethnic Macedonians considered this a concessional act in accordance 
with articles 8 and 48, ethnic Albanians judged this law an exceedingly restrictive 
action that failed to address their demands for university level education in the 
Albanian language. The ethnic Albanian University of Pristina, in Kosovo, had 
provided a major source of higher education for ethnic Albanians in Macedonia; 
however, Serbian authorities closed the university in 1990, which significantly 
increased the demand for an Albanian university within Macedonia. 
The issue of Kosovo serves to network ethnic Albanian minority grievances in 
opposition to the government of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, 
commencing before Macedonian independence, to protest endeavors critical of the 
Macedonian government following sovereignty. Autonomist agitation among 
Kosovar ethnic Albanians has been prominent since 1968, when moderate demands 
were first voiced for the granting of republic status for Kosovo and the establishment 
of an Albanian language university. The more radical demands, however, were for 
secession from Yugoslavia and union with Albania. Large scale demonstrations 
erupted in Kosovo, Macedonia and Montenegro, resulting in the opening of the 
ethnic Albanian University of Prist in a; and Kosovo being declared an autonomous 
region, albeit still part of Serbia, responsible only to the federal government. 
As a result of the early 1970s devolution of power to the republics and provinces 
within federal Yugoslavia, a fundamentally ethnic Albanian leadership emerged in 
Kosovo, thereby producing an ethnodemographic regional shift from ethnically 
varied to primarily Albanian. Within the now predominantly ethnic Albanian 
province, the University of Prist in a served as the engine of Albanian nationalism, 
facilitated by mounting discontent with the social and economic underdevelopment 
ofthe province. One must bear in mind that until 1991, and the independence of 
Macedonia, the border between Kosovo and Macedonia was merely an 
administrative line affording unrestricted travel between the two regions. Therefore, 
the majority of Macedonia's educated Albanians attended the University of Prist in a, 
as opposed to attending University in Skopje, and was therefore connected with the 
intelligentsia of Kosovo (perry 2000,274). 
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With the death ofTito in 1980 ethnic Albanian nationalism increased in intensity, 
which led to a further sequence of nationalist demonstrations in 1981 seeking either 
republic status within the Yugoslav federation or outright unification with Albania. 
These protests were suppressed with a brusque demonstration of force, further 
alienating the ethnic Albanian population. During the 1980s, Serbian nationalism 
grew while ethnic Serbian and ethnic Albanian relations continued to deteriorate 
within Kosovo. In 1989 a series of constitutional amendments, followed by a new 
constitution in 1990, ultimately eliminated autonomy of the provinces within 
Yugoslavia. This prompted 115 ethnic Albanian members of the provincial 
parliament to declare independence for Kosovo; thereby provoking a rigorous 
rejoinder by Serbian authorities, who terminated the provincial parliament and 
government, closed the University of Prist in a and increased political repression. 
Within the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugos la via, the Republic of Macedonia 
had long served as an escape mechanism for ethnic Albanians from Kosovo fleeing 
repression. Sizable quantities of Kosovar Albanians who have traversed Macedonia 
on their flight from political repression have remained to settle within Macedonia. 
Thus, the linkage of political, cultural, and nationalist convictions between ethnic 
Albanians from Kosovo and Macedonia is readily evident. Throughout this same 
interval, Macedonian national identity was emergent as well; fortified by a Yugoslav 
government that advocated Macedonian language, culture and nationality. What 
materialized during the dissolution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, 
and the ensuing Macedonian independence. was an increase in reciprocated aversion 
as ethnic Macedonians perceived an Albanian threat to their emerging sovereign 
state and ethnic Albanians feared again being second class citizens. 
While ethnic Albanians in Macedonia at the time of independence endeavored to 
express their heartfelt opposition to their status as recognized in the constitution, and 
demanded to be recognized as a constituent nation within the newly independent 
Republic of Macedonia, ethnic Macedonians regarded the actions of ethnic 
Albanians as a clear indication of rejection of the will to develop a sense of identity 
with the Macedonian state and their disinclination to coexist in a collective state. 
The fragmented and ethnically divided political parties, and their rivalries, further 
intensified political polarization; which in turn deepened the reluctance of developed 
western nations to seek direct investment opportunities. The three primary intrastate 
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challenges confronting Macedonia at independence, the need for democratic 
transformation, the socioeconomic situation, and interethnic tensions, were 
interrelated in nature and fundamental to the construct of a functioning independent 
and sovereign state. Economic viability ofthe new nation required ties be enlarged 
or reformed with its neighbors Serbia, Albania, Greece, and Bulgaria; however, 
continued interstate threats and political turmoil, both internally and in the region as 
a whole, prevented any prompt readjustments of trade patterns. Concurrently, fears 
within the international community mounted regarding the possibility of interstate 
conflict such as had already occurred between Serbia, Croatia, and Bosnia. 
These events threatened the stability ofthe country and exacerbated the tensions 
associated with the economic and political changes engendered in the move to 
independence. Dealing with ethnic tensions in a region rife with ethnic conflicts 
would only serve to further complicate the situation. In sum, the intrastate ethnic, 
political and economic transition, and development of the newly independent 
Macedonia were integrally connected; and all were subject to the interstate threats to 
the country and overall regional instability. 
4.2. Initial ConOict Prevention Efforts 
When Macedonia declared independence, as a result of the referendum of8 
September of 1991, the most significant threat was that of an interstate nature. 
Conflict had already commenced as a consequence of the Slovenian and Croatian 
declarations ofindependence on 25 June 1991. Although the conflict in Slovenia 
was short-lived, the Croatian conflict was to become much more protracted. As the 
Yugoslav National Army (JNA) attempted to militarily avert dissolution of the 
Yugoslav Federation; the international community became involved attempting to 
halt the conflict, while additionally endeavoring to preclude its diffusion or 
escalation. 
United Nations involvement in the situation began on 25 September of 1991 with 
approval of Security Council (SC) Resolution 713 (1991a), which immediately 
implemented a general and complete embargo on all deliveries of weapons and 
military equipment to Yugoslavia. On 23 November, Cyrus Vance, recently 
appointed as the Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) for 
Yugoslavia, chaired a meeting in Geneva between the presidents ofCroatia and 
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Serbia, the defense secretary of Yugoslavia and Lord Carrington, the European 
Community mediator, where an agreement was reached on an immediate cease-fire. 
Moreover, all factions implied solid support for a UN Peacekeeping force. On 27 
November, Security Council Resolution 721 (1991b) endorsed the SRSG's 
statement that deployment of a UN peacekeeping operation could not be envisaged 
without, inter alia, full compliance by all parties with the agreement signed in 
Geneva; and undertook to examine recommendations for establishment of a UN 
peacekeeping operation. Then on 15 December, the Security Council stated in 
Resolution 724 (1991c) that while the conditions for establishing a peacekeeping 
operation still did not exist; they would endorse the Secretary-General's otTer to send 
to Yugoslavia a small group of personnel, including military personnel, to carry 
forward preparations for possible deployment of a UN peacekeeping operation. 
Additionally, a UN Military Liaison Mission of 50 officers was dispatched to 
monitor the cease-fire. This Military Liaison Mission was subsequently increased in 
strength to a total of 75 officers on 7 February of 1992 by Security Council 
Resolution 740 (1992a). On 21 February, the Security Council, in Resolution 743 
(1992b) decided to establish a United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in 
Yugoslavia for an initial period of one year, and requested immediate deployment of 
those elements of the force that could assist in developing an implementation plan 
for the earliest possible full force deployment. The general mission of UNPROFOR 
was as an interim arrangement to create the conditions of peace and security required 
for the negotiation of an overall settlement of the Yugoslav crisis. Finally, on 7 
April, with Resolution 749 (1992c) the Security Council decided to authorize the 
earliest possible full deployment ofUNPROFOR. Whereas initial deployment of 
UNPROFOR was to three United Nations Protected Areas (UNPA) in Croatia 
(Eastern Slavonia, Western Slavonia and Krajina), there were to be three following 
expansions to the mandate in Croatia in 1992. 
Following Bosnia and Herzegovina's declaration ofindependence, on 3 March 
1992; Bosnian Serbs, supported by neighboring Serbia and Montenegro, responded 
with armed resistance and atrocious acts of ethnic cleansing aimed at partitioning the 
republic along ethnic lines and joining Serb-held areas to form a "greater Serbia". 
Acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the Security Council imposed 
comprehensive sanctions against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and 
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Montenegro) on 30 May 1992, through Security Council Resolution 757 (1992c). 
The sanctions prohibited the import or export of all commodities or products 
originating in Serbia and Montenegro, the sale or supply of any commodities or 
products to any person or body in Serbia and Montenegro, and the denial of any 
financial or economic resources. Between the imposed sanctions and the turmoil 
caused by armed conflict, this situation was to have profound impact upon the 
Macedonian economy as the other republics within Yugoslavia accounted for 60 
percent of its markets prior to dissolution, and also served as a conduit to other East, 
Central and West European markets. 
On 8 June 1992, the Security Council, through Resolution 758 (1992d), decided 
to enlarge the mandate and strength ofUNPROFOR to create the immediate and 
necessary conditions for unimpeded delivery of humanitarian supplies to Sarajevo, 
and other destinations in Bosnia and Herzegovina, including the establishment of a 
security zone encompassing Sarajevo and its airport. Additionally authorized was 
the deployment of military observers in Sarajevo to supervise the withdrawal of 
antiaircraft weapons around the city. On 13 August the Security Council, distressed 
by the current circumstances in Sarajevo that restricted UNPROFOR's efforts to 
create these conditions, adopted Resolution 770 (1992e); calling on States to take 
nationally, or through regional agencies or arrangements, all measures necessary to 
facilitate, in coordination with the United Nations, the delivery of humanitarian 
assistance to Sarajevo and wherever needed in other parts of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. In supplementary deliberations, though, it was determined that task 
should be entrusted to UNPROFOR. As a result, the Secretary-General submitted a 
report to the Security Council on 10 September recommending the expansion of 
UNPROFOR's mandate and strength in Bosnia and Herzegovina in order to support 
efforts by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) to deliver 
humanitarian reJiefthroughout Bosnia and Herzegovina; and in partiCUlar to provide 
protection, at UNHCR's request, where and when UNHCR considered such 
protection necessary (United Nations 1996, 5). In addition, UNPROFOR could be 
used to protect convoys of released civilian detainees if the International Committee 
of the Red Cross (ICRC) so requested and if the Force Commander agreed that the 
request was practicable. As a result, UNPROFOR would be deployed in four or five 
new zones. By means of resolution 776 (1992t), adopted on 14 September 1992, the 
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Security Council approved the Secretary-General's report and authorized the 
enlargement of UNPROFOR's mandate and strength in Bosnia and Herzegovina for 
these purposes. Furthermore, a separate Bosnia and Herzegovina Command was 
established within UNPROFOR to implement the resolution, thereby creating two 
separate commands under the overall command ofUNPROFOR Headquarters in 
Zagreb. There were to be two more increases in the mandate and strength of 
UNPROFOR in Bosnia during 1992. Interestingly enough, in December of 1991, 
Bosnia's president, Alija Izetbegovic, had requested that UN peacekeepers be 
deployed to his country in a preventive function. This request, however, was denied 
by the UN on the basis that it was not customary procedure to deploy peacekeepers 
to an area prior to the instigation of hostilities (Ackermann 2000, 3). 
While these events were occurring, the Macedonian government was enthusiastic 
about the UN mediation and establishment ofUNPROFOR and publicly stated their 
support. However, within the international community disquiet was spreading 
concerning the possibility of Serbian intervention in Macedonia as well. When 
conflict erupted in Croatia, international warnings of similar actions in Bosnia and/or 
Macedonia became prevalent, and once armed conflict diffused to Bosnia these 
warnings expanded to a pervasive state for Macedonia. The situation was further 
exacerbated by the withdrawal of JNA forces from Macedonian soil. Although the 
peaceful withdrawal of JNA forces was a tribute to the diplomatic and political 
acumen of President Gligorov, Macedonia was now virtually defenseless as the JNA 
removed all heavy weaponry, aircraft and border-monitoring equipment. leaving the 
Macedonian Armed Forces (ARM) lightly armed and poorly equipped. In fact, the 
JNA executed such an extensive and rapid equipment withdrawal that holes in the 
cement were left where forklifts and cranes had been used to rip vehicle maintenance 
equipment from the floors. Once the JNA had withdrawn this military equipment, 
some was sent to support units fighting in Croatia and Bosnia; however, much was 
positioned in Kosovo just across the border from Macedonia. This fact lent further 
credence to the fears of a future Serbian incursion into Macedonia. 
In light of these early warnings and fears, the Conference on Security and 
Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), renamed the Organization for Security and 
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) during the Budapest Summit of 5 to 6 December 
1994, intensified their focus on the threats to Macedonia and the region. Owing to 
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the CSCE's evolving and increasing diligence on development as the primary 
instrument for early warning, conflict prevention and crisis management in the 
region; missions oflong duration were deployed to Kosovo, Sandjak and Vojvodina, 
in Serbia and Montenegro on 8 September 1992. The determination to establish a 
CSCE Monitoring Mission in Macedonia was taken in mid-1992 in the context of 
efforts to extend the European Community Monitoring Mission (ECMM) to the 
neighboring countries of Serbia and Montenegro to help avoid the diffusion of 
conflict. The decision to specifically explore with authorities in Skopje the 
possibility of a mission under CSCE auspices was taken at the 15th Committee of 
Senior Officials (CSO) Meeting on 14 August 1992. Subsequently, the CSCE sent 
an assessment team to Macedonia from 10 to 14 September and formally approved 
deployment of the mission at the 16th CSO Meeting on 18 September 1992 (OSCE 
2003). The initial mission, designated the "Spill over Monitoring Mission to Skopje" 
out of deference to Greek objections to the utilization of the term Macedonia, 
deployed on 22 September with a staff of four. The primary objectives of the 
Macedonian mission were to monitor developments along the borders of Macedonia 
with Serbia, and in other areas of the country, which may suffer from diffusion of the 
conflict in the former Yugoslavia; in order to promote respect for territorial integrity 
and the maintenance of peace and to help prevent possible conflict in the region 
(CSCE 1993). Specifically, the mandate ofthe Mission was to: engage in talks with 
governmental authorities; establish contacts with political parties and other 
organizations, and with ordinary citizens; conduct trips to assess the level of stability 
and the possibility of conflict; and if conflict should occur, establish facts to avoid 
further deterioration of the situation. 
In view of his apprehension concerning interstate threats in general, possible 
diffusion of conflict from elsewhere in the former Yugoslavia in particular, and post-
independence insufficiency of military capability; on 11 November 1992, President 
Gligorov conveyed to the Secretary-General a request for the deployment of United 
Nations observers in Macedonia. The aforesaid deployment was also recommended 
by Mr. Vance and Lord Owen, Co-Chairmen of the Steering Committee of the 
International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia (ICFY). Thus, the Secretary-
General (1992g), on 23 November, sent a letter to the president of the Security 
Council relaying President Gligorov's request. With Security Council (1992h) 
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approval, the Secretary-General dispatched to Skopje, from 28 November to 3 
December, a fourteen member group of military, police and civilian personnel from 
UNPROFOR Headquarters in Zagreb to assess the situation and prepare a report 
appraising the utility of a possible larger deployment ofUNPROFOR to Macedonia. 
This exploratory group had three chief issues to examine: the comprehensive 
state of affairs leading to the request for UN presence; Macedonian authorities' 
overall goals for a UN presence; and the preferred timing of a deployment, if 
approved. The primary fear cited was of ethnic Albanian refugees from Kosovo 
fleeing into Macedonia, which coupled with Serbian territorial ambitions, would 
lead to an interstate Serbian attack on Macedonia. This would then have the 
propensity of drawing other regional states, such as Albania, Bulgaria, Turkey and 
Greece into the conflict. Two supplementary benefits of a UN deployed force on 
Macedonian soil, although not specifically stated, were enhancement of the 
legitimacy of the nation's sovereignty and independence, and an increase in the 
country's international diplomatic recognition (Williams 2000, 44). 
On 9 December, the Secretary-General (1992i) submitted to the Council a report 
in which he recommended an expansion of the mandate and strength of 
UNPROFOR to establish·a United Nations presence on Macedonia's 182 kilometer 
border with Albania and 240 kilometer border with the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro). The Secretary-General recommended the 
enlargement ofUNPROFOR comprise an estimated battalion of up to 700 troops, 3S 
military observers, 26 civilian police monitors, 10 civil affairs staff, 45 
administrative staff and local interpreters. This contingent would operate under 
UNPROFOR's "Macedonia Command", with headquarters in Skopje, and 
subordinate to UNPROFOR Headquarters in Zagreb. He denoted that the force's 
mandate would be essentially preventive and consist of two foremost objectives. 
The first was "To monitor the border areas and report to the Secretary-General. 
through the Force Commander, any developments which could pose a threat to 
Macedonia". The second was "By its presence, to deter such threats from any 
source, as well as help prevent clashes that could otherwise occur between external 
elements and Macedonian forces, thus helping to strengthen security and confidence 
in Macedonia". The Security Council, by resolution 795 (1992) of 11 December, 
approved the Secretary-General's report and authorized establishment of 
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UNPROFOR's presence in Macedonia, additionally requiring notification of the 
governments of Albania and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY). A further 
critical component of Resolution 795 was the urging of the UNPROFOR presence in 
Macedonia to coordinate closely with the CSCE mission already established. 
After approximately four decades of UN peacekeeping forces being utilized to 
divide rival factions of hostilities so as to prevent resumption of conflict, thus was 
authorized and deployed the first purely preventive UN peacekeeping force in 
history. Whereas traditional peacekeeping efforts were a result of international 
community failure to prevent conflict; the deployment ofUNPROFOR to Macedonia 
represented a major shift regarding international policy, perspective and emphasis 
toward conflict prevention. As such, the UNPROFOR mission in Macedonia was on 
never before tread territory and would go through an evolutionary process of 
transformation as it executed its mandate. A critical element of conflict prevention 
efforts is to be receptive to the ever varying intrastate and interstate indicators of the 
situation, and flexible and proactive enough to adapt the mandate to those changing 
circumstances. In retrospect, the UN mission in Macedonia can be separated into 
three key operational segments (Sokalski 2003, 100). The first segment, from 
December 1992 to March 1994, was as a subordinate command ofUNPROFOR; the 
second segment, from April 1994 to March 1995, was marked by the broadening of 
the political mandate; and the third segment, from April 1995 to February 1999, was 
as a separate and independent mission. Each segment ofthe overall mission was to 
be a progressive shift from the last. 
The principal justification for authorization ofUNPROFOR deployment was 
primarily from an interstate focus as a result of the overt threat to Macedonia from 
adjacent states, and exacerbated by regional instability. However, from an intrastate 
perspective, the three primary challenges that confronted Macedonia: the need for 
democratic transformation, the socioeconomic situation, and interethnic tensions' , 
were interrelated in nature and fundamental to the construct of a functioning 
independent and sovereign state. Similarly, these intrastate challenges were 
interconnected with the aforementioned interstate threat. As fears within the 
international community mounted regarding the possibility of interstate conflict, 
such as had already occurred between Serbia, Croatia, and Bosnia, so too did 
intrastate ethnic fears mount within Macedonia regarding the future functioning of 
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the country as a result of interstate actions. Likewise, various interstate threats were 
subject to increase as a result of intrastate ethnic tension. Overall, the intrastate 
ethnic, political and economic transition, and development of the newly independent 
Macedonia were integrally connected; and all were subject to interstate threats to the 
country and overall regional instability. 
4.3. UNPROFOR: D~ember 1992 to March 1994 
Owing to the gravity of the situation in Macedonia, the ensuing deployment of 
UNPROFOR was expeditious. Within a few days after the approval of Resolution 
795, two civil affairs officers, a senior military observer, and a senior administrative 
official had arrived as an advance party to coordinate the further deployment of 
UNPROFOR forces. On 15 December 1992, the UN formally requested Sweden to 
contribute troops to the mission. Surprisingly, favorable responses were received 
from not only Sweden, but Norway, Finland, and Denmark as well. Sweden, 
Norway and Finland offered to provide the necessary personnel to form a joint 
Nordic Battalion, to become known as NORDBAT; and Denmark, who already had 
troops serving under UNPROFOR in Zagreb, proposed supplying troops for the 
headquarters staff. 10 the interim, Canada, with forces already deployed to Bosnia, 
decided to volunteer a company on a temporary basis to provide time for 
NORDBA T to deploy in full. The Canadian troops arrived on 7 January 1993, 
established their headquarters at Kumanovo, and set up five observation posts along 
the Serbian and Macedonian border. On 25 January 1993, Brigadier General 
Saermark-Thomsen assumed command ofUNPROFOR forces in Macedonia. The 
Nordic Battalion, comprising 434 soldiers and organized into three rifle companies, 
received their equipment in Skopje from 11 to 15 February and were declared 
operational on 19 February 1993; whereupon the Canadian company redeployed 
back to Sarajevo. Also on 19 February, the Security Council adopted Resolution 
807 (1993a), which extended the mandate of UNPROFOR for an interim period 
until 30 March 1993. 
NORDBAT quickly established themselves within the area of operation. The 
headquarters element, Camp Arctic Circle, was established in CojJija, about 18 
kilometers east of Skopje; the Finnish company was based in Tetovo; the Swedish 
company in Kumanovo; and the Norwegian company in Djorce Petrov, just outside 
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of Skopje (WiIliams 2000, 51). The area of responsibility encompassed from Debar, 
on the western border with Albania, northward to the Albanian border with Serbia; 
and then eastward along the entire northern border with Serbia to the Bulgarian 
border. This was an expansive distance to cover for one battalion, not to mention 
the logistical difficulties of supplying the dispersed observation posts. In February, 
NORDBAT had established 10 permanent observation posts, in addition to 13 
temporary posts; and had 18 permanent observation posts operational by May of 
1993. In addition to NORDBAT operations, 19 military observers were positioned 
along the northern border, headquartered in Skopje; and along the western border, 
south of Debar, and based in Ohrid. The 24 Civilian Police Monitors (CIVPOL) 
were dispersed and headquartered similarly to the latter. 
During this time, the mandate ofUNPROFOR was extended on 30 March by 
Security Council Resolution 815 (1993b) for another interim period terminating 30 
June 1993. A major political development came on 7 April 1993, when the Security 
Council finally recommended to the General Assembly, through Resolution 817 
(l993c), that Macedonia be admitted to membership in the United Nations; albeit it 
with the provisional name "Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia" based on 
Greek objections. Whether the presence of a United Nations deployed force actually 
enhanced the legitimacy of the nation's sovereignty and increased in the country's 
international diplomatic recognition to the point where it facilitated UN membership 
cannot be determined precisely, but it certainly did not hinder the process. Finally, a 
further key event in this period was the Security Council strengthening of sanctions 
against Serbia and Montenegro through Resolution 820 (1993d) on 17 April 1993. 
The most critical aspect of this resolution for Macedonia was to prohibit the 
transport of all commodities and products across the land borders of the FRY. 
While this measure was targeted toward limiting the escalation of conflict in Croatia 
and Bosnia, the effect upon Macedonia would be devastating as the primary 
economic trade route was now blocked. Moreover, through informal arrangements 
between the UN, the CSCE and the EC, it had been agreed that UNPROFOR would 
monitor traffic at selected road and railway crossings on the Macedonia and Serbia 
border; a task with which UNPROFOR was not comfortable. 
By this time NORDBA T was up to full strength, in accordance with the 
UNPROFOR mandate, and effectively executing its mission. Consequently, an 
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increase in the size of the force had not been considered. Regardless, on 10 June 
1993, US Secretary of State, Warren Christopher, announced the United States 
would offer a reinforced company of 300 soldiers to augment the UNPROFOR force 
in Macedonia. The announcement was made during aNA TO foreign ministers 
conference in Athens, amid discussions of the possible further diffusion of conflict 
in the former Yugoslavia, and cited both the symbolic and tangible significance of 
the offer. While UNPROFOR headquarters in Macedonia felt the current 
NORDBAT contingent was adequate, the Macedonian government was stoutly in 
preference of US troops joining the mission. The Serbian government, on the other 
hand, was equally in opposition to the prospect. On 16 June, the Secretary-General 
(l993e) notified the Security Council of the US offer, and on 18 June 1993, the 
Security Council implemented Resolution 842 (1993f) expanding the size of 
UNPROFOR accordingly and authorizing the deployment of US personnel. 
Whereas the first US troops ofthe advance party arrived on 18 June, the main body 
did not land until 7 through 12 July 1993. As the United States transported their 
troops and equipment from Germany to Skopje via heavy C-141 and C-5 aircraft, 
public interest within Macedonia peaked, particularly since the size of these aircraft 
required most arrivals to occur at night when normal Skopje airport operations were 
at a minimum. Consequently, UNPROFOR headquarters in Skopje issued regular 
press reports regarding the incoming flights. This function served to generate 
goodwill in the form of open communication, as well as to publicly announce the 
newly added troops were deploying with credible force. The US forces, named Task 
Force Able Sentry, set up their headquarters at Petrovec Airport, just outside Skopje, 
and assumed the mission of observing and reporting along the Macedonian and 
Serbian border thereby allowing NORDBAT to concentrate on the Macedonian 
borders between Kosovo and Albania. 
. Occurring also on 18 June, the Security Council adopted Resolution 845 (1993g), 
which urged Macedonia and Greece to continue their cooperation, under the auspices 
ofthe Secretary-General, with the Steering Committee of the International 
Conference on the Former Yugoslavia to arrive at a speedy settlement of their 
differences. As it stood at the time, the two countries had made little progress in 
coming to any mutual agreement regarding the name ofthe new Macedonian state, 
or anything else. 
III 
On 30 June, the Security Council extended the mandate ofUNPROFOR, when 
Resolution 847 (1993h) was adopted, for an additional interim period terminating on 
30 September 1993. On 20 September 1993, the Secretary-General recommended 
the Security Council extend the mandate ofUNPROFOR for a period of six months. 
The Secretary-General also stated that should UNPROFOR's mandate be extended, 
he would give "favorable consideration" to a suggestion by the President of Croatia 
that the Force be separated into three distinctive components: UNPROFOR Croatia, 
UNPROFOR Bosnia and Herzegovina, and UNPROFOR Macedonia; while 
retaining its integrated military, logistical and administrative structure under the 
command of one SRSG and one theatre Force Commander. In the interim. the 
Security Council was informed by the Croatian Government, on 24 September. that 
if the mandate ofUNPROFOR was not amended to promote energetic 
implementation of the relevant resolutions of the Security Council. Croatia would be 
forced to request UNPROFOR leave the country not later than 30 November 1993 
(United Nations 1996, 16). Two interim extensions ofUNPROFOR's mandate 
ensued; one for a 24-hour period on 30 September. through Security Council 
Resolution 869 (1993i); and the other for an additional four days on 1 October. 
through Security Council resolution 870 (1993j). Finally, on 4 October 1993. after 
intensive consultations the Security Council, by its resolution 871 (1993k). extended 
the mandate of the Force for a period of six months, through 31 March 1994. 
Resolution 871 also officially noted the Secretary-General's intent to establish three 
subordinate commands within UNPROFOR, while retaining the existing 
dispositions in all other respects for the direction and conduct of the United Nations 
operation in the former Yugoslavia. 
On the economic front, Macedonia was feeling the effects of sanctions against the 
FRY. Although UNPROFOR forces had no mandate to stop and search vehicles 
transiting the border, their task to observe and report revealed substantial traffic. 
which indicated massive sanctions violations. Smuggling had become a lucrative 
proposition given the county's high unemployment rate and economic downturn. 
Smuggling often occurred off the roadways as well. since the mountainous terrain 
and porous border facilitated smuggling via foot and donkey. The Macedonian 
government had always maintained that in order to strictly enforce the UN sanctions 
the international community would need to provide economic assistance to the state. 
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In light of the negligible economic assistance provided. Macedonian authorities 
implicitly condoned violations ofthe sanctions as a matter of economic and political 
survival. As a result, the Macedonian government came under pressure from the 
international community to tighten their control of sanctions violations. President 
Gligorov, on 30 September, took the opportunity of Macedonia's first participation 
as a member ofthe UN, in the General Assembly's Annual Session, to address that 
forum regarding the effects of UN sanctions against the FRY upon Macedonia. 
Gligorov explicated that Macedonian compliance with the UN sanctions solely in 
that year had reduced its gross national product by 50 percent, which had severe 
repercussions upon democratic and economic development. He went on to elaborate 
on the possibility of increased social tensions, exacerbated by a weak or collapsed 
economy, leading to an intrastate crisis in the region. Finally, in his summation he 
officially requested international community economic assistance under Article 50 of 
the UN Charter. In spite of repetitive statements from the Secretary-general 
supporting and seeking economic assistance, the international community was never 
to overwhelmingly rally to this cause. 
Greece vehemently opposed Macedonian membership to the UN, and attempted 
to block it, but only succeeded in Macedonian membership being approved under the 
provisional name. Also in early 1993, Macedonia succeeded in gaining membership 
in the International Monetary Fund (IMF) under their provisional name. On 16 
December 1993. despite Greek protests. Denmark, Germany. France. Great Britain. 
Italy and the Netherlands formally recognized Macedonia and established full 
diplomatic relations; followed by the United States, Russia and Australia in early 
1994. Faced with these changes in the diplomatic field. on 17 February 1994. the 
Greek government imposed a strict new trade embargo banning the movement of 
goods between Greece and Macedonia, in either direction, except for food, medicine 
and humanitarian assistance. The embargo was imposed on Greek claims that 
adoption of the Greek name "Macedonia" for the state, the Greek symbol of the Star 
ofVergina for its flag, and certain articles in its constitution were indicative of 
irredentist designs against Greece. Consequently, for the embargo to cease, the flag 
and certain articles of its constitution had to be modified; whereas the name issue 
could be determined in later negotiations. The embargo immediately reduced 
Macedonia's export earnings by 85 percent, while food supplies were dropped by 40 
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percent (Roudometof 1996, 260). The Greek embargo against Macedonia elicited 
strong criticism from the press and the international community at large, and the 
European Commission unsuccessfully challenged the embargo's legitimacy in the 
European Court. The end result, however, was that now Macedonia had an effective 
economic blockade on both its northern and southern borders, its two primary trade 
routes. 
In a report submitted to the Security Council on 16 March 1994, the Secretary-
General recommended renewal ofUNPROFOR's mandate for a supplementary 12 
months beyond 31 March 1994. The report contained the outcome of a thorough 
review of the role and functioning ofUNPROFOR. At the same time, the conflict in 
Croatia and Bosnia was continuing to escalate. On 31 March 1994, the Security 
Council, through Resolution 908 (1994a), extended the mandate of UN PRO FOR for 
an additional six-month period terminating on 30 September 1994 and decided, as an 
initial step, to increase UNPROFOR's strength by 3,500 troops. Then on 27 April 
1994, by adopting Resolution 914 (1994b), the Security Council authorized an 
increase in the strength ofUNPROFOR of up to 6,550 additional troops, 150 
military observers and 275 civilian police monitors, in addition to the reinforcement 
already approved in Resolution 908. It should be noted, however, that none of these 
strength increases were targeted toward UNPROFOR in Macedonia. On 22 April 
1994, the North Atlantic Council (NAC) authorized the use of air strikes against 
Bosnian Serb military targets around Gorazde if the Bosnian Serbs did not end their 
attacks against the safe area immediately, pull their forces back three kilometers 
from the city, and allow United Nations forces and humanitarian relief convoys 
freedom of movement. 
In that same 16 March 1994 report, the Secretary-General stated that although the 
military situation in Macedonia remained relatively calm and stable, there had been 
an increase in the frequency of contact between patrols from the FRY and 
Macedonia along their common border. UNPROFOR successfully arbitrated 
numerous tense border encounters, achieving the withdrawal of military elements 
from both sides. During these events, as was typically the case, UNPROFOR 
maintained close coordination with other international bodies, including the ICFY 
and the CSCE. 
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The Secretary-General also observed that the most serious difficulties 
experienced by Macedonia were economic. Social stability had become threatened 
by increasing unemployment and a declining economy; predominantly as a result of 
effects of the economic blockade imposed by Greece and of the United Nations 
sanctions against the FRY, formerly Macedonia's two most important trading 
partners. Internal political tensions between Macedonians and ethnic Albanians had 
intensified as well. On 31 March 1994, in light of the complexities of the nexus of 
interstate and intrastate factors as a causative agent for economic and political 
uncertainty, and rising social tensions; the Security Council, in Resolution 908 
(1994a), encouraged the Secretary-General's Special Representative, in cooperation 
with the authorities of Macedonia, to use his good offices as appropriate to 
contribute to the maintenance of peace and stability in that Republic. This was to be 
a critical event for the overall mission ofUNPROFOR in Macedonia with respect to 
a broadened mandate and implementation of that mandate, as well as for the 
evolution of conflict prevention efforts in the country. 
From the establishment of UNPROFOR on 11 December 1992, to the approval of 
the SRSG to utilize his good offices in March 1994, the primary mission of 
UNPROFOR was to monitor the border and report any developments that could pose 
a threat to the country; and deter, by their presence, such threats or clashes between 
Macedonian and external forces. As such, the focus of the mission was 
predominantly of an interstate nature, and primarily targeted toward the triggering 
and proximate sources of conflict. Granted, the international community was aware 
of intrastate tensions, as evidenced by UN insistence of inclusion of United Nations 
Military Observer (UNMO) and CIVPOL personnel. However, it was through the 
reports of these UNMO and CIVPOL personnel that the severity of the intrastate 
threat was identified and brought to the attention of the UN and the international 
community. 
These reports further succeeded in identifying the complexities of the nexus of 
interstate and intrastate factors as a causative agent for economic and political 
uncertainty, and rising social tensions. Thus, in an adaptive and evolutional step the 
utilization of the good offices of the SRSG was approved and implemented. One 
must bear in mind the UNPROFOR mission in Macedonia was the first purely 
preventive UN peacekeeping force in history, and a major departure from traditional 
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UN peacekeeping operations where conflict had already commenced. Consequently, 
there was no available precedent set as for how to implement and proceed with a 
preventive mission such as UNPROFOR in Macedonia. Initially deployed to 
prevent the diffusion of interstate conflict to the newly independent Macedonia, it 
soon became evident that although UNPROFOR was successfully executing their 
mission in this regard, there existed a simultaneous threat of diffusion and/or 
contagion of intrastate conflict across borders that was not being addressed by 
UNPROFOR forces. This intrastate threat posed both the possibility of diffusion 
from Kosovo, as well as contagion from Kosovo, Bosnia, Croatia, and Serbia. 
The identification ofthe necessity of an intrastate mandate to compliment the 
interstate mandate, and approval ofthe SRSG to utilize his good offices, were to 
adjust the mandate so as to include structural sources of conflict. By incorporating 
the structural sources of conflict within the mandate already addressing the 
triggering and proximate sources of conflict, international community conflict 
prevention efforts were to expand and integrate the degree of multi faceted and 
multilevel action, thereby creating synergy of intervention. This willful transition on 
the part of the international community signifies the genesis and true essence of a 
strategy of simultaneity and connectivity in conflict prevention efforts. 
4.4. The Broadened Political Mandate: April 1994 to March 1995 
While the decision of Security Council Resolution 908 (1994a) to encourage the 
SRSG, in cooperation with the authorities of Macedonia, to use his good offices as 
appropriate to contribute to the maintenance of peace and stability in that Republic 
was to become an integral component of the overall mandate, the initial reaction 
from the Macedonian government was not enthusiastic. In fact, it was viewed as a 
mechanism of interference into the internal affairs of the state. However, the 
government acquiesced by considering it a minor irritating component ofthe 
overarching mission that provided the desired interstate security and political 
legitimization. The Albanian ethnic minority, on the other hand, welcomed the good 
offices mandate as a vehicle to broker their desire for greater equality within the 
state. 
Officially, the term "good offices' represents an instrument of peaceful settlement 
of disputes between states, or other parties, whereby a third party tries to bring the 
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conflicting parties into an agreement (Sokalski 2003, 102). In practicality, though, 
good offices is an infonnal and freely structured mechanism that is largely dependent 
on the creativity ofthe individual attempting to apply the measure. The specific 
verbiage contained in Resolution 908 was shrewdly composed so as to specify both a 
quantity of freedom and an extent of restriction. Where the phrase "as appropriate" 
lent the freedom of interpretation for the SRSG to detennine the most gennane 
application of good offices, the phrase "in cooperation with the authorities of 
Macedonia" held the SRSG to the reality that coordination and consent of the host 
government was paramount. This latter fact assisted the Macedonian authorities in 
later coming to accept and better understand the good offices addition to the 
mandate. 
The SRSG had an immense task before him, as by March of 1994 the total 
strength ofUNPROFOR consisted 000,655 military personnel and 3,328 civilian 
personnel (WiIliams 2000,112). As such, the SRSG decided to delegate the 
authority of the good offices mandate to Hugo Anson, and deploy him to Skopje. 
Anson, with experience from previous UN peacekeeping missions, and with the 
World Trade Organization, detennined the good offices mandate should be applied 
in a proactive, but guarded manner. One of the prime factors in Anson's 
detennination was his belief the UN should not approach the Macedonian intrastate 
situation as an "ethnic tinderbox" as that approach could, in fact, become a self-
fulfilling prophecy. In this regard, the good offices mandate would seek to 
encourage the government and major political parties to search for centrist political 
solutions to intrastate problems; make specific proposals to increase international 
assistance; and provide a conduit to the local and international media regarding the 
political and economic situation, and the efforts of the UN in that regard. From 
April 1994 to March 1995, the good offices mandate was to involve UNPROFOR in 
two key proceedings in Macedonia: monitoring the 1994 presidential and 
parliamentary elections, and interceding in the University ofTetovo crisis. 
On 8 September 1994, the speaker of the National Assembly, Stojan Andov, 
announced the first and second rounds of parliamentary and presidential elections 
would occur on 16 and 30 October. These elections were to be the first held since 
independence. Immediately, the opposition party contested the elections being held 
on the first possible constitutional date as a means by the ruling government to limit 
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the time available for the opposition party to effectively organize and campaign. As 
the numerous political parties maneuvered for position and engaged in mergers and 
alliances, the election campaign's intensity and animosity mounted. Early on, 
VMRO-DPMNE commenced a campaign based on nationalism and the threat to the 
Macedonian nation from Albanian extremists typified by the campaign slogan of 
"Macedonia is for Macedonians". In order to calm emotions, create an overall better 
political climate, and attempt to remove ethnicity from the campaigns; Hugo Anson 
enjoined all Macedonian political parties to sign a declaration committing the party 
leaders to ensuring the elections were free, fair and in the spirit of interethnic 
cooperation. The declaration was ultimately signed by 12 political parties, including 
two of the five major parties (SDSM and LP), but was noticeably not signed by 
VMRO-DPMNE and PDP. The declaration was an important and creative initiative 
that served to exemplify UNPROFOR's willingness to contribute, demonstrated 
what type of actions could be incorporated within the good offices mandate, and 
tested the consistency and gravity of some of the major political subjects that had 
surfaced during the campaign. 
The PDP, the largest ethnic Albanian party, had supported the declaration, but 
chose not to sign it for ancillary reasons. During the coordination ofthe declaration, 
the PDP was considering boycotting the elections on the grounds the Macedonian 
government was excluding 145 thousand ethnic Albanians from voting as they were 
not legal citizens. Anson held a number of meetings with the government and ethnic 
Albanian leaders, as well as coordinating with the CSCE and ICFY, and in the end 
achieved an agreement. The government determined that ethnic Albanians, who had 
the right to citizenship, but lacked official documentation, would be permitted to 
vote and, consequently, the PDP withdrew its threat to boycott three days prior to the 
first round elections. The intervention on the part of Anson in this regard functioned 
as another ingenious and opportune utilization of the good offices mandate, which 
resulted in an important political agreement. 
In the first round of elections, the popular Kiro Gligorov was easily elected to 
another term as president; however, only ten members of parliament were elected by 
a majority. In response, the two main opposition parties alleged the first round 
elections were manipulated and thereby fraudulent, and VMRO-DPMNE, along with 
the Democratic Party, threatened to boycott the second round unless the irregularities 
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were corrected. Observers from the CSCE and Council of Europe, who monitored 
the first round, stated the election had generally been well conducted. As a result, 
the boycott took place and in the second round the ruling Alliance for Macedonia 
(SDSM) won the majority of parliamentary seats. At this point, the two opposition 
parties who boycotted the elections, and now found themselves excluded from the 
ruling government, attempted to engage the good offices mandate ofUNPROFOR to 
act as a communications link between the current parliament and their parties. This, 
however, would prove a bridge to far, and would in effect operate to undermine the 
democratic process; hence UNPROFOR astutely avoided this potential pitfall. 
The demand for an Albanian language university in Macedonia had increased 
after the closing of the University of Pristina in 1990, and was a major point of 
contention between ethnic Albanians and the government. From a group of 
Albanian academicians, a Council for the Foundation of an Albanian University was 
formed under the leadership ofFadil Sulejmani, Murtezani Ismaili, and Agni Dika; 
which declared on 4 June 1994 their intent to establish the University of Tetovo. 
The Council stated the primary rationale of the university was to provide training to 
teachers responsible for education in Albanian primary and secondary schools as the 
curriculum at the Pedagogical Faculty in Skopje was inadequate, not conducted in 
Albanian, and few ethnic Albanians were admitted. Moreover, the university in 
Tetovo was supported by all Albanian political parties and the Albanian press. 
While some of the support was sincerely grounded in the desire for greater 
educational opportunities in Albanian, at least an equal share of support was a result 
of the university being exploited as a political symbol of equality for the Albanian 
parties. On 25 October 1994, the Council tendered a formal application to the 
government for permission to establish the university within the framework of the 
state's educational system. Unfortunately, this application was submitted between 
the first and second rounds of elections and, consequently, did not constitute the 
immediate priority of the politicians. In November, the Ministry of Education 
finally responded and stated the University in Tetovo had no legal grounds. 
Sulejmani, a former professor at the University of Prist in a was undeterred and 
publicly planned the opening of the university for 17 December 1994. 
On 12 December, five days before the planned opening, the government declared 
the establishment ofthe University ofTetovo unconstitutional and illegal. While the 
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ethnic Albanian community cited several constitutional articles that provided for the 
right to education, the right to establish universities and the right to education in 
their native language; the government cited the law which restricted the 
establishment of universities to public organizations. The discrepancy was the 
Albanians were citing the new constitution, and the government was citing the 1985 
Law on Professional Education that had not been changed since independence. The 
police raided the university on 14 December, confiscated documents, and sealed the 
doors. On 17 December, when the university organizers and students arrived to 
officially open the university they were prevented from entering by riot police. 
Unbeknownst to the government, however, the university organizers had held the 
actual opening ceremony secretly at the PDP building in Tetovo hours earlier. The 
Council continued to plan the initiation of classes, but on 31 January 1995, the 
Skopje District Court rejected the application for registration of the university. On 
15 February, nonetheless, approximately two thousand ethnic Albanians held a rally 
to commemorate the commencement of official classes at the university. Finally. on 
17 February 1995, police interceded to end the instruction that was occurring. In the 
ensuing violent confrontation one ethnic Albanian was killed and 28 people. 
including nine police officers, were wounded. Sulejmani was summarily arrested 
along with four of his counterparts. 
Throughout the University ofTetovo incident, UNPROFOR was at a severe 
disadvantage as any statements supporting either side would be inflammatory. To 
lend support to the government would alienate the ethnic Albanian minority. and to 
give credence to the assertions of the ethnic Albanians would ostracize the current 
administration and all ethnic Macedonians. Ultimately, UNPROFOR chose to 
remain strictly neutral on the matter and act as an unbiased negotiator to the best of 
its ability. The official position ofUNPROFOR on the matter was therefore 
explicated as acceding to the fact that ethnic minority groups held the equivalent 
entitlement to pursue better educational opportunities as did the ethnic majority, 
albeit to pursue these opportunities within the legal bounds of their obJigation to the 
state. Additionally, UNPROFOR maintained any project that may possibly lead to 
separation as opposed to further integration was obviously in the best interests of 
neither ethnic group, nor the state as a whole. Again, Hugo Anson employed his 
good offices mandate and hosted a number of discussions between government 
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officials and ethnic Albanian leaders to urge compromise. A continual undertone 
evident in each and every one of Anson's meetings was to think of themselves first 
and foremost as citizens and only afterwards as members of an ethnic group 
(Williams 2000,124). 
Shortly after the Tetovo incident, the SRSG from Zagreb, Yasushi Akashi, chose 
to visit Skopje. On 7 March 1995, Akashi met with President Gligorov, and various 
members of government; and emphasized the significance of resolving political and 
ethnic divergences through dialogue, tolerance, conciliation and moderation. The 
occurrence of the Tetovo incident indicated a manifest deterioration of ethnic 
relations in Macedonia, and increased suspicions of an impending larger ethnic 
confrontation within the country. Akashi's visit, almost immediately after the 
Tetovo incident, served as a figurative message of the UN's interest in a stable 
Macedonia; as well as an aide memoire that the Security Council had authorized the 
SRSG to use his good offices to contribute to the maintenance and stability of the 
state. The issue of an Albanian language university in Tetovo was not finished, 
however, for it would continue to act as a political point of disagreement in the 
future. 
The utilization of the good offices mandate with regard to the crisis in Tetovo 
was a critical measure that was at least partially responsible for regulating the extent 
of intrastate ethnic conflict at that time. Without the appendage of the good offices 
mandate to the overall UNPROFOR mandate in Macedonia, this event could have 
easily erupted into a more violent and self-destructive affair for the new republic. If 
that had occurred, UNPROFOR personnel in country, whose previous mandate 
limited them to focusing on external threats only, would have been precluded from 
reacting or assisting. Consequently, while the military forces ofUNPROFOR 
monitored the borders for interstate aggression, the good offices mandate allowed 
engagement to stave off an intrastate conflict. As previously indicated, if violent 
intrastate ethnic conflict were allowed to ignite within Macedonia, there existed a 
fervent risk of conflict diffusion across state borders and escalation into interstate 
conflict. Therefore, the UN treatment of the Tetovo crisis represents a concurrent 
and conjoined implementation of conflict prevention efforts exemplifying a strategy 
of simultaneity and connectivity. 
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While the presidential and parliamentary elections were occurring and the Tetovo 
scenario was unfolding, additional events continued to transpire with respect to the 
overall UNPROFOR mandate and the country as a whole. On 17 September 1994, 
the Secretary-General submitted a report to the Security Council pursuant to 
Resolution 908 (1994c); which highlighted recent developments in the area that 
affected the environment in which UNPROFOR, the largest peacekeeping mission in 
the history ofthe UN, had to operate. Of particular note was the increase in 
frequency of encounters between patrols of the FRY and Macedonia along their 
common border. Although the majority had been non-confrontational, the incidence 
of these encounters was expected to recur with increasing frequency based upon the 
continued non-recognition of the border by the FRY. Due to the threat to stability 
arising from this unresolved border issue, the Secretary-General recommended the 
establishment of an international border commission. 
The most serious difficulties encountered by Macedonia, however, were 
economic. The Secretary-General asserted in his report that social stability had been 
endangered by rising unemployment and a declining economy resulting from the 
effects of the economic blockade imposed by Greece, as well as from the UN 
sanctions against the FRY, which sequentially had fostered an increase in political 
tensions between ethnic Macedonians and ethnic Albanians. In light of this evident 
complex interrelation of interstate and intrastate factors contributing to rising social 
tensions, economic and political uncertainty, and the authorization by Resolution 
908 for the SRSG to utilize his good offices as appropriate to contribute to the peace 
and stability of Macedonia, the focus ofUNPROFOR's political work had been on 
strengthening mutual understanding and dialogue among political parties and on 
monitoring human rights. Concurrently, UNPROFOR's military component had 
successfully mediated several tense border encounters, achieving the withdrawal of 
soldiers on both sides. In addition, during the execution of both the political and 
military elements of the inclusive mission, UNPROFOR continued to maintain close 
coordination with other international bodies, particularly the CSCE and ICFY. 
Ultimately, the Secretary-General concluded that due to the vulnerable interrelation 
ofinterstate and intrastate threats to the country, and in relation to the overall context 
of regional instability deriving from the conflict in Croatia and Bosnia, that the 
UNPROFOR mandate be extended for an additional six months. On 30 September 
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1994, the Security Council adopted Resolution 947 (1994d), which extended 
UNPROFOR's mandate for an additional period tenninating on 31 March 1995. 
On 22 March 1995, the Secretary-General submitted his report pursuant to 
Resolution 947 (1995a), highlighting the fact that following incidents in the area of 
the disputed border between the FRY and Macedonia in the summer of 1994, 
UNPROFOR negotiated a military administrative boundary that detennines the 
Northern Limit of the Area Of Operations (NLAOO) ofUNPROFOR troops. 
Though neither government conceded the NLAOO as a valid interstate border, both 
countries utilized it for the reporting and management of border crossing incidents; 
however, the potential for confrontation continued to persist in the absence of a 
mutually recognized international border. The report further reinforced the position 
that as a result of UN Sanctions against the FRY and the Greek imposed interstate 
trade embargo; the fragile state of the country's economy continues to exacerbate the 
intrastate political, social and interethnic dilemmas. 
In all probability, the aspect of the report with utmost consequence, however, 
concerned the governments of Croatia, Macedonia and Bosnia all expressing their 
desire for the United Nations forces in their respective countries to be separate from 
UNPROFOR. Croatia was the most vociferous; avowing the retention of 
UNPROFOR in its present fonn, and with its present mandate, would not enjoy the 
consent ofthe Croatian government. Therefore, in order to be responsive to their 
requests, but not compromise the economy and efficiency of an integrated UN 
peacekeeping force in theater; the Secretary-General proposed UNPROFOR be 
replaced by three separate but interlinked peacekeeping operations: United Nations 
Peace Force-One (UNPF)-1 in Croatia, UNPF-2 in Bosnia and UNPF-3 in 
Macedonia. Each of the three missions would be lead by a civilian Chief of Mission 
at the assistant secretary-general level, and would have its own military commander; 
however, in view of the interlinked nature of the threat and in order to avoid 
replication of existing organization, inclusive command and control of the three 
operations would be exercised by the SRSG and a Theater Force Commander from 
the headquarters in Zagreb. 
Noting the report of the Secretary-General of22 March, the Security Council 
passed Resolutions 981 (1995b), 982 (1995c) and 983 (1995d) on 31 March 1995. 
Resolution 981, in light of the cease-fire agreement of29 March 1994 and the 
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current expiration date ofthe UNPROFOR mandate on 31 March 1995; established 
the United Nations Confidence Restoration Operation (UNCRO) in Croatia, with an 
adjusted mandate. Resolution 982, considering the cessation of hostilities in Bosnia, 
extended the UNPROFOR mandate within Bosnia and Herzegovina for an additional 
eight months in order to facilitate an overall settlement of the conflict, and 
additionally authorized any UNPROFOR assets or personnel whose continued 
presence was not required by UNCRO to redeploy to UNPROFOR in Bosnia. 
Resolution 983, based on the threat of interstate and intrastate developments that 
could undermine confidence and stability in Macedonia, decided that UNPROFOR 
within Macedonia would from that point on be known as the United Nations 
Preventive Deployment Force (UNPREOEP). The exact UNPROFOR mandate for 
Macedonia was transferred verbatim to UNPREDEP, as well as extended for a 
period terminating on 30 November 1995. 
From the approval for the SRSG to utilize his good offices on 31 March 1994 to 
the decision that UNPROFOR within Macedonia would from that point on be 
known as UNPREOEP on 31 March 1995, the broadened political mandate created a 
qualitative dimension that facilitated expansion of traditional peacekeeping 
techniques and was to develop into a fundamental element of the inclusive mandate. 
The declaration committing the party leaders to ensuring the elections were free, fair 
and in the spirit of interethnic cooperation was an important and creative initiative 
that served to exemplify UNPROFOR's willingness to contribute; and demonstrated 
explicit actions that could be incorporated within the good offices mandate. The 
intervention on the part of Hugo Anson, which effected the POP withdrawing its 
threat to boycott three days prior to the first round elections functioned as another 
resourceful and apt utilization of the good offices mandate that resulted in an 
important political agreement thereby strengthening democratic principles. By 
astutely avoiding the potential pitfall of acting as a communications link between the 
current parliament and the two opposition parties who boycotted the elections, 
UNPROFOR preserved and reinforced the democratic process as well as set defined 
limits on "appropriate" utilization of the good offices mandate. 
With regard to the University ofTetovo incident, Anson again employed his good 
offices mandate and hosted negotiations between government officials and ethnic 
Albanian leaders to urge compromise; and for ethnic Macedonians and ethnic 
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Albanians alike to think. of themselves first and foremost as citizens and only 
afterwards as members of an ethnic group. The SRSG from Zagreb, Yasushi 
Akashi's visit, soon after the Tetovo incident, served to fortify the UN's interest in a 
stable Macedonia, as well as reinforce that the Security Council had authorized the 
SRSG to use his good offices to contribute to the maintenance and stability of the 
state. The utilization of the good offices mandate with respect to the crisis in Tetovo 
was a crucial undertaking that was at least partially accountable for moderation of 
the potential extent of intrastate ethnic conflict at that time. Without the good 
offices mandate this incident could have erupted into a more violent and self-
destructive affair for the country. 
While the military forces of UNPROFOR monitored the borders for interstate 
aggression, the good offices mandate allowed engagement to stave off an intrastate 
conflict. Whereas UNPROFOR's political effort had focused on strengthening 
mutual understanding and dialogue among political parties and on monitoring 
human rights; UNPROFOR's military component had in tandem mediated several 
tense border encounters, achieving the withdrawal of soldiers on both sides of the 
disputed border. Ifviolent intrastate ethnic conflict were allowed to ignite within 
Macedonia, there existed a fervent risk of conflict diffusion across state borders and 
escalation into interstate conflict. Likewise, a military presence on the borders was 
requisite to prevention of more serious border incursions that could have escalated 
into violent interstate conflict, which consecutively could have further exacerbated 
intrastate tensions. 
In light of the manifest multifaceted nexus of interstate and intrastate factors as a 
causative agent for rising social tensions, and economic and political uncertainty; the 
authorization for the SRSG to utilize his good offices as appropriate to contribute to 
the peace and stability of Macedonia served to assimilate the structural sources of 
conflict within the mandate that already encompassed the triggering and proximate 
sources of conflict. In so doing, conflict prevention efforts on the part of the 
international community were to simultaneously target the triggering, proximate and 
structural sources of conflict in Macedonia, in a connected endeavor of multifaceted 
and multilevel action exhibiting a synergy of intervention. These efforts represent a 
synchronized and fused execution of international community interstate and 
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intrastate conflict prevention actions exemplifying a strategy of simultaneity and 
connectivity. 
4.5. UNPREDEP: April 1995 to February 1999 
The latter half of 1995 brought several significant proceedings that were to affect 
both Macedonia and the future ofUNPREDEP. On 13 September 1995, at United 
Nations Headquarters in New York, the foreign ministers of Macedonia and Greece 
signed a wide-ranging interim accord addressing friendly relations; confidence-
building measures; human and cultural rights; international and regional institutions; 
treaty relations; and economic, commercial, environmental and legal issues. The 
accord, mediated by Cyrus Vance as the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General, 
conveyed that each country would respect the sovereignty, territorial integrity and 
political independence of the other and confirmed their common existing frontier as 
an enduring and inviolable border. Additionally, the signing of the accord 
effectively terminated the embargo and allowed for unimpeded movement of people 
and goods between the two countries. In exchange, Macedonia agreed to cease to 
use in any manner the symbol that was currently on its national flag, and declare its 
constitution did not constitute any claim to territory not within its existing borders 
nor provide the basis for interference in the internal affairs of another state to protect 
the rights of Macedonians (United Nations 1995). Following the accord signing. 
Macedonia was admitted to the OSCE, the Council of Europe, NATO's Partnership 
for Peace initiative, and the United States established full diplomatic relations with 
Macedonia. Thus, a major interstate threat was removed, which likewise was 
expected to positively ameliorate certain intrastate tensions through improvement of 
the economic sector and membership in major international organizations. 
On 18 March of 1994, the Bosniak and Croat factions of Bosnia and Herzegovina 
agreed to form a federation by signing a federation constitution, thereby allowing a 
reprioritization and concentration of forces against Serb elements. Throughout the 
summer and fall of 1995 the conflict in Bosnia intensified, which brought more 
acute measures from NATO in the form of air strikes against Serb positions and 
spurred the US administration to launch a forceful peace initiative led by Richard 
Holbrooke (1998). Finally, after extended and intense negotiations the General 
Framework Agreement was initialed on 21 November 1995, in Dayton, Ohio, thus 
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ending the Bosnian conflict. As a result of the Dayton Accords, the Security Council 
adopted Resolution 1021 (1995e), that lifted the sanctions on military equipment and 
weapons; and Resolution 1022 (1995f), which immediately suspended all other 
comprehensive sanctions that had been imposed against the FRY. Whereas the 
signing of the interim accord with Greece removed the embargo against Macedonia's 
southern border, the lifting ofthe sanctions against the FRY opened its northern 
border. 
The Secretary-general issued his report pursuant to Resolution 983 (1995g) on 23 
November 1995, a few weeks after the car bomb assassination attempt on President 
Gligorov failed on 5 October 1995, a crime which to this day has not been solved. 
In his report the Secretary-general cited positive steps taken by the Macedonian 
government to meet Albanian community concerns, which included: release of the 
prisoners related to the University of Tetovo incident, establishment of a four-year 
teaching curriculum in the Albanian language at the Pedagogical Faculty in Skopje, a 
ten percent quota on ethnic minorities to attend institutions of higher learning, and 
appointment of the first Albanian general officer in the Army. Additionally, since all 
neighboring countries, except the FRY, had now officially recognized Macedonia as 
a sovereign state; the imminent military threat to the country had abated 
considerably. UNPREDEP was referred to as having had contributed greatly to 
creating a more stable environment and facilitating these positive achievements. 
However, it was also noted that intrastate differences and tensions remained a threat 
to the country's stability. Consequently, the Secretary-General recommended 
extending the UNPREDEP mandate, albeit with modifications. The modification, 
derived from projected adjustments to the mandates ofUNCRO and UNPROFOR as 
a result of the Dayton Accords, was to establish UNPREDEP on a fully independent 
footing and reporting directly to New York. On 30 November 1995, the mandate for 
UNPREDEP was extended for a period terminating on 30 May 1996, when the 
Security Council approved resolution 1027 (1995i); however, the resolution 
contained no reference to the issue of an independent status. 
The next couple of months brought considerable changes in the mandates of both 
UNCRO and UNPROFOR that would ultimately lead to alteration ofUNPREDEP's 
mandate. Security Council resolution 1025 (1995h), of 30 November 1995, in light 
ofthe Basic Agreement on the region of Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western 
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Sinnium. signed on 12 November 1995. between Croatia and Serbia, and in order to 
allow for the future establishment of a transitional administration and peacekeeping 
force in Croatia; terminated the mandate ofUNCRO effective 15 January 1996. On 
15 January 1996. by way of Security Council resolution 1037 (1996a). UNCRO was 
replaced by the United Nations Transitional Administration for Eastern Slavonia, 
Baranja and Western Sirmium (UNTAES). which was to have a Transitional 
Administrator exclusive ofUNPROFOR headquarters in Zagreb. With respect to 
UNPROFOR, noting the signing of the General Framework Agreement for Peace in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, specifically the requirements contained in Annex. I-A; the 
Security Council adopted Resolution 1031 (1995j) on 15 December] 995. which 
authorized the establishment ofa multinational Implementation Force (IFOR). The 
official transfer of authority from UNPROFOR to IFOR occurred on 20 December 
1995. which simultaneously terminated the mandate of UNPROFOR. While the 
Force Commander ofUNPROFOR was to become the Deputy Commander IFOR, 
there was a stipulation that he retain his UNPROFOR authority during the transition 
so as to continue to exercise operational control over UNPROFOR elements that 
would not transfer to IFOR. As a result of these actions. by 15 January 1996. 
UNPREDEP was the only remaining element ofUNPROFOR; and was technically 
still under operational control of the Force Commander in Zagreb, who was in 
actuality the Deputy Commander for IFOR. 
On 30 January 1996, the Secretary-General again urged, through his report 
pursuant to Resolution 1027 (1995i). that UNPREDEP transition into a fully 
independent status as soon as practicable. Finally, on 13 February 1996, the Security 
Council approved Resolution 1046 (1996c) thereby creating UNPREDEP as a fully 
independent mission. with its own SRSG and Force Commander. and reporting 
directly to UN headquarters in New York. Furthermore, the addition of 50 personnel 
was authorized to provide for continued engineering capability. It was at this time 
that UNPREDEP was at its peak. It operated 24 permanent and 33 temporary 
observation posts along the 422 kilometer Macedonian border with the FRY and 
Albania, the political affairs component had expanded and diversified to effectively 
monitor and promote reconciliation among various political and ethnic groups, 
CIVPOL was playing an indispensable role in areas populated by ethnic minorities, 
and the public affairs unit was active in raising public awareness regarding 
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UNPREDEP's unique role. Moreover, UNPREDEP was coordinating and working 
in a complimentary fashion with the ICFY and OSCE, as well as various NGOs. 
From the inception of UNPROFOR in Macedonia until this point in time, the focus 
had shifted from exclusive concentration on interstate threats to a simultaneous and 
connected focus on interstate and intrastate threats through the addition to the 
mandate of the use of good offices. With the cessation of hostilities elsewhere in the 
fonner Yugoslavia the interstate threat seemed to be diminished, however, many of 
the existing intrastate tensions had not been fully abated nor the danger of 
fragmentation averted. In view of this situation, the newly appointed SRSG and 
fonner Chief of Staff for UNPREDEP, Henryk J. Sokalski, decided to place even 
more emphasis on the intrastate aspects of the conflict prevention mission. 
Sokalski (2003, 153) acted on the presumption that for early prevention to be 
effective, the multidimensional root causes of conflict need to be identified and 
addressed and that conflict prevention and sustainable development are mutually 
reinforcing. The ensuing developmental aspect of the UNPREDEP mission was 
tenned by Sokalski (1999, 4) as ''the human dimension", and was closely aligned 
with what most refer to as peace-building. This function of the UNPREDEP mission 
fell within the good offices mandate, but advanced it further by commencing a major 
confidence-building measure, between Macedonia and UNPREDEP, in the form of a 
set of catalytic activities funded by seed contributions from extra-budgetary sources. 
It was designed and executed to demonstrate to Macedonia's concerned institutions 
how to resort to and utilize duly approved international standards, and the experience 
gained in their implementation, by countries transitioning to civil society and in 
pursuit of their own national policies and social integration programs. As such, 
UNPREDEP resorted to various forms of structural and operational conflict 
prevention measures, predominantly related to social development and crime 
prevention, and concentrated on relaying the message that state and society were two 
complimentary forces. Implementation was in the form of small-scale projects that 
either the government, local authorities, or NGOs could undertake; and in concert 
with other coordinating agencies, such as: the United Nations Development Program 
(UNDP), the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), the Search for Common 
Ground (SCG), the Center for International Crime Prevention (CICP), the Friedrich 
Ebert Foundation (FES), Catholic Relief Services (CRS), SOS Children's Villages, 
129 
and the Open Society Institute. In this manner the projects could continue after the 
eventual termination ofUNPREDEP. The attention devoted to the peace-building 
aspect augmented significantly the multiplier effect generated by development of the 
other conflict prevention efforts, thereby creating an overall unity of effort for the 
mission as a whole. 
On 30 May 1996, the Security Council extended UNPREDEP's mandate, with 
Resolution 1058 (1 996c ), for a period terminating on 30 November 1996. Noting 
the agreement signed between Macedonia and the FRY on 8 April 1996, the Security 
Council agreed that the security situation in Macedonia had improved; but 
recognized it was still too early to be confident that regional stability had been 
established. However, in light of the positive developments, the question arose 
whether UNPREDEP could execute its mandate with fewer resources. The real 
issue was whether the current volume of patrolling and the number of observation 
posts was absolutely necessary. Recalling that originally only one infantry battalion 
with an approximate strength of 700 troops was recommended, debate had surfaced 
as to whether further improvements in the country and region during the impending 
months might make it possible to reduce the size ofUNPREDEP. As a result, in 
Resolution 1082 (1996d), the Security Council, on 27 November 1996, decided to 
extend the mandate ofUNPREDEP for a period terminating on 31 May 1997, with a 
reduction of its military component by 300 personnel by 30 April, and with a view to 
concluding the mandate when circumstances permitted. 
While UNPREDEP was preparing to reduce its strength, however, regional 
stability began to deteriorate. In Serbia, on the heels of a contentious mayoral 
election in Belgrade, the Serbian Orthodox Church condemned President Milosevic 
for bringing the Serbian Nation to economic disaster and suppressing political and 
religious freedoms, and in so doing sparking civic protests. Additionally, in Kosovo, 
the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) had come to international attention and was 
increasing its attacks on Serbs within Kosovo. January of 1997, witnessed the 
collapse of the Bulgarian economy and ensuing antigovemment protests and strikes, 
resulting in the Bulgarian government declaring a state of emergency. In Albania, 
the pyramid scheme collapsed plunging the country into chaos and anarchy. The 
state of affairs in Albania caused several foreign embassies to evacuate their 
personnel, and Albanian refugees were fleeing to Greece and Italy. Macedonia, as 
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well, was concerned regarding a possible influx of refugees, and when the Albanian 
government declared a state of emergency the Macedonian Armed Forces were 
placed on alert. The situation deteriorated sharply on 13 March when seven 
Albanian border police attempted to illegally flee across the border at Kjafsan when 
their watch tower was seized by rebels, resulting in gunfire between them and the 
Macedonian border guards (Williams 2000, 165). Within a few short months, what 
had become a fairly stable interstate environment for Macedonia had become even 
more unstable than when UNPROFOR had first arrived on the scene. 
Macedonia immediately closed all border crossings with Albania and 
UNPREDEP observation posts were put on alert. Furthermore, UNPREDEP 
manned three temporary observation posts on the Albanian border and dispatched 
Force Protection Teams supported by armored personnel carriers. This swift 
military response by UNPREDEP demonstrated the utility of maintaining a strong 
military component ofUNPREDEP and continuing with a focus on possible 
interstate threat. Taking into consideration these actions and the increased instability, 
the Security Council passed Resolution 1105 (1997a) on 9 April 1997, suspending 
the reduction of the military component ofUNPREDEP until the end of its current 
mandate. On 12 May, the Secretary-General (1997b) submitted a report detailing the 
social unrest in Bulgaria and the FRY, as well as the collapsed state institutions and 
disintegrated social structures in Albania. Domestically within Macedonia, the 
report discussed positive steps in the democratic process, but highlighted remaining 
ethnic tensions and unrest, possibly due to the increase in ethnic conflict in 
neighboring Kosovo. These developments demonstrated that stability in the region 
was indeed still fragile. Based on the Secretary-general's recommendation, on 28 
May 1997 the Security Council adopted Resolution 1110 (1 997c) extending the 
UNPREDEP mandate until 30 November 1997, and reinstating the reduction of 300 
troops commencing on 1 October 1997. 
Even though, the mandate had been extended, there was still pressure within the 
Security Council to terminate UNPREDEP as soon as possible. Russia had voted for 
the extension, but did so solely due to the complications brought forth by Albania. 
Otherwise, Russia was of the opinion the mandate originally provided for 
UNPREDEP, namely prevent the diffusion of conflict from the former Yugoslavia, 
had been successfully implemented and completed. As the end of the mandate 
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approached, options were being considered as to how best to execute a phased exit. 
/ 
On 20 November 1997, the Secretary-General (1997d) reported the reduction of300 
troops would be completed by 30 November, and the number of observation posts 
would be decreased to eight, but compensated by increased patrolling along the 
border. Based on the uncertainty of the presidential elections in Serbia, the 
increased violence in Kosovo, and the slow progress in implementing the Dayton 
Accords; the report underscored the unpredictability of, and dangers inherent in, 
developments outside the control of Macedonia. The effects of inter ethnic tensions 
on long-term stability remained a concern, while fears of ethnic Albanian refugees 
from Kosovo exacerbated this concern. Regardless of these apprehensions, the 
future ofUNPREDEP was questionable. After Security Council Resolution 1140 
(1997e) extended the mandate for four days on 28 November; Resolution 1142 
(1997t) was adopted on 4 December 1997, which extended UNPREDEP's mandate 
for a supposed final period until 31 August 1998, with the withdrawal ofthe military 
component immediately thereafter. 
The conflict in Kosovo erupted in earnest in February 1998 when President 
Milosevic ordered army and police units to commence a crackdown on KLA 
elements. In response, the Permanent Council of the OSCE, in a special session on 
the Kosovo crisis on 11 March 1998, decided in Decision 218 (OSCE 1998) to 
temporarily enhance the monitoring capabilities of the OSCE Spillover Monitor 
Mission to Skopje. This temporary enhancement was to allow for adequate 
observation of the borders with Kosovo and the FRY, and prevention of possible 
crisis spillover effects. On 31 March 1998, the Security Council followed suit by 
adopting Resolution 1160 (1998a), which condemned the use of force by both 
Serbian and KLA forces; imposed sanctions against military equipment, weapons 
and training; and invited the OSCE to keep the Secretary-General informed on the 
situation in Kosovo. The Secretary-General (1998b) echoed the concerns of the 
OSCE and the Security Council in his Report Pursuant to Security Council 
Resolution 1142, on 1 of June 1998, with comments regarding the peace and 
stability in Macedonia continuing to depend largely on developments in other parts 
of the region. Recent developments in Kosovo had highlighted the danger of 
renewed violence in the area and the serious repercussions such violence could have 
upon both the interstate and intrastate security of Macedonia. Moreover, the 
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continuing regional uncertainties could exacerbate current ethnic tensions within 
Macedonia. Consequently, on 21 July 1998, the Security Council approved 
Resolution 1186 (1998c) increasing the strength ofUNPREDEP by 300 military 
personnel, and extending the mandate for a period terminating on 28 February 1999. 
More importantly, this resolution also authorized a modification in the mandate by 
including the tasks of monitoring and reporting on illicit anns flows and other 
activities prohibited under Resolution 1160. This marked a significant addition to 
the mandate and once again focused UNPREDEP on interstate issues. 
The situation in Kosovo continued to deteriorate through the summer of 1998, 
resulting in increased actions by the international community, all of which would 
impact on Macedonia in some fashion. Shortly after OSCE Decision 218 and 
Security Council Resolution 1160, the Contact Group decided to enter into the realm 
of Kosovo. The Contact Group, established in the spring of 1994 as a coordination 
forum for crisis management efforts related to Bosnia, consisted ofthe United 
States, Russia, France, the United Kingdom and Germany, with Italy joining in 1996. 
On 6 July 1998, the Contact Group announced the formation of the Kosovo 
Diplomatic Observer Mission (KDOM), which was to be a peaceful m ission where 
diplomatic members ofthe Contact Group would observe and report on the general 
freedom of movement throughout Kosovo as part of their daily duties. On 23 
September 1998, the Security Council passed Resolution 1199 (1998d) welcoming 
the establishment ofKDOM, noting the numbers of persons displaced and without 
shelter, expressing alann at the impending human catastrophe in Kosovo, affirming 
that deterioration of the situation in Kosovo constituted a threat to peace and stability 
in the entire region, and called for a cease-fire by both parties to the conflict. 
On 13 October 1998, following a deterioration of the situation, the NAC 
authorized activation orders for air strikes against Serb positions. This move was 
designed to support diplomatic efforts to make the Milosevic regime withdraw 
forces from Kosovo, cooperate in bringing an end to the violence, and facilitate the 
return of refugees to their homes. At the last moment, following further diplomatic 
initiatives including visits to Belgrade by NATO's Secretary General Solana; US 
Envoys Richard Holbrooke and Christopher Hill; the Chairman of NATO's Military 
Committee, General Naumann; and the Supreme Allied Commander Europe, 
General Clark; President Milosevic agreed to comply and the air strikes were called 
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off (NATO 2004b). Moreover, it was detennined that a Kosovo Verification 
Mission (KVM) would be instituted to verify compliance of all parties with 
Resolution 1199. The OSCE was to observe compliance on the ground, and NATO 
would conduct aerial surveillance. NATO concluded their agreement with the FRY 
Ministry of Defense on 15 October 1998, and the OSCE signed their agreement with 
the FRY Ministry of Foreign Affairs on 16 October. On 24 October 1998, the 
Security Council approved Resolution 1203 (1998e), endorsing both components of 
the KVM and affinning that in the event of an emergency, action may be necessary 
to ensure their safety and freedom of movement. 
The Macedonian government was fully aware of the intent of some of the 
permanent members of the Security Council to tenninate UNPREDEP in the near 
future, and based on the threat from Kosovo was inclined to encourage NATO to 
launch a presence in the country as a replacement. The rationalization was that 
NATO forces on Macedonian soil would deter any possible incursion into the 
country, as well as increase their international status in concert with the possibility of 
future NATO membership. Consequently, the Macedonian administration agreed to 
allow NATO to establish the Kosovo Verification Coordination Center (KVCC) on 
its soil. The KVCC was a multinational NATO headquarters, which served as the 
primary liaison between the OSCE ground verification and NATO air verification 
missions. It coordinated NATO unarmed air verification flights, provided a base for 
operations by unmanned aerial vehicles, and coordinated NATO requests for use of 
Macedonian airspace. The first personnel arrived in Skopje on 19 October 1998 and 
the KVCC was fonnally inaugurated on 26 November 1998, with its headquarters in 
Kumanovo (KVCC 2004). The KVCC consisted of approximately 150 personnel 
from a variety of NATO nations: Belgium, Denmark, France, Gennany, Greece, 
Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, United Kingdom and the United States. 
The OSCE portion of the KVM was to consist of two thousand unarmed 
personnel from OSCE participating states. While their safety and security was the 
primary responsibility of the FRY, a contingency operation was put into place as 
well. In support of the OSCE KVM mission, the NAC approved a NATO special 
military task force on 4 December 1998, to assist with the emergency evacuation of 
members of the KVM if renewed conflict should put them at risk. The NATO 
Extraction Force (EF), named Determined Guarantor, was activated on 10 
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December, likewise in Kumanovo; and initially comprised 1,500 personnel from 
Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom; all under French 
leadership (NATO 2004a). The KVCC closely coordinated with the EF 
and constituted a vital information link for the effectiveness ofthe Extraction Force 
mission. 
As a result of international community involvement in Kosovo, Macedonia 
likewise became involved due to its geographic proximity. Macedonia now had a 
UN mission and NATO forces stationed on its territory. The UN was present in the 
fonn ofUNPREDEP and had the mission to prevent the diffusion of conflict from 
interstate sources as well as from intrastate sources. NATO was present in 
coordination with efforts to stave off conflict in a neighboring country that, if 
escalated, could likewise diffuse to Macedonia. On 12 February 1999, the Secretary-
General (1999a) submitted his report pursuant to Resolution 1186, stating 
completion ofthe increase in UNPREDEP's strength by 300 personnel had occurred 
in early January, and the quantity of observation posts had been increased from eight 
to sixteen. It was noted, although the mandate had been extended to include 
monitoring and reporting on illicit arms flows and other activities prohibited under 
Resolution 1160, that it does not have authority to interdict or inspect cross-border 
traffic. In addition to the ongoing coordination with the OSCE, UNPREDEP also 
established a working relationship with the KVCC and EF. The report further 
commented on strengthened bilateral relations with Macedonia's neighbors, 
particularly Albania and Greece, and the positive domestic political development of 
peaceful parliamentary elections in October and November of 1998; but 
concentrated on the serious interstate and intrastate repercussions that continued 
conflict in Kosovo could have on Macedonia. Based upon the success of 
UNPREDEP to date, the danger of diffusion of the Kosovo conflict, the still unstable 
situation in Albania, the increased tension between Macedonia and the FRY 
regarding the stationing of NATO forces on Macedonian soil, and the lack of 
progress in the demarcation of the border with the FRY, the Secretary-General 
recommended a further extension of the UNPREDEP mandate until 31 August 1999. 
The peaceful elections referred to in the Secretary-General's report took place on 
18 October and 2 November 1998, and resulted in a landslide victory for VMRO-
DPMNE who formed a coalition government on 19 November with the DP A. The 
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two parties that now formed the government, both of which were nationalist parties, 
now had the task of leading Macedonia in unison through dangerous times. The 
primary emphasis of their campaigns had been to strengthen the economy after years 
of decline, regardless of the fact that the decline was predominantly a result of 
interstate factors. In early February 1999, the new government was enticed by the 
offer of two billion dollars in investment and aid to establish diplomatic relations 
with Taiwan. Unfortunately, the political intricacies of this venture were to cause 
immediate and long-term ramifications for Macedonia. China, a permanent member 
of the Security Council, considered Taiwan a breakaway province and immediately 
severed diplomatic ties and halted all bilateral agreements with Macedonia. When 
on 25 February 1999, the Security Council met to vote on the extension of the 
UNPREDEP mandate; China stated that in light of the original mandate, the 
improved relations with its neighbors, and increased domestic stability. the mandate 
had been accomplished successfully. Meanwhile, Russia campaigned for a change 
in the mandate thereby making the monitoring mission in relation to Kosovo, and 
Resolution 1160, the primary function ofUNPREDEP. At the end of the meeting, 
the vote was thirteen in favor, one abstention by Russia and one veto by China. 
While China has never admitted any relationship between the recognition of Taiwan 
by Macedonia and the veto of the extension for UNPREDEP, most observers have 
deduced a direct causal relationship. Regardless of the reasoning, the veto by China 
resulted in the mandate for UNPREDEP terminating at the stroke of midnight on 28 
February 1999. 
From the decision that UNPROFOR within Macedonia would officially transition 
to UNPREDEP on 31 March 1995, until the termination of the UNPREDEP 
mandate on 28 February 1999, the interstate threat was to vacillate in intensity and 
shift between specific threats to regional stability. While the signing of the interim 
accord between Greece and Macedonia effectively eliminated the major interstate 
threat from the south, the inability to attain agreement on demarcation of the border 
between the FRY and Macedonia, as well as the ethnic tension in Kosovo, retained 
the interstate threat from the north at a persistent degree. To the east and west, the 
crash of the Bulgarian economy and ensuing social unrest, and the collapsed state 
institutions and disintegrated social structures in Albania, respectively, were 
instruments of fluctuation for the interstate risk of instability diffusion. Aside from 
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the monitoring, reporting and patrolling of the borders, UNPREDEP also liaised 
with the General Staff of the FRY and with relevant ministries in Albania. The 
UNPREDEP presence on along the borders was initially intended as a forewarning 
against any overt military incursion, nevertheless, it appended the collateral 
advantage of deterring cross-border smuggling and passage of illegal immigrants. In 
all cases, however, the existence ofUNPREDEP executing its mandate on the 
borders of Macedonia with respect to interstate threats served not only as a deterrent, 
but also provided a calming and stabilizing effect within the interior of the country. 
In sequence, this permitted engagement within the broadened mandate of good 
offices, which created a qualitative dimension that facilitated expansion of 
traditional peacekeeping techniques into conflict resolution; and thereby contributed 
to the promotion of dialogue, restraint and practical compromise between dissimilar 
segments of society. Altogether, the mandate ofUNPREDEP required interface 
with diverse aspects of Macedonia's interstate and intrastate circumstances ranging 
from preventive deployment and patrolling to early warning, fact-finding, 
monitoring and reporting, good offices, confidence-building measures, and social 
and developmental projects. Without the interstate focus of the conflict prevention 
efforts of this mission, the intrastate aspects would not have been possible; whereas 
without the intrastate focus the interstate efforts would have been in vain. 
Conflict prevention efforts on the part of the international community 
simultaneously pursued the triggering, proximate and structural sources of conflict in 
Macedonia in an increasingly connected undertaking of multifaceted and multilevel 
action demonstrative of an intervention synergy. The critical element that emerges is 
the necessity for the entirety ofthese multifaceted and multilevel conflict prevention 
tools to be utilized, toward both interstate and intrastate components of conflict 
prevention, in a simultaneous and connective method; which is the embodiment of a 
strategy of simultaneity and connectivity within conflict prevention. 
4.6. Conclusions 
After approximately four decades of UN peacekeeping forces being utilized to 
divide rival factions of hostilities so as to prevent resumption of conflict, thus was 
authorized and deployed the first purely preventive UN peacekeeping force in 
history. Whereas traditional peacekeeping efforts were a result of international 
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community failure to prevent conflict, the deployment ofUNPROFOR to Macedonia 
represented a major shift regarding international policy, perspective and emphasis 
toward conflict prevention. As opposed to being deployed between two states to 
prevent the recurrence of conflict, UNPROFOR was to be deployed within a state; 
with that state's consent and upon their request, to prevent the possible outbreak of 
conflict. The conditions upon UN authorization of the mission were a fusion of 
interstate and intrastate threats to peace and stability, both within the country and 
within the region. Macedonia acquired independence exposed to interstate threats 
from all four bordering states, and overshadowed by regional instability in the form 
of violent conflict in the former Yugoslavia. From an intrastate perspective, three 
primary challenges confronted the country: the need for democratic transformation, 
the socioeconomic situation, and interethnic tensions. The intrastate challenges were 
all integrally connected, and subject to, the interstate threats to the country; as well 
as overall regional instability. 
The principal justification for authorization of UNPROFOR deployment was 
primarily from an interstate focus as a result of the overt threat to Macedonia from 
adjacent states, and exacerbated by regional instability. As fears within the 
international community mounted regarding the possibility of interstate conflict such 
as had already occurred between Serbia, Croatia, and Bosnia, so too, did intrastate 
ethnic fears mount within Macedonia regarding the future functioning of the country. 
Likewise, various interstate threats were subject to increase as a result of intrastate 
ethnic tension. 
From the establishment ofUNPROFOR on 11 December 1992 to the approval of 
the SRSG to utilize his good offices in March 1994, the primary mission of 
UNPROFOR was to monitor the border and report any developments that could pose 
a threat to the country; and deter, by their presence, such threats or clashes between 
Macedonian and external forces. As such, the focus of the mission was 
predominantly of an interstate nature, and primarily targeted toward the triggering 
and proximate sources of conflict. Granted, the international community was aware 
of intrastate tensions, as evidenced by UN insistence of inclusion of UN MO and 
CIVPOL personnel. However, it was through the reports of these UNMO and 
CIVPOL personnel that the severity of the intrastate threat was identified and 
brought to the attention of the UN and the international community. 
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These reports further succeeded in identifying the complexities of the nexus of 
interstate and intrastate factors as a causative agent for economic and political 
uncertainty, and rising social tensions. Thus, in an adaptive and evolutional step the 
utilization ofthe good offices of the SRSG was approved and implemented. Initially 
deployed to prevent the diffusion of interstate conflict to the newly independent 
Macedonia, it soon became evident that although UNPROFOR was successfully 
executing their mission in this regard, there existed a simultaneous threat of 
diffusion and/or contagion of intrastate conflict across borders that was not being 
addressed by UNPROFOR forces. This intrastate threat posed both the possibility of 
diffusion from Kosovo, as well as contagion from Kosovo, Bosnia, Croatia, and 
Serbia. 
The identification of the necessity of an intrastate mandate to compliment the 
interstate mandate, and approval of the SRSG to utilize his good offices, were to 
adjust the mandate so as to include structural sources of conflict. By incorporating 
the structural sources of conflict within the mandate already addressing the 
triggering and proximate sources of conflict, international community conflict 
prevention efforts were to expand and integrate the degree of multifaceted and 
multilevel action, thereby creating synergy of intervention. This willful transition on 
the part of the international community signifies the genesis and true essence of a 
strategy of simultaneity and connectivity in conflict prevention efforts. 
From the approval for the SRSG to utilize his good offices on 31 March 1994, to 
the decision that UNPROFOR within Macedonia would from that point on be 
known as UNPREDEP on 31 March 1995, the broadened political mandate created a 
qualitative dimension that facilitated expansion of traditional peacekeeping 
techniques and was to develop into a fundamental element of the inclusive mandate. 
The declaration committing the party leaders to ensuring the elections were free, fair 
and in the spirit of interetbnic cooperation was an important and creative initiative 
that served to exemplifY UNPROFOR's willingness to contribute, and demonstrated 
explicit actions that could be incorporated within the good offices mandate. The 
intervention on the part ofHugo Anson, which effected the PDP withdrawing its 
threat to boycott three days prior to the first round elections functioned as another 
resourceful and apt utilization of the good offices mandate that resulted in an 
important political agreement thereby strengthening democratic principles. By 
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astutely avoiding the potential pitfall of acting as a communications link between the 
current parliament and the two opposition parties who boycotted the elections, 
UNPROFOR preserved and reinforced the democratic process as well as set defined 
limits on "appropriate" utilization of the good offices mandate. 
With regard to the University ofTetovo incident, Anson again employed his good 
offices mandate and hosted negotiations between government officials and ethnic 
Albanian leaders to urge compromise; and for ethnic Macedonians and ethnic 
Albanians alike to think ofthemselves first and foremost as citizens and only 
afterwards as members ofan ethnic group. The SRSG from Zagreb, Yasushi 
Akashi's visit, soon after the Tetovo incident, served to fortify the UN's interest in a 
stable Macedonia, as well as reinforce that the Security Council had authorized the 
SRSG to use his good offices to contribute to the maintenance and stability of the 
state. The utilization of the good offices mandate with respect to the crisis in Tetovo 
was a crucial undertaking that was at least partially accountable for moderation of 
the potential extent of intrastate ethnic conflict at that time. Without the good 
offices mandate this incident could have erupted into a more violent and self-
destructive affair for the country. 
While the military forces ofUNPROFOR monitored the borders for interstate 
aggression, the good offices mandate allowed engagement to stave off an intrastate 
conflict. Whereas UNPROFOR's political effort had focused on strengthening 
mutual understanding and dialogue among political parties and on monitoring 
human rights; UNPROFOR's military component had in tandem mediated several 
tense border encounters, achieving the withdrawal of soldiers on both sides of the 
disputed border. If violent intrastate ethnic conflict were allowed to ignite within 
Macedonia, there existed a fervent risk of conflict diffusion across state borders and 
escalation into interstate conflict. Likewise, a military presence on the borders was 
requisite to prevention of more serious border incursions that could have escalated 
into violent interstate conflict, which consecutively could have further exacerbated 
intrastate tensions. 
In light of the manifest multifaceted nexus of interstate and intrastate factors as a 
causative agent for rising social tensions, and economic and political uncertainty; the 
authorization for the SRSG to utilize his good offices as appropriate to contribute to 
the peace and stability of Macedonia served to assimilate the structural sources of 
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conflict within the mandate that already encompassed the triggering and proximate 
sources of conflict. In so doing, conflict prevention efforts on the part of the 
international community were to simultaneously target the triggering, proximate and 
structural sources of conflict in Macedonia, in a connected endeavor of multifaceted 
and multilevel action exhibiting a synergy of intervention. These efforts represent a 
synchronized and fused execution of international community interstate and 
intrastate conflict prevention actions exemplifying a strategy of simultaneity and 
connectivity. 
From the decision that UNPROFOR within Macedonia would officially transition 
to UNPREDEP on 31 March 1995 until the termination of the UNPREDEP mandate 
on 28 February 1999, the interstate threat was to vacillate in intensity and shift 
between specific threats to regional stability. While the signing of the interim accord 
between Greece and Macedonia effectively eliminated the major interstate threat 
from the south; the inability to attain agreement on demarcation of the border 
between the FRY and Macedonia, as well as the ethnic tension in Kosovo, retained 
the interstate threat from the north at a persistent degree. To the east and west, the 
crash of the Bulgarian economy and ensuing social unrest, and the collapsed state 
institutions and disintegrated social structures in Albania, respectively, were 
instruments of fluctuation for the interstate risk of instability diffusion. Aside from 
the monitoring, reporting and patrolling ofthe borders, UNPREDEP also liaised 
with the General Staff ofthe FRY and with relevant ministries in Albania. The 
UNPREDEP presence on along the borders was initially intended as a forewarning 
against any overt military incursion, nevertheless, it appended the collateral 
advantage of deterring cross-border smuggling and passage of illegal immigrants. In 
all cases, however, the existence ofUNPREDEP executing its mandate on the 
borders of Macedonia, with respect to interstate threats, served not only as a 
deterrent, but also provided a calming and stabilizing effect within the interior of the 
country. 
In sequence, this permitted engagement within the broadened mandate of good 
offices, which created a qualitative dimension that facilitated expansion of 
traditional peacekeeping techniques into peace-building; and thereby contributed to 
the promotion of dialogue, restraint and practical compromise between dissimilar 
segments of society. Altogether, the mandate ofUNPREDEP required interface 
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with diverse aspects of Macedonia's interstate and intrastate circumstances ranging 
from preventive deployment and patrolling to early warning, fact-finding, 
monitoring and reporting, good offices, confidence-building measures, and social 
and developmental projects. Without the interstate focus of the conflict prevention 
efforts of this mission the intrastate aspects would not have been possible, whereas 
without the intrastate efforts the interstate focus would have been in vain. 
Conflict prevention efforts on the part of the international community 
simultaneously pursued the triggering, proximate and structural sources of conflict in 
Macedonia in an increasingly connected undertaking of multifaceted and multilevel 
action demonstrative of an intervention synergy. The critical element that emerges is 
the necessity for the entirety of these multifaceted and multilevel conflict prevention 
tools to be utilized, toward both interstate and intrastate components of conflict 
prevention, in a simultaneous and connective method; which is the embodiment of a 
strategy of simultaneity and connectivity within conflict prevention. 
In sum, this chapter indicates an evolutional process transpired with respect to 
conflict prevention. At initiation of international community conflict prevention 
actions toward Macedonia, it is clear that early warning and response and support of 
major international actors were present. However, it was not until identification of 
the necessity of an intrastate mandate to compliment the interstate mandate, and 
approval of the SRSG to utilize his good offices, that the mandate was adjusted so as 
to include structural sources of conflict. By incorporating the structural sources of 
conflict within the mandate already addressing the triggering and proximate sources 
of conflict, international community conflict prevention efforts were to expand and 
integrate the degree of multifaceted and multilevel action, thereby creating synergy 
of intervention. This willful transition on the part of the international community 
signifies the genesis and true essence of a strategy of simultaneity and connectivity 
in conflict prevention efforts. In light of the manifest multifaceted nexus of 
interstate and intrastate factors as a causative agent for rising social tensions, and 
economic and political uncertainty; the SRSG assimilated the structural sources of 
conflict within the mandate that already encompassed the triggering and proximate 
sources of conflict. In so doing, conflict prevention efforts on the part of the 
international community were to simultaneously target the triggering, proximate and 
structural sources of conflict in Macedonia, in a connected endeavor of multifaceted 
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and multi level action exhibiting asynergy of intervention. In essence, all four 
factors of conflict prevention were utilized to address all three sources of conflict, 
thus representing a synchronized and fused execution of international community 
conflict prevention actions exemplifYing a strategy of simultaneity and connectivity. 
The international community continued to simultaneously pursue the triggering, 
proximate and structural sources of conflict in Macedonia in an increasingly 
connected undertaking of multifaceted and multilevel action demonstrative of an 
intervention synergy. The critical element that emerges is the necessity for the 
entirety of these multifaceted and multilevel conflict prevention tools to be utilized, 
toward both interstate and intrastate components of conflict prevention, in a 
simultaneous and connective method; which is the embodiment of a strategy of 
simultaneity and connectivity within conflict prevention. 
, To assert that UNPROFOR and UNPREDEP were solely responsible for 
avoidance of either interstate or intrastate violent conflict in Macedonia would be 
presumptuous as an amalgamation of variables were present; however, it would be 
similarly presuming to aver the conflict prevention efforts of the international 
community in the form ofUNPROFOR and UNPREDEP did not play a critical 
function. One of the more important aspects of this developmental transition, 
though, is the evidenced ability of the international community to continually assess 
and adapt the requisite mix of conflict prevention tools to the ever-changing 
environment of the task at hand. The following table, Figure 4.1, provides a 
chronological summary of the relevant international community involvement 
regarding conflict prevention efforts in Macedonia from independence through 
termination of the UNPREDEP mandate. 
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Fi~re 4.1: Chronology of Relevant International Community Involvement: Phase I. 
Date Focus .. __ II!~.~p'!!.(?_n .. __ _ 
1991, Seo 25 UN imposition ofmili!ary sanctions against FRY UN SC Res 713 
1992, Feb 21 Establishment ofUNPROFORtJNS:C~_es"I~~-: 
1992, May 30 UN imposition of comprehensive sanctions a~l!~t FRY UN SC Res 757 
1992, Sep 18 CSCE establishes Spillover Monitor Mission to Sk~je _f~f..E ~~~!.~~.~!! .. __ 
1992, Nov 23 Letter from Sec-Gen to Security Council relaying President UN Doc S/248S1 
Gligorov's request for UN Observers 
1992, Nov 25 
1992, Dec 9 
1992,Dec 11 
Security Council approves request for UN obse!:"ers UN Doc S/24852 
Report on possible deplovment of UNPROFOR to Macedonia _.1~l.2~~ S/~4l)~} __ .. 
Security Council approval to establish UNPROFOR in UN SC Res 795 
Macedonia 1------+- .-------.-..... -.--.. 
~991L!~..l.- l!!!~~~ ~~P~~!!~i.~an~~~.£on~!':1.&~n'7't;-------- UN SC Res 79S 
... ~19~9~3:.1.., ~F=eb"_=_=19'--lI_UN_-PR-:-_:_O=-FOR mandate extended for 6 weeks ..~~g:_~·~i~QL-_-_-_-
~ ... Mar 30 UNPROFOR mandate exten~_~<!ior 3 ~o:-:n.;...t:h:..:.:s'-:-:---:~___ UN SC Res 815 
l-=.I::-99::..,:3::z,.:;.A::J:p:::..r.,:-7_+_Security Council rec..2.mmends Macedo~!~ be .!~itt~d to UN .. ili'i~~9_~~~~s~~Ii--= 
l-!I::....99~3~,.:-A::J;p::..r...:.l..:..7_f.-=UN:..:...c..:::'str:.:.ce:c;;n~ening ofsancti~!"s a.s~ins~!,,_~Y UN SC Res 820 
1993, Jun 16 Sec-Gen notifies Security Counc_il of US tr~~!!~Ur;;rD;-;~'sii594----
l-!.I::....99~3~,:..J=un~18=--+f..-=-..::S-=._ecc:...ur-=ity Council acce£~ce ofU~_!toop 0~er~jg)~~~.~42-.. _-== 
1993, Jun 18 Security Council urges Greece and Macedonia to continue to UN SC Res 84S 
work towards agreement 
Ul~99~3~,~J~un~30~~UN::..:...:.:P,:=R~O:::F:...;O::::R~m:::a::.:n=da::.:t7-e:=-ext=en:..:.:d:;,:e::=d;.,:fo.::,:r;..,;3';-'-7m;,::,0:.:,nt:..:.:h=;s-;-_--:-::---:-_ .. lJ1" ~C R~~4_7 __ _ 
1993, Sep 30 President Gligorov addresses General Assembly regarding the Macedonian 
effect of sanctions.Qovel!'~~~! . !,:qlJe~ 
1993, Seo 30 UNPROFOR mandate extended f~r 1 day UN SC Res 869 
1993,Oct 1 UNPROFOR mandate extended for 4 days "UN SCR-;-'S70---' 
1993, Oct 4 UNRPOFOR mandate extended for 6 months; Notice of Sce- UN SCR-cs871--' 
Gen's intent to establish 3 separate UNPROFOR commands 
Imposition of Greek Embarg~.::.o ____________ ... ...::Orcek Government 
Sec-Gen informs Security Council ofUNPROFOR- tiN"Oocsj-i994/'i60 
I.-_____ f.-=-M;.::a=c,:,=e:=do::.:nia mandate shortco!!!...iEgs - no inte~!E.1..!!l~~~~ __ 
UNPROFOR mandate extended for 6 months; Approval for . UN se Res'90S--' 
1994.Feb 17 
1994, Mar 16 
1994, Mar 31 
SRSG to use "good offices" 
1994, Sep 17 Sec-Gen recommends International Border Commission UN Doc 811994/1067 
1994, Sep 30 UNPROFOR mandate extended for 6 months UN se Res 94'7--' 
l-!'19~9~5~, ~M~ar~22;-J~S~e~c~-G~e~n~re~po~rts~M::ac::e=-d~o':':n;::ia~f:?-ac::"e':':s ::..a..::::co....:m:.::p:.:;l:.::ex~n-e-:-tw-o-r-:-k-o-:-f---I UN Doc-si·i99S1222 -
intrastate and interstate threats 
1995, Mar 31 UN SC Res 981 UNPROFOR-Croatia mandate terminated; UNCRO 
established 
l-------t=~=:::::::;:::.:==-------.-----------. "-:-=---"--_.---
UNPROFOR-Macedonia officially transitions to UN SC Res 983 1995, Mar 31 
1995, Sep 13 
1995, Nov 22 
1995, Nov 22 
1995, Nov 23 
UNPREDEP; initial mandate is for 8 months 
Macedonia and Greece sign Interim Accord UN Doe S/19951794 
UN military sanctions against FRY lifted UN SC Res 1021--' 
UN comprehensive sanctions a~n:::s::..t 7F:.:R;.,:Y-=I.::ift.::e:..=d-:-____ -I-....:UN::..!..:-~S~C.~RCs1022--· 
Sec-Gen reports on positive Macedonian concessions to UN Doe 811995/987 
Albanian minority 
L!.19~9~S~,.!.:N~o::.v..:3:.::0_+.::UN:.:-=C:::R.:::O:..:::::m=a::_:n=da=t.::..e_:_:te:::.;rm=in=a::.:ti~on:_:_::_:da=:te:::....::.:se:.:t--.-------I._UN-SC-R..':s-I-0-2S--. 
1995, Nov 30 UNPREDEP mandate extended for 6 months UN SC Res 1021 
1995, Dec IS UNPROFOR-Bosnia mandate terminated; IFOR established UN S~O-31--' 
1996, Jan IS UNCRO mandate terminated; UNTAES established UN SC Res 1037--
1996, Jan 30 Sec-Gen reports Macedonia's admission to regi-o-nal-----+UN Doe S/1996~ 
1.------+ organizations facilitates pluralist society 
UNPRDEP is declared an independent mission and strength is 
I.-_____ l~_l_=_·n~reased by SO pe-=:rso=-::-=.n:..:.:n;:,,:e'-.:-l---:---: __ ----------
1996, Mar 22 Sec-Gen issues guidance on SRSG's responsibilities 




1996, Apr 17 Sec-Gen reiterates guidance on SRSG's mandate UN Doe SI I 996/373 . __ .. _----_._ .. _-
1996, May 30 UNPREDEP mandate extended for 6 months UN SC Res 1058 
_~' __ M_. _ .. 
1996, Sep 30 Sec-Gen reports chance of spillover of northern conflict to UN Doc S/1996/819 
Macedonia is unlikel~ 
1996, Nov 27 UNPREDEP mandate extended for 6 months; troop strength UN SC Res 1082 
to be reduced b~ 300 ------_. __ .-
1997, Apr9 Security Council sus~n~~ UNPREDEP str~!!g!h re.<:!~_~~~_n __ UN SC Res 1105 - .. -----.---~ ....... _-._. _ .. ..... -.--.-. 
1997, May 12 Sec Gen reports on threats to regional stability _YN !?~l£. S/199?/365 
1997, May 28 UNPREDEP mandate extended for 6 months; troop strength UN SC Res 1110 
to be reduced by 300 
1997,Ju114 Sec-Gen issues guidance on SRSG's responsibilities UNDoc 
~5_1/95Q{!99? __ .. 
1997, Nov 20 Sec-Gen reports on unEredictabili!}:: of events in Macedonia UN _P.~~_§fl.997~. 
1997, Nov 28 UNPREDEP mandate extended for 4 days UN SC Res 1140 .. _-----_ .. _---_. __ . 
1997,Dec4 UNPREDEP mandate extended for 9 months .. UN.~~_~_~s_!!.1.~_. 
1998, Mar 11 OSCE enhances Spillover Monitor Mission to Skopje; calls OSCE Decision 218 
for FRY to halt violence in Kosovo and fully cOl?~rate 
1998, Mar 31 UN imposition of military sanctions against FRY; invitation UN SC Res 1160 
for OSCE to inform Sec-Ocn on Kosovo situation 
_ Sec-Gen re(?Orts 0.0 ~~..!.!£..~_a.~_~2.!!~a o{K~~vo ref~g~~.!I_-. 
·---________ ._ .. __ • __ 'e __ 
1998, Jun 1 UN Doc 811998/454 
1998, Jul6 C~nta~t q~uE esptblishes KpDM •. ~~~c.I:2~~liP:~~=· 
1998, Jul21 UNPREDEP mandate extended for 6 months; Troop strength UN SC Res 1186 
increased by 300; Authorization to report on smu.ggling 
1998, Sep23 UN demands all parties cease hostilities and enable UN SC Res 1199 
international monitoring in Kosovo; Endorses K~OM 
1998, Oct IS OSCE declares preparedness to embark upon verification OSCE Decision 259 
activities in Kosovo within framework of UN SC Res 1199 
1998,Oct24 UN endorses OSCE KVM; Authorizes NATO Extraction UN SC Res 1203 
Force in Macedonia 
1998,Oct25 OSCE establishes KVM . osc"E-Decis~~-263 
1998, Nov 26 NATO establishes KVCC '}l~~j~~~(~~?ii---'-
1998, Dec4 NATO Extraction Force ~ermined Ouaran~~l~~!!1_~!!_~_~_(!.L NAC Decision 
1999, Jan 29 Macedonian Foreign Affairs Minister requests UNPREDEP UNDOcS!i999il0S--
extension 
1999, Feb 12 Sec-Gen reports that Kosovo could have serious repercussions UN Doc S/1999/161 
in Macedonia; Recommends UNPREDEP extension 
1999, Feb 25 China vetoes extension ofUNPREDEP UN Press Release 
SC/6648 
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Chapter 5: Phase 11: Kosovo Intervention 
5.1. Introduction 
On 29 January 1999, the Macedonian Foreign Affairs Minister submitted to the 
Secretary-General his government's rationale for extension ofUNPREDEP's 
mandate for an additional six months, with its existing composition and structure. In 
particular, Macedonia expressed concern over the danger of diffusion of the conflict 
in Kosovo; the increase in tensions on the Albanian-Yugoslav border; the still 
unstable situation in Albania, which had burdened Macedonia's efforts to prevent 
arms trafficking to Kosovo; and the lack of progress in demarcation of the country's 
border with the FRY. 
On 12 February 1999, the Secretary-General (1999a) submitted his report 
pursuant to Resolution 1186. The report stated the increase in UNPREDEP's 
strength by 300 personnel had been completed in early January, and the quantity of 
observation posts had been increased from eight to sixteen. It was also noted the 
mandate had been extended to include monitoring and reporting on illicit arms flows 
and other activities prohibited under Resolution 1160. Increasing concern was 
expressed that the spread of violence and the nature of the attacks in Kosovo could 
lead to a situation of all-out civil war. which might have unpredictable repercussions 
for the entire region. Accordingly, it was a matter of satisfaction, the Secretary-
General stated, that thus far Macedonia had not been adversely affected by the 
Kosovo conflict. However, the potentially serious repercussions that continued 
violence in Kosovo could have upon the interstate and intrastate security of the 
country must not be ignored given the large proportion of ethnic Albanians in the 
Macedonian population. Consequently, the Secretary-General had recommended 
UNPREDEP be extended for another six-month period, through 31 August 1999, as 
taken up in draft resolution S/19991201 that was considered on 25 February 1999. 
China exercised its veto in the Security Council (1999b) to prevent extension of 
the UNPREDEP mandate in Macedonia on 25 February 1999. Numerous 
delegations of Member States articulated distress regarding China's veto, 
predominantly pertaining to possible diffusion of conflict from Kosovo across the 
border with Macedonia. UNPREDEP's host Government, Macedonia, noted in the 
Council that UNPREDEP was discharging its mandate in an exemplary manner; 
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amid a regional situation that continued to be very difficult, dangerous and 
unpredictable; and the possibility of a new bloody war in the Balkans was real. The 
United States judged the continued role ofUNPREDEP as indispensable. 
particularly during such a sensitive period of valid security threats. The President of 
the Security Council, the Permanent Representative of Canada to the United Nations, 
voiced opinion on behalf of his nation that UNPREDEP's continued presence in 
Macedonia was essential at this critical juncture of regional instability. Germany, on 
behalf ofthe European Union, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary. 
Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Cyprus, Iceland and 
Norway, expressed the Union's support, and attachment of great importance, to the 
role of UNPREDEP as a stabilizing and peace-promoting element in the geo-
political context of the region. The European Union saw the value ofUNPREDEP 
not only in its military component and its border monitoring, but also in its civilian 
efforts to promote understanding among the different ethnic groups in Macedonia. 
Secretary-General Kofi Annan said in a statement after the Council vote that a new 
approach would have to be adopted by the Government of Macedonia and its 
neighbors, in consultation with regional organizations. 
UNPREDEP had contributed successfully to the prevention of diffusion or 
contagion of conflict elsewhere in the region to Macedonia. By promoting dialogue 
among various political forces and ethnic communities, and utilizing its good 
offices, UNPREDEP had a stabilizing effect within the country. which further 
reduced tensions that could have clearly increased as a direct result of the continued 
crisis in Kosovo. However, considering the persistent regional threats, a suitable 
replacement would have to fill the newfound conflict prevention void created in the 
wake of UNPREDEP termination. In essence, based upon the current interstate and 
intrastate threats to peace and stability within Macedonia, the termination of conflict 
prevention efforts of the international community in the form ofUNPREDEP could 
not have come at a more inopportune time. 
Ever since Macedonia declared its independence, the two primary goals to which 
the country aspired were membership in NATO and in the European Union. 
President Gligorov, Prime Minister Crvenkovski and Minister ofDefense Kitanoski 
(1998) had all proclaimed the sincere desire of Macedonia to join Partnership for 
Peace (PfP) and become a member of NATO, in full compliance with NATO norms 
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and standards, so as to contribute to the building of a Euro-Atlantic Community of 
shared values. The Macedonian leadership saw NATO as one ofthe crucial columns 
in the modem European security architecture and considered its membership in 
NATO as a permanent obligation for which there was broad political and social 
consensus. The Macedonian government was fully aware of the intent of some of 
the permanent members of the Security Council to terminate UNPREDEP, and 
based on aspirations toward NATO membership and the threat from Kosovo, the 
Macedonian leadership was inclined to encourage NATO to launch a presence in the 
country. The rationalization was that NATO forces on Macedonian soil would deter 
any possible incursion into the country, as well as increase their international status 
in concert with the possibility of future NATO membership. Additionally, to 
proceed from a UN presence targeted toward conflict prevention to aNA TO 
presence in which Macedonia would be an active participant, was deemed by the 
Macedonian leadership as a sign of positive progression. 
As a result, the Macedonian administration agreed to allow NATO to establish 
the Kosovo Verification Coordination Center and the NATO Extraction Force on its 
soil. As discussed in the previous chapter, the KVCC was a multinational NATO 
headquarters, which served as the primary liaison between the OSCE ground 
verification and NATO air verification missions. In support of the OSCE KVM 
mission, the NAC approved a NATO special military task force on 4 December 
1998, to assist with the emergency evacuation of members of the KVM if renewed 
conflict should put them at risk. The NATO Extraction Force, named Determined 
Guarantor, was activated on 10 December and initially comprised 1,500 personnel 
from Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom; all under French 
leadership. Consequently, prior to the termination ofUNPREDEP there were 
already nearly two thousand NATO troops in Macedonia, under the NATO flag, in 
support of Kosovo operations. 
As much as Macedonia desired a NATO presence in country, NATO also wanted 
a presence in Macedonia. Since 1990, and the fall of the Berlin Wall, NATO had 
been in the process of redefining itself from an organization principally concerned 
with collective defense to one concerned with collective security as well as 
collective defense (Aybet 2000, 2001; Butler 2000; Leurdijk 2003, NATO 2003). 
NATO's defense posture transformation and political reconstitution had progressed 
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from the Comprehensive Concept in 1989, to the London Declaration of July 1990, 
to approval of the New Strategic Concept in November 1991, and by June of 1992 
had defined its future raison d'etre by endorsing the principle of its participation in 
peacekeeping, specifically by making available its assets to the CSCE/OSCE. In 
December 1992, NATO confirmed their preparedness to support, on a case by case 
basis, peacekeeping operations under the authority of the UN Security Council. This 
confirmation was in actuality only substantiating what was already occurring, as on 
16 July 1992, NATO's involvement in the Yugoslav crisis commenced when NATO 
ships entered the Adriatic to monitor compliance with Security Council Resolution 
757. As the UN became increasingly more involved with the Yugoslav conflicts, so 
too did NATO's role intensify from sea, to air, and finally land support operations. 
NATO's scope of operations was also to transition from support of peacekeeping 
operations, to combat operations in support of peace enforcement, and ultimately to 
tasks related to post-contlict peace building. 10 essence, NATO had established its 
collective security role by becoming a military subcontractor for the UN. 
As the critical stages of the Kosovo crisis were unfolding, though, the 
relationship between the UN and NATO was to alter yet again. As the UN 
strengthened its position regarding the impending crisis in Kosovo by approval of 
Security Council Resolutions 1160 and 1199, NATO had concurrently increased its 
rhetoric regarding the level of military preparedness for air operations against FRY 
forces. However, as it later became evident a Security Council resolution 
authorizing NATO use of force in Kosovo would be vetoed rather than passed, 
NATO was suddenly faced with a credibility dilemma. As a result, NATO reverted 
back to the coJlective defense function by authorizing out of region, non-Article 5, 
operations outside the framework of Chapter VIll. Accordingly, the geo-strategic 
location of Macedonia became paramount to NATO success in executing an air 
campaign against the FRY. as well as serving as a pre-positioning base for a foHow-
on NATO force in Kosovo. Thus, as Macedonia desired a NATO presence in 
countJy. NATO reciprocally sought a presence in Macedonia. This mutual 
aspiration, however, was to become a source of political acrimony in the future. 
While the predominance of international community focus regarding Macedonia 
was directed at the termination ofUNPREDEP and ensuing expansion of NATO 
forces, note should be made of the OSCE. which continued to execute the conflict 
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prevention efforts of the Spillover Monitor Mission to Skopje. Unfortunately the 
size ofthe OSCE mission precluded any overly encompassing efforts. The OSCE 
mission in Skopje began with a staff of four personnel in 1992, and OSCE Decision 
218 to temporarily enhance the mission in 1998 increased the total number of staff 
personnel to eight. The mission did, however, remain and continue to engage with 
the Macedonian leadership as well as the ethnic communities, which helped to 
perpetuate those conflict prevention efforts commenced by the OSCE and 
UNPREDEP aimed at creating the conditions necessary for peace and stability 
within the country. In spite of the OSCE mission's limited size, it did continue to 
serve as a stabilizing source through the troubling times ahead. 
5.2. Kosovo Intervention 
Origins of the Conflict. 
While some claim the genesis of the Kosovo conflict dates back hundreds of 
years and is the result of ancient hatreds, the origins of the crisis leading up to the 
NATO intervention of 1999 must be understood in tenns of a new wave of 
nationalism arising in the 1970's and 1980's (Independent Commission on Kosovo 
2000). Since the incorporation ofKosovo within Serbia as a result of the Balkan 
Wars, the general tone of mutual intolerance between Serbs and Kosovar Albanians 
has vacillated from harsh repression to near autonomy. Following World War n, 
Kosovar Albanians underwent a period of repression as Tito had just separated from 
Moscow in 1948, and was circumspect regarding Kosovar Albanians sympathizing 
with Albanian president and loyal Stalinist, Enver Hoxha. Autonomist agitation 
among Kosovar Albanians rose in 1968, when moderate demands were first voiced 
for the granting of republic status for Kosovo and the establishment of an Albanian 
language university. Demonstrations ensued in Kosovo, Macedonia and 
Montenegro, resulting in the opening of the ethnic Albanian University of Prist in a; 
and Kosovo being declared an autonomous province in 1974. While an autonomous 
province had its own administration, assembly, judiciary and the right of veto in the 
Serbian and Federal Parliaments, it did not have the right to secede from the 
federation nor was considered a bearer of Yugos la v sovereignty. The fundamental 
differentiation was the Kosovar Albanians, like the Hungarians in Vojvodina, were 
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considered a nationality as opposed to a nation since both their nations existed 
elsewhere in the form ofthe countries of Albania and Hungary. 
With granting Kosovo autonomous province status in the 1974 constitution, Tito 
had embarked on a policy of ethno-national devolution that would permit a high 
level of Albanization within Kosovo (Dannreuther 2001, 16). While this policy was 
to result in relatively successful management of the interethnic tensions between the 
Albanian majority and Serbian minority populations within Kosovo from 1974 until 
Tito's death in 1980, it also would form the basis for greater nationalistic sentiment 
from both sides after his death. From the Serb perspective, the fact that Kosovo and 
Vojvodina could merge to outvote Serbia in federal bodies, coupled with the 
demographic reduction of the Serb minority from approximately 27 percent of the 
population of Kosovo to ten percent in the 1980s, led to the conviction that Serbia's 
rightful influence and power as the largest constituent nation within the federation 
had been emasculated. From the Kosovar Albanian perspective, the existence of an 
autonomous province facilitated creation of a Kosovar Albanian identity; while the 
fact that an autonomous province was not of an equivalent status as a republic and 
was precluded from seceding from the federation, created the desire for greater 
autonomy and independence. Thus, Kosovo was to become a crucial facet in the 
post-Tito evolution of an assertive Serbian nationalist movement. 
As a result of the early 1970s ethno-national devolution of power to the republics 
and provinces within federal Yugoslavia, a fundamentally ethnic Albanian 
leadership emerged in Kosovo, thereby producing an ethnodemographic regional 
shift from ethnically varied to primarily Albanian. Within the now predominantly 
ethnic Albanian province, the University of Prist in a served as the engine of Albanian 
nationalism, facilitated by mounting discontent with the social and economic 
underdevelopment of the province. With the death ofTito in 1980, ethnic Albanian 
nationalism increased in intensity, which led to a further sequence ofnationalist 
demonstrations in 1981 seeking either republic status within the Yugoslav federation 
or outright unification with Albania. These protests were suppressed with a brutal 
demonstration of force, further alienating the ethnic Albanian population. 
During the 1980s, Serbian nationalism grew while ethnic Serbian and Albanian 
relations continued to deteriorate within Kosovo. Kosovo had always been the 
poorest region of Yugoslavia, and despite the highest levels of public investment for 
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underdeveloped regions within Yugoslavia, the gap between Kosovo and the 
remainder of Yugoslavia continued to widen. While discontent with the social and 
economic underdevelopment of the province continued to increase among the 
Kosovar Albanian community, so too did the resentment of Serbia and the other 
northern republics toward utilization of federal tax monies to support Kosovo. It 
was Slobodan Milosevic, the little-known protege oflvan Stambolic, president of the 
Serbian republic, who capitalized on the increasing Serbian nationalist predilection 
so as to ensure his political ascendance. In April of 1987, when riot police in the 
province ofKosovo beat back thousands ofSerbs as they swarmed a political 
meeting hall, Milosevic stood on a nearby balcony and declared, "No one has the 
right to beat you, no one will ever beat you again." This speech was to transform 
into a battle cry for Serbians, the largest nationality within Yugoslavia. Five months 
later Milosevic deposed Stambolic, once his friend and mentor. In 1989, Milosevic 
assumed the presidency of Yugoslavia, and in a series of constitutional amendments, 
followed by a new constitution in 1990, ultimately eliminated autonomy of the 
provinces within Yugoslavia. This prompted ethnic Albanian members of the 
provincial parliament to declare independence for Kosovo; thereby provoking a 
rigorous rejoinder by Serbian authorities, who terminated the provincial parliament 
and government, closed the University of Prist in a and increased political repression. 
Milosevic's apparent goal was to create a Serb-dominated Yugoslavia, with 
himself as leader. This demonstration of Serb domination and discrimination toward 
Kosovo, coupled with the dissolution of communism throughout Eastern Europe, 
contributed to the emergence of competing nationalisms in opposition to Serbia 
(Dannreuther 2001, 17). In 1991, Slovenia, Croatia and Macedonia declared 
independence, followed by Bosnia in 1992. After losing a short conflict with 
Slovenia, Milosevic's attempts to retain control over Yugoslav areas with large 
Serbian minorities resulted in protracted conflicts in Croatia and Bosnia. 
Surprisingly, though, Kosovo did not erupt into conflict during this period, which 
was predominantly a result of internal politics within Kosovo. 
After the Kosovo Provincial Parliament was dissolved by Milosevic on 5 July 
1990, the delegates of that provincial parliament continued to meet privately to 
develop a parallel state apparatus. This unusual political maneuver resulted in a 
shadow government for Kosovo as well as an informal economy, which received 
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substantial funding from the Kosovar Albanian Diaspora that had emigrated to 
Western Europe and the United States. In September of 1991, a self-organized 
referendum on independence took place, with 87 percent of eligible voters 
participating and 99 percent of those voting in favor of independence for Kosovo. 
This was followed in May of 1992 by elections for a new republican government and 
assembly. Utilizing private homes as polling stations, the League for a Democratic 
Kosovo (LDK) was elected by an overwhelming majority of96 of 100 single 
constituency seats (Independent Commission on Kosovo 2000, 45). The LDK 
leader, Dr.lbrahim Rugova was elected president of the Republic of Kosovo at the 
same time. While this parallel government was not accepted officially by the 
international community, it did perform a major function within Kosovo with respect 
to governance of the Kosovar Albanian majority. Rugova set about leading Kosovo 
in a tactical and principled non-violent movement seeking Kosovo independence 
from Serbia. This movement was grounded in Rugova's personal belief in a 
Gandhian form of non-violent resistance, and coupled with the reality that Milosevic 
and the Serbs needed only a justification to engage Kosovo in violent conflict as had 
already been exemplified in Croatia and Bosnia. 
The establishment of a parallel system within Kosovo was funded utilizing 
remittances from a ''recommended'' three percent tax on incomes of the Kosovo 
Albanian Diaspora, as well as from contributions from Albanian families and 
businesses within Kosovo. Rugova distributed these funds to the municipal councils 
to be utilized for education, health care, culture, science, sports agriculture and 
social assistance. This idea of a parallel system was deeply influenced by the 
notions of autonomy and self-organization developed among Central European 
intellectuals and Polish Solidarity. Additionally, Kosovar Albanians wished to show 
the international community they were more developed than the barbaric stereotype 
they believed the Serbs exemplified. As at least one third of the Kosovar Albanian 
population had traveled outside of Kosovo to predominantly Western Europe and 
Albania, there also grew a more general inclination toward independence and 
Europeanization as opposed to uniting with less developed Albania proper. 
Rugova's ultimate goal in this non-violent form of resistance was to garner the 
support of the international community, who, he hoped, would eventually recognize 
the legitimacy of the Kosovar right to self-determination. While the establishment 
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and administration of this parallel system, in the face of Serb repression, was an 
achievement in itself. it was never to attain the desired goal. 
The international community, while aware of the situation in Kosovo. was 
preoccupied with the conflicts in Croatia and Bosnia., As a result, the international 
community did not respond to the evidence of "good behavior" on the part ofthe 
Kosovar Albanians in the expected manner. Just as Kosovar Albanians were losing 
patience with Rugova's strategy of non-violent resistance, and were becoming 
fatigued from the exertion to uphold the parallel system under such complex 
conditions, the Dayton Agreement was signed. Although the signing ofthe Dayton 
Agreement, achieved in Dayton on 21 November of 1995, and signed in Paris on 14 
December of 1995, ended conflict in the remainder of the former Yugoslavia, it was 
to serve as a catalyst for more violent actions within Kosovo (Dannreuther 2001. 18; 
Heinbecker 2004, 539; Independent Commission on Kosovo 2000. 50; Mertus 1999, 
6; O'Neill 2002, 22; Troebst 1998, 19). The Dayton Agreement mentioned Kosovo 
only once, and that was in connection with preconditions for lifting the sanctions 
against the FRY related to full diplomatic recognition of the FRY. full membership 
ofthe FRY in international organizations and institutions, and release of contested 
FRY assets. The result of this blatant omission of Kosovo in the Dayton Agreement 
was an almost instantaneous split of the united front of political parties in Kosovo. 
The conclusions drawn from rival parties to Rugova's LDK regarding Dayton was 
the attention of the international community can only be gained through violence. 
Leading Kosovar intellectuals, such as Adem Demaci and Rexhap Qosja, began to 
openly criticize Rugova's strategy of non-violent resistance, while underground 
groups began to call for a more aggressive and violent campaign. 
From Non-Violent Resistance to Violent Conflict. 
The Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), the English transliteration of the Ushtria 
Clirimtare e Kosoves (UCK), grew out of a Marxist-Leninist-Enverist party formed 
in the Albanian Diaspora in the early 1980s called the Levisja Popullare e Kosoves 
(LPK) (Independent Commission on Kosovo 2000. 51). Hashim Thaci, a former 
university student movement leader,joined forces with leaders of the LPK to found 
the armed movement that became the KLA in 1993. Expelled from the University of 
Pristina by Serb forces Thaci went to the Drenica Valley region ofKosovo to 
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promote resistance among Kosovar Albanians. After being sentenced in absentia to 
22 years in prison for terrorist offences, he fled to Switzerland, where he attended 
graduate school and received a Masters Degree in International relations from the 
University of ZUrich. He returned to Kosovo in 1998 to fight with the KLA. 
The KLA slowly grew as small, often squabbling, groups gradually coalesced 
(O'Neill 2002, 22). Starting in 1993, a few KLA members received military training 
in secret camps in northern Albania. KLA members then began harassing attacks 
against Serb police posts, which led to the killing ofa Serb policeman in 1995, but it 
was not until 1996 that KLA members claimed responsibility for these attacks. In 
the eyes of the international community, however, due to the KLA's small size, 
modest equipment, lack of training and lack of popular support, the KLA was not 
viewed as a serious threat. This was to change in 1997. It was January of 1997 that 
witnessed the collapse of the pyramid scheme in Albania, resulting in uncontained 
rioting. The Albanian government fell, and the country descended into anarchy and 
a near civil war in which some 2,000 people were killed. Moreover, many in the 
army and police force had deserted, and one million weapons had been looted from 
the armories (Jarvis 2000). This sudden proliferation of available weapons in the 
region was to alter the character and intensity of the KLA resistance. 
The first KLA member to be killed is believed to have been Adrian Krasniqi, 
during a raid on a Serb police post in western Kosovo in October of 1997. By late 
1997, the Drenica Valley region ofKosovo had become a breeding ground ofKLA 
activity. Serb police forces were aware of a KLA activist by the name of Adem 
Jashari, from the village ofDonji Prekaz in the Drenica Valley, who had received 
military training in Albania. The Serb Police had attempted to arrest Jashari twice, 
but were repelled each time, thereby elevating lashari to hero status within his 
village and the region. Activity increased in the Drenica Valley with several high 
profile KLA attacks against Serb Police, which were reciprocated with a Serb 
ambush on KLA forces on 28 February 1998, leaving several from each side dead. 
On 5 March 1998, the Serb police tried again to arrest Jashari, this time utilizing 
artillery and other heavy weapons. While the Serb forces succeeded in killing Adem 
Jashari, the attack also resulted in 58 casualties, which included 18 women and 10 
children. From this point forward, the possibility of a peaceful settlement between 
Serb and Kosovar forces was no longer possible. In effect, the Serb forces had 
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greatly increased KLA recruitment and cause, as well as finally bringing greater 
international community attention. 
By early 1998, the increasing level of violence in Kosovo finally forced the 
international community to focus on the potentially explosive situation, whereas 
until now only NGOs had been active in the region. The United States assumed a 
leading role by dispatching Robert Gelbard, the special representative for 
implementation of the Dayton Agreement, to Belgrade on 23 February 1998. While 
Gelbard urged Milosevic to use restraint in dealing with the KLA, he also officially 
labeled the KLA a terrorist group. The unintended consequence of this statement 
was to effectively give Serb forces the authority to deal with the KLA in a manner 
befitting terrorists. Serb forces embarked upon an offensive against KLA forces a 
week after Gelbard's visit, of which the Jashari attack was a component. 
Responding to the excessively brutal Serb actions, the United States dropped the 
terrorist group linkage to the KLA, and condemned the Serb violence. Other 
prominent states and institutions condemned the Serb aggression as well, including 
the Contact Group. On 31 March 1998, the Security Council acted by adopting 
Resolution 1160 (1998a), which condemned the use of force by both Serbian and 
KLA forces; imposed sanctions against military equipment, weapons and training; 
and invited the OSCE, who had just passed Decision 218 (OSCE 1998) on 11 
March, to keep the Secretary-General informed on the situation in Kosovo. 
The KLA continued to increase their attacks on Serb police posts thereby 
provoking swift, and often disproportionate Serb reprisals, with both sides 
sporadically targeting civilians. The spreading violence within Kosovo, coupled 
with increasing international pressure against Serb forces, served to legitimize 
Milosevic's position domestically. During the summer of 1998, Milosevic 
commenced a large scale operation to crush the KLA insurgency and recapture the 
Drenica Valley region. This campaign was aimed at not only eradicating KLA 
activities, but was intended to achieve this by directly targeting the Albanian 
majority population in rural areas, thus causing the first significant exodus of 
Kosovar Albanian refugees. These increases in military activity and violence against 
civilians led to the first consideration by NATO of military intervention in June of 
1998. 
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Throughout the summer of 1998 the level of violence in Kosovo increased. 
resulting in amplified actions by the international community. On 23 September 
1998, the Security Council passed Resolution 1199 (1998d) welcoming the 
establishment ofKDOM. noting the numbers of persons displaced and without 
shelter, expressing alarm at the impending human catastrophe in Kosovo, affirming 
that deterioration of the situation in Kosovo constituted a threat to peace and stability 
in the entire region. and called for a cease-fire by both parties to the confl ict. On 13 
October 1998. following further deterioration of the situation. the NAC authorized 
activation orders for air strikes against Serb positions. This move was designed to 
support diplomatic efforts to make the Milosevic regime withdraw forces from 
Kosovo. cooperate in bringing an end to the violence. and facilitate the return of 
refugees to their homes. At the last moment, following further diplomatic initiatives 
including visits to Belgrade by NATO's Secretary General Solana; US Envoys 
Richard Holbrooke and Christopher Hill; the Chairman of NATO's Military 
Committee. General Naumann; and the Supreme Allied Commander Europe. 
General Clark; President Milosevic agreed to comply and the air strikes were called 
off (NATO 2004b). Moreover. it was determined the KVM would be instituted to 
verify compliance of all parties with Resolution 1199. The OSCE was to observe 
compliance on the ground. and NATO would conduct aerial surveillance. NATO 
concluded their agreement with the FRY Ministry of Defense on 15 October 1998. 
and the OSCE signed their agreement with the FRY Ministry of Foreign Affairs on 
16 October. On 24 October 1998. the Security Council approved Resolution 1203 
(1998e). endorsing both components of the KVM and affirming that in the event of 
an emergency, action may be necessary to ensure their safety and freedom of 
movement. 
Although Milosevic's forces initially observed the terms of the cease-fire. the 
presence of the KDOM and KVM had little effect on KLA forces. who utilized the 
opportunity to reconstitute and resume military action. In December of 1998. as 
could be expected. Serb forces retaliated. On 15 January of 1999. the brutal Serb 
massacre of 45 Kosovars in the village ofRacak came to the attention ofthe 
international community. Led by the United States. the Contact Group was 
determined that any further diplomatic attempts at reconciliation of the Kosovo crisis 
had to be backed by the explicit and credible threat of force. On 29 January 1999. 
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the Contact Group agreed to host peace talks at Rambouillet, France, where Serbs 
and ethnic Albanians would be coerced to sign a prepared peace settlement. 
On 6 February, peace talks opened at Rambouillet, sponsored by France and 
Britain and led by the United States, the EU, and Russian negotiators. The 
overarching goal was to establish a durable and fair interim agreement that would 
create a peaceful political framework for Kosovo while deferring the question of 
Kosovo's status for several years. Both the Serb and Kosovar delegations were 
warned this diplomatic effort was backed by the threat of military action by NATO. 
The Interim Agreement for Peace and Self-Government in Kosovo, drafted on behalf 
of the Contact Group by United States Ambassador to Macedonia, Christopher Hill, 
proposed establishing a system of democratic self-government for Kosovo while 
upholding the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the FRY. It also invited NATO 
to deploy a military force to ensure compliance and provide a secure environment, 
allowing NATO free and unrestricted passage and unimpeded access throughout the 
FRY. From the outset Serb representatives were adverse to the deployment of 
NATO forces on Serbian soil, while Kosovar representatives were opposed to 
maintenance of the territorial integrity of the FRY as opposed to independence. 
Finally, after almost three weeks of negotiations. the Kosovars relented to 
conditionally accept the draft accord, which would grant wide autonomy for Kosovo 
and revisit the issue of independence after three years. However. this acceptance 
was subject to a two week delay. The Serb delegation. conversely. continued to 
oppose the agreement. 
On 15 March 1999 the peace talks resumed in Rambouillet, with the Kosovar 
delegation finally signing the interim agreement on 18 March. The Serb delegation. 
with continued opposition, refused to sign; and the Rambouillet peace talks were 
officially closed on 19 March 1999. under the threat of NATO air strikes. At this 
point, Serbian military and police forces increased the intensity of their attacks, and 
on 20 March. the OSCE KVM withdrew from Kosovo to Macedonia. On 22 March. 
US Ambassador Richard Holbrooke flew to Belgrade, in a final attempt to persuade 
President Milosevic to haIt the violent attacks on the Kosovar Albanians or face 
imminent NATO air strikes. Milosevic refused to comply. and on 23 March the 
NATO order was given to commence air strikes. Ultimately. NATO initiated the air 
campaign, termed Operation Allied Force, on 24 March 1999. 
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NATO commenced Operation Allied Force with the expectation that Milosevic 
would capitulate after only a few days of subjection to the NATO air campaign. and 
would seek to restart peace talks thereafter. As a result of this expectation. NATO 
had only planned sufficient targets, munitions. and support elements for a short 
campaign. as well as only planned for minimal numbers of resultant refugees and 
displaced persons. NATO's expectations. however. were not to be met as Milosevic 
initiated a vicious campaign against the Kosovar Albanian population. Although 
Serb military and police forces claimed to be attacking only KLA enclaves. the Serb 
campaign resulted in one of terror and compelled expulsion aimed at forcing most, if 
not all. of the Kosovar Albanians from the territory of Kosovo. 
On 6 May 1999, the G-8 Foreign Ministers. at a meeting in Bonn, Germany. 
adopted a proposal for the "immediate and verifiable" end to violence and repression 
in Kosovo and the withdrawal of military, police and paramilitary forces (UN 
Security Council 1999c). This proposal was presented to the FRY leadership by 
Martti Ahtisaari. the President of Finland and representing the EU. and Victor 
Chernomyrdin of Russia; and was finally accepted by the Serbian and FRY 
governments on 2 June 1999 (UN Security Council 199ge). In light of the FRY 
acceptance of the general principles on a political solution to the Kosovo Crisis. the 
OSCE passed Decision 296 on 8 June 1999 (OSCE 1999a), which effectively 
terminated the KVM and established an OSCE Task Force for Kosovo to plan for 
future engagement as part of the impending new international presence. A Military 
Technical Agreement (MTA) was concluded between NATO (1999) and the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia on the evening of9 June 1999. The agreement was signed 
by Lt. General Sir Michael Jackson, on behalfofNATO. and by Colonel General 
Svetozar Marjanovic of the Yugoslav Army and Lieutenant General Obrad 
Stevanovic of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. on behalf of the Governments of the 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Republic of Serbia respectively. This 
agreement reaffirmed the political agreement of2 June. set the terms for withdrawal 
of the FRY forces, and allowed for deployment of the International Security Force 
(KFOR). all in accordance with a pending UN Security Council resolution. On 10 
June 1999. after an air campaign lasting 78 days. NATO Secretary General Javier 
Solana announced he had instructed General Wesley Clark, Supreme Allied 
Commander Europe, temporarily to suspend NATO's air operations against 
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Yugoslavia. This decision was taken after consultations with the North Atlantic 
Council and confinnation from General Clark that the full withdrawal of Yugoslav 
forces from Kosovo had begun. Also on 10 June the UN Security Council (1999f) 
passed Resolution 1244, announcing the Security Council's decision to deploy 
international civil and security presences in Kosovo, under United Nations auspices. 
Thus the war between NATO and the FRY officially ended, and a new period of 
international presence was to commence in Kosovo. Both the physical intervention 
itself, inclusive ofthe military buildup, and the ensuing international presence in 
Kosovo were to have profound effects upon Macedonia. 
Macedonian Effects from Kosovo Intervention. 
As previously discussed, while Macedonia desired a NATO presence in country, 
NATO reciprocally sought a presence in Macedonia. This mutual ambition, 
however, was to become less reciprocal as time progressed. Whereas the 
Macedonian focus was to deter any possible incursion into the country, in addition to 
increasing their international status in concert with the possibility of future NATO 
membership; the predominance of NATO and international community focus 
regarding Macedonia was directed toward the geo-strategic location of Macedonia as 
a critical component to NATO success in the air campaign against the FRY, as well 
as serving as a pre-positioning base for a follow-on NATO force in Kosovo. In other 
words, while Macedonia was considering what was in the best interests for 
Macedonia, NATO was seeking to utilize Macedonia in the best interests of NATO 
with respect to Kosovo and the FRY. Consequently, although the desire for a NATO 
presence in Macedonia was reciprocal, the goals of each entity were divergent. 
The first physical evidence that a NATO presence was not effusively supported 
by all elements of Macedonian society came on 25 March 1999, one day after the air 
campaign commenced in Kosovo. Members of the Serb minority sympathetic to the 
FRY organized a demonstration to express their anger at NATO presence, and 
marched to the Hotel Aleksandar Palace, which was housing officials from the 
OSCE KVM who had evacuated Kosovo on 20 March. The demonstrators, carrying 
anti-war banners and waving the flags of Yugoslavia and pre-independence 
Macedonia, were protesting NATO air attacks on Serbian targets. After damaging a 
number of OSCE vehicles, the group of more than two thousand protestors marched 
160 
to the US Embassy, where the demonstration turned into a riot. There, the protesters 
occupied the US Embassy compound and, anned with rocks and Molotov cocktails, 
set fire to 19 diplomatic vehicles and caused major damage to the exterior of the 
Embassy. The protesters did not gain entry into the Embassy, and were eventually 
dispersed by the police. 
Anti-NATO sentiment was to increase shortly thereafter as a result of the arrival 
of numerous Kosovar Albanian refugees. When Milosevic initiated his campaign 
against the Kosovar Albanian population targeted toward compelled expulsion of 
most, ifnot all, ofthe Kosovar Albanians from the territory of Kosovo, a sudden and 
unexpected deluge of refugees flooded into Albania and Macedonia. UNHCR 
estimates indicate approximately 344,500 refugees entered Macedonia during the 78 
day NATO campaign, thereby creating an immediate humanitarian crisis (UNHCR 
1999, 348). The Macedonian government had always been concerned about the 
prospect ofa large refugee influx and the possible destabilizing effect it could have 
within the country. Relatively small numbers of refugees had been regularly 
admitted to Macedonia until 31 March when entry processing requirements at the 
primary crossing point ofBlace were drastically slowed in a government effort to 
stem the impending tide of refugees. The immediate result of this action was tens of 
thousands of refugees trapped in muddy fields at the Blace border crossing. They 
could not return to from where the Serb forces had expelled them, nor could they 
enter Macedonia until they had been properly processed by the Macedonian 
government. 
The Macedonian government received harsh criticism from NATO, UNHCR and 
the international community at large. From the Macedonian perspective, the refugee 
crisis was a matter of national security. Sudden acceptance of substantial numbers 
of Albanian refugees could have grave effects upon the delicate ethnic balance and 
political issues within the country. At the time, there was no way of knowing if the 
refugees would return to Kosovo once admitted. Additionally, as the flow of 
refugees was a direct result of the commencement of the NATO air campaign the 
Macedonian leadership was of the opinion that NATO and the international 
community bore some responsibility for sharing the economic and social burden that 
would accompany the acceptance of refugees. On 4 April 1999, the Macedonian 
government's fears were somewhat allayed by assurances of rapid assistance from 
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NATO, UNHCR and the international community. As a result, NATO was to assist 
in the construction of refugee camps; the UNHCR to implement two innovative 
policies to assist with transfer of refugees out of Macedonia, and the international 
community had promised economic aid. 
NATO forces initially constructed the tented refugee camps of Stenkovec I and 11, 
Radusa and Nepostreno, and were later to add camps at Cegrane, Senokos, Bojane 
and Blace; while various NGOs installed water and sanitation facilities, and 
provided health care (UNHCR-EPAU 2000, 67). While the UNHCR was initially 
opposed to NATO forces constructing the refugee camps, in the end it was the only 
possibility due to the factors of a required immediate response and NA TO forces 
already pre-positioned in country. Meanwhile, the UNHCR implemented the 
Humanitarian Evacuation Program (HEP) and the Humanitarian Transfers Program 
(HTP). The HEP was a program where refugees admitted to Macedonia would be 
processed and flown to a third country who had volunteered to accept various 
numbers of refugees, while the HTP would transfer refugees from camps in 
Macedonia to other camps in Albania. Both programs were voluntary in nature and 
designed to alleviate the burden on Macedonia thereby allowing redress of the acute 
blockage of refugees at the border. In all, roughly 96,000 refugees were transported 
to third countries under the HEP, and 1,382 were transferred to Albania via the HTP, 
leaving 247,118 refugees in country at the zenith. Of these, 110,800 were in refugee 
camps, with the remainder cohabited with host Albanian families. Additionally, 
there were estimates of up to 8,000 unregistered refugees. On 14 May of 1999, the 
UN Security Council (l999d) adopted Resolution 1239, which expressed grave 
concern at the humanitarian crisis in and around Kosovo as a result of the enormous 
influx of refugees into Macedonia and Albania. 
Critical to the conduct of the NATO mission was full support of Macedonia. 
From the construction and operation of refugee camps, to the loss of Macedonian 
airspace and closing of the Skopje International Airport to civilian traffic, to granting 
permission to preposition 18,500 NATO soldiers as a follow-on peacekeeping force, 
Macedonia was indeed a crucial component of NATO's efforts. Macedonian 
support for the interstate efforts of NATO, however, was to lead to intrastate effects. 
These effects can be predominantly categorized into the four focal components of 
economic, social, political, and environmental. Understandably, these 
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categorizations are by no means definitive in nature, as a singular effect can have a 
corresponding, or a second order, effect in another or several other categories. 
The effect most easily discernable is economic impact; where the slowly 
recovering Macedonian economy was dealt an acute setback through the influx of 
refugees, disruption to international trade in goods and services, closing of 
transportation routes through the FRY, damage to consumer and investor 
confidence, and reductions in access to international capital markets. In addition to 
bringing trade with, and through, the FRY to a halt, the military campaign inflicted 
considerable damage on the transport and storage infrastructure in the FRY that 
would affect future trade endeavors as well. The cessation of all economic relations 
with the FRY not only caused the loss of Macedonia's largest trade partner, but also 
brought about the inability to utilize critical transit routes through the FRY to other 
European markets (World Bank 2000). In an export dependent economy, the 
consequences were a clear example of the domino effect. The lack of transit routes 
led to the cancellation of European and American contracts for Macedonian exports, 
causing factories to be closed and the workers unemployed, which led to the pullout 
offoreign investment due to real, or perceived, instability of the country. This 
situation was then exacerbated by those newly unemployed persons becoming 
dependent on the state for social welfare. 
Moreover, while the international community eventually reimbursed Macedonia 
for a portion of refugee related expenditures, the sum received was considerably less 
than what was originally professed to be forthcoming. An alternative factor to 
consider is that the refugees cohabiting with host families were an additional drain 
on that family's resources. These families then had to resort to social welfare in 
order to finance their own basic requirements, asserting that these refugees were in 
point of fact a drain on state finances rather than being incorporated within 
international relief efforts. The refugees themselves were an ancillary economic 
outfloW. The Macedonian government partially financed construction and 
maintenance of the refugee camps, as well as provided the 18,000 paid policemen to 
provide security for the refugees (Kljusev 1999b). 
A further key consumption of Macedonian resources stemmed from a military 
source. With instability and violence approaching the Serbian and Albanian 
Borders, coupled with the cessation of all UNPREDEP activities, the Ministry of 
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Defense was obliged to deploy its minimal defense forces to underwrite border 
security. This was essential to force the refugees to utilize established border 
crossing sites so as to accurately account for and register their entry, and to interdict 
and deter weapons smuggling intended to ann the KLA with weapons transported 
from Albania through Macedonia. The outcome was that by May of 1999, the 
Ministry of Defense had already expended its entire budget for 1999, simply to fund 
the deployment of its military to make safe its own borders. All told, estimates show 
the Kosovo crisis cost the Macedonian government in the region of 1.5 billion 
dollars (Kljusev 1999a). It is also projected that use of the road network by the 
cumbrous NATO military vehicles resulted in 106.9 million dollars of damage 
requiring reparation that was never received. 
Kosovo intervention effects were manifest within the Macedonian social sector as 
well. Foremost, is the onset of the refugees, which as previously discussed impacted 
both the economy and society. Nearly 20,000 refugees elected to remain in 
Macedonia, aggravating the already present discord between the Macedonian 
majority and Albanian minority (US Committee for Refugees 1999). The 
predominance of these refugees decided to remain purely because they had naught to 
return to in Kosovo, and were better offwith their host family. Moreover, there was 
anxiety and apprehension within the Albanian minority resident in Macedonia 
throughout the crisis. On the one hand, Albanians could choose to support KLA 
aspirations, which would result in not being deemed devoted to Macedonia. On the 
other hand, they could choose not to champion the KLA cause, and thereby be 
considered dedicated to Macedonia and less than loyal to their brother Albanians. 
Either way, it was a difficult quandary. What appears to have taken place was the 
Albanian minority in Macedonia supported NATO and the air strikes, but gave 
limited and guarded support for the KLA and the aim of independence for Kosovo 
(pierre 1999). Thus despite their ethnic connection, the Albanian minority 
purposefully tempered their espousal for KLA ambitions with the intention of 
stability within Macedonia. A plausible causative agent for this sentiment would be 
that the good offices mandate of the SRSG, coupled with the political efforts of 
UNPREDEP had facilitated the strengthening of mutual understanding and dialogue 
among political and ethnic parties. Had these efforts ofUNPREDEP not preceded 
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the Kosovo crisis, the situation in Macedonia most likely would have been much less 
stable, and possibly inflammatory. 
A supplementary social consequence not connected with ethnicity, was the wide-
ranging consciousness by the populace that they were not in fact masters oftheir 
own destiny. Regardless of what they desire or imagine, Macedonia was at the 
mercy of international events. What was worse was the sentiment in general that the 
international community was essentially not primarily concerned with the welfare of 
Macedonia, other than in verbiage. In fact, Macedonians came to believe their 
country was viewed merely as a pawn that would be played as necessary to facilitate 
international engagement in Kosovo. 
Although a tangible causative correlation is more problematical to ascertain in the 
political realm, there are certain possible corollaries that oblige examination. Since 
Macedonian independence in 1991, until elections in the fall of 1998, the SDSM, 
which was noted for close cooperation with the United States and NATO had been 
in power. Major opposition parties such as the VMRO-DPMNE and the DPA were 
considered by Washington to be "nationalist" and "extreme". In November 1998, 
VMRO-DPMNE won the plebiscite and opted to form a coalition with DPA. Their 
electoral victory was seen as a public censure ofthose marked ties of SDSM to the 
U.S. and NATO. Another chief dynamic in the elections was the economy. VMRO-
DPMNE promised the economic reform that SDSM had not been able to produce. 
In the end, ironically, the new government permitted NATO to preposition forces 
and utilize the entire infrastructure of the country. These were trying times for the 
Macedonian government, and the predominance of the Western powers presumed 
the government would not survive in tact. Paradoxically, contemporary opinions are 
the unlikely coalition of the ''nationalistic'' Macedonian and Albanian parties is what 
constituted the quintessence of political stability during the crisis. Again, had it not 
been for the previous efforts ofUNPREDEP in the realm of good offices and mutual 
political and ethnic understanding, this unique ethnically oriented coalition 
government might not have been possible. 
The concluding component is the one least likely to come to mind and is 
consequently often overlooked, that being the environment. However, it is equally 
pertinent to the Macedonian development of a generally anti-NATO position. There 
were several assertions regarding environmental damage to Macedonian land, air, 
165 
and ecosystems as a consequence ofKosovo intervention, however, the exact cause, 
or extent of damage, will not be known until further research and analysis are 
completed. One environmental effect is extensive bombing released large amounts 
of hazardous, toxic, carcinogenic, and radioactive substances in Yugoslavia, which 
entered Macedonia via air and the Lepenec River (Dokovska 1999a). The polluted 
river water then contaminates the underground water sources through aquifers (BBC 
2000). A further threat to the underground water supply was severe strain placed on 
fresh water and sewage facilities as a result of hastily constructed refugee camps. In 
some cases, the amount of human waste simply exceeded sewage capacity and was 
buried instead. This was also true for medical waste, including human body parts, 
until Great Britain donated an incinerator with a large enough capacity that the 
medical waste could be incinerated at the Skopje Army Hospital under agreement 
between the Ministry of Defense and NATO, (Dokovska 1999b). 
Two other environmental effects are unequivocally linked to NATO. One is that 
along with NATO forces and the OSCE KVM, came thousands of heavy vehicles, 
including tanks and armored personnel carriers. These vehicles deployed to 
Macedonia in a tactical manner, requiring maintenance to be performed in the field, 
quite literally. The outcome is large amounts of petrol and other substances have 
been dumped on Macedonian lands. The other environmental consequence is much 
more blatant. NATO was accused, and later admitted, to dumping excess explosives 
into two lakes from helicopters. After being confronted with witnesses, spokesmen 
from NATO admitted helicopters ejected unexploded ordnance into Lake Prespa and 
Lake Dolnolipkovsko (Dokovska 1999c). Lake Dolnolipkovsko is in northern 
Macedonia and is a reservoir used for drinking water, and Lake Prespa is in southern 
Macedonia and feeds, via underground aquifers, Lake Ohrid, which is protected by 
the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO). 
While culpability has been established, suitable methods of restitution have still not 
yet been agreed upon by Macedonia and NATO. 
Kosovo Intervention Precis. 
By promoting dialogue among various political forces and ethnic communities. 
and utilizing its good offices, UNPREDEP had a stabilizing effect within 
Macedonia, which further reduced intrastate tensions that could have clearly 
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increased as a direct result of the continued crisis in Kosovo. Similarly, the presence 
ofUNPREDEP forces along the Albanian and FRY borders acted as a powerful 
interstate element of security, which allowed and facilitated UNPREDEP's intrastate 
engagement. However, regardless ofthe positive effects UNPREDEP had within 
Macedonia, the mission was terminated prematurely. Considering the persistent 
regional threats, and particularly the imminent interstate threat imposed by Kosovo, 
the international community should have been more concerned with the conflict 
prevention and security vacuum created in the wake ofUNPREDEP termination. 
The sudden removal ofUNPREDEP forces along the Macedonian border with 
Albania and the FRY left Macedonia considerably more vulnerable to interstate 
threat. 
In the absence of international concern, the Macedonian leadership saw NATO as 
the appropriate presence to fill that vacuum. As previously discussed, while 
Macedonia desired a NATO presence in country, NATO reciprocally sought a 
presence in Macedonia. However, while the Macedonian focus was to deter any 
possible incursion into the country, as well as increase their international status in 
concert with the possibility of future NATO membership; the predominance of 
NATO and international community focus regarding Macedonia was directed toward 
the geo-strategic location of Macedonia as a critical component to NATO success in 
the air campaign against the FRY, as well as serving as a pre-positioning base for a 
follow-on NATO force in Kosovo. As a result, the number of NATO troops on 
Macedonian soil had risen from nearly two thousand at the termination of 
UNPREDEP to 18,500 at the cessation of the NATO air campaign; a period of just 
over three months. It was precisely because of this large NATO presence the 
international community did not concern itself with discussions of a formal conflict 
prevention mandate of any type in Macedonia, with the noted exception of the 
OSCE. As a result ofOSCE Decision 218, the OSCE mission in Skopje still had 
eight personnel in country to execute its mission with respect to Macedonia. The 
mission did remain and continue to engage the Macedonian leadership as well as the 
ethnic communities, which helped to perpetuate those conflict prevention efforts 
commenced by the OSCE and UNPREDEP aimed at creating the intrastate 
conditions necessary for peace and stability. 
167 
Although the international community had grave concerns regarding intrastate 
stability within Macedonia during execution of the Kosovo intervention. none of the 
nightmare scenarios came to fruition. Despite their ethnic connection, the Albanian 
minority purposefully tempered their espousal for KLA ambitions with the intention 
of stability within Macedonia. Additionally, the unlikely coalition of the 
''nationalistic'' Macedonian and Albanian parties is what constituted the 
quintessence of political stability during the crisis at the governmental level. This is 
not to say, however, that interethnic tensions within the country were no longer 
present. The Kosovo crisis saw continued, and increased, interethnic tension in 
Macedonia, however, the previous efforts ofUNPREDEP toward strengthening 
mutual understanding and dialogue among political and ethnic parties helped abate 
the possibility of any rapid escalation of escalation of these tensions into overt 
conflict. Furthermore, any immediate threat to Macedonia's intrastate stability was 
defused by the NATO victory and rapid return of over 90 percent of Kosovar 
Albanian refugees. 
As a consequence of the intervention in Kosovo, in the form of an air campaign, 
ethnic Macedonian support for NATO had waned, while support from ethnic 
Albanians increased. However, NATO still represented the critical component of 
international community presence sought by the Macedonian government, with the 
primary rationalization for this presence remaining to deter any possible incursion 
into the country, as well as increase Macedonian international status in concert with 
the possibility of future NATO membership. Likewise, NATO continued to desire a 
presence in Macedonia, although the principal function had now altered. With the 
signing ofthe MTA and approval of Security Council Resolution 1244, NATO's 
interest in Macedonia was to switch from a pre-positioning platform to a logistical 
base for KFOR operations. Moreover, NATO and the international community were 
convinced with Kosovo becoming a UNINA TO protectorate, an interstate threat to 
Macedonia no longer existed; and the intrastate threat was likewise diminished as 
the "crisis stage" had now passed. Of particular note, though, is that although the 
desire for a NATO presence in Macedonia continued to be reciprocal, the goals of 
each entity remained divergent. 
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5.3. KFOR, UNMIK and Macedonia. 
United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244 (I 999t), adopted on 10 June 
1999, officially authorized the deployment in Kosovo, under United Nations 
auspices, ofinternational civil and security presences, with appropriate equipment 
and personnel as required. The resolution contained two pertinent annexes: the 
"Statement by the Chairman on the Conclusion of the Meeting of the 0-8 Foreign 
Ministers held at the Petersberg Centre on 6 May 1999", regarding the general 
principles on the political solution to the Kosovo crisis; and the "principles set forth 
in points 1 to 9 of the paper presented in Belgrade on 2 June 1999, and the FRY's 
agreement to that paper". By its adoption, resolution 1244 further legitimized these 
two documents as well as the MTA that was agreed upon on 9 June 1999. 
Specifically, Resolution 1244 authorized two separate components of the overall 
international presence in Kosovo. First, was authorization that the international 
security presence, with substantial NATO participation, must be deployed under 
unified command and control to establish a safe environment for all people in 
Kosovo and to facilitate the safe return to their homes of all displaced persons and 
refugees. Second, was authorization for the Secretary-General, with the assistance 
of relevant international organizations, to establish an international civil presence in 
Kosovo in order to provide an interim administration in Kosovo under which the 
people of Kosovo could enjoy substantial autonomy within the FRY, and which 
would provide transitional administration while establishing and overseeing the 
development of provisional democratic self-governing institutions. Additionally, the 
resolution demanded that both components cooperate fully in their deployment. 
KFOR 
The primary responsibilities ofKFOR, as delineated in Resolution 1244, were to: 
deter renewed hostilities, and ensure the withdrawal of FRY forces in accordance 
with the MTA; demilitarize the KLA; establish a secure environment; ensure public 
safety and order; supervise demining; support and coordinate closely with the 
international civil presence; ensure protection and freedom of movement for itself 
and the international civil presence; and conduct border monitoring duties as 
required. KFOR then summarized these responsibilities into an overall mission 
objective of, "to establish and maintain a secure environment in Kosovo, including 
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public safety and order; to monitor, verify and when necessary, enforce compliance 
with the agreements that ended the conflict; and to provide assistance to the UN 
Mission in Kosovo" (KFOR 2002). Noticeably absent from the KFOR mission 
objective is any mention of border monitoring duties as it was considered a smaller 
component of establishing and maintaining a secure environment. 
KFOR was composed of military forces of various sizes from over 30 nations, 
and grouped into five multinational brigades·. These five multinational brigades 
were then responsible for a geographic sector of Kosovo, with a lead nation 
assuming command of that multinational brigade (MNB). As a result, France was 
the lead nation for MNB North, Germany for MNB South, Italy for MNB West, the 
United Kingdom for MNB Central, and the United States for MNB East. All MNBs 
fell directly under the the force commander, who was in turn responsible to NATO's 
regional command, Allied Forces South (AFSOUTH), in Naples Italy, and ultimately 
to NATO headquarters in Brussels, Belgium. The decision to specifically not place 
KFOR under the command of the UN was made as a result of NATO's "lessons 
learned" from Bosnia and Croatia. In those conflicts, NATO had determined their 
forces under UN command had suffered due to an inability to react, and had 
corrected that error when UNPROFOR transitioned to IFORlSFOR. In fact. NATO 
was vehement on the matter and argued strenuously that it was happy to cooperate 
with whatever civilian administration emerged but that it would never come under 
its control (O'Neill2002, 37). Consequently, NATO persuaded the UN that a 
separate force in Kosovo would have far greater operational flexibility (Conflict, 
Security & Development Group 2003, 29). During deliberations of how to structure 
the relationship between KFOR and UNMIK, the focus was so intense on how to 
improve upon the failures of Bosnia and Croatia, the evident success of the unified 
structure in Macedonia was never considered or mentioned. 
KFOR entered Kosovo on 12 June 1999, and assumed its mission based on a 
timetable laid out in the MTA delineating a phased withdrawal of FRY forces and 
I Contributing n~tions to the overall KFO~ presence were: ~gen~ina. Armenia. Austria. Azerbaijan. 
Belgium, BulgarIa. Canada, Czech Repubhc, Denmark. Estoma. Fmland. France, GL'Orgia. Germany 
Greece! Hunga~, Icelan~, Irela~d, Italy, Lithuania, Moro~co, Ne~herlands, Norway, Poland, Portug;l, 
RomanIa. RUSSIa. Slovema, Spam, Sweden, Turkey, Ukrame, Umted Arab Emirates, United Kingdom 
and United States. KFOR OnIine Homepage, KFOR Headquarlers, 
http://www.nato.intlkforlkfor/about.htm. (2003, 8, April). 
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Serbian police by 20 June 1999, with the goal of preventing a security vacuum 
between the withdrawing military and police forces and arriving KFOR elements. 
The MT A established two buffer zone areas termed the Air Safety Zone (ASZ) and 
the Ground Safety Zone (GSZ). The ASZ was defined as a 25 kilometer zone that 
extended beyond the Kosovo province border into the rest of FRY territory, and 
included the airspace above that zone. The GSZ was defined as a 5 kilometer zone 
that extended beyond the Kosovo province border into the rest of FRY territory 
(MTA 1999). By the terms of the MTA, under no circumstances could any forces of 
the FRY or Republic of Serbia enter into, reenter, or remain within the territory of 
Kosovo or the GSZ and ASZ without the prior consent of the KFOR Commander; 
with the exception of local police. Moreover, the MTA specified KFOR would 
provide appropriate control ofthe borders ofthe FRY in Kosovo with Albania and 
Macedonia until the arrival of the civilian mission of the UN. 
The withdrawal of FRY and Serb forces was completed by 20 June 1999, as 
required, and was to prove the easiest task KFOR. What was to prove the most 
challenging aspect ofKFOR's mandate was establishing a secure environment and 
public safety and order (Conflict, Security & Development Group 2003, 30). The 
first reason for this was inadequate force numbers. While 18,500 NATO troops had 
been pre-positioned in Macedonia, the overall Structure ofKFOR called for 50,000 
troops. As a result, KFOR was undermanned in Kosovo, primarily due to slow 
nation response in sending troops and limited logistical networks to transport the 
troops as well as their accompanying equipment. The second reason KFOR was to 
encounter difficulties establishing a secure environment and public safety and order 
was purely because they were not trained for this function. These personnel were 
combat troops who were only supposed to "temporarily" accomplish these tasks 
until arrival of the UN civilian mission. In light of this fact, while the NATO Rules 
of Engagement (ROE) were very clear for combat situations, they were extremely 
vague in the realm of how to properly establish a secure environment and public 
safety and order. As a result, the third reason was contributing nations would 
interpret their mandates differently, which led to inconsistencies in national forces 
implementing basic police actions. The fourth reason, related to the third, was each 
MNB would establish different procedures within their area of responsibility. A 
fifth reason was certain nations had placed restrictions on their contributed forces. 
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The most obvious example of this dilemma is the US forces insistence on force 
protection, which precluded US personnel from engaging in many activities 
requiring only one or two soldiers, i.e., basic police patrols. A sixth reason was due 
to the Force Commander not being able to direct the movement of troops within 
Kosovo, when needed (Nardulli, Perry, Pimie, Gordon and McGinn 2002, 106). In 
spite oflessons learned in previous peacekeeping missions, some nations still 
refused to relinquish command to a multinational force commander. Consequently, 
forces on the ground in Kosovo would receive an order from the force commander 
and then send it to their nation's capitals for authorization. A foremost illustration 
ofthis dilemma came when violence flared in the divided city of M itrovica, within 
the French MNB area. When the commander of KFOR directed US forces to deploy 
elements to support French elements, the US force commander replied the Pentagon 
had told him not to deploy his troops there (O'Neill 2002, 43). Finally, the seventh 
reason KFOR was to encounter difficulty establishing a secure environment and 
public safety and order was simply because they were preoccupied with other 
priority tasks such as ensuring FRY or Serb forces did not reattack, and 
demilitarizing the KLA. 
Although the initial goal was to prevent a security vacuum between the 
withdrawing military and police forces and arriving KFOR elements, this goal was 
not to be effectively achieved. One explanation for this was there were almost no 
local police who remained, as the predominance of police activities were performed 
by FRY and local Serb personnel. As a result, KFOR elements were overwhelmed 
by the enormity ofthe task. In addition to this, KFOR was not prepared for the 
rapidity in which the situation was to alter, where the victims became the aggressors. 
Within the first few months after cessation of the air campaign, over 800,000 
Albanian refugees streamed back into areas that were now only inhabited by Serb 
minorities (O'Neill 2002, 44). Revenge was a prominent and popular thought 
among Kosovar Albanians and the Serb minority soon became the minority group in 
need of police protection. This was a difficult concept for many KFOR personnel as 
until that time their primary mission was to protect the Kosovar Albanians from Serb 
forces. This dilemma was exacerbated by the undue deference KFOR paid to former 
KLA members and leaders (Conflict, Security & Development Group 2003, 31). 
After all, only days before, the KLA had served as NATO's surrogate ground force. 
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What resulted from this situation of inadequate force numbers, competing mission 
priorities, and lack of training and preparedness on the part ofKFOR was precisely 
what they had hoped to avoid; a security vacuum, in which a widespread increase in 
individual and organized crime occurred. On 12 July 1999, the Secretary General 
issued a report to the Security Council (1999h) highlighting that the security problem 
in Kosovo; exemplified by recent high profile killings, abductions, looting, arson 
and forced expropriation of housing; was largely a result of the absence of law and 
order institutions and agencies. While KFOR was responsible for maintaining both 
public safety and civil law and order, its ability to do so was limited as it was still in 
the process of building up its forces. Add to this the fact that establishing a secure 
environment and public safety and order was clearly not KFOR's priority at the time. 
While the FRY and Serb forces withdrew in accordance with the MT A, KFOR was 
preoccupied with the possibility they could reengage at any time. This was to 
remain the priority concern ofKFOR for quite some time. The secondary mission 
was to demilitarize the KLA, which was estimated to be approximately 28 thousand 
at its peak (Conflict, Security & Development Group 2003, 40). 
On 20 June 1999, an accord, entitled "Undertaking the Demilitarization and 
Transformation of the KLA", was signed by KLA Commander in Chief, Hashim 
Thaci, and KFOR Commander, Lieutenant General Mike Jackson. This agreement 
provided for a KLA cease-fire, disengagement from zones of conflict, and 
subsequent demilitarization and reintegration into civil society, all to occur within 90 
days. The agreement in addition stated "all KLA forces in Kosovo and neigh boring 
countries will observe the provisions of this undertaking" (Accord between KFOR 
and the KLA 1999), which confirmed the many reports of KLA factions prevalent in 
northern Albania and northwestern Macedonia. In the very next line, the agreement 
stated KLA forces would "freeze military movement in either direction across 
international borders" thereby legally allowing those KLA personnel currently 
outside Kosovo to remain there and not be subject to demilitarization. KFOR 
elements established weapons collection and storage points throughout the province, 
and while the initial weapons turn-in rate languished at the start, the numbers did 
appreciably proliferate as the deadline approached. By late September over ten 
thousand weapons had been collected (Rezun 2001, 83). On 20 September 1999, the 
KFOR Commander, Lieutenant General Jackson, declared KFOR had completed 
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demilitarization ofthe KLA. (Nardulli, et al. 2002, 104). When 28 thousand 
members of an armed force surrender 10 thousand weapons, simple math supports 
claims the declaration of demilitarization ofthe KLA was merely a symbolic gesture, 
particularly in light of the fact that roughly one million weapons had been looted 
from armories when the Albanian government collapsed in 1997 and were prevalent 
in the immediate geographic area. 
Item 25 of the "Undertaking the Demilitarization and Transformation of the KLA" 
accord additionally contained guidance regarding ''transformation'' of the KLA once 
demilitarization had been completed. It stated since the KLA intended to abide by 
UN Security Council Resolution 1244, the international community should ''take due 
and full account of the contribution of the KLA during the Kosovo crisis and 
accordingly give due consideration to": allowing ''members to participate in the 
administration and police forces ofKosovo, enjoying special consideration in view 
of the expertise they have developed"; and ''the formation of an Army in Kosovo on 
the lines of the US National Guard" (Accord between KFOR and the KLA 1999). 
As explicated by the Secretary-General (1999i), in his September 1999 report on 
UNMIK, this concept was designed to contribute to the demilitarization of the KLA 
by offering individual members to participate in a disciplined, professional and 
multi-ethnic civilian emergency corps. The design was to allow for ten percent of 
the corps to consist of ethnic minorities, where KFOR would provide daily 
supervision, and the UNMIK civil administration component would maintain 
responsibility for overall civil emergency management. Accordingly, on 20 
September 1999, the KFOR Commander's declaration that demilitarization of the 
KLA had been completed was accompanied by the signing ofUNMIK Regulation 
1999/8, authorizing establishment of the Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC) (UNSC 
1999j). The KPC consisted of three thousand active and two thousand reserve 
members, and would be utilized exclusively for civil emergencies as opposed to 
having any role in law enforcement or the maintenance of law and order. Since the 
KPC was predominantly composed of former KLA members, the SRSG appointed 
General Agim Ceku, former chief of Staff of the KLA, as Commander of the KPC. 
participating in the signing ceremony were NATO Supreme Allied Commander 
General Wesley Clark, KFOR Commander Lieutenant General Jackson, UNMIK 
SRSG Bernard Kouchner, KLA Commander Hashim Thaci and General Ceku. As 
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could be expected, while the creation of a follow-on KLA in the form of the KPC 
was not only condoned but proclaimed as successful demilitarization of the KLA by 
the UN and NATO; others in the international community, particularly the FRY. 
Serb, and Macedonian governments expressed sincere reservations about what they 
perceived as perpetuation of, and reward to, an organization that at the outset at least 
partly fomented the Kosovo conflict. 
UNMIK. 
On 12 June 1999, the Secretary-General issued a report pursuant to Resolution 
1244 (1999g), which presented a preliminary operational concept for the overall 
organization of the civil presence that would be known as the United Nations Interim 
Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK). The primary responsibilities of 
UNMIK, as delineated in Resolution 1244, were to: perform basic civilian 
administrative functions; promote establishment of substantial autonomy and self-
government in Kosovo; facilitate a political process to determine Kosovo's future 
status; coordinate humanitarian and disaster relief efforts; support reconstruction of 
key infrastructure; maintain civil law and order; promote human rights; and assure 
the safe and un impeded return of all displaced persons and refugees to their homes. 
The structure of UNMIK was determined based on the need for coherence and 
optimal effectiveness on the ground that could be executed in an integrated manner 
and with a clear chain of command. This resulted in UNMIK being headed by an 
SRSG, with four Deputy SRSGs (DSRSG), each responsible for one major 
component ofthe mission. Each component, later to become more commonly 
known as a piJJar, was then assigned to an agency, which would take the lead role in 
that particular area of operations. Consequently, PiJJar I encompassed the interim 
civil administration, including the police and judiciary, and was assigned to the UN 
Secretariat. Pillar n comprised humanitarian affairs, with the UNHCR as the lead 
agency. Pillar ID covered institution-building, including democratization, elections 
and human rights, and came under the leadership ofthe OSCE. PiJJar IV included 
reconstruction, for which the EU was responsible. 
The primary purpose in this structure was to ensure the institutional capacities of 
the agencies cooperating with the United Nations were pooled for optimal 
effectiveness, as we)) as to mirror KFOR's multinational brigade structure. The 
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SRSG was granted overall authority to manage the mission and coordinate the 
activities of all UN agencies and other international organizations operating as part 
ofUNMIK. Nevertheless, to facilitate a coordinated approach it was expected that 
the agency with overall responsibility for a particular component would draw upon 
the capacities and expertise of other organizations on the ground and coordinate their 
work to maximum advantage. It was the hope of the Secretary-General, this 
structure would avoid the bureaucratic coordination problems encountered in the UN 
mission in Bosnia. For on the civil segment, the primary lesson learned from Bosnia 
was to avoid the hydra-headed structure at all costs in any future missions (O'Neill 
2002,37). In addition to the four pillar mission structure, the SRSG was to be 
supported by a Chief of Staff and separate offices for political advice, legal advice, 
relations with the mass media, and military liaison. 
Interestingly enough, the OSCE had completed much pre-mission planning in the 
months prior to Resolution 1244, and key member states had given the UN 
Secretariat the impression the OSCE would be the preferred lead organization for 
any follow-on mission in Kosovo. However, the EU and the OSCE were ruled out 
by the US and Russia, respectively, and the G-8 determined the mission lead would 
be given to the UN (Conflict, Security & Development Group 2003,23). 
Accordingly, the OSCE (l999b) on 1 July 1999, approved Decision 305, which 
terminated the Transitional OSCE Task Force for Kosovo, established by OSCE 
Decision 296 on 8 June 1999; and established the OSCE Mission in Kosovo, 
defining its mission as related to Pillar III of the overarching UNMIK plan. 
UNMIK entered Kosovo on 13 June 1999, one day after KFOR, when the 
advance team arrived in Pristina from Skopje; where it had been originally 
assembled in preparation for deployment. The immediate tasks at hand were to 
establish operations and conduct confidence-building measures aimed at restraining 
Kosovar Albanians and reassuring Kosovar Serbs. UNMIK, like KFOR, however, 
was not without challenges to its organizational effectiveness. The pillar structure 
adopted by UNMIK was intended to cede a measure of autonomy to participating 
agencies; nevertheless, it became a hindrance to effective cross-pillar cooperation. 
In essence, for any decision to be made regarding a mission aspect that necessitated 
cross-pillar coordination, the issue had to be elevated to the SRSG level. This then 
further negated the overall mission effectiveness of the office of the SRSG, who was 
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not only responsible for daily leadership and direction ofUNMIK as a whole. but 
was furthermore solely responsible for facilitating a political process designed to 
determine the future political status ofKosovo. 
Moreover. UNMIK chose to mirror KFOR's five zone structure. and selected five 
regional administrators to serve as a supervisory link between the civil 
administration department and the 30 municipal administrators (Conflict. Security & 
Development Group 2003, 26). What resulted was a structure with neither 
centralized nor decentralized authority. As the regional administrators had no formal 
authority over their colleagues within the same pillar, collegial goodwill emerged as 
the only viable method of cooperation and coordination. which was not always the 
resultant situation. Additionally. there were no legitimate local counterparts for 
these UNMIK regional administrators, which tended to lead many to question their 
relevance. 
There were interagency problems encountered as well that stemmed directly from 
the parochial nature of administrative regulations particular to each agency or 
organization. For instance, both the EU and OSCE were responsible for their own 
pillar of the overall mission, but fell under UN leadership. However, in the 
execution of their duties both the EU and OSCE were prohibited from utilizing UN 
assets such as vehicles or other equipment and resources. Although administrative 
in nature, these issues affected early inter-organizational good will and cooperation, 
as well as detracted from initial progress and achievement of an overall integrated 
mission. 
Although each pillar was responsible for a critical component of the 
overarching mission, one of the initial priorities ofUNMIK was the police and 
judiciary element of the interim civil administration. This was a function of the 
integral linkage to KFOR's mandate of establishing a secure environment and public 
safety and order. As delineated by the Secretary-General (1 999h), KFOR was only 
responsible for ensuring public safety and order until the international civil presence 
could assume responsibility. Until that responsibility was transferred, UNMIK 
would only advise KFOR on policing matters; but once UNMIK finally assumed 
responsibility for law and order within Kosovo, KFOR would only support police 
efforts as required. The eventual goal, however, was to create an indigenous police 
force capable of providing a secure environment and public safety and order for all 
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of Kosovo. Consequently, UNMIK's law and order strategy consisted oftwo 
primary goals: provision of interim law enforcement services, and the rapid 
development of a credible, professional and impartial Kosovo Police Service (KPS). 
Achievement of these goals was to encompass three separate elements of law 
enforcement, through three distinct phases of development, and require efforts on the 
part of two separate organizations from two different pillars ofUNMIK's structure. 
All law enforcement activities were to be commanded by an UNMIK Police 
Commissioner, who reported to the SRSG through the DSRSG for civil 
administration, and had responsibility for all three elements of law enforcement 
activities: civilian police, special police and the border police. The civilian police, to 
be comprised of 1,800 officers, were assigned normal police duties; the special 
police, to consist often units of 115 officers each, were charged with public order 
functions such as crowd control, area security and physical protection ofUNMIK 
facilities; and the border police, to include 205 officers, were allocated the duties of 
ensuring compliance with immigration laws and other border requirements. As 
already discussed, in the first phase KFOR was responsible for ensuring public 
safety and order, through all three elements oflaw enforcement activities, until 
UNMIK had sufficient personnel to assume responsibility. In the second phase, 
UNMIK would assume responsibility for all three law enforcement elements oflaw 
and order from KFOR. In the third phase, once properly trained local police were 
available in sufficient strength, UNMIK would fully transfer all law enforcement 
responsibility to the KPS. While all of these elements and phases of law and order 
were to fall under the jurisdiction of the interim civil administration pillar, and 
consequently the UN Secretariat, the development of a professional KPS was to 
come under the authority of the OSCE and UNMIK's institution-building 
component. 
The OSeE received the mandate to develop and deliver democratically oriented 
basic police training to approximately 3,500 locally recruited students, as well as 
develop supervisory and management police training for roughly seven hundred 
members ofthe KPS to attend at a later date (UNMIK 2002). The police school was 
established in Vucitrn, the traditional site of police training in Kosovo, and included 
instruction on crime investigation, defense tactics, legal affairs, patrol duties, use of 
firearms, first aid, conflict intervention, handling of refugees, forensics, evidence 
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control, and traffic control. All of these courses were taught through the overarching 
strategy of democratic policing, in which loyalty towards the democratic legal order 
was the primary focus (OSCE 2004). After the nine-week initial training course, the 
prospective police officer was then assigned to an UNMIK Field Training Officer 
(FTO) for 19 weeks of on the job training in the field and an additional 80 hours of 
advanced classroom training. After completion of the three phases of training, the 
officer was then eligible for certification and independent assignment. 
The KPS is one ofthe only two institutions, along with the fire department, that is 
truly multi-ethnic. In the first class, of the 176 students, 17 were minorities and 20 
percent were women; in the second class, of the 178 students, there were 28 Kosovar 
Serbs, 14 other minorities, and 17 percent women; and this multi-ethnic focus was to 
continue. However, as with the KPC, the KPS was to serve as an element of the 
strategy to transition the KLA to civil society. Originally, the KLA urged for the 
entire KPS to be composed of former KLA members as was the case in the KPC, but 
both the UN and KFOR opposed this idea as being antithetical to the multi-ethnic 
goal of democratic oriented policing. Finally, an agreement was reached between 
UNMIK and the KLA where former KLA members would constitute fifty percent of 
the KPS (O'Neill 2002, 111). While no official written documentation can be found 
to back this assertion, the quota was nevertheless applied to the first 15 classes 
(Conflict, Security & Development Group 2003, 39). Generally, the OSCE was 
successful in establishment of the KPS School, which effectively produced locally 
recruited trained police officers for a multi-ethnic force. UNMIK. though, was to 
encounter much more complexity in fulfilling their police mandate. 
The first major hurdle UNMIK faced in establishing local police forces was the 
fact that Kosovo was basically a province without any police, infrastructure or any 
commonly established applicable policies. Previously. all police duties and laws 
were promUlgated by FRY or Serb officials, and they had al1 evacuated the area in 
accordance with UNSC Resolution 1244. In light ofthe lack of guidance regarding 
applicable law within Kosovo, many UNMIK police simply resorted to the laws they 
were familiar with from their country of origin. This, of course, resulted in several 
incongruous methods of law enforcement. By the time UNMIK officials prescribed 
applicable Kosovo criminal law and procedure for UNMIK police, and the 
Department of Judicial Affairs prepared written guidance to be used in police 
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training, it was September of2000 (O'Neill2002, 109). In addition, to the blatant 
lack of any local police or established law in the absence of FRY or Serb oversight, 
there was no established judicial system yet to enforce any laws or police actions. 
UNMIK also encountered severe delays in fielding the mission's international 
police component. While the first unarmed international police officers arrived on 
27 June 1999, they were actually on secondment from the UN mission in Bosnia; 
and the first UNMIK police patrol alongside KFOR personnel did not take place 
until 9 August. The Secretary-General (1999i) reported on 16 September that 1,100 
international civilian police officers had arrive to date, and were concentrating 
resources on the city of Pristina, and its surrounding region, where one third of the 
crimes reported in Kosovo occurred. In addition to these police officers, 82 border 
police had been deployed to cover the entire border with Albania and Macedonia, 
where their principal function was to conduct vehicle checks and passport control. 
Even at this early juncture, though, with the relative open border areas between 
Kosovo and Albania and Macedonia, coupled with the manifest increase in 
organized crime and smuggling, it was evident a more significant quantity of border 
police than originally envisaged would be necessitated. Therefore, the Secretary-
General recommended an increase of border police from the original 205 to a new 
total of364. As of 13 December 1999, the Secretary-General (1999j) had requested 
an increase in the total international police component from 3,314 to 4,718. 
However, the fundamental quandary remained sluggish arrivals as thus far only 
1,817 UNMIK police had arrived within the mission area, including 149 border 
police, and none of the 10 special police units had yet arrived. The dilemma of 
inadequate international police personnel was to continue with only 77 percent of the 
total authorized strength having arrived by 6 June of2000, 85 percent by 18 
September 2000, and 90 percent by 15 December 2000; more than 18 months after 
UNMIK first entered Kosovo (Secretary-General 2000b; 2000c; 2000d). 
Of the UNMIK primary responsibilities delineated in Resolution 1244, several 
focused on development of governmental structures such as: perform basic civilian 
administrative functions, promote establishment of substantial autonomy and self-
government in Kosovo, and facilitate a political process to determine Kosovo's 
future status. Execution of these responsibilities, however, was to be a complicated 
matter due to the ambiguity of Resolution 1244 (1999f), which stated there was to be 
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"a political process toward the establishment of an interim political framework 
agreement providing for a substantial self-government for Kosovo, taking full 
account the Rambouillet Accords and the principles of sovereignty and territorial 
integrity ofthe FRY". Thus, while it was clear Kosovo was to have an autonomous 
self-government, it was not clear that Kosovo would have self-determination with 
the option of full independence (Groom and Taylor 2000,303). What had united all 
Kosovar Albanians, regardless of their political loyalties, was full independence 
from Serbia and the FRY, however, as most Security Council members opposed any 
change in borders resulting from armed conflict, Resolution 1244 did not mention 
independence (O'Neill2002, 30). As a result, this ambiguity regarding the future of 
Kosovo was to complicate UNMIK's tasks in the political realm. 
In this light, UNMIK (1 999a) announced on 16 July 1999, the establishment of 
the Kosovo Transitional Council (KTC), which would meet on a weekly basis under 
the leadership ofthe SRSG and bring together all major political parties and ethnic 
groups. The KTC was designed to provide Kosovo residents an opportunity to have 
direct input into the UNMIK decision-making process and achieve consensus on a 
broad range of issues related to civil administration, institution-building and 
essential services, thereby creating a climate where participation in democratic 
processes was the norm. As such, the KTC was to act as an initial measure toward 
the creation of a framework of wider and more inclusive democratic structures. On 
15 December 1999, UNMIK (1999b) announced the signing ofan agreement where 
the three political leaders of Kosovo agreed to share the provisional management of 
Kosovo with UNMIK, until elections in 2000, through the establishment of the Joint 
Interim Administrative Structure (JIAS). The three Kosovo Albanian political 
leaders that had emerged in the initial months after implementation of Resolution 
1244 were: Hashim Thaci of the Peoples Democratic Party of Kosovo (PPDK), 
Ibrahim Rugova of the LDK, and Rexbep Qosja of the United Democratic 
Movement (LOB). In addition to the three Kosovo Albanian political parties, a 
Kosovo Serb National Council (SNC) was established on 18 October 1999, headed 
by Bishop Artemije, who was to officially name the fourth political member of the 
JIAS at a later date. Within the overall HAS, the KTC was to remain the highest 
level consultative body in Kosovo and be enlarged to better reflect the pluralistic 
nature ofKosovo's population. 
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Political parties within Kosovo continued to jockey for public support in 
preparation for the upcoming elections in the fall of2000, which resulted in a further 
proliferation of parties. In his 6 June 2000 report. the Secretary-General (2000b) 
highlighted the fact that an increased number of political parties had grown out of 
former KLA members, and roughly thirty parties had now attained the minimum 
four thousand signatures of support required to register and certify a party. 
Municipal elections were held on 28 October 2000, and the Secretary-General 
(2000d) announced his SRSG had certified the results on 7 November. A total of 
913,179 Kosovo residents were eligible to vote for 5,500 candidates competing for 
920 seats in 30 municipal assemblies. Voter turnout was substantial, with 79 percent 
of voters casting their ballots. Kosovar Serbs did not participate, however, and 
consequently, the results in the three municipalities representing Serb Majorities 
were not certified. In the 27 remaining municipalities, the LDK won 58 percent of 
the vote and 21 municipalities, and the PPDK won 27 percent of the vote and six 
municipalities. In light of the prominence of many former KLA members 
throughout Kosovo, and their role in NATO's intervention in Kosovo, the election 
results came as a shock to former KLA leader Hashim Thaci and the PPDK. The 
overwhelming victory of the LDK and Ibrahim Rugova, the moderate politician who 
was against violence, was a blow to Thaci and the continued goal of independence. 
Thus, in accordance with UN Resolution 1244 both the international civil and 
security presence had been structured and assigned relative responsibilities based on 
perceived improvements upon previous UN missions in Bosnia and Croatia. This 
framework was to be more complicated in actuality than originally envisioned, 
however, as it involved an alliance between the UN Secretariat, an independent UN 
body, and two regional bodies on the part ofUNMIK; together with a military 
presence that included a strong contribution from NATO (Groom and Taylor 2000, 
304). While KFOR executed its mission in accordance with NATO direction, 
UNMIK implemented its mission as directed by the Secretary-General, with the 
connectivity between the civil and security elements consisting of a military liaison 
office directly under the leadership of the SRSG. While the structure ofKFOR and 
UNMIK were based on perceived improvements from the previous missions in 
Croatia and Bosnia, both were beset by their own communications, administrative 
and logistical hindrances to effective and integrated execution. As the focus was 
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solely on rebuilding a post-conflict society within Kosovo, advances were 
observable; however, many aspects ofKFOR's and VNMIK's efforts and successes 
were to have profound effects upon neighboring Macedonia. 
Macedonia. 
During deliberations of how to structure the relationship between KFOR and 
UNMIK, the focus was so intense on how to improve upon the failures ofBosnia 
and Croatia, the evident success of the unified structure ofUNPREDEP in 
Macedonia was never considered or mentioned. Neither were the possible or 
probable effects any actions in Kosovo might have upon Macedonia. Even though 
the MTA specified KFOR would provide appropriate control of the borders of the 
FRY, in Kosovo, with Albania and Macedonia until the arrival of the civilian police 
mission of the UN, noticeably absent from the KFOR mission objective statement 
was any mention of border monitoring duties. This was due to the fact it was 
considered a smaller component of establishing and maintaining a secure 
environment. As already explicated, however, KFOR was to encounter difficulty 
establishing a secure environment and public safety and order within Kosovo. The 
primary reason for this was due to KFOR's preoccupation with other priority tasks 
such as ensuring FRY or Serb forces did not reattack, and demilitarizing the KLA. 
When KFOR assumed its mission on 12 June 1999, Kosovo was basically a 
province without any police, infrastructure or any commonly established applicable 
policies. While the FRY and Serb forces withdrew in accordance with the MTA, 
KFOR was preoccupied with the possibility they could reengage at any time, and this 
was to remain the priority concern of KFOR for several months. The secondary 
mission was to demilitarize the KLA. Consequently, establishing a secure 
environment and public safety and order within Kosovo, at best, fell a distant third in 
precedence; exacerbated by the fact that though KFOR was responsible for 
maintaining both public safety and civil law and order, its ability to do so was 
limited as it was still in the process of building up its forces. In priority, what efforts 
KFOR did execute towards establishing a secure environment and public safety and 
order within Kosovo were concentrated toward the city of Pristina, and its 
surrounding region, where one third of the crimes reported in Kosovo occurred; then 
toward the remainder of the interior ofKosovo, and finally toward the borders. 
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Whereas the immediate concern ofKFOR was the possibility of FRY and Serb 
forces attacking after their withdrawal from Kosovo, the creation of the ASZ and 
GSZ were designed to mitigate that possibility. On the ground, the MTA mandated 
GSZ created a five kilometer buffer zone along the 402 kilometer border between 
Kosovo and the FRY. This buffer zone extended beyond the Kosovo province 
border into the rest of FRY territory, and by the terms of the MT A, under no 
circumstances could any forces of the FRY or Republic of Serbia enter into, reenter, 
or remain within the territory of Kosovo or the GSZ and ASZ without the prior 
consent ofthe KFOR Commander. The goal in the creation of the GSZ was 
twofold: to avoid any possible accidents between KFOR and FRY forces, for 
otherwise they would be face to face along the border; and help deter a FRY attack 
on Kosovo (Conflict, Security & Development Group 2003, 101). The result was 
basically a section ofJand void of military forces of any kind, and patrolled by 
limited police with light arms only. In the V.S. sector, this buffer zone was to be 
larger yet as V.S. forces concern with force protection had mandated a four 
kiIometer buffer zone on the Kosovo side of the border. As such, along the 
southeastern border between Kosovo and Serbia, there was a nine kilometer zone 
virtually without any security forces. 
Along the Albanian and Macedonian borders, even though the MT A specified 
KFOR would provide appropriate control of the borders of the FRY in Kosovo with 
Albania and Macedonia until the arrival of the civilian mission of the UN, KFOR 
had little reason to suspect a threat. After all, Albania and Macedonia were wilIing 
partners in the NATO coalition, and it wasn't until later the organized crime threat 
was identified. UNMIK also encountered severe delays in fielding the mission's 
international police component. By November 22 of 1999, civilian police had only 
been made available to man four border crossing stations along the 508 kilometer 
Kosovo border with Albania and Macedonia (Nardulli, et al. 2002, 107). Adding to 
the perception of no threat emanating from Macedonia was the fact that both KFOR 
and UNMIK were utilizing Macedonia as a base for rear operations in support of the 
Kosovo mission. 
KFOR had established a secondary headquarters in the Gazella shoe factory, 
located in Skopje and commonly referred to as KFOR Rear. The primary mission of 
this unit, commanded by a Major General, was reception, staging, onward movement 
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and integration ofKFOR contingents moving through the "Communications Zone"; 
as well as the primary point of contact for respective National Support Elements. Of 
the participating nations in Kosovo, 17 had their National Support Elements located 
in Skopje. In support of the Kosovo mission KFOR estimated as many as one 
thousand vehicles a day could cross the border carrying troops, food and supplies 
(KFOR 2002). UNMIK as well had a liaison office in Skopje in order to coordinate 
with the National Support Elements and the Macedonian authorities. As such, the 
border between Kosovo and Macedonia was considered by KFOR and UNMIK to be 
of minimal consequence as it was within the area of operations. 
KFOR's demilitarization and transformation of the KLA was executed in rapid 
fashion and deemed a success by both KFOR and UNMIK, as within 90 days the 
KLA had been declared demilitarized as a result of surrendering 10 thousand 
weapons and being reintegrated into civil society through the creation of the KPC 
and KPS. However, demilitarization and reintegration of the KLA was more ofa 
symbolic rather than comprehensive feat for three reasons. First, the agreement 
between KLA Commander in Chief, Hashim Thaci, and KFOR Commander, 
Lieutenant General Mike Jackson, stated "all KLA forces in Kosovo and 
neighboring countries will observe the provisions ofthis undertaking" (Accord 
between KFOR and the KLA 1999), which confirmed the many reports ofKLA 
factions operating in northern Albania and northwestern Macedonia. The agreement 
went on to state KLA forces would "freeze military movement in either direction 
across international borders" thereby legally allowing those KLA personnel currently 
outside Kosovo to remain there and not be subject to demilitarization. Secondly, the 
turn in and collection of weapons was far from all-inclusive. As previously 
explicated, in light of the fact that roughly one million weapons had been looted 
from armories when the Albanian government collapsed in 1997 and were readily 
available in the immediate geographic area, the surrender of 10 thousand weapons 
from a 28 thousand member armed force does not constitute demilitarization. 
Finally, reintegration into civil society of former KLA members was to consist of: 
three thousand active and two thousand reserve members of the KPC, for a total of 
five thousand; fifty percent of the KPS through the first 15 courses, equaling 1,426 
personnel ofthe 2,851 trained through December 2000; and 13 thousand who had at 
least signed up for vocational training through the International Organization for 
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Migration (Conflict, Security & Development Group 2003, 39-44). These best 
possible scenario statistics indicate, assuming none of these individuals retained any 
KLA contacts, 8,374 fonner KLA members were not reintegrated into civil society, 
and weapons availability remained prevalent. 
Consequently, as of December 2000, there were unknown numbers ofKLA 
members not subject to demilitarization or reintegration into civil society present in 
northern Albania and northwestern Macedonia, 8,374 unaccounted for KLA 
members in Kosovo, untold numbers of available weapons in the area, and relatively 
open and unprotected borders between Kosovo and Macedonia and Albania. Also, 
the recent electoral victory of the moderate LDK, and Ibrahim Rugova, came as 
quite a disappointment, and source of disenchantment, to the fonner KLA members 
and politicians who continued to support independence. Moreover, UNMIK and 
KFOR suffered from the perception the fonner KLA did not constitute a continuing 
threat to Kosovo, or a threat at all toward Macedonia. KFOR and UNMIK's 
mandate and total focus was on conflict resolution and post-conflict peace-building 
within Kosovo, and did not include Macedonia other than as a rear area logistical 
supply base. 
Others in the international community, however, particularly the FRY, Serb, and 
Macedonian governments expressed sincere reservations about what they perceived 
as perpetuation of, and reward to, an organization that at the outset at least partly 
fomented the Kosovo conflict. The Macedonian government continued to highlight 
the impending threat of the fonner KLA personnel and ideologies, from both 
interstate and intrastate sources; however, the international community at large was 
concerned only with the intrastate context of Kosovo. Ever since tennination of 
UNPREDEP, Macedonia was considered a successful case of conflict prevention, 
with no current threat, and was accordingly left with an OSCE contingent of eight 
personnel to continue those successful conflict prevention efforts. In so doing, the 
strategy of simultaneity and connectivity of interstate and intrastate conflict 
prevention efforts within Macedonia had ceased at the same time UNPREDEP was 
tenninated. This situation was exacerbated by the fact that while contained within 
the overall conflict prevention mandate for Kosovo there was an interstate mandate 
as well as intrastate, both KFOR and UNMIK were incapable of executing that 
mandate even if they had perceived it as integral to the overall concept. 
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Additionally, the conflict resolution and post-conflict peace-building efforts within 
Kosovo suffered from the structure ofUNMlK and KFOR, thereby precluding a 
synchronized and multifaceted approach. These faults in the conflict prevention 
efforts ofthe international community in both Kosovo and Macedonia, exemplified 
by the lack of a multifaceted approach toward both interstate and intrastate 
components of conflict prevention in a simultaneous and connective method, were to 
manifest themselves in renewed conflict. 
5.4. Macedonian Conflict Genesis. 
Regional Conflict Resurgence. 
In southern Serbia, the three provinces of Presevo, Medvedja and Bujanovac also 
contained approximately 80 thousand resident ethnic Albanians, constituting them 
the majority population in Presevo and Bujanovac. After World War 11 these areas 
were excluded from Kosovo due to strategic reasons relating to Serbia's north-south 
trade corridor. but ethnic Albanians continued to refer to this area as Eastern 
Kosovo. This area bordered the U.S. MNB area ofKosovo, and Macedonia, which 
meant porous and minimally protected borders to the south with Macedonia; and as a 
result of the five kilometer GSZ in Serbia and the four kilometer U.S. force 
protection standoff in Kosovo, a nine kilometer safe haven zone with no effective 
military or police patrols existed between Serbia and Kosovo. At about the same 
time as KFOR was concentrating on the increased violence in the Mitrovica region, 
conflict began to materialize in this region. After the deaths of two Albanian men on 
26 January 2000, the Liberation Army ofPresevo, Medvedja and Bujanovac 
emerged under the Albanian name ofUshtria Clirimtare Presheve, Medveja e 
Bujanovec (UCPMB). The uniforms, tactics and procedures of the UCPMB 
mirrored those of the supposed demilitarized KLA, and it was evident from the 
outset the UCPMB had connections with the local KPC sector 6, led by former KLA 
member Shaban Shala and based in Gnjilane (Conflict, Security & Development 
Group 2003, 102). 
The emergence of the UCPMB had its roots in an internal political struggle 
within Kosovo, where the older generation moderate parties such as Rugova's LDK 
and the more radical parties of former KLA members diverged in ideology (Troebst 
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2001a, 3). The trigger was the increasing violence in the Mitrovica region, the 
predominantly Serb stronghold of northern Kosovo. As Mitrovica became more 
divided by KFOR forces, the more radical ethnic Albanians ofthe UCPMB devised 
the ideology of executing a trade ofthe "Eastern Kosovo" area of the Presevo Valley 
for the northern Kosovo area of lvecan, Leposaviq and the northern sector of 
Mitrovica. The idea was to signal to the Serbs that if they could partition Kosovo 
and gain the Serb inhabited northern area around Mitorvica, then ethnic Albanians 
could likewise do the same in the Presevo Valley. 
From January of2000 until the spring of2001, a low level conflict occurred 
between the VCPMB and Serb police within the GSl. While the UCPMB appeared 
to be a collection of relatively small and disorganized groups, they encountered no 
difficulties moving back and forth across borders. This was due in part to the 
structure ofUNMIK and KFOR precluding any synchronized and multifaceted 
approach. In fact, as of February of2000, UNMIK claimed ignorance of such 
activities, while KFOR refused to discuss the topic, implying they had full 
knowledge (Conflict, Security & Development Group 2003, 103). Understandably, 
this was the cause of much friction between UNMIK and KFOR headquarters, 
especially since the commander ofKFOR and the SRSG were meeting daily at this 
time. However, a meeting does not necessarily result in information being shared or 
passed. A further impediment stemmed from the NATO attitude and belief the KLA 
had been demilitarized and was their former ally in the Kosovo campaign. Indeed, 
NATO leadership initially opined that these attacks upon Serb police elements in the 
GSl were a ruse staged by Slobodan Milosevic. Additionally complicating the 
situation was the V.S. commitment to force protection and the four kilometer 
standoff from the Kosovo border, which provided nine kilometers of safe haven for 
VCPMB operations. The border of Kosovo and Serbia with Macedonia provided 
safe haven areas as well since the FRY and Macedonia had not yet concluded any 
agreement on demarcation of the border, thus also providing broad strips of no-
man's land up to one kilometer wide. This fact had been exacerbated since the 
departure ofUNPREDEP forces. The departure ofUNPREDEP created a complete 
vacuum along the Macedonian and FRY border as the Macedonian border police did 
not assume UNPREDEP's old infrastructure and as a result could not advance as far 
north as the NLAOO, or UN Patrol Line, that had been agreed upon by the FRY and 
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the UN. Consequently, these areas along the FRY and Macedonian border had been 
exploited by the KLA, and now the UCPMB, ever since tennination of the 
UNPREDEP mission. 
Under U.S. pressure, Hashim Thaci affinned on 24 March 2000 that the UCPMB 
had fonnally renounced its anned struggle against Serbia, and would fight for 
liberation of the Presevo Valley through political means in the future. While this did 
result in a temporary decrease of violent attacks on the part of the UCPMB, it also 
served to confirm connectivity between Thaci's PPDK party and the UCPMB. The 
intensity ofUCPMB operations was to increase again in late 2000, though, as a 
result of four events (Troebst 2001a, 6). First, on 25 July of2000, the Macedonian 
Parliament adopted a new law regarding higher education, which would allow the 
establishment of a private, internationally funded, tri-Iingual "Southeast European 
University" in Tetovo. This event was a major political step towards granting ethnic 
Albanians in Macedonia more rights and also solving the University ofTetovo 
problem that had been a political sore point since 1995. Second, was the diplomatic, 
political and strategic change that accompanied the ouster of Slob od an MiIosevic on 
5 October 2000. This event resulted in the UCPMB loss ofSlobodan Milosevic as a 
common transatlantic enemy, and allowed the international community to restore 
political communication channels with Belgrade, through the new western leaning 
Deputy Prime Minister, Nebojsa Covic. Third, was the shock of the 28 October 
2000 elections where the moderate LDK party of Ibrahim Rugova posted an 
overwhelming victory over Hashim Thaci and his PPDK party. Finally, the electoral 
victory ofU.S. President Bush also had an effect. Bush's election effectively 
removed Washington as an active player in Balkan politics, as the direct line from 
the !(LA to the Department of State was cut. All of these events contributed to an 
intensification ofUCPMB actions within the GSZ and the Presevo Valley, where the 
UCPMB attempted to force all FRY and Serb police elements out of the GSZ. 
On 17 February 2000, The UCPMB executed a successful missile attack on a bus 
carrying Serbian civilians, killing seven, and a day later three Serbian policemen 
were killed when they hit a mine laid by UCPMB insurgents. Meanwhile relations 
between the international community and Belgrade had improved considerably, 
which led to Nebojsa Covic appealing to NATO to allow FRY and Serb security 
forces to re-enter the GSZ. When Peter Feith, the Secretary-General appointed 
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Special Representative to facilitate discussion between Belgrade and the ethnic 
Albanian community, failed to alter the UCPMB's determination, NATO 
reconsidered the Covic Plan. On 8 March 2001, the NAC agreed to a phased and 
conditioned relaxation of the GSZ restrictions, thereby allowing FRY and Serb 
security forces to redeploy in the buffer zone, up to the Kosovo border (Carp 2002, 
2). The GSZ redeployment was to commence on 14 March and be completed on 31 
May 2001. The effect of agreement on the Covic plan was immediate, and on 12 
March 2000, the UCPMB signed a NATO negotiated cease-fire with Belgrade and 
vowed to renounce the use of force by the next day. One of the primary elements 
contributing to cessation of hostilities was the KFOR offer of amnesty for those 
UCPMB members who turned in their weapons to KFOR and signed a pledge not to 
again take up arms. By the last day of the amnesty program, over 450 UCPMB 
personnel had availed themselves of the program and returned to Kosovo. NATO 
consented to allowing FRY and Serb security forces to return to the GSZ area as a 
result of four principal incentives: NATO simply wanted to end the insurrection, the 
desire to provide tangible political rewards to the FRY government for their part in 
the overthrow of Milosevic, the military necessity to cut off the illegal flow of 
weapons through the OSZ, and NATO now had to redirect any available forces 
toward a new conflict taking place in northwestern Macedonia. 
Macedonian Conflict Genesis. 
The conflict in the Presevo Valley area was quickly overshadowed by the 
emergence of armed conflict in neighboring Macedonia. The Ushtria Clirimtare 
Kombetare, referred to in English as the National Liberation Army (NLA), surfaced 
on 22 January of2001 when they attacked a police station in the village of Tearce. 
near Tetovo, resulting in the death of one policeman (Troebst 2001 b, 2). The NLA 
was headed by Ali Ahmeti, who was born and raised in the village of Zajas. near the 
town ofKicevo in western Macedonia, which is predominantly inhabited by ethnic 
Albanians. He studied at the University of Pristina, in Kosovo. and was a student 
radical, combining Albanian nationalism and Marxism-Leninism. He was 
imprisoned for several months and was also an active participant in the 1981 
uprising of Albanian students in Pristina. Then he fled to Switzerland, where he 
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remained politically active until he returned to Kosovo in 1999 in the capacity of a 
KLA logistician. An immense influence on Ahmeti was his uncle, Fazli Veliu, a 
former schoolteacher from the same village of Zajas. While in Pristina, Ahmeti 
joined a small political party called the LPK, which his uncle had been instrumental 
in founding, and was the antecedent of the KLA (Ash 2001, 3-4). In essence, 
Ahmeti's background is almost identical to that of Hashim Thaci, which is why it is 
not surprising the Albanian initials of the National Liberation Army in Macedonia 
and those of the Kosovo Liberation Army are both "UCK". Many of the principal 
leaders of the NLA were KLA veterans. Much to the embarrassment ofKFOR and 
UNMIK, the Chief of Staff of the NLA, Gezim Ostremi, had been the second in 
command of the KPC until he deserted his post to assume his position in the NLA. 
Consequently, it is also not surprising that between ten and twenty percent of the 
entire KPC were "on leave" during the Macedonian conflict and believed to be 
fighting for the NLA (Conflict, Security & Development Group 2003, 106). This 
would be congruent with Ahmeti's claim that 80 percent ofNLA fighters were 
indigenous to Macedonia. It is additionally assumed most of the weaponry utilized 
by the NLA had Kosovo connections. 
Some observers believe NLA actions developed from ethnic Albanian extremists 
frustrated when elections in Kosovo resulted in a moderate LDK victory (Liotta and 
Jebb 2002, 99). The Macedonian government claimed the NLA was merely a new 
name for the KLA, and their emergence in Macedonia was a direct result of UNMIK 
and KFOR failing to effectively seal the border between Kosovo and Macedonia 
(Daftary 2001,6). Other observers were convinced the origins of the Macedonian 
conflict stemmed from the struggle among various ethnic Albanian groups for 
domination of the territory and criminal enterprises of the region (Pearson 2002,4). 
Kim (2001, 1-2) provides the most encompassing view by citing several factors 
accounting for materialization of the NLA: the increasing radicalism of disparate 
ethnic Albanian militant groups operating in Kosovo, Serbia and Macedonia, linked 
to organized crime and regional smuggling; the unresolved status of Kosovo and 
limited progress in realizing Kosovar self-government; the international embrace of 
post-Milosevic Yugoslavia and Serbia; the Albanian militant groups' desire to elicit 
a heavy-handed Serb or Macedonian response so as to garner Western sympathy and 
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support; unaccounted for KLA members and weapons; the existence of the GSZ; and 
the border agreement between the FRY and Macedonia. 
The NLA, however, was very explicit in what they proclaimed as their goals, 
which were equal status and rights for Albanian Macedonians; recognition as a 
constituent nation of Macedonia, acceptance of Albanian as an official language in 
Parliament and public administration; the right of higher education in Albanian; 
proportionate representation in the bureaucracy, the courts and the police; and more 
devolution of power to local governments (Ash 2001,5). From the view of the 
NLA, they were only seeking that which the ethnic Albanian politicians in 
Macedonia had been seeking since independence, although neither of the two major 
ethnic Albanian political parties claimed any affiliation with the NLA. In an 
interview by Timothy Garton Ash (2001), Ahmeti was asked ifhe thought Albanian 
Macedonians would have been ready to fight for their rights in 1998. No. he said, 
"because of the situation in Kosovo." However. after the international community 
intervened in Kosovo and, as most Albanian Macedonians saw it. the KLA had 
"won" as a result. there were enough people ready to heed the call to arms in 
Macedonia. Ahmeti stated he had drawn two main conclusions from the Kosovo 
war: first. you could win more by a few months of armed struggle than ethnic 
Albanian politicians had achieved in nearly a decade of peaceful politics; and 
second. that you could do this only if you got the West involved. 
The conflict slowly escalated, and on 12 February 2001. the NLA took control of 
Tanusevci; a small village situated along the Macedonian and Kosovo border. which 
reportedly served as a KLA base in 1999 (Daftary 200 I. 3; Pearson 2002. 2; Troebst 
2001b,3). A combination of Macedonian special police and military units deployed 
to the area, and a prolonged urban guerilla warfare scenario unfolded with almost 
daily skirmishes occurring from Tetovo north to the Kosovo border. On 1 March 
2001. the United States Department of State issued a Travel Warning advising 
avoidance of the area ofTetovo and due north ofSkopje due to armed clashes 
between Macedonian security forces and NLA forces. and reports of the roads being 
mined as well. The conflict intensity increased. causing a new refugee and displaced 
persons crisis, with refugees now fleeing towards Kosovo. and begetting with it the 
notice of the international community. On 7 March 2001. the President of the UN 
Security Council (2001a) issued a statement strongly condemning the recent 
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violence by ethnic Albanian anned extremists in the north of Macedonia. He called 
upon the political leaders of Macedonia, Kosovo and the FRY to isolate the forces 
responsible for the violence and shoulder their responsibility for peace and stability 
in the region, and welcomed dialogue between Macedonia and KFOR on practical 
steps to address the immediate security situation and to prevent crossing of the 
border by extremists. This statement was followed by similar statements by NATO 
(2001 a) on 8 March and the EU (2001) on 9 March. On 13 March, the UN 
Secretary-General (2001 b) issued a report on UNMIK, where he cited a further 
complication in the security situation for UNMIK involved the tensions created by 
the armed ethnic Albanians operating inside Macedonia. 
Macedonian goveinrnent officials, however, continued their insistence the NLA 
was a terrorist organization with no domestic legitimacy, and its operations within 
Macedonia were a direct result of the international community failing to effectively 
seal the border between Macedonia and Kosovo. The international community on 
the other hand, while also refusing to accept the legitimacy of the NLA as a voice for 
the grievances ofthe ethnic Albanian community of Macedonia, nevertheless held 
the position the actual grievances were legitimate and the solution to the crisis lay in 
addressing these concerns through political dialogue (Oaftary 200 I, 6). On 20 
March 2001, the two main ethnic Albanian political parties, the OP A led by Arben 
Xhaferi and the POP led by Imer Imeri, signed a declaration that, although expressed 
sympathy for the NLNs demands for Albanian equity and urged the Macedonian 
government to speed up reform, condemned the use of force by the NLA in pursuit 
of political objectives (Kim 2001, 6). With the two primary ethnic Albanian 
political parties claiming no affiliation with the NLA, the Macedonian government 
decided upon strong military action to destroy the NLA, and issued a 24 hour 
deadline to the NLA to surrender their weapons and/or depart the country. In 
response, the NLA declared a unilateral ceasefire, stated it did not wish to threaten 
the territorial integrity of the country, and called for dialogue on the rights of ethnic 
Albanians. This request for dialogue from the NLA, though, was to be refused by 
the Macedonian government on the grounds the NLA was a terrorist organization 
and not a legitimate political entity. 
Facing an imminent crisis, 21 March 2001, was to bring three events on behalf of 
the international community that would raise the level of awareness and activity in 
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the new Macedonian conflict. First, NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson 
(200Ib) issued a statement reiterating his condemnation of extremist groups 
operating in Macedonia, and promised to strengthen cooperation with the 
government of Macedonia by dispatching Ambassador Hans-Joerg Eiffto 
supplement the NATO Liaison Office in Skopje. NATO emphasized this measure 
was in full cooperation with other organizations such as the EU, OSCE and UN, 
thereby indicating international community determination to support stability in the 
region. Second, was the Chairman-in-Office of the OSCE (2001a) announcement 
that Ambassador Robert Frowick, former head of the OSCE Spill over Monitor 
Mission to Skopje and former Chief of the OSCE Mission to Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, was to act as his Personal Representative for the situation in 
Macedonia. The OSCE Chairman-in-Office, Romanian Foreign Minister Mircea 
Geoana, also underlined the OSCE was prepared to participate together with other 
international organizations in a coordinated effort to settle the crisis in northern 
Macedonia. Finally. the UN Security Council (2001c) adopted Resolution 1345, 
welcoming the international efforts ofUNMIK., KFOR, EU, OSCE, NATO, and the 
Macedonian government to prevent the escalation of ethnic tensions in the area, 
while condemning the extremist violence taking place. The Security Council noted 
the support of violence from ethnic Albanian extremists outside Macedonia, and 
called on ethnic Albanian leaders in the FRY, Kosovo and Macedonia to condemn 
such violence and use their influence to secure peace; as well as calling on KFOR to 
further strengthen its efforts to prevent unauthorized movement and illegal arms 
shipments across borders in the region in accordance with UN Security Council 
Resolutions 1160 and 1244. Thus, the adoption of Resolution 1345 represented the 
return of the international community to conflict prevention efforts in Macedonia, 
targeted toward the simultaneous and connected aspects of both interstate and 
intrastate conflict prevention in a multifaceted and synchronized approach. 
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5.5. Conclusions. 
On 29 January 1999, Macedonia expressed concern over the danger of difTusion 
of the conflict in Kosovo and requested the UNPREDEP mission be extended. On 
12 February 1999, the Secretary-General (1999a) submitted his report pursuant to 
Resolution 1186, articulating increasing trepidation regarding the potentially serious 
repercussions that continued violence in Kosovo could have upon the interstate and 
intrastate security of Macedonia given the large proportion of ethnic Albanians in the 
Macedonian population. When China exercised its veto in the Security Council 
(1999b) to prevent extension of the UNPREDEP mandate in Macedonia on 25 
February 1999, numerous delegations of Member States articulated distress 
regarding possible diffusion of conflict to Macedonia from across the border in 
Kosovo. Macedonia, the United States, the UN Secretary-General, the President of 
the UN Security Council, and the European Union, all noted the indispensable role 
performed by UNPREDEP, and stated its continued presence was essential at this 
critical juncture of regional instability as a stabilizing and peace-promoting element 
in the geo-political context of the region; not only in its military component and its 
border monitoring, but also in its civilian efforts to promote understanding among 
the different ethnic groups in Macedonia. These Member States unitarily agreed 
UNPREDEP had, by promoting dialogue among various political forces and ethnic 
communities, and utilizing its good offices, a stabilizing effect within the country; 
which further reduced tensions that could have clearly increased as a direct result of 
the continued crisis in Kosovo, and thereby contributed successfully to the 
prevention of diffusion or contagion of conflict elsewhere in the region to 
Macedonia. As explicated above, at the time ofUNPREDEP's termination the 
international community was completely aware and conscious of the enduring 
interstate and intrastate threats to peace and stability within Macedonia. 
Considering the persistent regional threats, a suitable replacement would have to 
fill the void of conflict prevention efforts created in the wake of the UNPREDEP 
termination, however, the international community was predisposed with the 
impending conflict in Kosovo. The Macedonian leadership was inclined to 
encourage NATO to launch a presence in the country as the immediate solution, with 
the rationalization that NATO forces on Macedonian soil would deter any possible 
incursion into the country. As a result, the Macedonian administration agreed to 
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allow NATO to establish the KVCC and the NATO Extraction Force on its soil. As 
much as Macedonia desired a NATO presence in country, NATO also wanted a 
presence in Macedonia as part ofits process of redefining itself from an organization 
principally concerned with collective defense to one concerned with collective 
security as well; and its transition from support of conflict termination operations, to 
combat operations in support of conflict mitigation, and ultimately to tasks related to 
conflict resolution and post-conflict reconstruction. However, as the critical stages 
of the Kosovo crisis were unfolding, NATO was forced to revert back to the 
collective defense function by authorizing out of region, non-Article 5, operations 
outside the framework of Chapter VIII, as a result of a lack of UN Security Council 
support for NATO use of force in Kosovo. Accordingly, the geo-strategic location 
of Macedonia became paramount to NATO success in executing an air campaign 
against the FRY, as well as serving as a pre-positioning base for a follow-on NATO 
force in Kosovo. 
As a result of the reciprocal desire for aNA TO presence in country, prior to the 
termination ofUNPREDEP there were nearly two thousand NATO troops in 
Macedonia under the NATO flag, in support of Kosovo operations. The NATO and 
Macedonian rationalizations for a NATO presence in Macedonia were divergent in 
cause but mutually reinforcing in that while NATO gained a geo-strategic base of 
operations for Kosovo, the mere presence ofNA TO would achieve the Macedonian 
aspirations of preventing any possible interstate incursion. The result, however, was 
that both were focused wholly on the interstate threat, albeit from different 
perspectives, while any intrastate conflict prevention efforts were to be left to an 
OSCE contingent of eight personnel. While the international community at large, 
including the OSCE, was focusing on the evolving conflict in Kosovo, that 
involvement was partially justified by the desire to prevent interstate conflict 
diffusion from Kosovo to Macedonia. The OSCE contingent of eight personnel was 
likewise focusing efforts toward the possible interstate diffusion of conflict to 
Macedonia as evidenced by the name of the mission remaining the "OSCE spillover 
Monitor Mission to Skopje". Consequently, the only international community 
organization with a valid conflict prevention mandate to remain in Macedonia was 
also focused on interstate aspects of conflict prevention; thereby minimizing any 
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concentration on intrastate efforts, and negating a strategy of simultaneity and 
connectivity toward interstate and intrastate conflict prevention efforts. 
The number ofNA TO troops on Macedonian soil rose from nearly two thousand 
at the termination ofUNPREDEP to 18,500 at the cessation of the NATO air 
campaign, a period of just over three months, as a result of the pre-positioning of 
troops to take part in KFOR operations in Kosovo. It was precisely because of this 
large NATO presence the international community did not concern itselfwith 
discussions of a formal conflict prevention mandate of any type in Macedonia, with 
the noted exception of the OSCE. Although the international community had grave 
concerns regarding intrastate stability within Macedonia during execution of the 
Kosovo intervention, none of the nightmare scenarios came to fruition. Despite their 
ethnic connection, the Albanian minority purposefully tempered their espousal for 
KLA ambitions with the intention of stability within Macedonia. Additionally, the 
unlikely coalition of the ''nationalistic'' Macedonian and Albanian parties is what 
constituted the quintessence of political stability during the crisis at the 
governmental level. This is not to say, however, that interethnic tensions within the 
country were no longer present. The Kosovo crisis saw continued, and increased, 
interethnic tension in Macedonia, however, the previous efforts ofUNPREDEP 
toward strengthening mutual understanding and dialogue among political and ethnic 
parties helped abate the possibility of any rapid escalation of these tensions into 
overt conflict. Furthermore, it was thought any immediate threat to Macedonia's 
intrastate stability was defused by the NATO victory and rapid return of over 90 
percent of Kosovar Albanian refugees. However, the negation of any intrastate 
conflict prevention focus by the international community in Macedonia was to 
slowly erode the previous success ofUNPREDEP. 
As a consequence of the intervention in Kosovo, in the form of an air campaign, 
ethnic Macedonian support for NATO had waned, while support from ethnic 
Albanians increased. However, NATO still represented the critical component of 
international community presence sought by the Macedonian government, and with 
the signing of the MTA and approval of Security Council Resolution 1244, NATO's 
interest in Macedonia was to switch from a pre-positioning platform to a logistical 
base for KFOR operations. Moreover, NATO and the international community were 
convinced with Kosovo becoming a UNINA TO protectorate, an interstate threat to 
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Macedonia no longer existed; and the intrastate threat was likewise diminished as 
the "crisis stage" had now passed. 
During deliberations of how to structure the relationship between KFOR and 
UNMIK, the focus was so intense on how to improve upon the failures of Bosnia 
and Croatia, the evident success of the unified structure ofUNPREDEP in 
Macedonia was never considered or mentioned. Neither were the possible or 
probable effects any actions in Kosovo might have upon Macedonia. Although 
mandated to control ofthe borders of the FRY, in Kosovo, with Albania and 
Macedonia until the arrival of the civilian police mission of the UN, what efforts 
KFOR did execute concerning establishment of a secure environment and public 
safety and order within Kosovo were concentrated toward the intrastate areas of 
Pristina and its surrounding region, then toward the remainder of the interior of 
Kosovo, and finally toward the borders. Consequently, execution of the interstate 
border component of its mission fell a distant third in priority to KFOR. 
This preoccupation with the intrastate components of the Kosovo mission, to the 
detriment of the interstate mission was exacerbated by the creation of the OSZ. The 
result was basically a section of land void of military forces of any kind, and 
patrolled by limited police with light arms only. In the V.S. sector, this buffer zone 
was to be larger yet as U.S. forces concern with force protection had mandated a four 
kilometer buffer zone on the Kosovo side of the border. As such, along the 
southeastern border between Kosovo and Serbia, there was a nine kilometer zone 
virtually without any security forces. Additionally, KFOR had little reason to 
suspect a threat. After all, Albania and Macedonia were willing partners in the 
NATO coalition, and it wasn't until later the organized crime threat was identified. 
UNMIK also encountered severe delays in fielding the mission's international police 
component. Adding to the perception of no threat emanating from Macedonia was 
the fact that both KFOR and UNMIK were utilizing Macedonia as a base for rear 
operations in support of the Kosovo mission. As such, the border between Kosovo 
and Macedonia was considered by KFOR and UNMIK to be of minimal 
consequence as it was within the area of operations. A further complicating factor 
was the establishment of Kosovo as a UN protectorate meant there were no 
agreements in place between KFOR, UNMIK and Macedonia regarding cooperative 
border policing. The lack of a legally defined mechanism for cooperative 
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engagement along the border only exacerbated the lack of a definitive interstate 
separation of conflict prevention efforts between Kosovo and Macedonia. 
KFOR's demilitarization and transformation of the KLA was executed in rapid 
fashion and deemed a success by KFOR and UNMIK, however, demilitarization and 
reintegration of the KLA was more ofa symbolic rather than comprehensive feat for 
three reasons. First, the agreement between the KLA and KFOR stated "all KLA 
forces in Kosovo and neighboring countries will observe the provisions of this 
undertaking", which confirmed the many reports ofKLA factions operating in 
northern Albania and northwestern Macedonia. The agreement went on to state 
KLA forces would "freeze military movement in either direction across international 
borders" thereby legally allowing those KLA personnel currently outside Kosovo to 
remain there and not be subject to demilitarization. Secondly, the turn in and 
collection of weapons was far from all-inclusive. Finally. reintegration into civil 
society of former KLA members was also far from all encompassing. Consequently, 
as of December 2000, there were unknown numbers ofKLA members who were not 
subject to demilitarization or reintegration into civil society present in northern 
Albania and northwestern Macedonia, thousands of unaccounted for members of the 
KLA in Kosovo, untold numbers of available weapons in the area, and relatively 
open and unprotected borders between Kosovo and Macedonia and Albania. 
Moreover, UNMIK and KFOR suffered from the perception the former KLA did not 
constitute a continuing threat to Kosovo, or a threat at all toward Macedonia. KFOR 
and UNMIK's mandate and total focus was on conflict resolution and post-conflict 
reconstruction within Kosovo, and did not include Macedonia other than as a rear 
area logistical supply base. While KFOR and UNMIK concentrated on the intrastate 
aspects ofKosovo, all of these factors represented an interstate threat to Macedonia. 
Others in the international community, however, particularly the FRY, Serb, and 
Macedonian governments expressed sincere reservations about what they perceived 
as perpetuation of, and reward to, an organization that at the outset at least partly 
fomented the Kosovo conflict. The Macedonian government continued to highlight 
the impending threat of the former KLA personnel and ideologies, from both 
interstate and intrastate sources; however, the international community at large was 
concerned only with the intrastate context of Kosovo. Ever since termination of 
UNPREDEP, Macedonia was considered a successful case of conflict prevention, 
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with no current threat, and was accordingly left with a minimal OSCE contingent to 
continue conflict prevention efforts. In so doing, the strategy of simultaneity and 
connectivity of interstate and intrastate conflict prevention efforts within Macedonia 
had ceased at the same time UNPREDEP was terminated. This situation was 
exacerbated by the fact that while contained within the overall conflict prevention 
mandate for Kosovo there was an interstate mandate as well as intrastate, both 
KFOR and UNMIK were incapable of executing the interstate mandate even if they 
had perceived it as integral to the overall concept. Additionally, the conflict 
resolution and post-conflict reconstruction efforts within Kosovo suffered from the 
administratively dysfunctional structure ofUNMIK and KFOR. thereby precluding a 
synchronized and multifaceted approach. These faults in the conflict prevention 
efforts of the international community in both Kosovo and Macedonia, exemplified 
by the lack of a multifaceted and multilevel approach toward both interstate and 
intrastate components of conflict prevention in a simultaneous and connective 
method, were to manifest themselves in renewed conflict. 
The two main conclusions drawn from the Kosovo war by AIi Ahmeti were that 
first, you could win more by a few months of armed struggle than ethnic Albanian 
politicians had achieved in nearly a decade ofpeaceful politics; and second, that you 
could do this only if you got the West involved. These conclusions of Ahmeti 
represent lucid examples of conflict contagion, and coupled with geographic 
proximity laid the foundation for conflict diffusion. As a result, Ahmeti and the 
NLA deliberately chose violence in their pursuit of political gains for the Albanian 
minority in Macedonia. However, the NLA could not have commenced and 
sustained operations without the porous border situation created by KFOR and 
UNMIK. The preoccupation of the international community in Kosovo upon the 
intrastate aspects of conflict resolution, without regard to the interstate relationship 
to Macedonia and the region, created the possibility for conflict to emerge in 
Macedonia. This was coupled with the lack of any major intrastate focus within 
Macedonia, which facilitated the dissipation of previous successes from 
UNPREDEP. 
In sum, this chapter explicates the strategy of simultaneity and connectivity as 
related to a nexus of interstate and intrastate conflict prevention efforts toward 
Macedonia ceased with the termination ofUNPREDEP. Based upon the reactions 
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and statements of the international community at the time of the UNPREDEP 
mandate tennination, early warning was clearly present and readily available. 
However, the international community as a whole failed to react. Even though, 
China vetoed the proposal to extend the UNPREDEP mandate, there was sufficient 
support of major international actors, particularly at the regional level, that some 
echelon of conflict prevention action could have been instituted for Macedonia. 
Unfortunately, the international community chose not to react, other than allowing 
the OSCE interstate contingent of eight to remain. Within Macedonia, this meant 
the entirety of conflict prevention measures on behalf of the international community 
consisted of one organization, with eight personnel and an interstate mandate 
targeted only at the triggering and proximate sources of conflict. As a result, the 
lack of inclusion of the structural sources of conflict, coupled with the lack of 
multifaceted and multilevel action, culminated with the absence of any type of 
intervention synergy. 
The situation in Macedonia was exacerbated by the conflict prevention efforts in 
Kosovo. While the mandate for conflict resolution and post-conflict reconstruction 
in Kosovo included both interstate and intrastate aspects, the efforts ofUNMIK and 
KFOR were neither synchronized nor fused within Kosovo due to structural flaws 
and planning errors, which precluded achieving simultaneity and connectivity. The 
lack of preparedness and limited numbers of troops in Kosovo impeded utilization of 
the entirety of multifaceted tools, toward both interstate and intrastate components of 
conflict prevention, in a simultaneous and connective method thereby negating a 
strategy of simultaneity and connectivity in conflict prevention efforts aimed at 
Kosovo. Neither was there any rational connectivity of the conflict prevention 
efforts of the international community to the situation in Macedonia. 
The end result ofthe international community involvement in Kosovo was the 
negation of interstate conflict prevention efforts designed to prevent conflict 
diffusion to Macedonia. This was facilitated by the international community not 
heading the early warnings at the tennination ofUNPREDEP and not establishing 
any conflict prevention efforts targeted specifically toward Macedonia to continue 
the successful efforts ofUNPREDEP or compliment those actions ongoing in 
Kosovo. Consequently, the absence of a strategy of simultaneity and connectivity 
regarding a nexus ofinterstate and intrastate conflict prevention efforts toward either 
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Kosovo or Macedonia fostered and enabled conflict diffusion and contagion to 
Macedonia. 
The following table, Figure 5.1, provides a chronological summary of the relevant 
international community involvement regarding conflict prevention efforts in 
Macedonia from the termination of the UNPREDEP mandate through adoption of 
UN Security Council Resolution 1345. 
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Fi2ure 5.1: Chrono Ogy ° fR I e evant nternattona .ommuDltv IC . I nvo Yemen!: Ph 11 ase 
Date Focus __ ~~rce 
1999, Feb 25 China vetoes extension of UNPREDEP UN SCvo!e 
1999, Mar 19 Rambouillet negotiations adjourn . CQ'.:'tacg!~~p' ___ . 
1999, Mar 24 NATO commences air operations against FRY NAC Decision " __ '_H. 
1999, May 6 G-8 Foreign Ministers adopt General Principles on Political 0 .. 8 Statement and 
Solution to the Kosovo Crisis _lJN."!?~I£'§{!2~~(~""L 
1999. May 12 Kosovo refugees represent too large a burden fiJr Mucl...Jonia OSCE Press Release -----------_ .... *_._----_. 
1999, May 14 UN expresses grave concern at the humanitarian catastrophe UN SC Res 1239 
in and around Kosovo 
FRYaccePts General Principles on Political Solution to the 
____ ~ __ ._.,_.w._ ... _M_. _____ 
1999, Jun 2 UN Doc S/1999/649 
Kosovo Crisis 
1999, Jun 8 OSCE declares KVM will terminate on 9 June, and a OSCE Decision 296 
Transitional Task Force for Kosovo will be established 
1999, Jun 9 Military-Technical Agreement (MTA) signed between NATO MT A Document 
anj~~vemments of FRY and Serbia ---------_.-
1999, Jun 10 NATO terminates air o~~tio..!l.~~gl!inst FR_y NAC Decision _ ... _ H. _0' " .•• ___ 
1999, Jun 10 UN decides to deploy, under UN auspices, international civil 
and security presences in Kosovo; UNMIK ~d KFOR 
UN SC Res 1244 
1999, Jull Transitional OSCE Task Force for Kosovo will cease to exist, OSCE Decision 305 
and OSCE Mission in Kosovo is established 
1999, Nov 30 SC President states UNPREDEP prevented conflict spill over UN Doc 
SIPRSTII99Qf34 
2000,Jun 6 UN acknowledges emergence of UCPMB UN i")oc SI2"oooiS 3 8 " 
2000, Sep 8 UN cites continuance of low-intensity conflict in Presevo UN Doc SI:iOO()/S"7S-
Vallev, between UCPMB and Se~Q_~~uri~()rces -----_.-_. __ ._--
2000, Dec 15 Escalation of conflict between UCPMB and Serb security 
forces; KFOR responds to constrain freedom of movement 
UN Doc S/2000/1196 
2001, Jan 8 FRY and Macedonia announce border demarcation agreement Mak fuks News 
"A.8~ 
2001, Feb 23 FRY and Macedonian presidents sign border agreel'!!.ent ___ "" Ta'.:'Jug New!!",~s~~cL" 
2001, Mar 2 NATO condemns violent incidents occurring in the border NA TO Press Relea.c;e 
area of Macedonia (2001) 032 
2001, Mar 7 SC Pres Statement condemning insurgent activity and urging UN Doc 
MK restraint ~'p-"R~:r 12001/7 
2001, Mar 8 NATO authorizes phased and controlled return of FRY and NA TO PTes-sRelea.~e 
Serb security forces into GSZ; NATO states commitment to (2001) 035 
security of Macedonia 
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Chapter 6: Phase Ill: Post-Kosovo 
6.1. Introduction 
When conflict in Macedonia finally emerged, the international community was 
essentially unaware of the severity of the situation due primarily to a willful 
determination to view the country as the region's lone multiethnic success story 
among the scattered remnants of the former Yugoslavia'S nationalist wars (Pcarson 
2002, 13). As a result ofUNPREDEP's achievements, Macedonia had been held up 
as a model of successful conflict prevention, although an imperfect one, of 
interethnic coexistence and democratic rule, with active participation of the Albanian 
community in political institutions (Kim 2001, 1). At least that is the direction it 
was headed when UNPREDEP was terminated. As a result, this was the image the 
international community believed and propagated. However, one of the fundamental 
questions in the field of conflict prevention is exactly when does one declare success 
and disengage? In the case of Macedonia, although headed in the right direction, it 
had not yet arrived at the desired level of self-sufficiency. While the international 
community had moved on and was focused on Kosovo, ethnic tensions continued to 
simmer in Macedonia. In spite of evident progress made by the Macedonian 
government regarding concerns of the Albanian minority, the slow pace of that 
progress acted as fertile ground for the NLA. The minimal size of the OSCE 
element left behind and charged with the conflict prevention mission in Macedonia, 
albeit from an interstate focused mandate, was insufficient to mount a viable strategy 
of simultaneity and connectivity for both interstate and intrastate threats. This, 
coupled with the similar inability ofKFOR and UNMIK to contain ethnic Albanian 
insurgents within Kosovo, led to the state of conflict Macedonia was encountering. 
Facing an imminent crisis, 21 March 2001, resulted in three events on behal f of 
the international community that would raise the level of awareness and activity in 
the Macedonian conflict. First, NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson (200 I b) 
issued a statement reiterating his condemnation of extremist groups operating in 
Macedonia, and promised to strengthen cooperation with the government of 
Macedonia by dispatching Ambassador Hans-Joerg Eiff to supplement the NATO 
Liaison Office in Skopje. Second, the Chairman-in-Office of the OSCE (200 la) 
announced that Ambassador Robert Frowick, former head of the OSCE Spillover 
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Monitor Mission to Skopje and former Chief of the OSCE Mission to Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, was to act as his Personal Representative for the situation in 
Macedonia. Finally, the UN Security Council (200Ic) adopted Resolution 1345 
condemning the extremist violence taking place. The Security Council noted the 
support of violence from ethnic Albanian extremists outside Macedonia, and called 
on ethnic Albanian leaders in the FRY, Kosovo and Macedonia to condemn such 
violence and use their influence to secure peace; as well as calling on KFOR to 
further strengthen its efforts to prevent unauthorized movement and illegal arms 
shipments across borders in the region in accordance with UN Security Council 
Resolutions 1160 and 1244. NATO emphasized their measure was in full 
cooperation with other organizations such as the EU, OSCE and UN, thereby 
indicating integrated international community determination to support stability in 
the region. The OSCE also underlined they were prepared to participate together 
with other international organizations in a coordinated etTort to settle the crisis in 
northern Macedonia. The Security Council welcomed the international efforts of 
UNMIK, KFOR, EU, OSCE, NATO, and the Macedonian government to prevent the 
escalation of ethnic tensions in the area. Thus, the adoption of Resolution 1345 
represented the return of the international community to conflict prevention efforts 
in Macedonia, targeted toward the simultaneous and connected aspects of both 
interstate and intrastate conflict prevention in a multifaceted and synchronized 
approach. Immediately thereafter, on 22 March 2001, the OSCE (200 1 b) announced 
approval of decision 405 that would increase the size of the mission in Skopje to 16 
personnel, with a view to strengthen their capabilities to monitor developments 
along the border and report. 
The international community, while refusing to accept the legitimacy of the NLA 
as a voice for grievances ofthe ethnic Albanian community in Macedonia, 
nonetheless held the position the actual grievances were legitimate and the solution 
to the crisis lay in addressing these concerns through political dialogue (Oaftary 
2001,6). Macedonian government officials, however, continued their insistence the 
NLA was a terrorist organization with no domestic legitimacy, and its operations 
within Macedonia were a direct result of the international community failing to 
effectively seal the border between Macedonia and Kosovo. The Macedonian 
government decided upon strong military action to defeat the NLA, and on 21 March 
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2001, issued a 24 hour deadline to the NLA to surrender their weapons and/or depart 
the country. In response, the NLA declared a unilateral ceasefire, stated it did not 
wish to threaten the territorial integrity of the country, and called for dialogue on the 
rights of ethnic Albanians. This request for dialogue from the NLA, however, was 
refused on the grounds the NLA was a terrorist organization, and hence not a 
legitimate political entity, and the Macedonian government ordered a full scale 
military offensive on 25 March. 
6.2. Macedonian Conflict 
Continuation of Conflict. 
Surprisingly, the Anny of the Republic of Macedonia (ARM) encountered 
minimal organized resistance at first, and succeeded in regaining control of some of 
the smaller villages in the Tetovo area. This was in large part due to the 
commencement of political dialogue in Skopje. The international community had 
long emphasized a political rather than military solution was required to solve the 
conflict, and supported inclusion of all political parties as opposed to only those 
currently represented in the government. On 2 April 200 I, President Trajkovski 
convened the first meeting of representatives of all Macedonian political parties to 
address the interethnic issues at hand (Kim 2001,8). Although the NLA demanded 
it be included in the negotiations, the Macedonian leadership adamantly refused on 
the grounds it would only negotiate with legitimate political parties. At the fifth 
round of meetings, President Trajkovski announced agreement on several minor 
issues, namely, to postpone the census, encourage refugees and displaced persons to 
return home, and to assist in reconstruction of the homes destroyed in the conflict. 
But, on 28 April the conflict was to enter a new stage. 
On 28 April 2001, NLA forces used mortars to ambush a Macedonian mine 
clearing unit and police convoy in the village ofVejce, near Tetovo, killing eight and 
wounding three (Daftary 2001,9; Kim 2001, 7; Troebst 2001b, 4). The burial of the 
victims sparked vengeful riots by ethnic Macedonians against ethnic Albanian 
owned shops and bars in Hitola, a city in southern Macedonia from where four of the 
victims originated. In response, the Macedonian government imposed curfews in 
Bitola, Tetovo and Kumanovo, and several times announced it was considering 
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declaring a state of war so as to leverage greater means of combating the NLA. It 
was at this time the NLA proclaimed a liberated area around the villages of Lipkovo, 
Slupcane and Vaksince, an area east ofTetovo and near Kumanovo, and much closer 
to the capital city of Skopje. On 3 May, the ARM launched another offensive to oust 
the NLA from this area, utilizing heavy artillery, tanks and attack helicopters. 
In light of the escalation of conflict on the part of both the NLA and the ARM, 
and the onset of retaliatory ethnic violence on the part of ethnic Macedonian 
civilians, the international community increased their pressure for formation of a 
more inclusive coalition government. Under immense international community 
pressure, all parties agreed to form a national unity government, and on 13 May 
2001. parliament overwhelmingly approved the action by a vote of 104 to I. Hence, 
the ruling government was now a coalition of all major political parties in country: 
VMRO-DPMNE, SDSM, DPA, LP, and PDP; however. unity was not the outcome. 
The Albanian parties diverged on how best to proceed, although both were advocates 
of amnesty for, and discussions with, the NLA. The Macedonian parties were 
divided even further. Prime Minister Ljubco Georgievski and Minister of the 
Interior Ljube Boskovski, both ofVMRO-DPMNE, were convinced of the necessity 
of a strong military offensive to end the conflict; while Branko Crvenkovski, of the 
SDSM, favored a much more moderate approach. To exacerbate the situation 
further. Prime Minister Georgievski was prone to issuing inflammatory statements 
against the ethnic Albanian parties and against the international community, who he 
held responsible for allowing the conflict to take root. Furthermore, neither of the 
Albanian parties would unequivocally condemn the NLA. Unfortunately, except for 
the attempts of President Trajkovski to stabilize the situation and devise a peace 
plan, most politicians and political parties seen:'ed more concerned with how to use 
the conflict for their political advantage in the next elections as opposed to how to 
use their political leverage to end the conflict. While the political entities squabbled, 
the conflict escalated further. 
During the end of May the ARM commenced another offensive, which the NLA 
not only countered but used to advance their position. Between 8 and 10 June 2001, 
the NLA occupied the village of Aracinovo, a suburb of Skopje. This was a major 
event in the conflict as from Aracinovo the capital city ofSkopje was now within 
mortar range ofthe NLA; as well were the only international road and rail links 
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connecting Athens to Belgrade; the only refinery in country; and Petrovec airport, 
which not only was the largest international airport in Macedonia, but also served as 
the logistical hub of all KFOR supplies bound for Kosovo (Troebst 200 I, 5). With 
the threat of urban warfare looming, both sides signed a cease-fire on 11 June. 
However, political dialogue proved futile and the ARM commenced bombardment 
of Aracinovo on 22 June 200 I. In an attempt to stave off further collateral damage 
to the Skopje suburb, prevent an all out major battle that might irreparably polarize 
the two ethnic communities of Macedonia, and avoid a military versus political end 
to the conflict, EU High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy, 
Javier Solana, arranged another cease-fire that included tenns for evacuation ofNLA 
forces from Aracinovo under international supervision (Kim 2001, 7). On 25 June 
2001, elements ofKFOR evacuated between three and four hundred anned NLA 
members from Aracinovo to the vicinity of Lipkovo. The fact that NATO evacuated 
the NLA, complete with all of their weaponry, from Aracinovo was to cause harsh 
criticism and violent protestation from the ethnic Macedonian community. This was 
to be a political turning point for the international community (Rapporteur 200 I, 9). 
On the other side of the border, in Kosovo, KFOR and UNMIK were also making 
attempts to deflect the severe criticism of their inability to secure the border between 
Kosovo and Macedonia. The first concrete achievement on the part of KFOR was 
the deployment of Task Force Viking, 400 British and Norwegian soldiers, on 29 
March 2001, to augment the Polish and Ukrainian elements charged with border 
monitoring duties. These troops were equipped with surveillance capabilities in 
order to assist in the mountainous terrain, and established communications links 
with the ARM across the border in an effort to synchronize activities. In an effort to 
better coordinate activities of the border component of KFOR with Macedonian 
efforts, NATO established the NATO Cooperation and Coordination Center (NCCC) 
on 23 April 2001. This NATO element was located in Skopje with KFOR Rear, but 
had the specific mission of facilitating the timely exchange of infonnation and data 
between KFOR and Macedonian military and civilian authorities. As a 
subcomponent of the NCCC, the NATO Clearing House (NCH) was instituted as a 
means to coordinate with nations on offers of bilateral support and military 
cooperation that originated from NATO and PfP nations. To compliment the 
military aspect of the border mission, UNMIK announced on 24 May 2001 the 
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release ofUNMIK (2001) Regulation 2001110, on the prohibition of unauthorized 
borderlboundary crossings. This regulation effectively stated any person who 
crosses a border or boundary of Kosovo at any location other than an authorized 
crossing point commits a criminal offense and shall be liable upon conviction to a 
fine of 500 OM or 30 days' imprisonment. For anyone convicted of crossing with a 
weapon, ammunition or military clothing, supplies or equipment, the sentence can 
increase up to 5,000 OM or one year imprisonment. Combined, these represented 
the first coordinated actions ofUNMIK and KFOR aimed specifically at hindering 
interstate diffusion of conflict and isolating it either solely within Kosovo or 
Macedonia. 
Until now, the in country efforts of Ambassador Eiff and Ambassador Frowick, 
representing NATO and the OSCE respectively, coupled with the shuttle diplomacy 
of Javier Solana and Lord Robertson, on behalf of the EU and NATO respectively, 
had accomplished little other than prevention of the declaration of a state of war and 
formation of the national unity government. The international community was 
determined to invest more resources to ending the conflict in Macedonia. During the 
last week ofJune 2001, the EU and the United States each nominated a special 
representative to facilitate talks in Skopje; the EU nominated former French Oefense 
Minister Francois Leotard and the United States nominated Ambassador James 
Pardew. Additionally, the OSCE announced former High Commissioner for 
National Minorities. Max Van der Stoel would replace Ambassador Frowick, and 
NATO dispatched Special Representative Peter Feith. Although Hans-Joerg Eiff 
would remain NATO's Ambassador to Macedonia, Mr. Feith was to assume the role 
of NATO envoy concentrating solely on the crisis. 
Meanwhile. President Trajkovski presented to parliament on 8 June, a strategy 
that included partial amnesty, disarmament ofthe NLA and reconstruction of 
destroyed houses. The government adopted the plan on 12 June, and on 14 June of 
200 I, President Trajkovski formally requested NATO's assistance in disarming the 
NLA if a political solution was reached. President Trajkovski then commenced 
discussions within the government on 15 June, which primarily concerned possible 
changes to the Macedonian constitution so as to alleviate the ethnic Albanian 
community's concerns. On 20 June, however. the discussions were declared 
completely deadlocked. Also on 20 June 200 I, the NAC issued a statement 
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responding to President Trajkovski's request for NATO assistance with 
demilitarization ofthe NLA. NATO (2001c) agreed to provide troops to supervise 
the disarming ofthe NLA predicated on four conditions: a peace agreement signed 
by the main parliamentary leaders; a status of forces agreement with Macedonia on 
conditions of NATO troop deployment; an agreed plan for weapons collection, 
including an explicit agreement by the NLA to disann; and an enduring cease-fire. 
On 5 July 2001. NATO succeeded in negotiating a cease-fire. thereby opening the 
way for a revitalized and augmented international community presence to revive the 
stalled political negotiations. 
Political Negotiation. 
On 7 July 2001, EU envoy Leotard and US envoy Pardew presented a single 
framework document to the negotiating parties that was to be the basis for further 
negotiation. This document was an extensive proposal drafted by domestic legal 
experts with assistance from French constitutional law expert Robert Badinter 
(Daftery 2001, 13; Kim 2001, 9). The first round of negotiations commenced on 9 
July, in Skopje. and included the four largest Macedonian political parties (VMRO-
DPMNE, SDSM, DPA and PDP); the EU, US, and OSCE special representatives; 
with NATO envoy Feith responsible for liaising with the NLA. The proposed 
document was harshly criticized by the Albanian parties and a counterproposal was 
prepared demanding ethnic Albanians be made a constituent people. Albanian 
language be equal Macedonian, the post of vice president be filled with an ethnic 
Albanian and have veto power, and transference of local police control to municipal 
authorities. Basically, these demands were a component of the DPA's political 
platform from the previous election. In response, international mediators met 
separately with the Albanian parties and prepared a revised document where the 
Albanian parties conceded the post of vice president and the constituent people 
demands. The second draft was presented to the Macedonian parties on 18 July, and 
likewise received a stout rejection. Prime Minister Georgievski stated acceptance of 
Albanian as an official language would lead to "language federalization" and 
condemned the "cowboy-like methods" of the international community mediators. 
In protest. Lord Robertson and Javier Solana canceled a trip to Skopje scheduled for 
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19 July, and the situation deteriorated elsewhere in the country with several cease-
fIre violations on both sides. 
After Ambassador Feith negotiated yet another cease-fire on 25 July. Lord 
Robertson and Javier Solana met with the four primary political parties on 26 and 27 
July, culminating with an announcement that political negotiations would resume. 
Although originally planned to resume in Tetovo, security concerns caused a shift to 
the southern resort town of Oh rid, where on 28 July 2001, the talks recommenced. 
The fIrst breakthrough came on 1 August, when the parties agreed Albanian would 
be considered an official language at the local level in areas where Albanians 
comprised at least 20 percent of the population. The next advance arrived on 5 
August, when the parties agreed on increasing Albanian representation in the police, 
while maintaining the police force under control of the central government. 
Ultimately, announcement was made on 8 August that a final agreement had been 
unofficially initialed, and would be officially signed in Skopje on 13 August 200 I. 
The period just prior to the official signing of the Ohrid Agreement, however, 
was to experience some of the most intense fighting of the conflict (Daftary 2001, 
14; Kim 2001,8; Rappoteur 2001, 10). On 7 August, fIve Albanians were killed 
during a police raid in Skopje, where a cache of weapons was also seized. In 
apparent retaliation, 18 Macedonian security forces were killed between 8 and 10 
August in two separate attacks near Skopje and Tetovo. On 12 August, Macedonian 
security forces killed at least fIve more Albanians. During this period of intense 
fighting ARM forces utilized attack helicopters and attack aircraft to drop bombs on 
suspected NLA held villages. Under heavy international community pressure, a 
unilatera] cease-fIre was declared by the government on the evening of 12 August, 
enabling a low-key official signing of the Ohrid Agreement on 13 August 2001. 
Sporadic violence continued to be reported, however, until 19 August, when Ali 
Ahmeti announced the NLA would honor the peace accord and surrender their 
weapons under NATO supervision. In exchange, President Trajkovski pledged 
amnesty to the NLA, excluding those suspected of war crimes. In total, the seven-
month conflict resulted in the deaths of82 members of the Macedonian Security 
forces, 16 civilians, 2 members ofthe OSCE, and approximately 200 ethnic 
Albanians (Pearson 2002, 9). UNHCR estimated the conflict created over 100 
thousand refugees and displaced persons, with over 70 thousand fleeing to Kosovo. 
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In light of the Ohrid Agreement signing. the President of the UN Security Council 
(2001d) issued a statement on 13 August 2001. welcoming the signing of the 
agreement. calling for full implementation Resolution 1345. and welcoming the 
concerted efforts of the EU. OSCE. and NATO in support of the agreement. 
Unfortunately. after nearly a decade of peace in an independent Macedonia the 
outbreak of armed ethnic conflict cost Macedonia its status of a model state and 
example of conflict prevention success. This was due to. in part, to international 
community abandonment of a strategy of simultaneity and connectivity as related to 
interstate and intrastate conflict prevention efforts. as well as a failure to recognize 
conflict prevention labors to date had not yet been nurtured to maturity. The 
reinstitution of security forces into the GSZ. coupled with the increased efforts of 
KFOR to secure the border between Kosovo and Macedonia finally constituted 
partial execution of the interstate component ofKFOR's mission as delineated in 
Resolution 1244 and the MTA. Although this interstate component of the KFOR 
and UNMIK mission technically related to an action internal to Kosovo, the 
functional quality of the mission was to negate the possibility of conflict diffusion 
from Kosovo to Macedonia, and later vice versa. The initial failure of KFOR or 
UNMIK to execute this task was a large contributor to the diffusion and contagion of 
conflict to Macedonia; however, once focus on the interstate aspect was increased, it 
assisted in isolating the Macedonian conflict so the intrastate efforts of the 
international community negotiators could conclude a peace agreement. 
6.3. Framework Agreement. 
Although commonly referred to as the Ohrid Agreement, in deference to the town 
in which it was initially agreed upon, the official title of the document is "The 
Framework Agreement of 13 August 2001", hereinafter referred to as the 
Framework Agreement. Reactions to the signing of the Framework Agreement 
varied within Macedonia. Prime Minister Georgievski, and the more nationalist 
political leaders, accused the international community of supporting Albanian 
terrorists and sought to distance themselves from the terms of the agreement, which 
they alleged was signed under international pressure (Daftary 2001,24; Kim 2001, 
10). The other less nationalistic Macedonian political parties and leaders, such as 
the SDSM, generally reacted positively and refrained from criticizing the agreement. 
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The Albanian political parties were in the main pleased with the agreement, but far 
from ecstatic. This was basically a result of relative deprivation. where rather than 
appreciate the positive gains that had been made. they chose to contemplate what 
ultimately could have been gained but was not. President Trajkovski was probably 
the most supportive. and concurrently realistic. regarding the agreement. He 
described the Framework Agreement as a path chosen by the legitimately elected 
leaders of both Macedonian and Albanian citizens, but his central line of reasoning 
was it was the only alternative to full-scale civil war. The NLA. though not fonnally 
included in the negotiations. did have indirect involvement through the NATO 
liaison connection as well as through unofficial ties with the Albanian political 
parties; and, in the end, Ali Ahmeti did admit to being pleased with the final 
outcome. Support for the agreement throughout the Macedonian population was 
likewise divided based upon ethnicity. The international community. however. was 
unanimous in its support of the Framework Agreement; although, given the mixed 
reactions cited above. concern over the proposed implementation timetable lingered. 
The Framework Agreement specifically required that parliament pass 
constitutional amendments and legislation implementing a revised law on local self-
government within 45 days of the signing. This passage was then linked to 
international community support further necessitated by the agreement. This was to 
prove difficult as a two-thirds majority of the 120 seat parliament was required to 
ratify any constitutional amendments or legislative modifications, and the opposed 
political party. VMRO-DPMNE. held 47 seats. Another complicating fact was the 
original agreement was in English and had to be translated. Regardless, the 
Macedonian parliament commenced debate on the Framework Agreement on 31 
August 2001. Stojan Andov, the Speaker of the Parliament, also happened to oppose 
the refonns and would periodically engage in delay tactics. On 6 September. the 
parliament gave initial endorsement ofthe agreement by a vote of 91 out of 112 
members present. which paved the way for further consideration regarding proposed 
changes. While this was a step in the right direction. a final vote was still required 
by 27 September, however. numerous contentious issues were to delay the final vote. 
First, some members ofthe parliament urged for consideration of a public 
referendum. Second. a primary concern from the Albanian side was the status of 
granting amnesty to fonner members of the NLA. While President Trajkovski 
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pledged amnesty in August, this was not formally an item within the Framework 
Agreement. Thirdly, the Macedonian side insisted in reopening the issue of 
constitutional wording related to the Macedonian people versus the Macedonian 
citizens. It took several visits to Skopje by Lord Robertson and ChiefSolana to 
finally revive the stalled parliamentary process. Eventually, albeit past the specified 
deadline, the constitution was amended on 16 November 200 I, the law of local self-
government was adopted on 22 January 2002, and the amnesty law was emplaced on 
26 February. 
Regardless of the mixed reactions to the signing, and the political delay in 
adopting the requisite amendments and legislation, the Framework Agreement was 
the document that brought the Macedonian conflict to a close. The Framework 
Agreement consists often sections, one of which contains three pertinent annexes, 
drafted to provide an agreed framework for securing the future of Macedonia's 
democracy and permitting the development of closer and more integrated relations 
with the Euro-Atlantic community, and to promote the peaceful and harmonious 
development of civil society while respecting the ethnic identity and interests of all 
Macedonian citizens (Framework Agreement 2001, 1). The nine sections of the 
agreement, not dealing with annexes, can be abridged into five primary endcavor 
areas (Rapporteur 200 I, 10-11). First, the Constitution will be amended to delete 
reference to the role of the Slav Macedonians as a constituent people, and to 
explicitly recognize the multiethnic nature of Macedonian society. Second, the 
agreement will introduce a system of "double majority" into parliament and the local 
public institutions, so that any vote will also call for a majority among the 
representatives of the "minority" population groups. Albanian will be used in a more 
widespread fashion and will become the official language of those regions in which 
Albanian speakers represent more than 20% of the population. Legislation will be 
drafted in both languages, so that Albanian will also become a language of 
parliament. Third, changes will be introduced into the civil service, Constitutional 
Court and police services to guarantee the proportional representation of different 
communities within Macedonia. Local government will be developed and its 
powers strengthened, particularly in regions where a minority group exceeds 20% of 
the local population. Fourth, the Macedonian government undertakes to finance and 
contribute to development of the use of the Albanian language for higher education, 
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in addition to primary and secondary education. in areas where Albanian speakers 
account for at least 20% of the population. Fina1Jy, a population census under 
international supervision is to be held by the end of2001 in order to establish the 
precise ethnic breakdown of the Macedonian population. Furthermore. all religions, 
including Islam, will enjoy the same status. 
Section 9 of the Framework Agreement contains the three annexes. Annex A 
delineates the requisite amendments to the preamble and articles 7, 8, 19, 48, 56, 69, 
77, 78, 84, 86, 104, 109, 114, 115, and 131 of the constitution. Annex B demarcates 
the necessary legislative modifications, as wel1 as the specified time limits. Annex 
C, though, is the most critical component ofthe Framework Agreement as it relates 
to the international community's role in conflict prevention efforts, and as such 
defines implementation and confidence-building measures. Annex C, entitled 
International Support, states ''The Parties invite the international community to 
facilitate, monitor and assist in the implementation of the provisions of the 
Framework Agreement and its annexes". Specifical1y, it requests the Council of 
Europe, OSCE, and other international organizations supervise and observe the 
impending census and elections; the UNHCR, European Commission and World 
Bank to assist in refugee return, rehabilitation and reconstruction; the international 
community as a whole to assist in development of decentralized government; the 
OSCE, EU and United States to support and assist with implementation of non-
discrimination and equitable representation practices related to training and 
assistance programs for police; and the OSCE to assist in programs for multiethnic 
culture, education and use of languages. 
The Macedonian conflict inflicted immense damage upon the social fabric of 
Macedonia, and erased any positive gains previously made by the conflict prevention 
efforts ofUNPROFOR and UNPREDEP. In seven months Macedonia went from a 
model of conflict prevention success to a country in need of international community 
conflict prevention efforts in the form of conflict resolution. The Framework 
Agreement was the document that would form the basis for all future intrastate 
conflict prevention efforts in Macedonia. This document, drafted by the 
international community and agreed upon by the Macedonian political leaders, 
bound the international community to assist in myriad long-term confidence-
building measures of a magnitude that would dwarf the earlier good offices mandate 
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of the UN. The practical implementation of these reforms was highly delicate and 
complex, given the far-reaching changes they entailed; and the process of reform, 
conducive to internal stability and economic development thereby providing hope of 
a fresh start for Macedonia, could not succeed without European and Euro-Atlantic 
involvement both in economic terms and in terms of security. The primary 
international community group of actors involved in the Framework Agreement 
implementation was to be NATO, the EU and the OSCE. Originally, the United 
States was to be included among the primary group of actors, but after the events of 
11 September 2001, the global priorities ofthe US were to shift. 
6.4. NATO 
Operation Essential Harvestffask Force Essential Harvest. 
As previously discussed, on 20 June 200 I, the NAC issued a statement 
responding to President Trajkovski's request for NATO assistance with 
demilitarization of the NLA. NATO (2001c) agreed to provide troops to supervise 
the disarming of the NLA predicated on four conditions: a peace agreement signed 
by the main parliamentary leaders; a status of forces agreement with Macedonia on 
conditions ofNA TO troop deployment; an agreed plan for weapons collection, 
including an explicit agreement by the NLA to disarm; and an enduring cease-fire. 
This proposed mission was designated Operation Essential Harvest. With the 
signing of the Framework Agreement, NATO determined sufficient progress had 
been made and decided to build upon positive momentum by announcing on 15 
August 2001, the NAC had authorized deployment of Task Force Harvest (TFH) 
headquarters and communications assets. The mission ofTFH was to collect arms 
and ammunition voluntarily turned over by ethnic Albanian insurgents and thereby 
assist in building confidence in the broader peace process. The fundamental tasks of 
TFH were: collection of weapons and ammunition from the NLA, transportation and 
disposal of capitulated weapons, and transportation and destruction of surrendered 
ammunition (NATO 200Id). The operation was to be of limited duration and 
conducted in three phases. Phase one included preparation, pre-deployment and 
deployment; phase two comprised weapons and ammunition collection, 
disposal/destruction of those items, and was not to exceed 30 days in length; and 
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phase three was the redeployment of all personnel. The NLA had agreed to the 
weapons collection plan, as well as provided a list of weapons and ammunition they 
planned on surrendering so as to comply with one of their confidence-building 
measure obligations. By agreement. it was the NLA's responsibility to dc-mine 
weapons caches and bring any hidden weapons to the collection sites. TFH's only 
mandate was to collect weapons that were voluntarily turned in by the armed 
extremists. 
Operation Essential Harvest was officially launched on 22 August and effectively 
commenced on 27 August 200 1 (NATO 2003b, 2). It was comprised of 
approximately 3,500 troops from 11 countries and charged with collecting 3,300 
weapons). The operation initiated amid disagreement between Macedonian 
authorities and NATO regarding the number of weapons the NLA was required to 
surrender. While NATO set the number at 3,300, the Macedonian government set 
the figure at least three times higher. The ensuing discussions caused ethnic 
Macedonians to again accuse NATO troops of supporting ethnic Albanians, which 
was probably a factor in the incident which cost one British soldier his life. On the 
evening of26 August 2001, a group of Macedonian youths threw a piece of concrete 
at a NATO vehicle, which shattered the windscreen and struck the TFH soldier on 
the head, killing him (BBC 2001). On 29 August 2001, Lord Robertson addressed 
the Macedonian parliament regarding the weapons issue and stated it was not the 
quantity of weapons surrendered that mattered, but rather the clear political signal 
provided by surrendering a weapon that was previously used for political ends 
(NATO 2001e). It was NATO's opinion that voluntary disarmament should be 
looked at as a confidence-building measure. As was the case in Kosovo, 
disarmament was to be primarily a symbolic rather than comprehensive affair. 
Collection sites were established within the NLA's operational areas. As agreed 
to with Macedonian authorities, collected weapons were destroyed at the collection 
point, and ammunition was transported to the Krivolak training range, in the central 
1 Contributing nations to Operation Essential Harvest were: Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, 
France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Turkey, United 
Kingdom and United States. Furthermore, several NATO nations deployed additional forces in 
support of their operational elements. NATO, AFSOUTH Operations, Operation Essen/ial Harvest 
http://www.afsouth.nato.intloperationslskoRjeJharvest.htm (2002e, 18, Dec) , 
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region of the country, where it was destroyed taking into account the potential 
environmental impact. Ammunition unsafe to move, however, was destroyed at the 
collection points. Operation Essential Harvest ended on 26 September 2001, with 
3,210 assault rifles, 483 machine guns, 161 mortars/anti-tank weapons, 17 air 
defense weapon systems, and 4 tanks/armored personnel carriers collected and 
destroyed (NATO 2001 f, 2). 
Concurrent with NATO's intrastate execution of Operation Essential Harvest, 
KFOR continued to increase their focus on the interstate aspect of their mission. By 
this time KFOR had dedicated 19 companies, comprised of2,500 soldiers to border 
monitoring duties, supported by sophisticated technologies such as electronic 
surveillance, infrared and thermal vision devices, and helicopter support. As 
reported in the 2 October, Secretary-General's (2001 f) report on UNMIK, since 4 
June 2001, KFOR had detained more than 1,200 individuals under the provisions of 
UNMIK Regulation 2001110, on the prohibition of unauthorized borderlboundary 
crossings. Additionally, since 31 May 2001, KFOR had seized over 1,100 rifles and 
pistols, close to 1,700 grenades, nearly 1,100 anti-tank weapons and about 170,000 
rounds of ammunition. These results were a function ofKFOR increasing their 
emphasis on the interstate component of their mission, as welJ as more KPS 
personnel fmally completing training and the KPS becoming a more professional 
and effective organization. These interstate efforts of KFOR contributed 
significantly to the isolation of the NLA in Macedonia. 
NATO (200 I f), declared Operation Essential Harvest a success upon its 
termination. It was noted violence had dramatically declined within Macedonia and 
a true commitment was being shown to end the fighting for good. While the 
mandate of Operation Essential Harvest was explicitly related to the voluntary 
collection of weapons, and did not entail any responsibility to ensure a safe and 
secure environment, the mere presence ofa sizeable quantity of NATO troops 
implicitly had a calming and reassuring effect throughout the country. Although 
merely a component of the overall Framework Agreement, successful conclusion of 
the mission was deemed an important and essential step in the inclusive peace 
process. The operation also paved the way for a further NATO deployment in 
Macedonia, this time in order to protect the OSCE and EU civilian monitors charged 
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with supervising application of the political and institutional arrangements contained 
in the Framework Agreement. 
Operation Amber FoxITask Force Fox. 
From the start of Operation Essential Harvest, many observers expressed 
concerns over a potential security vacuum that would result after departure of the 
3,500 NATO troops (Kim 2001, 13; Rapporteur 2110 16). The ethnic Albanian 
community desired an extended NATO military presence be maintained in the 
former conflict area out of fear of reprisals by extremist ethnic Macedonians 
following the departure ofTFH. The ethnic Macedonian community also favored an 
extended military presence, but preferred the EU or UN have direct political control 
over that presence in order to play down the role ofNA TO, considered to be pro-
Albanian due to its intervention in Kosovo. This option was not accepted by EU 
member states, which were of the opinion that European Security and De fen se 
Policy (ESDP) structures could not become operational on such short notice. 
Shortly afterward, the UN adopted Security Council (200Ie) Resolution 1371, on 26 
September 2001, reinforcing its commitment to Resolution 1345, and endorsing 
efforts of member states to establish a multinational security presence in country. 
Consequently, a NATO-led option garnered the most international community 
support, and on 19 September 200 I, President Trajkovski requested a "light" NATO 
presence subsequent to termination of Operation Essential Harvest. The NAC, on 26 
September, therefore agreed to the principle of deploying a new mission, entitled 
Operation Amber Fox. 
The mission officially started on 27 September 2001, with an initial three-month 
mandate, and was comprised of 1,000 troops. In actuality, however, the mission 
only entailed the deployment of 700 troops as the remaining 300 were to come from 
KFOR Rear soldiers already present in Skopje. While Germany provided the bulk of 
the mission, Denmark, France, Italy and the Netherlands also contributed forces. 
Operation Amber Fox was mandated to contribute to protection of the international 
monitors from the EU and OSCE, who were charged with overseeing 
implementation ofthe Framework Agreement. One of the principal tasks of the EU 
and OSCE was to accompany the return of refugees from both the Albanian and 
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Macedonian communities, as there was still estimated to be approximately 76,000 
refugees returning to Macedonia. 
Even though Operation Amber Fox had an initial mandate ofthree months, many 
thought it should stay in place longer, depending on the period of time needed to 
reform the Macedonian security forces in order to comply with the quota of ethnic 
Albanians stipulated in the Framework Agreement. Consequently, Operation Amber 
Fox was subsequently extended on 7 December 2001 (NATO 200 I g), for an 
additional three months; on 18 February 2002 (NATO 2002a), for an additional three 
months; on 21 May 2002 (NATO 2002b), for an additional four months; and on 11 
October 2002 (NATO 2002c), for an additional period oftime ending on 15 
December 2002. In total, Operation Amber Fox maintained a presence in 
Macedonia for nearly 15 months. 
During the time Task Force Fox (TFF) was executing its mission, the 
Macedonian government expressed dissatisfaction with attempting to negotiate the 
labyrinth-like headquarters elements ofNA TO located in Skopje. KFOR Rear, who 
also had operational control over TFF, actually reported to the KFOR Commander in 
Pristina, Kosovo; while the NCCC reported to AFSOUTH headquarters in Naples, 
Italy; and the NATO Ambassador to Macedonia and Senior Military Representative 
reported to NATO headquarters in Brussels, Belgium. Likewise, NATO was also 
searching for ways to streamline operations and reduce manpower and costs. 
Consequently, in early April of2002, the NATO Headquarters Skopje was created, 
thereby consolidating KFOR Rear, Operation Amber Fox, the NCCC and the NATO 
Senior Military Representative. The NATO Ambassador to Macedonia retained his 
direct link to Brussels. The mission of this new headquarters was to command all 
NATO forces in Macedonia, coordinate with the national support elements, 
cooperate with the Macedonian Ministry of Defense, and to support KFOR. This 
was a major political step in relations between Macedonia and NATO, as all NATO 
forces in Macedonia now fell under one headquarters, and were all in primary 
support to Macedonia as opposed to being assigned to KFOR, with an additional 
duty of supporting operations in Macedonia. This concrete separation of Kosovo 
and Macedonia from being one area ofmilitary operations greatly aided in 
eradicating the treatment of the Macedonia state and the province of Kosovo as one 
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operational entity, and enhanced the idea of Macedonia as a sovereign nation with a 
defined interstate border. 
In addition to transformation of the NATO headquarters structure, progress was 
also made in the cooperative relationship between Kosovo and Macedonia. On 18 
March 2001, the Security Council (2002a) reported the SRSG for Kosovo met with 
President Trajkovski and agreed to establish a Joint Expert Committee to address the 
practical situation on the ground resulting from the border demarcation agreement 
between the FRY and Macedonia. On 28 March an agreement was also reached on 
exchange ofinformation to combat organized crime and terrorism. Although 
previous agreements had been in place between Macedonia and the FRY, the 
establishment of Kosovo as a UN protectorate meant these agreements were not 
valid between Macedonia and KFOR, resulting in no legally defined mechanism for 
cooperative engagement along the border. The restructuring of the NATO 
headquarters in Skopje, and the agreements with KFOR and UNMIK on border 
demarcation and police cooperation, helped reestablish and redefine the interstate 
delineation of conflict prevention efforts between Kosovo and Macedonia. 
By December of2002, the security situation had progressed to the point where 
Operation Amber Fox was no longer required. At the conclusion of the mission, 
NATO (2003c) affirmed Operation Amber Fox was a remarkable example of how 
joint efforts ofthe International Community and Macedonian authorities resulted in 
bringing the country from the brink of civil war back on the track of further 
democratization and improvement of human rights through a process of dialog and 
reconciliation. While acknowledging that Operation Amber Fox could be 
successfully terminated, the NAC felt there was a requirement for a follow-on 
international military presence in the country so that risks of destabilization were 
minimized. In response to a request from President Trajkovski, the NAC agreed to 
continue supporting Macedonia with a new mission. 
Operation Allied Harmony. 
In order to demonstrate its commitment and support, NATO by invitation of the 
Government of Macedonia commenced a new mission, called Operation Allied 
Harmony, on 16 December 2002. Due to the greatly improved security environment 
in the country a special task force was no longer needed, resulting in the executive 
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command of the new NATO mission being given to the recently formed NATO 
Headquarters Skopje. The forces were reduced from 700 soldiers to about 450, and 
the initial mandate was to expire on 31 March 2003. 
Operation Allied Harmony consisted of both operational and advisory tasks along 
with other supportive activities as appropriate. The operational aspect of the mission 
comprised two components. First,liaison and monitoring operations focused on the 
former crisis areas were conducted in order to maintain links with authorities. forces, 
local leaders, local population and international community organizations. Second, 
was to demonstrate NATO's continued presence and commitment to facilitating the 
reconciliation process in order to promote stability by deterring the resurgence of 
ethnically motivated violence. The advisory facet of the m ission encompassed four 
functions. First, was to provide military advice to the country's authorities and 
defense security sector reform activities. Second, was to provide military advice to, 
and exchange information with, Macedonian authorities, KFOR and Albanian 
authorities on border security, smuggling interdiction and other matters as 
appropriate. Third, was to provide military advice, when necessary and appropriate, 
to Macedonian leaders to help coordinate bilateral and NATO offers of military 
training and resources. Finally, the last of the advisory functions was to provide 
military advice on organizational and training requirements. 
The overall goal of Operation Allied Harmony was to capitalize on the success of 
Operation Essential Harvest and Operation Amber Fox to assist the Macedonian 
government in taking ownership of security throughout the country (NATO 2002d). 
As such, NATO agreed to review the modalities of its continued presence in 
February of2003. As a result of this review of the current security environment in 
Macedonia, and based on a request from President Trajkovski to retain a presence, 
and agreement between NATO and the EU, a mutual decision was made to terminate 
the NATO operation and have the EU assume the next phase of the Framework 
Agreement implementation. Accordingly, Operation Allied Harmony concluded on 
31 March 2003, when the operational portion of the mission was effectively handed 
over to the EU. Through NATO (2003d) Headquarters Skopje, however, NATO 
was to retain the advisory role in the country so as to continue to assist in 




With the combined efforts of the International Community an end to the armed 
conflict was attained with the signing of the Ohrid Framework Agreement, thereby 
providing more rights to the ethnic Albanian population. NATO started its first 
mission in Macedonia on 26 August 2001. with Operation Essential Harvest. The 
aim ofthe mission was to collect weapons that were voluntarily handed over from 
NLA insurgents. NATO renewed its support and commitment to Macedonia by 
continuing its presence with a subsequent mission named Operation Amber Fox. 
launched on 26 September 2001. The mandate of Operation Amber Fox was to 
provide additional security to international community monitors in the crisis areas, 
while Macedonian authorities maintained primary security responsibility. Further 
democratization and improvement in human rights through the process of dialogue 
and reconciliation progressed significantly. and as a result of the vastly improved 
security environment in the country, the Macedonian leadership and NA TO decided 
to bring the mission to an end on 15 December 2002. By invitation of the 
Government of Macedonia. on 16 December 2002. NATO commenced a third 
mission. termed Operation Allied Harmony. Based on the enhanced security 
environment, a special task force was no longer needed and therefore the executive 
command of the new NATO mission was given to NATO Headquarters Skopje. The 
objective of Operation Allied Harmony was to provide operational. advisory and 
other supportive activities to assist Macedonia with normalization of modernization 
and democratization processes. and to contribute to the overall international 
community aim to bring confidence and stability to the country and region. On 31 
March 2002. NATO relinquished the operational component of Allied Harmony to 
theEU. 
While the mandate of Operation Essential Harvest was explicitly related to the 
voluntary collection of weapons. and did not entail any responsibility to ensure a 
safe and secure environment. the mere presence of a sizeable quantity of NATO 
troops, with a specific Macedonian mandate. implicitly had a calming and reassuring 
effect throughout the country. Although merely a component of the overall 
Framework Agreement, successful conclusion of the mission was dcemed an 
important and essential step in the inclusive peace process. Operation Amber Fox. 
initially predicated on the grounds of international community monitor protection. 
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however, had the supplementary benefit of furthering the credibility of the EU and 
OSCE observers. Thus, Operation Amber Fox signified a further vital and 
progressive step in the inclusive peace process. Operation Allied Harmony 
capitalized on the success of Operation Essential Harvest and Operation Ambcr Fox 
to assist the Macedonian government in taking ownership of security throughout the 
country. 
The execution of all three NATO operations, taken as a whole, represents a 
synchronized and successive progression to restore security, and ultimately have the 
host nation assume responsibility for that security. Concurrent with NATO's 
intrastate execution of Operations Essential Harvest, Amber Fox and Allied 
Harmony, KFOR continued to increase their focus on the interstate aspect of their 
mission. These KFOR efforts contributed significantly to the isolation of the NLA 
in Macedonia, and the ability of NATO to effectively execute their missions. 
Additionally, restructuring of the NATO headquarters in Skopje, and the agreements 
with KFOR and UNMIK. on border demarcation and police cooperation, helped 
reestablish and redefine the interstate delineation of conflict prevention efforts 
between Kosovo and Macedonia, also facilitating the ability ofNA TO to effectively 
execute their intrastate missions. NATO's efforts, however, only represented the 
security portion of the overall plan targeted toward the proximate and triggering 
sources of conflict, thereby allowing other members ofthe international community 
to implement their intrastate and interstate components of the Framework 
Agreement. 
6.5. European Union 
Involvement of the EU in Macedonia did not commence with assumption of the 
security mission at the cessation of Operation Allied Harmony, but had been ongoing 
for quite some time. In fact, between 1992 and 2000 Macedonia received some €475 
million ofEC assistance (EU 2004). On 9 April 2001, following the successful 
conclusion of negotiations at the Zagreb Summit of24 November 2000, Macedonia 
became the first country of the region to sign a Stabilization and Association 
Agreement (SAA). As a signatory, Macedonia would gradually take on board the 
core obligations of membership, start aligning its legal and economic framework 
with that of the EU, strengthen cooperation with its neighbors and cooperate with the 
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EU on a number of issues. An Interim Agreement covering the trade and trade-
related aspects ofthe SAA has been in effect since 1 June 2001, and provides near-
total free access to the EU-market. Through the Community Assistance for 
Reconstruction, Democratization and Stabilization (CARDS) Program, the EU 
additionally allocated Macedonia a budget of€173 million for the period 2001-2004, 
to support the country's efforts towards European Integration. The CARDS Program 
is a financial instrument firmly inserted into a well defined political context, the 
stabilization and association process, designed to favor the gradual integration of the 
countries of Southeast Europe into the structures of the European Union. Central to 
this strategy is the SAA. The primary objectives of EU assistance to Macedonia are 
to support achievements to date in the field of democracy by strengthening the 
institutional and administrative capacity of the state and of the actors of civil society; 
to assist the government at the central and local levels to facilitate the process of 
economic and social transformation towards a market economy; to bring Macedonia 
closer to EU standards and principles, and to assist the country in the framework of 
the Stabilization and Association Process; and to support the country in its efforts to 
give full implementation to the Framework Agreement. As a distinct component of 
the overall EU program of support to Macedonia, and to progressively harmonize its 
support to the Framework Agreement implementation, the EU (2003a) decided to 
conduct a military operation to follow the NATO led Operation Allied Harmony. 
Operation Concordia. 
The handover of authority from NATO to EU officials on 31 March 2003, 
indicated unprecedented coordination and cooperation between the two vital 
organizations, and consequently, one of NATO's most senior leaders, German Navy 
Admiral Rainer Feist, Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe, was appointed 
as Operational Commander thereby filling a pivotal role between the EU and NATO. 
The development of the NATO-EU strategic partnership and the agreements for EU 
access to NATO assets and capabilities for EU-Ied operations, the so-called "Berlin 
Plus" arrangements, were crucial in enabling the EU to take over NATO's mission. 
Admiral Feist (NATO 2003d) commented, upon inauguration of the new EU 
mission, that coordination, harmonization and mutual support between EU activities 
in Macedonia and the ongoing NATO operations Kosovo, would be essential to all 
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future planning. Thus, through agreement and coordination between the EU, NATO 
and Macedonia, the EU embarked upon its first military mission. code-named 
Operation Concordia. 
The operation was anticipated to be six months in duration. total 350 personnel 
from 13 EU Member States and 14 non-EU countries (EU 2003b). and was intended 
to complement and reinforce the EU's extensive and ongoing efforts to bring greater 
stability to the countri. The core aim of Operation Concordia was to contribute to a 
secure environment to allow the Macedonian government to implement the 
Framework Agreement, while the specific mission was to monitor the situation and 
show a visible international presence. In other words. the mission of Operation 
Concordia was fundamentally the same as the operational component of Operation 
Allied Harmony. On 4 July 2003, President Trajkovski invited the EU to extend 
Operation Concordia until 15 December 2003, and on 29 July of 2003, the EU 
(2003c) approved this action. Throughout the year-long execution of the EU's 
Operation Concordia, the mission directly assisted the international community's 
policy of confidence building through their visible presence in the former crisis 
areas. Hence, due to the increased level of stability and security, the Macedonian 
government invited the EU to assume a more enhanced role in policing support. 
Consequently, the EU (2003d) decided to terminate Operation Concordia on 15 
December 2003, and replace it with a new mission. During the ceremony marking 
the end of Operation Concordia, EU High Representative for Common Foreign and 
Security Policy, Javier Solana (EU 2003e). remarked the process towards 
stabiIization and normalization had reached a point in Macedonia where an 
international military presence for security was no longer necessary as the main 
threat to stability was no longer armed conflict but criminality, and as such the 
emphasis of support should be police and not military. 
2 Military personnel from thirteen EU Member States (Ireland and Denmark did not participate) and 
from fourteen non-EU countries (all ten Central and Eastern European accession countries, Norway, 
Iceland, Turkey and Canada) were involved in the operation. EU Military Operation Informer 




The EU, established Mission Proxima on 15 December 2003. The mandate of the 
mission was for a period of one year, and included the services of200 personnel, to 
monitor, mentor and advise Macedonia's police thus helping to fight organized 
crime as well as promoting European policing standards. Specifically, Mission 
Proxima was designed to support: the consolidation oflaw and order, including the 
fight against crime; the practical implementation and comprehensive reform of the 
Ministry of Interior, including the police; the operational transition toward, and 
creation of, a border police as part of a wider EU effort to promote integrated border 
management; and the local police in building confidence within the population and 
the enhancing cooperation with neighboring states in the field of policing (EU 
2003f). As such, Mission Proxima is a partnership with the Ministry of Interior and 
other relevant authorities, to contribute toward poJice reforms required within the 
implementation of the Framework Agreement. 
European Union Synopsis. 
The European Union's contribution was based on a broad approach with 
activities to address the entire spectrum of rule of law aspects, including institution 
building programs and police activities that were mutually supportive and 
reinforcing. These specific activities related to the rule of law were further 
supported by the European Community'S CARDS Program and contributed to the 
overall peace implementation, as well as to a more stable environment in which the 
Macedonian government and international community could implement the 
Framework Agreement. Operation Concordia and Mission Proxima must be 
considered separate but mutually reinforcing operations, which were equally separate 
but mutually reinforcing to those operations executed by NATO. Additionally, these 
missions targeted primarily toward the structural sources of conflict were executed 
in full coordination and synchronization with other institution-building projects, as 
well as the OSCE and national bilateral programs. The simultaneous focus of EU 
efforts toward enhancing the overall effectiveness of internal police actions, along 
with the further development ofthe border police to promote integrated border 
management, reflects a simultaneous and connected methodology toward both 
intrastate and interstate aspects of the mission. 
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6.6. OSCE 
The original mandate of the CSCE/OSCE Spillover Monitor Mission to Skopje 
called on the mission to monitor developments along the borders with Serbia in 
order to preserve territorial integrity; promote the maintenance of peace, stability and 
security; and help prevent possible conflict diffusion in the region (OSCE 2004b). 
On 22 March 2001, the OSCE (2001 b), noting an upsurge of violent actions by 
ethnic Albanian armed groups in the northern border regions of Macedonia, decided 
to increase the size of the Mission by eight personnel to a total of 16. The 
additional staff members were to concentrate particularly in the border area, with a 
view to strengthening the capabilities of the mission to monitor developments along 
the border and report. On 7 June 2001, as the internal crisis in Macedonia was 
escalating, the OSCE (2001c) decided to additionally augment the size of the 
Mission by ten personnel, to a total of26, and under the same justification and 
mandate. Following the seven-month conflict, the Framework Agreement outlined 
steps to be taken to ensure the functioning of democratic structures, the advancement 
toward Euro-Atlantic institutions and the development of a civil society respecting 
ethnic identity. The implementation of these objectives was clarified primarily in 
the three annexes ofthe agreement, and according to Annex C the OSCE was invited 
to assist in a number of specific task areas in addition to the original mandate. These 
areas included: redeployment of police to the former crisis areas; assistance to the 
government to increase representation of non-majority communities in public 
administration, military and public enterprises; strengthening oflocal self-
government institutions; projects in the area of rule oflaw; projects in the area of 
media development; and continuing support for the engagement of the High 
Commissioner on National Minorities in the field of education (Framework 
Agreement 2001; OSCE 2004c). 
After a request from the Macedonian Minister for Foreign Affairs, I1inka Mitreva, 
on 6 September 2001, the OSCE (200Id) decided to further increase the size of the 
Mission by 25 personnel to a total of 51. These additional personnel were to monitor 
and report regularly on the security situation in Macedonia, including: the situation 
in the northern border areas including illicit arms trafficking; the humanitarian 
situation, including the return of refugees and internally displaced persons and 
trafficking in human beings; the situation in sensitive places with communities not 
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in the majority; and cases of incidents and recurrence of hostilities. They were not, 
however, to monitor the arms collection process or conduct operations aimed 
exclusively at observing compliance with the ceasefire, as that fell within the 
spectrum ofNA TO operations. 
Finally, on 28 September 200 1, the OSCE (200 1 e) decided again to further 
increase the number of mission personnel based on guidance from Annex C of the 
Framework Agreement. The Permanent Council authorized an additional 72 
confidence-building monitors, 60 police advisors, 17 police trainers and 10 
administrators to deal with support matters. The additional confidence-building 
monitors were to operate under the original interstate oriented mandate, while the 
police advisors were deployed to the sensitive areas concurrently with the phased 
redeployment of the national police. Their role was to assist in ensuring a phased 
and coordinated redeployment by the national police. The police trainers were to 
assist in implementation of the Police Academy project. In accordance with Annex 
C, this increase in personnel added a specific intrastate component to the mandate of 
the OSCE mission. 
By mid 2004, the OSCE (2004b) mission in Skopje had transformed into five 
separate, but integrated, units operating under a single headquarters structure. The 
Confidence-Building Unit contributes to the maintenance of stability and security in 
the country and to the building of general confidence amongst the population by 
regularly reporting on issues impacting the security situation, as well as 
humanitarian and development needs, return of refugees and internally displaced 
persons, and trafficking in human beings. The Public Administration Reform 
Department promotes decentralization as a key to strengthening democracy, where 
the inclusion oflocal government reform in the Framework Agreement provided 
new momentum to the transformation process. The Rule of Law Unit supports the 
government's efforts to strengthen the rule of law in the country by bolstering 
domestic institutions and mechanisms with a view toward long-tern structural 
change. The Police Development Unit assists the government in police training and 
institutional reform by striving to increase citizens' trust and confidence in law 
enforcement, and to develop the institutional foundation upon which a community-
based multiethnic police service can be built. The Media Development Unit works 
to make assistance to the local media a priority of the international community by 
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increasing its assistance for non-majority language media. These five units are 
integrated within the overall OSCE mission, while the OSCE headquarters element 
then ensures coordination and integration with the EU, UN, NATO and other 
international organizations operating within the country. 
OSCE Synopsis. 
As a result ofthe OSCE Permanent Council decisions, between 7 June and 28 
September of2001, the size of the OSCE mission in Skopje increased from 8 
personnel to a total of21O; while the mandate evolved from one dealing solely with 
the interstate focus of monitoring, to a combined interstate and intrastate tripartite 
focus of monitoring, police training and development, and other political activities 
related to the implementation of the Framework Agreement such as media reform, 
rule of law and election monitoring. Additionally, OSCE mission activities were 
integrated and coordinated with other active organizations in the country, primarily 
the UN, EU and NATO, as well as with Macedonian government officials. Thus, the 
OSCE mandate evolved to incorporate triggering, proximate and structural sources 
of conflict, and was implemented in a multifaceted and multilevel fashion 
representative of a synergy of intervention. 
6.7. Conclusions. 
When conflict in Macedonia finally emerged, the international community was 
essentially caught ignorant of the severity ofthe situation due primarily to a willful 
determination to view the country as the region's lone multiethnic success story 
among the scattered remnants of the former Yugoslavia's nationalist wars (Pearson 
2002, 13). As a result ofUNPREDEP's achievements, Macedonia had been held up 
as a model of successful conflict prevention, although an imperfect one, of 
interethnic coexistence and democratic rule, with active participation of the Albanian 
community in political institutions (Kim 200 I, 1). As a result, this was the image 
the international community believed and propagated. While the international 
community was focused on Kosovo, ethnic tensions continued to fester in 
Macedonia. In spite of evident progress made by the Macedonian government 
regarding concerns of the Albanian minority, the slow pace of that progress acted as 
fertile ground for the NLA. The minimal size of the OSCE element left behind and 
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charged with the conflict prevention mission in Macedonia, albeit from an interstate 
focused mandate, was insufficient to mount a viable strategy of simultaneity and 
connectivity for both interstate and intrastate threats. This, coupled with the similar 
inability ofKFOR and UNMIK to contain ethnic Albanian insurgents within Kosovo 
by executing the interstate component of their mission, facilitated the state of 
conflict Macedonia was encountering. After nearly a decade of peace in an 
independent Macedonia, the outbreak of armed ethnic conflict cost Macedonia its 
status of a model state and example of conflict prevention success. This was due in 
part to the lack of inclusion of the structural sources of conflict, coupled with the 
lack of multifaceted and multilevel action, and culminated with the absence of any 
type of intervention synergy. As a result, the international community abandoned a 
strategy of simultaneity and connectivity as related to interstate and intrastate 
conflict prevention efforts, as well as a failed to recognize conflict prevention labors 
to date had not yet been nurtured to maturity. The situation in Macedonia was then 
exacerbated by the conflict prevention efforts in Kosovo. 
Facing an imminent crisis, 21 March 2001, resulted in three events on behalf of 
the international community that would raise the level of awareness and activity in 
the new Macedonian conflict: NATO issued a statement reiterating condemnation of 
extremist groups operating in Macedonia, and promised to dispatch Ambassador 
Hans-Joerg Eiffto supplement the NATO Liaison Office in Skopje; the OSCE 
announced Ambassador Robert Frowick, was to act as the Personal Representative 
for the situation in Macedonia; and the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 
1345. NATO emphasized their measure was in full cooperation with other 
organizations such as the EU, OSCE and UN, thereby indicating integrated 
international community determination to support stability in the region. The OSCE 
also underlined they were prepared to participate together with other international 
organizations in a coordinated effort to settle the crisis in northern Macedonia. The 
Security Council welcomed the international efforts ofUNMIK. KFOR. EU, OSCE, 
NATO, and the Macedonian government to prevent the escalation of ethnic tensions 
in the area. Thus, the adoption of Resolution 1345 represented the return of the 
international community to conflict prevention efforts in Macedonia, targeted toward 
the simultaneous and connected aspects of both interstate and intrastate conflict 
prevention in a multifaceted and synchronized approach. 
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The reinstitution of security forces into the GSZ, coupled with the increased 
efforts ofKFOR to secure the border between Kosovo and Macedonia finally 
constituted partial execution of the interstate component ofKFOR's mission as 
delineated in Resolution 1244 and the MTA. Although this interstate component of 
the KFOR and UNMIK mission technically related to an action internal to Kosovo, 
the functional quality ofthe mission was to negate the possibility of conflict 
diffusion from Kosovo to Macedonia, and later vice versa. The initial failure of 
KFOR or UNMIK to execute this task was a large contributor to contagion and 
diffusion of conflict to Macedonia; however, once focus on the interstate aspect was 
increased. it assisted in isolating the Macedonian conflict so the intrastate efforts of 
the international community negotiators could conclude a peace agreement. 
The Macedonian conflict inflicted immense damage upon the social fabric of 
Macedonia, and erased any positive gains previously made by the conflict prevention 
efforts ofUNPROFOR and UNPREDEP. In seven months Macedonia went from a 
model of conflict prevention success to a country in need of international community 
conflict prevention efforts in the form of conflict resolution. The Framework 
Agreement was the document that would form the basis for all future intrastate 
conflict prevention efforts in Macedonia. This document, drafted by the 
international community and agreed upon by the Macedonian political leaders, 
bound the international community to assist in myriad long-term confidence-
building measures ofa magnitude that would dwarf the earlier good offices mandate 
ofthe UN. The practical implementation ofthese reforms was highly delicate and 
complex, given the far-reaching changes they entailed; and the process of reform, 
conducive to internal stability and economic development and thereby providing 
hope of a fresh start for Macedonia, could not succeed without European and Euro-
Atlantic involvement both in economic terms and in terms of security. As such, the 
Framework Agreement represented the international community's return to a conflict 
prevention mandate with all four factors of successful conflict prevention addressing 
all three sources of conflict. The primary international community group of actors 
involved in the Framework Agreement implementation was to be NATO, the EU 
and the OSeE. Originally, the United States was to be included among the primary 
group of actors, but after the events of 11 September 2001, the global priorities of 
the US were to shift. 
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The execution of all three NATO operations, taken as a whole, represents a 
synchronized and successive progression to restore security, and ultimately have the 
host nation assume responsibility for that security. Concurrent with NATO's 
intrastate execution of Operations Essential Harvest, Amber Fox and Allied 
Harmony, KFOR continued to increase their focus on the interstate aspect oftheir 
mission. These KFOR efforts contributed significantly to the isolation of the NLA 
in Macedonia, and the ability ofNA TO to effectively execute their missions. 
Additionally, the restructuring ofthe NATO headquarters in Skopje, and the 
agreements with KFOR and UNMIK on border demarcation and police cooperation, 
helped reestablish and redefine the interstate delineation of conflict prevention 
efforts between Kosovo and Macedonia, also facilitating the ability of NATO to 
effectively execute their intrastate missions. NATO's efforts, however, only 
represented the security portion of the overall plan thereby allowing other members 
ofthe international community to implement their intrastate components of the 
Framework Agreement. 
The European Union's contribution was based on a broad approach with 
activities to address the entire spectrum of rule of law aspects, including institution 
building progr8!I1s and police activities that should be mutually supportive and 
reinforcing. These specific activities related to the rule of law were further 
supported by the European Community's CARDS Program and contributed to the 
overall peace implementation, as well as to a more stable environment in which the 
Macedonian government and international community could implement the 
Framework Agreement. Operation Concordia and Mission Proxima must be 
considered separate but mutually reinforcing operations, which were equally separate 
but mutually reinforcing to those operations executed by NATO. Additionally, these 
missions were executed in full coordination and synchronization with other 
institution building projects, as well as the OSCE and national bilateral programs. 
The simultaneous focus ofEU efforts toward enhancing the overall effectiveness of 
internal police actions, along with the further development of the border police to 
promote integrated border management, reflects a simultaneous and connected 
methodology toward both intrastate and interstate aspects of the mission. 
As a result ofOSCE Permanent Council decisions, between 7 June and 28 
September of2001, the size of the OSCE mission in Skopje increased from 8 
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personnel to a total of21O; while the mandate evolved from one dealing solely with 
the interstate focus of monitoring, to a combined interstate and intrastate tripartite 
focus of monitoring, police training and development, and other political activities 
related to the implementation of the Framework Agreement such as media reform, 
rule oflaw and election monitoring. Additionally, OSCE mission activities were 
integrated and coordinated with other active organizations in the country, primarily 
the UN, EU and NATO, as well as with Macedonian government officials. Thus, 
the OSCE mandate developed to incorporate triggering, proximate and structural 
sources of conflict, and was implemented in a multifaceted and multilevel fashion 
representative of a synergy of intervention. 
In sum, this chapter examines the reestablishment of the international community 
in conflict prevention in Macedonia, targeted toward the simultaneous and connected 
aspects of both interstate and intrastate conflict prevention in a multifaceted and 
multilevel approach representative of a synergy of intervention. The execution of all 
three NATO intrastate operations in Macedonia, concurrent with KFOR's, increase 
on the interstate aspect of their Kosovo mission represents a synchronized and 
successive progression to reestablish and redefine the interstate delineation of 
conflict prevention efforts between Kosovo and Macedonia. The simultaneous focus 
ofEU efforts toward enhancing the overall effectiveness of internal police actions, 
along with the further development of the border police to promote integrated border 
management, as well reflects a simultaneous and connected methodology toward 
both intrastate and interstate aspects of the mission. The OSCE mission mandate 
evolution from one dealing solely with the interstate focus of monitoring, to a 
combined interstate and intrastate tripartite focus of monitoring, police training and 
development, and other political activities equally embodies a concurrent and linked 
methodology toward both intrastate and interstate facets of conflict prevention. In 
total, the combined actions of the international community in Macedonia from the 
adoption of Resolution 1345 until the present; exemplify a simultaneous, 
multifaceted and multilevel utilization of the full spectrum of conflict prevention 
tools toward the triggering, proximate and structural sources of conflict in a 
synergistic strategy of simultaneity and connectivity as related to a nexus of 
interstate and intrastate conflict prevention efforts. Consequently, the reinstatement 
of a strategy of simultaneity and connectivity regarding a nexus of interstate and 
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intrastate conflict prevention efforts toward Macedonia generated the requisite 
conditions for successful peace implementation and conflict prevention. 
The following table, Figure 6.1, provides a chronological summary of the relevant 
international community involvement regarding conflict prevention efforts in 
Macedonia from the Adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 1345 through the 
writing of this dissertation in 2004. 
Figure 6.): eh rono ogyo eevan n rna IOna fR I tlte f le 't I ommum v nvo vemen: ase t Ph III 
Date Focus __ "~lllr£~_ 
2001, Mar 21 UN strongly condemns violence in Macedonia and southern UN SC Res 1345 
FRY, and notes outside Albanian extremist SUp~lrt 
2001. Mar 22 oseE strengthens Spillover Monitor Mission to Sk()pj~ ___ OS(,E Decision 40~ 
2001, May 13 National Unity Government Formed M~~ed(;~i~n""--""--
Government 
2001, May 24 UNMIK promulgates prohibition on unauthorized UNMIK Reg--2(X)"j-TIO" 
borderlboundary crossings 
2001, June 7 OSCE further enhances Sj>illover Monitor Mission to Sk.Q'pj~ OSCE DI.'Cision 414 
2001, June 14 Macedonia requests NATO assistance in disarming NLA Maccdt~nfan----
Government 
. ---_."._._-
200 I, June 20 NATO agrees to assist in NLA disarmament, with conditions NA TO Statement 
First round of negotiations commence in Skopje 
~-~.---~ ... - .. -.- .. -.--~ .... _-
2001, July 9 E.~f.1J~~~!:~~iL 
2001, July 28 Second round of negotiations commence in Ohrid B!J/lJS ~_!i()~_~}L 
2001, Aug 13 Ohrid Agreement signed "~>",!!:i_~._t\"g~~~~~.!'_t __ 
2001, Aug 22 NATO commences Operation Essential Harvest NAC Decision -_. __ ._-,--_.,-----
2001, Sep 6 oseE further enhances Spillover Monitor Mission to Sk()PL OSCE Decision 437 ._-_._-_. __ .. __ ._._-_._-" 
2001, Sep 10 UN terminates prohibitions against sale or supply of weapons UN SC Res 1367 
to Yugoslavia. and dissolves SC Committee on Kosovo 
2001, SeP 23 NATO terminates Operation Essential Harvest " NAC I>~~~sion 
2001, Sep 23 NATO commences Operation Amber Fox NAC Decision 
2001, Sep 26 UN reinforces se Res 1345 UN "SC-R~-13 71 
2001, Sep 28 OSCE quadruples Spillover Monitor Mission to Skopje, and OSCE Dt:cision 439 
broadens mandate 
2002, Dee 15 NATO terminates Operation Al11ber Fox NAC Decision 
2002, Dec 16 NATO commenc~tion Al!ied Harmony "NAC-D~isi~~~---
t---= 
NA TO termi~ates Operation Allied Harmony 
- .•... --.......................... _--
2003, Mar 31 "~~(Lgecisi()n 
2003, Mar 31 EU launches Operation Concordia EC DI.'Cision------
2003/92/{,FSI> 
2003, Dec 15 EU terminates Operation Concordia EC Decision 
_~003/681/~ySP 




Chapter 7: Conclusions, Limitations 
and Theoretical Implications 
The central and overarching question this thesis addressed is why some conflict 
prevention efforts succeed where others fail? Within that context, the specific 
question examined was what is the relationship, ifany, concerning the appliance of 
interstate and intrastate conflict prevention fundamentals, as they relate to overall 
success. This study took a two-level approach to conflict prevention, that of 
interstate and that of intrastate. The first independent variable was the level of 
interstate conflict prevention efforts, defined as the degree to which the international 
community advocates and pursues policies to inhibit or mitigate the occurrence of 
interstate conflict. These interstate efforts were based on conflict prevention actions 
designed to promote effective international regimes, stable and viable countries, and 
create a secure environment by providing the necessary security for government to 
function. The second independent variable was the level of intrastate conflict 
prevention efforts, defined as the degree to which the international community 
advocates and pursues actions designed to inhibit or mitigate the occurrence of 
intrastate conflict. These intrastate efforts were based on conflict prevention actions 
designed to promote and establish political systems characterized by representative 
government, open economies with social safety nets enabling socioeconomic and 
humanitarian needs to be met, and egalitarian justice systems. The confluence of 
these two variables determined this study's dependent variable: the level of conflict 
prevention effectiveness, defined as the degree to which the international community 
created an environment for conflict to be prevented by advocating and pursuing 
actions designed to inhibit or mitigate the occurrence of interstate and intrastate 
conflict through a strategy of simUltaneity and connectivity. 
Whereas conflict was traditionally perceived as either interstate or intrastate, the 
fungible nature of contemporary conflict has a tendency to shift along a sliding scale 
between interstate and intrastate. Intrastate conflict easily permeates across existing 
state borders to form regional conflict complexes; conversely, regional conflict 
dynamics can impact readily on the internal processes of neigh boring states. I 
proposed a logical assumption that as the nexus between interstate and intrastate 
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conflict is inherently linked in a larger strategic calculus, so too should be the 
theoretical and conceptual foundations, and practical application, of apposite conflict 
prevention efforts in the form of a strategy of simultaneity and connectivity. 
Simultaneity was defined as the process of advocating and pursuing policies to 
inhibit or mitigate the occurrence ofinterstate and intrastate conflict in a concurrent 
and synchronous manner, while connectivity was defined as the linkage and degree 
by which the processes of advocating and pursuing policies to inhibit or mitigate the 
occurrence of interstate and intrastate conflict are associated and conjoined. The 
concepts of simultaneity and connectivity are integrally linked in myriad modes and 
do not create mutually exclusive categories. Together, these two terms form a 
strategy of simultaneity and connectivity, whereby the process of advocating and 
pursuing policies to inhibit or mitigate the occurrence of interstate and intrastate 
conflict are associated and conjoined in a concurrent and synchronous manner. It 
was argued that it is this critical and very delicate nexus between interstate and 
intrastate conflict prevention efforts on the part of the international community that 
is ultimately responsible for success or failure. 
As such, this hypothesis was tested on the critical conflict prevention efforts 
applied by the international community tow~ds Macedonia from independence in 
1991 until the present. Within that temporal interval three discrete phases were 
patently differentiated: the pre-Kosovo phase, the Kosovo Intervention phase and the 
post-Kosovo phase. The pre-Kosovo phase incorporated the temporal period from 
independence in 1991 until the end of the United Nations mandate in 1999. During 
this period conflict prevention efforts were predominantly administered by the 
United Nations, although experiencing several transitional stages throughout the 
phase. The Kosovo intervention phase addressed conflict prevention efforts in 
Macedonia from the end of the United Nations mandate, through the NATO air 
campaign and conflict resolution stage, until adoption of UN Security Council 
Resolution 1345 in March of2001. Throughout this phase, while minimal conflict 
prevention efforts continued within Macedonia, the international focus had become 
Kosovo with Macedonia assuming a peripheral or tangential significance. The post-
Kosovo phase attended to conflict prevention efforts from the adoption of UN 
Security Council Resolution 1345 until the writing of this thesis in 2004. It was the 
adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 1345 that marked the return of 
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international community conflict prevention efforts targeted specifically towards 
Macedonia. Thus, the Macedonian case of conflict prevention was selected as it 
allowed within-case comparison similar to a cross-case comparison, although 
providing more structure in holding the dependent variable constant. 
7.2. Summary of Findings 
The central argument of this thesis was the existence of a critical and very 
delicate nexus between interstate and intrastate conflict prevention efforts on the part 
of the international community that is ultimately responsible for success or failure. 
As such, a strategy of simultaneity and connectivity, whereby the process of 
advocating and pursuing policies to inhibit or mitigate the occurrence of interstate 
and intrastate conflict are associated and conjoined in a concurrent and synchronous 
manner, must be adopted and applied as a condition for successful conflict 
prevention. The negation of this nexus of interstate or intrastate conflict prevention 
efforts can result in the precondition for the outbreak or resumption of conflict. In 
the first and third phases of the Macedonian case, there exists a synchronized and 
fused execution of multifaceted international community conflict prevention etTorts 
exemplifYing a strategy of simultaneity and connectivity, resulting in successful 
conflict prevention. In the second phase, the obverse occurs where the absence of a 
strategy of simultaneity and connectivity regarding a nexus of interstate and 
intrastate conflict prevention efforts fostered and enabled conflict diffusion and 
contagion to Macedonia. Hence, there appears to be direct correlation between the 
application of international community efforts targeted toward a nexus of interstate 
and intrastate conflict prevention through a strategy of simultaneity and connectivity, 
and the success or failure of those efforts. 
Phase 1 
Whereas traditional peacekeeping efforts were a result of international 
community failure to prevent conflict, the deployment ofUNPROFOR to Macedonia 
represented a major shift regarding international policy, perspective and emphasis 
toward conflict prevention. As opposed to being deployed between two states to 
prevent the recurrence of conflict, UNPROFOR was deployed within a state; with 
that state's consent and upon their request, to prevent the possible outbreak of 
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conflict. The conditions upon UN authorization of the mission were a fusion of 
interstate and intrastate threats to peace and stability, both within the country and 
within the region. Macedonia acquired independence exposed to interstate threats 
from all four bordering states, and overshadowed by regional instability in the form 
of violent conflict in the former Yugoslavia. From an intrastate perspective, three 
primary challenges confronted the country: the need for democratic transformation. 
the socioeconomic situation, and interethnic tensions. The intrastate challenges were 
all integrally connected. and subject to, the interstate threats to the country; as well 
as overall regional instability. 
The principaljustitication for authorization ofUNPROFOR deployment was 
primarily from an interstate focus as a result of the overt threat to Macedonia from 
adjacent states, and exacerbated by regional instability. As fears within the 
international community mounted regarding the possibility of interstate conflict such 
as had already occurred between Serbia, Croatia, and Bosnia, so too, did intrastate 
ethnic fears mount within Macedonia regarding the future functioning ofthe country. 
Likewise, various interstate threats were subject to increase as a result of intrastate 
ethnic tension. 
From the establishment ofUNPROFOR on 11 December 1992 to the approval of 
the SRSG to utilize his good offices in March 1994. the primary mission of 
UNPROFOR was to monitor the border and report any developments that could pose 
a threat to the country; and deter, by their presence, such threats or clashes between 
Macedonian and external forces. As such. the focus ofthe mission was 
predominantly of an interstate nature, and primarily targeted toward the triggering 
and proximate sources of conflict.. However, it was through the reports of UN MO 
and CIVPOL personnel that the severity of the intrastate threat was identified and 
brought to the attention of the UN and the international community. 
These reports further succeeded in identifying the complexities of the nexus of 
interstate and intrastate factors as a causative agent for economic and political 
uncertainty, and rising social tensions. Initially deployed to prevent the diffusion of 
interstate conflict to the newly independent Macedonia, it soon became evident that. 
although UNPROFOR was successfully executing their mission in this regard, there 
existed a simultaneous threat of diffusion and/or contagion of intrastate conflict not 
being addressed by UNPROFOR forces. This intrastate threat posed both the 
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possibility of diffusion from Kosovo, as well as contagion from Kosovo, Bosnia, 
Croatia, and Serbia. Thus, in an adaptive and evolutional step the utilization of the 
good offices of the SRSG was approved and implemented. 
The identification of the necessity of an intrastate mandate to compliment the 
interstate mandate, and approval of the SRSG to utilize his good offices, were to 
adjust the mandate so as to include structural sources of conflict. By incorporating 
the structural sources of conflict within the mandate already addressing the 
triggering and proximate sources of conflict, international community conflict 
prevention efforts were to expand and integrate the degree of multifaceted and 
multilevel action, thereby creating synergy of intervention. This willful transition on 
the part ofthe international community signifies the genesis and true essence of a 
strategy of simultaneity and connectivity toward interstate and intrastate conflict 
prevention efforts. 
From the approval for the SRSG to utilize his good offices on 31 March 1994, to 
the decision that UNPROFOR within Macedonia would from that point on be 
known as UNPREDEP on 31 March 1995, the broadened political mandate created a 
qualitative dimension that facilitated expansion of traditional conflict prevention 
techniques; and was to develop into a fundamental element of the inclusive mandate. 
While the military forces ofUNPROFOR monitored the borders for interstate 
aggression, the good offices mandate allowed engagement to prevent intrastate 
conflict. Whereas UNPROFOR's political effort had focused on strengthening 
mutual understanding and dialogue among political parties and on monitoring 
human rights; UNPROFOR's military component had in tandem mediated several 
tense border encounters, achieving the withdrawal of soldiers on both sides of the 
disputed border. Ifviolent intrastate ethnic conflict were allowed to ignite within 
Macedonia, there existed a fervent risk of conflict diffusion across state borders and 
escalation into interstate conflict. Likewise, a military presence on the borders was 
requisite to prevention of more serious border incursions that could have escalated 
into violent interstate conflict, which consecutively could have further exacerbated 
intrastate tensions. 
In light of the manifest multifaceted nexus of interstate and intrastate factors as a 
causative agent for rising social tensions, and economic and political uncertainty; the 
authorization for the SRSG to utilize his good offices as appropriate to contribute to 
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the peace and stability of Macedonia served to assimilate the structural sources of 
conflict within the mandate that already encompassed the triggering and proximate 
sources of conflict. In so doing, conflict prevention efforts on the part of the 
international community were to simultaneously target the triggering, proximate and 
structural sources of conflict in Macedonia, in a connected endeavor of multi faceted 
and multilevel action exhibiting a synergy of intervention. These efforts represent a 
synchronized and fused execution of international community interstate and 
intrastate conflict prevention actions exemplifying a strategy of simultaneity and 
connectivity. 
From the decision that UNPROFOR within Macedonia would oflicially transition 
to UNPREDEP on 31 March 1995, until the termination of the UNPREDEP 
mandate on 28 February 1999, the interstate threat was to vacillate in intensity and 
shift between specific threats to regional stability. The UNPREDEP presence on 
along the borders was initially intended as a forewarning against any overt military 
incursion, nevertheless, it appended the collateral advantage of deterring cross-
border smuggling and passage of illegal immigrants. In all cases, however, the 
existence ofUNPRRDEP executing its mandate on the borders of Macedonia, with 
respect to interstate threats, served not only as a deterrent, but also provided a 
calming and stabilizing effect within the interior of the country. In sequence, this 
permitted engagement within the broadened mandate of good offices, which 
facilitated extension of traditional conflict prevention techniques into conflict 
resolution; and thereby contributed to the promotion of dialogue, restraint and 
practical compromise between dissimilar segments of society. Altogether, the 
mandate ofUNPREDEP required interface with diverse aspects of Macedonia's 
interstate and intrastate circumstances ranging from preventive deployment and 
patrolling to early warning, fact-finding, monitoring and reporting, good oflices, 
confidence-building measures, and social and developmental projects. Without the 
interstate focus ofthe conflict prevention efforts of this mission the intrastate aspects 
would not have been possible, whereas without the intrastate efforts the interstate 
focus would have been in vain. 
Conflict prevention efforts on the part of the international community 
simultaneously pursued the triggering, proximate and structural sources of conflict in 
Macedonia in an increasingly connected undertaking of multifaceted and multilevel 
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action demonstrative of an intervention synergy. The critical element that emerges is 
the necessity for the entirety ofthese multifaceted and multilevel conflict prevention 
tools to be utilized, toward both interstate and intrastate components ofconnict 
prevention, in a simultaneous and connective method; which is the embodiment of a 
strategy of simultaneity and connectivity within conflict prevention. 
In sum, this phase explicates an evolutional process transpired with respect to 
conflict prevention. At initiation of international community conflict prevention 
actions toward Macedonia, it is clear that early warning and response and support of 
major international actors were present. However, it was not until identification of 
the necessity of an intrastate mandate to compliment the interstate mandate, and 
approval of the SRSG to utilize his good offices, that the mandate was adjusted so as 
to include structural sources of conflict. By incorporating the structural sources of 
conflict within the mandate already addressing the triggering and proximate sources 
of conflict, international community conflict prevention efforts were to expand and 
integrate the degree of multifaceted and multilevel action, thereby creating synergy 
of intervention. This wiIlful transition on the part of the international community 
signifies the genesis and true essence of a strategy of simultaneity and connectivity 
in conflict prevention efforts. In light of the manifest multifaceted nexus of 
interstate and intrastate factors as a causative agent for rising social tensions, and 
economic and political uncertainty; the SRSG further assimilated the structural 
sources of conflict within the existing mandate encompassing the triggering and 
proximate sources of conflict. In so doing, conflict prevention efforts on the part of 
the international community were to simultaneously target the triggering, proximate 
and structural sources of conflict in Macedonia, in a connected endeavor of 
multifaceted and multilevel action exhibiting a synergy of intervention. In essence, 
all four factors of conflict prevention were utilized to address all three sources of 
conflict, thus representing a synchronized and fused execution of international 
community interstate and intrastate conflict prevention actions exemplifying a 
strategy of simultaneity and connectivity. The international community continued to 
simultaneously pursue the triggering, proximate and structural sources of conflict in 
Macedonia in an increasingly connected undertaking of multifaceted and multi level 
action demonstrative of an intervention synergy. The critical element that emerges is 
the necessity for the entirety of these multifaceted and multilevel conflict prevention 
242 
tools to be utilized, toward both interstate and intrastate components of conflict 
prevention, in a simultaneous and connective method; which is the embodiment of a 
strategy of simultaneity and connectivity within conflict prevention. 
Phase IL 
At the time ofUNPREDEP's termination the international community was 
completely aware and conscious of the enduring interstate and intrastate threats to 
peace and stability within Macedonia, however, the international community was 
predisposed with the impending conflict in Kosovo. The Macedonian leadership 
was inclined to encourage NATO to launch a presence in the country as the 
immediate solution, with the rationalization that NATO forces on Macedonian soil 
would deter any possible incursion into the country. As much as Macedonia desired 
a NATO presence in country, NATO also wanted a presence in Macedonia as the 
geo-strategic location of Macedonia became paramount to NATO success in 
executing an air campaign against the FRY, as well as serving as a prc-positioning 
base for a follow-on NA TO force in Kosovo. 
NATO and Macedonian rational izations for aNA TO presence in Macedon ia 
were divergent in cause but mutually reinforcing in that while NATO gained a geo-
strategic base of operations for Kosovo, the mere presence of NATO would achieve 
the Macedonian aspirations of preventing any possible interstate incursion. The 
result, however, was that both were focused wholly on the interstate threat, albeit 
from different perspectives, while any intrastate conflict prevention efforts were left 
to a minimal OSCE contingent. While the international community at large, 
including the OSCE, was focusing on the evolving conflict in Kosovo, that 
involvement was partially justified by the desire to prevent interstate conflict 
diffusion from Kosovo to Macedonia. Consequently, the only international 
community organization with a valid conflict prevention mandate to remain in 
Macedonia was also focused on interstate aspects of conflict prevention; thereby 
minimizing any concentration on intrastate efforts, and negating a strategy of 
simultaneity and connectivity toward interstate and intrastate conflict prevention 
efforts. 
The number ofNA TO troops on Macedonian soil rose from nearly two thousand 
at the termination ofUNPREDEP to 18,500 at the cessation of the NATO air 
243 
campaign, a period of just over three months, as a result of the pre-positioning of 
troops to take part in KFOR operations in Kosovo. It was precisely because of this 
large NATO presence the international community did not concern itselfwith 
discussions ofa formal conflict prevention mandate of any type in Macedonia, with 
the noted exception of the OSCE. Although the international community had grave 
concerns regarding intrastate stability within Macedonia during execution of the 
Kosovo intervention, none of the nightmare scenarios came to fruition. This is not 
to say. however, that interethnic tensions within the country were no longer present. 
The Kosovo crisis saw continued, and increased, interethnic tension in Macedonia, 
however, the previous efforts ofUNPREDEP toward strengthening mutual 
understanding and dialogue among political and ethnic parties helped abate the 
possibility of any rapid escalation ofthese tensions into overt conflict. Furthermore, 
it was thought any immediate threat to Macedonia's intrastate stability was defused 
by the NATO victory and rapid return of over 90 percent of Kosovar Albanian 
refugees. However, the negation of any intrastate conflict prevention focus by the 
international community in Macedonia was to slowly erode the previous success of 
UNPREDEP. Moreover, NATO and the international community were convinced 
with Kosovo becoming a UNINATO protectorate, an interstate threat to Macedonia 
no longer existed; and the intrastate threat was likewise diminished as the "crisis 
stage" had now passed. 
Although mandated to control of the borders of the FRY, in Kosovo, with 
Albania and Macedonia until the arrival of the civilian police mission of the UN, 
what efforts KFOR did execute concerning establishment of a secure environment 
and public safety and order within Kosovo were concentrated toward the intrastate 
areas of Pristina and its surrounding region, then toward the remainder of the interior 
ofKosovo, and finally toward the borders. Consequently, execution of the interstate 
border component of its mission fell a distant third in priority to KFOR. This 
preoccupation with the intrastate components of the Kosovo mission, to the 
detriment of the interstate mission was exacerbated by the creation of the GSZ, and 
in the U.S. sector, the mandated four kilometer buffer zone on the Kosovo side of 
the border. As such. along the southeastern border between Kosovo and Serbia, 
there was a nine kilometer zone virtually without any security forces. Additionally, 
KFOR had little reason to suspect a threat. After all, Albania and Macedonia were 
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willing partners in the NATO coalition, and it wasn't until later the organized crime 
threat was identified. Adding to the perception of no threat emanating from 
Macedonia was the fact that both KFOR and UNMIK were utilizing Macedonia as a 
base for rear operations in support ofthe Kosovo mission. As such, the border 
between Kosovo and Macedonia was considered by KFOR and UNMIK to be of 
minimal consequence as it was within the area of operations. A further compl icating 
factor was the establishment of Kosovo as a UN protectorate meant there were no 
agreements in place between KFOR, UNMIK and Macedonia regarding cooperative 
border policing. The absence of a legally defined mechanism for cooperative 
engagement along the border only exacerbated the lack of a definitive interstate 
separation of conflict prevention efforts between Kosovo and Macedonia. 
KFOR's demilitarization and transformation of the KLA was executed in rapid 
fashion and deemed a success by KFOR and UNMIK, however, it was more of a 
symbolic rather than comprehensive feat. Consequently, as of December 2000, there 
were unknown numbers ofKLA members who were not subject to demilitarization 
or reintegration into civil society present in northern Albania and northwestern 
Macedonia, thousands of unaccounted for members of the KLA in Kosovo, untold 
numbers of available weapons in the area, and relatively open and unprotected 
borders between Kosovo and Macedonia and Albania. Moreover, UNMIK and 
KFOR suffered from the perception the former KLA did not constitute a continuing 
threat to Kosovo, or a threat at all toward Macedonia. KFOR and UNMIK's 
mandate and total focus was on conflict resolution within Kosovo, and did not 
include Macedonia other than as a rear area logistical supply base. While KFOR and 
UNMIK concentrated on the intrastate aspects of Kosovo, all of these factors 
represented an interstate threat to Macedonia. 
The Macedonian government continued to highlight the impending threat of the 
former KLA personnel and ideologies, from both interstate and intrastate sources; 
however, the international community at large was concerned only with the intrastate 
context ofKosovo. Ever since termination ofUNPREDEP, Macedonia was 
considered a successful case of conflict prevention, with no current threat, and was 
accordingly left with a minimal OSCE contingent to continue conflict prevention 
efforts. In so doing, the strategy of simultaneity and connectivity of interstate and 
intrastate conflict prevention efforts within Macedonia had ceased at the same time 
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UNPREDEP was terminated. This situation was exacerbated by the fact that while 
contained within the overall conflict resolution mandate for Kosovo there was an 
interstate mandate as well as intrastate, both KFOR and UNMIK were incapable of 
executing the interstate mandate even if they had perceived it as integral to the 
overall concept. Additionally, conflict resolution efforts within Kosovo sutTered 
from the administratively dysfunctional structure ofUNMIK and KFOR. thereby 
precluding a synchronized and multifaceted approach. These faults in the conflict 
prevention efforts ofthe international community in both Kosovo and Macedonia. 
exemplified by the lack of a multifaceted approach toward both interstate and 
intrastate components of conflict prevention in a simultaneous and connective 
method, were to manifest themselves in renewed conflict. 
The two main conclusions drawn from the Kosovo war by AIi Ahmeti were that 
first. you could win more by a few months of armed struggle than ethnic Albanian 
politicians had achieved in nearly a decade of peaceful politics; and second. that you 
could do this only if you got the West involved. These conclusions of Ahmeti 
represent lucid examples of conflict contagion, and coupled with geographic 
proximity laid the foundation for conflict diffusion. As a result. Ahmeti and the 
NLA deliberately chose violence in their pursuit of political gains for the Albanian 
minority in Macedonia. However, the NLA could not have commenced and 
sustained operations without the porous border situation created by KFOR and 
UNMIK.. The preoccupation of the international community in Kosovo upon the 
intrastate aspects of conflict resolution. without regard to the interstate relationship 
to Macedonia and the region, created the possibility for conflict to emerge in 
Macedonia. This was coupled with the lack of any major intrastate focus within 
Macedonia. which facilitated the dissipation of previous successes from 
UNPREDEP. 
When conflict in Macedonia finally emerged, the international community was 
essentially caught ignorant of the severity of the situation due primarily to a willful 
determination to view the country as the region's lone multiethnic success story 
among the scattered remnants of the former Yugoslavia's nationalist wars. As a 
result ofUNPREDEP's achievements, Macedonia had been held up as a model of 
successful conflict prevention, although an imperfect one, of interethnic coexistence 
and democratic rule, with active participation of the Albanian community in political 
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institutions. As a result, this was the image the international community believed 
and propagated. While the international community was focused on Kosovo, ethnic 
tensions continued to worsen in Macedonia. In spite of evident progress made by 
the Macedonian government regarding concerns of the Albanian minority, the slow 
pace of that progress acted as fertile ground for the NLA. The minimal size of the 
OSCE element left behind and charged with the conflict prevention mission in 
Macedonia, albeit from an interstate focused mandate, was insufficient to mount a 
viable strategy of simultaneity and connectivity for both interstate and intrastate 
threats. This, coupled with the similar inability ofKFOR and UNMIK to contain 
ethnic Albanian insurgents within Kosovo by executing the interstate component of 
their mission, facilitated the state of conflict Macedonia encountered. After nearly a 
decade of peace in an independent Macedonia, the outbreak of armed ethnic conflict 
cost Macedonia its status of a model state and example of conflict prevention 
success. This was due to, in part, to international community abandonment of a 
strategy of simUltaneity and connectivity as related to interstate and intrastate 
conflict prevention efforts, as well as a failure to recognize conflict prevention labors 
to date had not yet been nurtured to maturity. 
In sum, this phase explicates the strategy of simultaneity and connectivity as 
related to a nexus ofinterstate and intrastate conflict prevention etTorts toward 
Macedonia ceased with the termination ofUNPREDEP. Based upon the reactions 
and statements of the international community at the time of the UNPREDEP 
mandate termination, early warning was clearly present and readily available. 
However, the international community as a whole failed to react. Even though, 
China vetoed the proposal to extend the UNPREDEP mandate, there was sufficient 
support of major international actors, particularly at the regional level, that some 
echelon of conflict prevention action could have been instituted for Macedonia. 
Unfortunately, the international community chose not to react, other than allowing 
the OSCE interstate contingent of eight to remain. Within Macedonia, this meant 
the entirety of conflict prevention measures on behalf of the international community 
consisted of one organization, with eight personnel and an interstate mandate 
targeted only at the triggering and proximate sources of interstate conflict. As a 
result, the lack of inclusion of any intrastate mandate and the failure to address the 
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structural sources of conflict, coupled with the lack of multifaceted and multilevel 
action, culminated with the absence of any type of intervention synergy. 
The situation in Macedonia was exacerbated by the conflict prevention efforts in 
Kosovo. While the mandate for conflict resolution and post-conflict reconstruction 
in Kosovo included both interstate and intrastate aspects, the efforts ofUNMIK and 
KFOR were neither synchronized nor fused within Kosovo due to structural flaws 
and planning errors, which precluded achieving simultaneity and connectivity. The 
lack of preparedness and limited numbers of troops in Kosovo impeded utilization of 
the entirety of multifaceted tools, toward both interstate and intrastate components of 
conflict prevention, in a simultaneous and connective method thereby negating a 
strategy of simultaneity and connectivity in conflict prevention efforts aimed at 
Kosovo. Neither was there any rational connectivity of conflict prevention efforts of 
the international community to the situation in Macedonia. 
The end result of the international community involvement in Kosovo was the 
negation of interstate conflict prevention efforts designed to prevent conflict 
diffusion to Macedonia. This was facilitated by the international community not 
heading the early warnings at the termination of UNPREDEP and not establishing 
any conflict prevention efforts targeted specifically toward Macedonia to continue 
the successful efforts ofUNPREDEP or compliment those actions ongoing in 
Kosovo. Macedonia was simply left with a minimal OSCE mission that only had an 
interstate mandate. Consequently, the absence of a strategy of simultaneity and 
connectivity regarding a nexus of interstate and intrastate conflict prevention efforts 
toward Macedonia fostered and enabled conflict diffusion and contagion to 
Macedonia. Additionally, a similar absence of a strategy of simultaneity and 
connectivity toward the interstate and intrastate aspects of conflict prevention efforts 
in Kosovo further facilitated the diffusion and contagion of conflict to Macedonia 
Phase IlL 
On 21 March 200 I, three events resulted on behal f of the international 
community that would raise the level of awareness and activity in the Macedonian 
conflict: NATO issued a statement reiterating condemnation of extremist groups 
operating in Macedonia, and promised to dispatch Ambassador Hans-Joerg EifTto 
supplement the NATO Liaison Office in Skopje; the OSCE announced Ambassador 
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Robert Frowick, was to act as the Personal Representative for the situation in 
Macedonia; and the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1345. NATO 
emphasized their measure was in full cooperation with other organizations such as 
the EU, OSCE and UN, thereby indicating integrated international community 
determination to support stability in the region. The OSCE also underlined they 
were prepared to participate together with other international organizations in a 
coordinated effort to settle the crisis in northern Macedonia. The Security Council 
welcomed the international efforts ofUNMIK, KFOR, EU, OSCE, NATO, and the 
Macedonian government to prevent the escalation of ethnic tensions in the area. 
Thus, the adoption of Resolution 1345 represented the return of the international 
community to conflict prevention efforts in Macedonia, targeted toward the 
simultaneous and connected aspects ofa nexus of interstate and intrastate conflict 
prevention in a multifaceted and synchronized approach. 
The reinstitution of security forces into the GSZ, together with the increased 
efforts ofKFOR to secure the border between Kosovo and Macedonia finally 
constituted partial execution of the interstate component ofKFOR's mission as 
delineated in Resolution 1244 and the MTA. Although this interstate component of 
the KFOR and UNMIK mission technically related to an action internal to Kosovo, 
the functional quality of the mission was to negate the possibility of conflict 
diffusion from Kosovo to Macedonia, and later vice versa. The initial failure of 
KFOR or UNMIK to execute this task was a large contributor to the diffusion and 
contagion of conflict to Macedonia; however, once focus on the interstate aspect was 
increased, it assisted in isolating the Macedonian conflict so the intrastate efforts of 
the international community negotiators could conclude a peace agreement. 
The Framework Agreement was the document that would form the basis for all 
future intrastate conflict prevention efforts in Macedonia. This document, drafted by 
the international community and agreed upon by the Macedonian political leaders, 
bound the international community to assist in myriad long-term confidence-
building measures ofa magnitude that would dwarf the earlier good offices mandate 
of the UN. The practical implementation of these reforms was highly delicate and 
complex, given the far-reaching changes they entailed; and the process of reform, 
conducive to internal stability and economic development and thereby providing 
hope of a fresh start for Macedonia, could not succeed without European and Euro-
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Atlantic involvement both in economic and security terms. The primary 
international community group of actors involved in the Framework Agreement 
implementation was to be NATO, the EU and the OSCE. 
The execution of all three NATO operations, taken as a whole, represents a 
synchronized and successive progression to restore security, and ultimately have the 
host nation assume responsibility for that security. Concurrent with NATO's 
intrastate execution of Operations Essential Harvest, Amber Fox and Allied 
Harmony, KFOR continued to increase their focus on the interstate aspect of their 
mission. These KFOR efforts contributed significantly to the isolation of the NLA 
in Macedonia, and the ability of NATO to effectively execute their missions. 
Additionally, the restructuring of the NATO headquarters in Skopje, and the 
agreements with KFOR and UNMIK on border demarcation and police cooperation, 
helped reestablish and redefine the interstate delineation of conflict prevention 
efforts between Kosovo and Macedonia, also facilitating the ability of NATO to 
effectively execute their intrastate missions. NATO's efforts, however, only 
represented the security portion of the overall plan thereby allowing other members 
of the international community to implement their intrastate components of the 
Framework Agreement. 
The European Union's contribution was based on a broad approach with 
activities to address the entire spectrum of rule of law aspects, including institution 
building programs and police activities that were mutually supportive and 
reinforcing. These specific activities related to the rule of law were further 
supported by the European Community's CARDS Program and contributed to the 
overall peace implementation, as well as to a more stable environment in which the 
Macedonian government and international community could implement the 
Framework Agreement. Operation Concordia and Mission Proxima must be 
considered separate, but mutually reinforcing operations that were equally separate, 
but mutually reinforcing to those operations executed by NATO. Additionally, these 
missions were executed in full coordination and synchronization with other 
institution building projects, as well as the OSCE and national bilateral programs. 
The simultaneous focus ofEU efforts toward enhancing the overall effectiveness of 
internal police actions, along with the further development of the border police to 
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promote integrated border management, reflected a simultaneous and connected 
methodology toward both intrastate and interstate aspects of the mission. 
As a result ofOSCE Permanent Council decisions, between 7 June and 28 
September of2001. the size of the OSCE mission in Skopje increased from 8 
personnel to a total of210; while the mandate evolved from one dealing solely with 
the interstate focus of monitoring. to a combined interstate and intrastate tripartite 
focus of monitoring. police training and development, and other political activities 
related to the implementation of the Framework Agreement such as media reform, 
rule of law and election monitoring. Additionally, OSCE mission activities were 
integrated and coordinated with other active organizations in the country, primarily 
the UN, EU and NATO, as well as with Macedonian government officials. 
All told, this phase explains the reestablishment of the international community 
in conflict prevention in Macedonia, targeted toward the simultaneous and connected 
aspects of both interstate and intrastate conflict prevention in a multifaceted and 
multi level approach representative of a synergy of intervention. The execution of all 
three NATO intrastate operations in Macedonia, concurrent with KFOR's, increase 
on the interstate aspect of their Kosovo mission represents a synchronized and 
successive progression to reestablish and redefine the interstate delineation of 
conflict prevention efforts between Kosovo and Macedonia. The simultaneous focus 
ofEU efforts toward enhancing the overall effectiveness of internal police actions, 
along with the further development of the border police to promote integrated border 
management, as well reflects a simultaneous and connected methodology toward 
both intrastate and interstate aspects of the mission. The OSCE mission mandate 
evolution from one dealing solely with the interstate focus of monitoring, to a 
combined interstate and intrastate tripartite focus of monitoring, police training and 
development. and other political activities equally embodies a concurrent and linked 
methodology toward both intrastate and interstate facets of connict prevention. In 
total, the combined actions ofthe international community in Macedonia from the 
adoption of Resolution 1345 until the present; exemplify a simultaneous. 
multifaceted and multilevel utilization of the full spectrum of conflict prevention 
tools toward the triggering, proximate and structural sources of conflict in a 
synergistic strategy of simultaneity and connectivity as related to a nexus of 
interstate and intrastate conflict prevention efforts. Consequently, the restoration of 
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a strategy of simultaneity and connectivity regarding a nexus of interstate and 
intrastate conflict prevention efforts toward Macedonia generated the requisite 
conditions for successful peace implementation and conflict prevention. 
The following table, Figure 7.1, summarizes the findings of the three phases of 
international community conflict prevention efforts targeted toward Macedonia. 
d Figure 7.1: Summary of Fin iogs 
Phase Interstate Intrastate Nexus Outcome 
Efforts Efforts 
Phase I Yes Yes Yes Successful Conflict 
Prevention 
Phase 11 Yes No No Outbreak of armed 
Conflict 
Phase ill Yes Yes Yes Successful Conflict 
Resolution/Prevention 
Collectively, the within-case study of the three phases of international community 
conflict prevention efforts toward Macedonia shows significant support for the 
hypothesis. In short, when a strategy of simultaneity and connectivity is adopted and 
applied, whereby the process of advocating and pursuing policies to inhibit or 
mitigate the occurrence of interstate and intrastate conflict are associated and 
conjoined in a concurrent and synchronous manner, that strategy serves as a 
condition for successful conflict prevention. However, the negation of this nexus of 
interstate or intrastate conflict prevention efforts can result in a precondition for the 
outbreak or resumption of conflict. Therefore, as related to the level of conflict 
prevention effectiveness, defined as the degree to which the international community 
created an environment for conflict to be prevented by advocating and pursuing 
actions designed to inhibit or mitigate the occurrence of interstate and intrastate 
conflict through a strategy of simultaneity and connectivity, there is direct 
correlation between the application of international community efforts targeted 
toward a dyadic nexus of interstate and intrastate conflict prevention and the success 
or failure of those efforts. 
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7.3. Limitations and Prospects for Further Research. 
The principal ambition of this work was to add to the conflict prevention theory 
refinement process by identifying and testing the criticality of a nexus between 
interstate and intrastate conflict prevention, implemented through a strategy of 
simultaneity and connectivity, as it related to the successful application of conflict 
prevention efforts. Whereas the above deliberations have found significant support 
for the hypothesis, all studies are inherently limited by constraints ofmagnitudc. 
aspect and time, and this study is no exception. As such, this study is limited by 
certain factors. which I will attempt to further illuminate. 
First, is the nature and scope of the study itself. As previously stated, the case of 
Macedonia was selected as a representative case in international community conflict 
prevention efforts based on the length. phased evolution and generally accepted 
success of those efforts. However. as a single case study it is possible the external 
validity ofthis study is limited by this fact. In an effort to avoid theory over-
determination. analogous case studies should be conducted so as to confirm, 
challenge or extend the supported hypothesis of this study. Similar in-depth analysis 
of international community conflict prevention efforts in Croatia. Bosnia or Kosovo 
would be valuable due to the interrelatedness of the conflicts and conflict prevention 
efforts. 
A second issue is the geographic scope of the study. with Macedonia being 
located within Europe. As such. the international community was in essence 
coterminous with the West, and accordingly had well developed regional 
organizations such as the EU, OSCE and NATO available to implement conflict 
prevention efforts. Additionally. other geographic areas may present alternate root 
causes of conflict that could lead to dissimilar conflict dynamics. As explicated 
previously. each conflict is unique and so too are the conflict prevention efforts 
related to that conflict. Further studies should be performed on conflict prevention 
efforts conducted in various other geographic areas of the world, such as the Middle 
East, Africa and Asia. that incorporate different international community 
organizations and conflict dynamics. As a result, expanding the geographic scope of 
this study could increase the level of confidence in the findings of this study. 
A third factor is the utilization of states and the international community as the 
principal actors. As was seen. the Albanian Diaspora played an important role in 
2S3 
supporting ethnic Albanian armed groups, both from an economic and ideological 
perspective. It is possible diasporas have a different level of nationalistic fervor due 
to the fact they are somewhat removed in proximity to the actual conflict, which 
could cause the ethnic group in conflict to overestimate their political position within 
the conflict. Likewise, myriad NGOs are involved in the conflict prevention 
process. Perhaps a detailed examination should be conducted regarding the goals 
and available mechanisms of engagement ofNGOs to determine their level of 
contribution to the overall international community efforts. 
The final issue is that of the small-n structure of this study. A possible avenue for 
future research would be to test the role of a nexus of interstate and intrastate 
conflict prevention efforts through a quantitative, large-n study. While it would be 
difficult to quantify the nature of conflict prevention success, particu larJy related to 
any direct correlation as the temporal spectrum expands, it would be useful to 
examine the relationship between a nexus of interstate and intrastate conflict 
prevention efforts and whether that potential conflict did or did not evolve into 
conflict at various temporal intervals. Granted, many possibilities exist for 
forthcoming research that might refine and validate this hypothesis within the field 
of conflict prevention; nevertheless there is sufficient support for the hypothesis of a 
dyadic nexus of interstate and intrastate conflict prevention so as to examine future 
policy prescription. 
7.4. Policy Implications 
This thesis has important policy implications for the international community 
involved with conflict prevention efforts. As the hypothesis in Chapter 1 posits, and 
the examination of the three phases of the Macedonian case strongly indicates, the 
dyadic nexus of interstate and intrastate international community conflict prevention 
efforts plays a crucial role in the success or failure of those efforts. Early warning 
and response, support of major international actors, multifaceted and multilevel 
action, and synergistic intervention are necessary but not sufficient components for 
successful conflict prevention. However, through the implementation of a strategy 
of simultaneity and connectivity as regards the dyadic nexus of interstate and 
intrastate conflict prevention efforts, the international community can enhance their 
prospects for success. Without an interstate mandate for conflict prevention, the 
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intrastate efforts have little chance to succeed. The interstate mandate provides the 
vital security environment, much like an incubator, for the intrastate conflict 
prevention actions to take root and develop. However, without an intrastate 
mandate, the interstate efforts are hollow in that defense of the borders ofa 
sovereign nation do not establish political systems characterized by representative 
government, open economies with social safety nets enabling socioeconomic and 
humanitarian needs to be met, and egalitarian justice systems. Without these 
elements being developed, the country can be neither stable nor viable. 
Consequently, the interstate and intrastate elements of conflict prevention efforts 
must be inextricably intertwined into a dyadic nexus. 
However, the impact of the international community is mitigated by certain 
factors. First, is the fact that the international community and policy sectors have 
not yet comprehended the significance and magnitude of the dyadic nexus of 
interstate and intrastate conflict prevention. Lessons learned from previous conflict 
prevention missions, both successful and unsuccessful, have not been sufficiently 
analyzed, recorded or incorporated into current practice. In fact, the current 
quagmire the United States is encountering in the post-conflict reconstruction stage 
of Iraq suffers from an absence of a strategy of simultaneity and connectivity 
regarding interstate and intrastate conflict prevention. Until such time that an 
interstate component is added to the overarching scheme, insurgents utilizing the 
open borders of Iraq will continue to undermine any intrastate advances. 
Unfortunately, the international community continues to discern interstate and 
intrastate conflict as two discrete typologies of conflict. 
Likewise, the academic community has not yet completely embraced the notion 
of a dyadic nexus of interstate and intrastate conflict prevention. As stated 
previously, while the academic community began to examine and espouse a nexus 
between interstate and intrastate conflict as early as the 1980s, this data is only now 
commencing to be acknowledged, and integrated within the policy community. 
Consequently, academic literature and methodology to date have not fully integrated 
the standing theoretical implications of a nexus between intrastate and interstate 
conflict into any normative literature within the field of conflict prevention. 
Second, the dichotomy of military and civil aspects of conflict prevention 
missions presents challenges to be overcome. Traditionally, military and civil 
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organizations plan for missions in a different manner. Military organizations tend to 
plan for potential missions in advance, with contingency options; while civil 
organizations often wait until their respective decision-making bodies have approved 
the mission mandate. This results in a lack of prior strategic coordination. Based 
upon the level of military-civil interrelatedness of mission aspects and interaction 
required in execution, strategic coordination between military and civil components 
ofa proposed conflict prevention mission must be increased. Similarly, coordination 
at the operational level of the locality of the mission suffers from coordination 
hindrances. This has been exhibited both within the military and civil components 
ofa conflict prevention mission and between the military and civil components. For 
instance NATO suffers from a lack of willingness of certain nations to relinquish 
operational control of their forces to command by other nations, while civil 
organizations such as the EU and OSCE suffer from the parochial interests of stove 
piped chains of command. Additionally, in the case ofUNMIK and KFOR in 
Kosovo, the bifurcation of the overall mission into two discrete mandates led to the 
inability to properly coordinate actions within the province. In order for a true nexus 
of interstate and intrastate conflict prevention efforts to occur, these challenges must 
be surmounted. 
Another area of concern related to policy is the dangerous precedent that has been 
set in the political arena. As evidenced by AIi Ahmeti's admission that he 
deliberately chose violence in Macedonia based upon his perception that violence on 
the part of the KLA was rewarded by the international community, a precedent may 
have been set that condones violence as opposed to preventing it. This is 
compounded by the creation of temporary protectorates, such as the situation in 
Kosovo where the province remains part of Serbia, but is currently under UN 
administration. Consequently, one of the root causes of the Kosovo conflict has still 
not been effectively addressed, namely that of independence for Kosovo, wh ich may 
have important consequences on other countries in the region when a dctcnnination 
is finally made. 
Understanding these problems and the overall findings of this thesis will have an 
important impact on future policy. By fully integrating the theoretical implications 
ofa dyadic nexus between intrastate and interstate conflict prevention within the 
standing conflict prevention literature and methodology, the ability of the 
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international community to engage in more successful efforts targeted toward future 
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